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Heather L Munro 
 
Identity, Religion, and the State: Haredi Politics and Social Change in Israel 
 
 
This thesis is about religion and the state. The ethnography is based on fieldwork conducted 
in Israel with Haredi (ultra-orthodox) women, mainly in the performing arts community and 
in the women’s rights activist groups. The thesis demonstrates that Haredi identity formed as 
a resistance to secularising forces, and through negotiations with secular power structures and 
the state became an entwined political-religious identity. I argue that through constant 
negotiations of religious ethics with secular values and the state of Israel, Haredim are 
picking apart their political identities from their religious ethics, and these choices insinuate 
implications for the nature of the role of religion and Jewish identity in the state of Israel in 
the future. I place women at the centre of this negotiation, and attribute much of these 
changes to the agency of Haredi women, with a wealth of ethnographic examples. 
 
This thesis contributes to understandings of the relationship between the secular state and 
religion by suggesting that the state may expect a specific type of religious citizen, and that in 
order for religious minorities like Haredim to resist the state, more stringent observance is 
produced. I suggest that not only are religious citizens capable of critique, that they critique 
the state through religious choices, and critique their own societies in ways which are 
designed to produce more resilient forms of religious ethics and community. The agency 
which is used is pious in its ethics, but it allows for the inclusion of certain secular forms of 
knowledge in order to bolster religious life. The thesis also offers an exploration of religious 
women’s feminism which applies liberal secular feminist goals to parts of life outside the 
direct dictates of religion, and in doing so curtails the authority of patriarchal religious 
leaders in a religiously ethical way. Furthermore, this thesis explores the experiences and 
contributions of Sephardi and Mizrahi Haredim, and discusses them as central to political and 
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Glossary of Foreign Words 
Please Note: I mix Ashkenazi and Sephardi pronunciations of Hebrew, choosing the most 
commonly used form from my ethnography. This thesis includes Modern and Biblical 
Hebrew, Yiddish, and Aramaic words. 
TERM DEFINITION FORMS 
Agudat Yisrael 
  
a Haredi political party, see Chapter 
Two 
 
aguna  A woman who is being denied a 
divorce by her husband (f s.) 
agunot (f pl.) 
akeida  lit. ‘bound’, implying relinquishing 
control to God 
 
aliyah  lit. ‘going up’, term used for Jews who 
immigrate to Israel through the Right 
of Return 
 
amutah  NGO, a non-profit non-governmental 
organisation 
 
Ashkenazi  used to refer to the Jews of Northern, 
Central, Eastern Europe 
 
Avodah  lit. ‘Work’, the name of the Israeli 
Labour Party 
 
ayn od milvado  expression: there is none besides God  
Ba'al Shem Tov  lit. ‘Master of the Good Name’, 
founder of the Hasidic movement 
Besht 
ba'al teshuvah  lit. ‘master of repentance’, used to 
refer to those who were raised less- or 
non-religious and chose to become 
observant in their adult life (m s.) 
ba’alas teshuvah (f 
s.), ba’alei teshuvah 
(m pl.), ba’alos 
teshuvah (f pl.) 
bagrut  Israeli high school diploma  
Bais Ya'akov  worldwide system of Haredi girls’ 
schools, for more information please 
see Seidman 2019. 
Beis Yaakov, Beit 
Yaakov, other 
spelling variations 
balagan  chaotic mess  
Baruch Hashem  lit. ‘Bless God’, common interjection  
bat ayin  lit. ‘daughter of the eye’, the children 
of God 
 
bli ayin hara  lit. ‘without the evil eye’, used to fend 
off bad luck 
 
Chardal  a combination of ‘Haredi’ and ‘Dati 
Leumi’, used for Jews who are both 
extremely religious and extremely 
Zionist 
Chardali 
chas v'shalom  Expression: ‘have mercy’ ‘heaven 
forbid’ 
 
chasan  groom, husband-to-be  
chasuna  wedding  
cheider  Hasidic primary school for boys  
chesed  lit. ‘kindness, caring, compassion’, 
used for charity; either charity 
organisations or charitable activities. 
 
Chochmat Nashim  A women’s rights organisation  
chug  after school elective activity (s.) chugim (pl.) 
chuppah  wedding canopy  
chutzpah  brazenness, audacity, gutsiness  
Dati Leumi  National Religious, Religious Zionist  
daven  pray, often used as a verb with English 
conjugation in vernacular Jewish 
English 
 
Degel HaTorah  a Haredi political party that typically 
represents Litvish interests 
 
Eidah HaChareidis  see p. 43  
Eretz Yisrael  lit. ‘the land of Yisrael’, used in 
Haredi vernacular as a replacement for 
Israel 
 
erev  lit. ‘evening’, used to refer to the day 
before a particular event, when 
counted from sunset to sunset; i.e., 
‘erev Shabbos’ is from sunset 
Thursday to sunset Friday, when 
Shabbos begins 
 
frum  Yiddish word for ‘religious’, used 
more readily than other labels for self-
definition in both the Haredi world 
and other communities 
frum from birth 
gemach  a free-loan society, usually themed 
around specific objects 
 
HaBayit HaYehudi  ‘The Jewish Home’ political party  
hakaras hatov  expression: ‘recognising the good’  
halacha  Jewish law  
Haredi  loosely translates to ‘ultra-orthodox’, 
see Chapter Two, (s.), (adj.) 
Haredim (pl.) 
Hashem  lit. ‘the name’: God  
hashkafa  commonly translated to ‘outlook,’ but 
more complex, encompassing 
‘approach’ and ‘theology’ as well; 
used in vernacular Jewish English 
 
Haskallah  the Jewish Enlightenment  
heter 
 
a piece of rabbinical guidance, a 
rabbinic ruling, rabbinic allowance (s.) 
hadracha (pl.) 
hineni  expression: ‘here I am’  
hishtadlus  the idea that God only helps those who 
have already done their best 
 
kallah  bride  
kedusha  holiness  
kippah  yarmulke, skull cap kippot 
kol isha  see p. 72 kol b’isha erva 
kollel  yeshiva for adult male full-time study  
Likud  lit. ‘consolidation’, the political party 
to which Netanyahu belongs 
 
Litvish  ‘Lithuanian’, used for non-Hasidic 
Ashkenazi Haredim; also known as 
misnagdim, Litvak 
 
Lo Nivcharot Lo Bocharot  see p. 226  
maidele  Yiddish for little girl  
mamlachtiyut ‘State-ism’  
mandatim  mandates, the groupings of 
representative votes in the Israeli 
democratic system 
 
mashgiach  kosher supervisor  
mechozi  ‘regional’, used in regional court  
mehadrin seal which indicates the highest level 
of kosher supervision 
 
melave malka lit. ‘escorting the Queen’, a joyful 
event at night after the Sabbath has 
ended to prolong the feeling of the 
Sabbath 
 
minhag  custom, practice, or tradition  
minyan  quorum necessary for prayer  
Mishpacha  lit. ‘Family’, the name of a popular 
magazine 
 
misnagdim  see Litvish  
Mizrahi  see p. 74  
Moshiach  ‘Messiah’  
nashim/neshot  women  
Neshot Agudat Yisrael  The Women of Agudat Yisrael, a 
committee within the party 
 
nisayon  struggle, trials and tribulations (s.) nisyonos 
Nivcharot  see p. 224  
olim  Jewish immigrants to Israel  
parnassah  livelihood or economic survival  
pikuach nefesh  ‘saving a life’, a principle in Judaism  
Rabbanit  a Rabbi’s wife who is respected for 
her wisdom in her own right 
 
Rabbi  lit. ‘teacher’, Jewish spiritual and 
religious leader, who is ordained 
through smicha (s.) 
rabbanim (pl.). rebbe 
(rabbi who leads a 
Hasidic sect), Rav 
Rabbanim  see rabbi  
schnorrer  beggar  
Sephardi  see p. 74  
Shabbat/Shabbos  the Sabbath; begins before sunset on 
Friday, and ends after sunset on 
Saturday 
 
Shabbaton  a Sabbath spent as a group with 
special programming, often in a 
special location 
 
shacharis  morning prayer  
shadchan  matchmaker  
shalom courts  small courts in Israel, the lowest level  
Shas  the Sephardi Haredi political party  
Shechinah  the female in-dwelling of God  
sheirut leumi  national service (an alternative to 
army service for religious non-Haredi 
girls) 
 
sheitel  wig  
shidduch  marriage match (s.) shidduchim (pl.) 
shiur  lecture (s.) shiurim (pl.) 
shlichut  commission  
shomer ani  ‘the keeper of me’  
shomer negiah  keeping a commitment not to touch 
people of the opposite sex except 
one’s spouse (for both men and 
women) 
 
shpiel  play (s.) shpiels (pl.) 
shtark  severe, harsh, strict  
shtiebel  a small room used for prayer  
siddur  prayer book  
simcha  joy  
Simchas Torah  holiday, celebrating the beginning of a 
new liturgical year 
 
smicha  rabbinical ordination or certification  
Tanach  the Hebrew Bible  
tatti  Daddy  
tefilla  prayer (s.) tefillin (pl.), also 
used for the 
phylacteries 
tikkun olam  healing the world  
Tkuma  a political party, Religious Zionist in 
orientation 
 
Torahni  see Chardal  
tsnius  see p. 66  
tsurah troubles  
tzedakah  money given to the needy  
tzomet  crossroads  
tzviut/tzvuah  hypocrisy  
Ubizchutan  Ruth Colian’s political party, see p.  
veib  wife  
yeshiva  Jewish hall of study  
yetzer hara  evil inclination  
yichud  lit. ‘seclusion’, refers to the halacha 
prohibiting an unmarried man and 
woman from being alone together, lest 
they commit adultery 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
As I write this, bombs are falling in Gaza and rockets are being struck from the sky by the 
Iron Dome. Headlines tell us the Cabinet is debating a ceasefire; no word yet as to whether or 
not that will come to fruition. This has provided grim relief from another tragedy: the 
accident at Mount Meron on Lag B’Omer, a holiday that this year fell on the thirtieth of 
April. The rains continued much later than expected this year in Israel; normally this is a 
blessing, but on Meron it made the narrow stone steps treacherous. Someone slipped, and the 
crowds of men were thrown into a stampede which left forty-five men dead and over one 
hundred and fifty men seriously injured in hospital. The current flare up in the greater 
conflict with the Palestinians has distracted me from pouring over the Meron news articles in 
fear: fear that I would see a name or a face I recognised from fieldwork, for the Meron 
disaster happened to the Haredi community, the community that I have been researching for 
almost a decade. 
The general public is very aware of one of the conflicts in the Holy Land today: the 
Palestinian Israeli conflict makes worldwide headlines every time another flare up occurs. 
But the country of Israel is rife with conflicts of all kinds, and each of these conflicts affect 
each other. One of the most significant conflicts is that of the secular versus the religious; 
another is the conflict between Nationalist-Religious ideology and ultra-orthodox ideology, 
the ideology of the Haredim. Both the secular and the National Religious Israelis view the 
Haredi community as the ultimate ‘other’. They are Jews who are too religious to be 
acceptable to the non-religious, and too resistant to nationalism to be acceptable to the other 




proper citizen of Israel (Dalsheim 2019) and the opposite of what it is to be a ‘good Jew’ 
(Efron 2003). After the tragedy at Meron, I was thus also fearful of encountering the usual 
vitriol from the Israeli public that is often projected at Haredim in the press following any 
publicity surrounding a Haredi event. ‘Haredim, parasitim’ (Dalsheim 2019, 139) is a not 
uncommon utterance by non-Haredim who encounter me in the street when I am working in 
the field: I dress to adhere to the standards of the community in which I work. 
Israel is a site in which the theoretical abstracts which dominate anthropological scholarly 
discourse today become unrefined, materialised facts which are not only inevitable, but they 
are part of the overt rhetoric of state-making. In Anthropology, we theorise the secular and 
the religious binary, the violence of the state on bodies and persons, and the performance of 
nationalism (Asad 2003, Billig 1995). In Israel, people talk about their religious selves and 
the secular Other (or vice-versa) (Avishai 2008), and in order to be Israeli, one must literally 
serve in the army where bodies and selves are violently shaped into citizenship (Lavie 2018). 
Joseph suggests that in academia,  
‘One thing is in dispute: namely, what we mean by ‘politics’. In 
everyday usage, it signifies what politicians do, affairs of the state 
[sic], just as Aristotle assumed and as the etymology of the word 
politics [sic] (from the Greek polis ‘city, state’ [sic]) suggests. On 
the other hand, ‘office politics’, ‘sexual politics’ and the like have 
become perfectly common vernacular phrases, so it is not just in 
academic parlance that we find a broader application of the political 
to any situation in which there is an unequal distribution of power, 
and where individuals’ behaviour reflects the play of power, or is 
guided (or maybe even determined) by it.’ (Joseph 2006, 2) 
  
In Israel, the subtler politics of religion and gender are blatantly inseparable from the 
Aristotelian politics of the state, the Left, and the Right. ‘Secular’ is part of Israeli discourse, 
and not imposed by academics in these pages. People in Israel do politics through a direct 
negotiation with these binary oppositions of ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’, especially 
women in the Haredi world. 




from the ever-changing subject of my research— as if it were slipping away from me…. The 
Middle East is so dynamic and so turbulent that “the present” rapidly becomes “the past”’ 
(Lefkowitz 2006, 4). Indeed, when I first arrived home from the field, I had initially 
envisioned this work as being structured around the momentous general election of April 
2019. But before I knew it, that election was declared null and void, and since then three 
further elections have been held within the space of two years. Today, even as I am preparing 
to submit this to examiners, I had to edit a mention of Yair Lapid because his role in the 
government and party affiliation continually shift. ‘But all societies are constantly changing, 
and the ethnographic project is best understood as an attempt to capture culture as a process, 
rather than as an object’ (Ibid.), and the same is true for this ethnography, and this society. 
The question remains: amid this change, how have the Haredim become what they are, and 




The Haredi sector is currently the fastest growing segment of the population in Israel. 
Haredi birth rate surpassed that of Arab-Israelis nearly a decade ago, and while flagging 
slightly in the last several years, is persisting at levels well above the rising secular Jewish 
birth rate and the steady National Religious fertility. In 2017, there were approximately 
1,033,000 Haredim in Israel, comprising 12% of the population; 50% of the Haredi 
population was under the age of 16 (‘Statistical Report’ 2018, 4-5). The Jerusalem Institute 
for Policy Research anticipates that Haredim will constitute 16% of the Israeli population by 
2030, and be 2,000,000 strong by 2033 (Ibid., 6). ‘Haredi’ is usually translated to ‘ultra-
orthodox’ in English, but a more accurate definition would be, ‘those who tremble before 
God.’ Haredi identity includes Hasidic groups and Litvish or misnagdim. These groups and 




which are used with much significance and meaning in Israel today. Other labels used in this 
thesis are Dati Leumi and Chardal. Dati Leumi literally means National Religious; these are 
the Religious Zionists, a significant proportion of the population of Modern Israel, and 
generally less strictly observant and more Zionist than the Haredim. Chardal is an acronym-
label which is a contraction of the words Haredi Dati Leumi. Thus the Chardal are those who 
are extremely religious and extremely Zionist. Chardal may be perceived as somewhat of a 
pejorative; it is not my intention to use it as such, but I feel forced to choose Chardal over the 
alternative, Torani, for fear of confusion with the Ma'ayan HaChinuch HaTorani school 
system. 
The Haredi educational system is discussed fairly often in this thesis, and so I feel obliged 
to provide some background for the reader. Boys and girls are educated separately in the 
Haredi world; for primary school, boys attend a cheider if they are Hasidic, and a Talmud-
Torah if they are not, and then go on to a high school yeshiva for the equivalent of Years 10-
13. Following high school, men study in a yeshiva, a Jewish educational institution which 
focuses on the study of religious texts. Girls also attend religious schools, the majority of 
which are part of the Beis Yaakov school network. Some Hasidic girls attend schools specific 
to their sect instead of Beis Yaakov, but the curriculum will be influenced by Beis Yaakov 
even there. The first Beis Yaakov was founded in Krakow in 1917, and it is now the 
predominant network of Jewish religious girls’ schools throughout the world, with a presence 
on five continents. To learn more about Beis Yaakov, see Naomi Seidman’s recent book, 
Sarah Schenirer and the Bais Yaakov Movement (2019). Tamar El-Or also discussed Beis 
Yaakov in Israel and Ger Hasidic women’s education in her book Educated and Ignorant 
(1994). In addition to these school systems for girls, there is also the Ma'ayan HaChinuch 
HaTorani school system for Sephardi girls. Opened by Shas, the Sephardi Haredi political 




Haredi girls who are excluded from Beis Yaakov. 
 
Literature Review and Contribution to Scholarship 
 
While this dissertation is based on ethnography with women, it is not a dissertation about 
women. Rather, the women’s voices in this work are considered to be just as able to speak for 
their whole community as men would be in other ethnographies. It has never seemed right 
that women’s ethnography is considered a ‘special interest’ in anthropology, but ethnography 
with men is considered representative. As a woman who conducts fieldwork in a conservative 
religious society, and therefore only has access to other women within this community, I 
have on occasion felt anger that I have to address the question of ‘Why women?’ when it 
seems that men never must ask, ‘Why men?’ I simultaneously feel that as a woman 
researching women, I still have great difficulty having my work and research taken seriously, 
especially within the scholarly areas of the state, religion, and politics which I investigate. 
‘Clutching her pencil, she wonders how “the discipline” will view the writing she wants to 
do. Will it be seen as too derivative of male work? Or too feminine? Too safe? Or too risky? 
Too serious? Or not serious enough? Many eyes bore in on her, looking to see if she will do 
better or worse than men, or at least as well as other women’ (Behar 1995, 2). Though these 
words were written over twenty-five years ago, I sometimes feel little has changed. 
This dissertation is about Haredi society; more specifically, it is about Haredi identity, 
religion, and the state. The voices heard in the ethnography are predominantly those of 
women, with one or two exceptions, and they represent women’s understandings of 
themselves, their identities, their community, and the national and international context in 
which they live. Perhaps, like Lila Abu-Lughod in Writing Women’s Worlds (1993), this 




granted (Abu-Lughod 1993, xvi). In relying on ethnography with women to inform me as 
effectively as ethnography with men, I am perhaps trying to right past wrongs committed by 
the academy (Behar 1995, 17-21). I do, however, acknowledge that in a culture which so 
strictly separates women’s and men’s spaces in the community, excluding a men’s 
perspective could leave me with certain profound blind spots. Thus, this dissertation relies 
heavily in parts upon Nurit Stadler’s Yeshiva Fundamentalism (2009). This is an 
ethnographic exploration of manhood and masculinities in Israel’s yeshiva students during 
the first decade of this century. Stadler describes men in crisis, who feel increasingly 
emasculated by the demands of the Haredi lifestyle in the context of a country which invests 
in a militaristic type of masculinity. The crisis which Stadler details is the same crisis which 
arose in my ethnography, and because her work was in the same communities as where I 
conducted research, it makes sense to include Stadler’s research when I am lacking the men’s 
perspective. In addition, I use some statistical reports on yeshiva attendance, secular 
education, and employment in order to more fully develop my understanding of Haredi 
society in Israel today. 
Joyce Dalsheim’s recent book, Israel Has a Jewish Problem (2019), does not focus solely 
on Haredim, but includes them in her examination of the state of Israel today and the 
relationship of religion and the state. She proposes that Haredim are the ‘indigenous Jews’ of 
Israel (Dalsheim 2019, 118-119), because they espouse a purer form of religious observance, 
unadulterated by Zionism, and because there were Haredim in the Holy Land before the 
arrival of Zionists. Dalsheim argues that the state projects of integration are a form of 
indigenous eradication (Ibid., 124). Dalsheim suggests that the Haredim are one thing, and 
Isrealiness is another, and integration in any form is an eradication of essential ‘Haredi-ness’. 
This presents a two-fold problem, especially in the context of my research. It creates an 




possibility that the secular and the religious can reside together within a single identity. Talal 
Asad (2003) was the first to warn of the dangers of creating a false dichotomy between the 
secular and the religious, and to remind us that the two are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In this dissertation, I examine the negotiation of both the secular and the religious 
within Haredi identity. 
This dissertation explores the relationship between the secular and the religious. Talal 
Asad brought the question of Formations of the Secular to the forefront of the anthropology 
of religion in 2003; in this he investigates the origins of secularism in Western Reformation 
philosophy, and suggests that the secularising project is essentially a violent repackaging of 
the colonialist project. Saba Mahmood also contributed significantly to understandings of the 
relationship between the secular and the religious in her 2016 work Religious Difference in a 
Secular Age. In this, Mahmood explores the secularisation process of the Egyptian state, and 
examines how secularism actually exacerbates issues of religious difference, and in fact 
creates a more hostile environment for religious minorities. Mahmood and Asad both assert 
that secularism ultimately led to the question of minority rights, because the position of 
minorities became more precarious in a secular society. In considering the relationship 
between the secular and the religious, I also include the works of historians Gershon Bacon 
and Noah J. Efron. Bacon’s history of Agudat Yisrael, a religious and political organisation, 
in Poland describes it as a project to maintain the purity of tradition. He also discusses the 
advent of Da’as Torah as a way of extending rabbinical power over elements of life which 
were previously not considered regulated by rabbinic rulings. Efron explores the history of 
the Haredi encounter with Zionists and secularism in the Holy Land before the founding of 
the state of Israel. I suggest that the Haredi identity forms as a religious minority identity in 
response to the secular, and through the formation of Agudat Yisrael and the investment in 




My exploration of the relationship between the religious and the secular is to suggest that 
religious minorities transform their religious identities into political identities in order to 
resist the secular. 
This thesis focuses on the question of the relationship between religion and the state. 
Mahmood (2016) and Asad (2003) both claim, based on the writings of Hannah Arendt, that 
sovereignty became the central question in determining the protection for minority groups 
after World War II. ‘Minority rights’ were transformed into ‘human rights’, and the only way 
to ensure one’s own community’s human rights were protected was to form a nation-state 
which could protect the group’s interests (Mahmood 2016; Asad 2003). The inevitable 
product of secularism’s removal of religion from the public sphere was the growth of 
nationalism (Asad 2003). However, Asad also suggests to us in his more recent book that we 
should not assume that the liberal project of secularism necessarily produces ‘liberal’ states— 
for indeed, secularist projects have also given birth to fascism and the Far Right (Asad 2018). 
Mahmood’s Religious Difference in a Secular Age (2016) explores the question of the 
relationship between religion and the state in terms of the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt. 
She found that secular governance led to an exacerbation of religious tensions because the 
state produces new forms of difference and intensifies existing inequalities (Mahmood 2016). 
Yael Navaro-Yashin explores similar issues in Turkey in her book Faces of the State (2002), 
and discovered that sometimes it served people for the state to be secular, and sometimes it 
served people for the state to be religious, but that nationalism invaded both the secular and 
the religious in ‘fuzzy’ ways (Navaro-Yashin 2002). 
There is significant literature on the relationship between religion and the state 
specifically in Israel. Dalsheim (2019) and Efron (2001) both suggest that the state of Israel 
demands Jewishness of its citizens, but that only specific types of Jewishness are acceptable. 




future of the state of Israel and its Jewish identity, but his work does not consider the 
question of the Haredim (Yadgar 2020). Smadar Lavie and Ella Shohat both discuss being the 
right kind of Jew, a type of Jew which is formed in opposition to Arabness and in alignment 
with Europeanness, extensively; Lavie makes this the subject of her book Wrapped in the 
Flag of Israel, while Shohat’s works on the topic are too numerous to list singly. Some have 
written about the relationship between the state and religion in terms of immigration in Israel, 
and the process of conversion to which some are subjected. Yulia Egorova discussed the need 
for the Bene Menashe to become certain types of Jews, both in order to become citizens, but 
also in order to be accepted because of their ethnicity (Egorova 2015). Michal Kravel-Tovi’s 
recent book When the State Winks (2017) concerns the conversion process of post-Soviet 
immigrants, and how, by superficially fulfilling the requirements of the religious conversion, 
the state of Israel actually seeks to transform post-Soviet immigrants into proper Zionists 
(Kravel-Tovi 2017). Daniel Lefkowitz writes concerning the negotiation of religious minority 
identity through language politics in his book Words and Stones: The Politics of Language 
and Identity in Israel (2006), which concerns Arab minority language use. Simeon D. 
Baumel’s book Sacred Speakers: Language and Culture Among the Haredim in Israel (2006) 
also uses language as a foil with which to explore the position of Haredim as a religious 
minority in Israel. Ben Kasstan’s work on Haredim in England explores health choices as 
ways in which a religious minority resist the state in Making Bodies Kosher (2019). In this 
dissertation, I argue that Haredim in Israel negotiate with the state and this gradually shapes 
new types of Haredi political identities. 
When discussing religion and the secular state, it is also necessary to consider the 
question of critique, and the capacity for, and purpose of, critique within the religious 
community. Michel Foucault first suggested that critique was necessarily secular because it 




(Foucault 1997). Asad, Mahmood, Wendy Brown, and Judith Butler responded in vehement 
opposition to this supposition in their 2013 book, Is Critique Secular?. Through a series of 
essays formed as responses to both Foucault and each other, these authors suggest that 
critique is entwined with criticism, but more meaningful than criticism, in that it suggests an 
engagement with epistemology in terms of self-reflection and self-meaning-making (Asad 
2013b). Critique produces new phenomena, and interrogates categories (Ibid.). Thus, critique 
is an active process in society, and it exists in religious life as well as secular. Asad supports 
his argument with examples from Islamic scripture. Since Is Critique Secular?, the question 
of critique has been further explored in the context of Islam by both Irfan Ahmad in Religion 
as Critique (2017) and Rachel Rinaldo (2014). Both of these investigations have been in 
terms of Muslim practices of scriptural reasoning and critique. Fader’s recent work Hidden 
Heretics (2020) concerns critique in the Haredi world to a certain extent, as it examines the 
use of technology and those who have lost their faith. Stephanie Wellen Levine’s book 
Mystics, Mavericks, and Merry-Makers (2003) could be viewed as an exploration of critique 
in that the Hasidic teenage girls who are the subject of the book are questioners; some leave 
the community, and some stay. To date, however, there has been little exploration of critique 
in the Jewish religious world. Furthermore, critique has almost universally applied to the 
logic of religion itself, in terms of scriptural reasoning. While it necessarily exists in the 
Jewish world in this form, because the very nature of Jewish Torah study relies on 
disagreement and discussion, I explore critique in terms of its role in religious society. Asad 
clearly suggests that critique plays a role in meaning-making and epistemology; critique is 
thus a necessary precursor to the negotiations around identity which this dissertation 
concerns. I explore critique in terms of the everyday; the critiques of society and tradition 
which take place not in order to leave religious society, but in order to perpetuate and 




Necessary to the consideration of critique is the question of agency; indeed, agency is 
central to my argument in this thesis. Saba Mahmood introduced the concept of agency in her 
book Politics of Piety (2005). Through ethnography conducted with the women of the 
Mosque Movement in Egypt, Mahmood suggested that religious women invest in different 
types of ethics and formations of the self, and through these formations of piety, they are able 
to achieve changes in their lives. Though their choices may not seem liberal or similar to 
those which people outside of their circumstances would understand, these women 
nonetheless possessed agency to operate in ways which helped them achieve their goals. 
Most importantly, this conception of agency lays aside any application of European or 
secular values, and centred understanding of religious women in their own contexts. 
Mahmood’s work was built on the foundations of the work done by Abu-Lughod in Writing 
Women’s Worlds (1993) and Veiled Sentiments (1986), which brought the experiences of 
religious women to the fore and suggested that hidden types of power existed for women in 
places which the West assumed were entirely oppressive. Some work has been done 
concerning agency in the Jewish world. Orit Avishai conducted research with Modern 
Orthodox women in Israel and argued that they used their agency to perpetuate religious 
goals (2008). Ayala Fader discussed the agency of Hasidic mothers in raising daughters in 
her book Mitzvah Girls (2009). More recently, Michal Raucher has published on Haredi 
women’s agency in fertility and choices around childbirth in Israel in Conceiving Agency 
(2020). Skinazi has written about religious Jewish women’s agency in the arts (2018), as has 
Lea Taragin-Zeller, more specifically focusing on teenage girls and the arts (2014). Though 
much of my own exploration of agency is in the performing arts space, I also explore Haredi 
women’s agency in other realms. I argue that Haredi women invest in certain forms of piety 
in order to use their agency to negotiate the secular and the religious; they use their agency to 




the future of the Haredi world. I view women’s agency to negotiate the seemingly opposed 
ideas of ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’ as central to the ongoing process of Haredi identity 
formation. I understand women’s agency as a process of knitting together many strands from 
secular values with religious ethics, and indeed sometimes picking apart the tangle of 
religious stringencies within the Haredi world. My ethnographic data is furthermore 
extremely valuable to the greater scholarly field of women’s agency, because of the richness, 
variation, and diversity of examples. 
Critique, discussed above, is the counterpart of agency, for indeed one cannot exist 
without the other. Critique is important to the process of meaning-making understood in the 
negotiation of identity in which women engage. In this thesis, critique is envisioned as an 
effort to re-knit a portion of the scarf, which may involve unravelling a re-knitting with a 
combination of yarns. The re-knitting may appear similar, but the unravelling was part of a 
process of examination and reversal in order to re-make the scarf better than before. In this 
way, critique is not simply criticism, but rather a complex process of internal reflection and 
meaning-(re)-making. 
This thesis is about identity. Identity is a complex idea with weighty intellectual baggage. 
Identity can refer to the amorphous categories of ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, body 
(Vidal 2007), class, nationality, etc, variously. All of these have at some point been referred 
to as imaginary by leading scholars from Butler (1999) to Goodman et al. (2020), and indeed 
identity is itself an imaginary (Pratt 2003, 10). This does not, however, make it any less 
important of a concept to consider, or any less useful as an academic category, nor indeed 
any less real for our interlocutors (Goodman et al. 2020, 2). I take a constructivist approach 
to my understanding of identity (Ben-eliezer 2004), in which I understand that Haredim 
construct their identity over time (Pratt 2003, 10), as a minority at the margins (Ben-eliezer 




specific contexts (Taylor 1992) of pre-war Europe and post-state Israel. In this way, I employ 
a similar approach of identity discourse as Pratt in his book Class, Nation and Identity, 
though I have freed my interpretation from Marxist class struggle. I initially develop an 
understanding of Haredi identity as increasingly bounded (Mizrachi et al. 2012, 438), but I 
appreciate the limits of extreme subjectivism (Taylor 1992, 521), and recognise my 
interlocutors’ modernising instincts to ‘escape the restrictions of the unitary self’ (Ibid., 529) 
in the latter portion of this work. Though Haredi life lends itself to a generalised communal 
identity, because the emphasis is placed on participation rather than the individual as 
discussed in Chapter Three, I nonetheless do not want to obscure difference by over 
generalising Haredi identity as ‘a people’ (Pratt 2003, 6, citing Gellner 1983). Rather, I 
believe by the end of this thesis I have shown that there can be very little generalising about 
what it means to be Haredi. Identity, instead, is a starting point from which we can 
understand many forms of every-day resistance (Ben-eliezer 2004, 258, citing Scott 1985). 
Ben-Eliezer stresses the importance of using identity as a tool for understanding ‘social 
fabric’ (Ibid., 256), and indeed, this thesis uses the metaphor throughout of the ‘scarf’ of 
Haredi society. In sum, ‘Its [identity’s] importance lies in understanding… any society that is 
structurally fragmented and culturally pluralistic…. It represents a concept of “we-ness”, of 
shared, mutual feelings between people, which are not stable, but always amenable to social 
negotiation and conflict’ (Ibid.). 
This thesis has a significant focus on activism; the voices of activists wind their way 
through these pages and speak to every aspect of Haredi life. I understand the activism which 
has arisen as a result of the types of agency which women possess in the Haredi world, and 
an inevitable extension of the discussion of agency. Naisargi Dave, Paolo Heywood, and 
Smadar Lavie have written on various types of activisms, especially concerning the 




legitimacy and thereby losing power. Heywood discusses the transformation of certain types 
of queer activism becoming less acceptable to the movement in a town in northern Italy as a 
result of certain types of legitimacy being granted activists (2018). Dave speaks to the ‘NGO-
isation’ of the women’s movement in India resulting in certain types of women’s rights being 
acceptable, and others becoming unacceptable (2012). Lavie similarly criticises the NGO-
isation of the Mizrahi Single Mothers’ Movement in Israel, suggesting that the state’s goals 
run counter to the goals of the movement (2018). The activists in this thesis are part of the 
Haredi Feminist Movement; I therefore also examine this activism in light of scholarship on 
feminism in different streams of Judaism. But unlike the Orthodox feminists of whom Blu 
Greenberg was a leader (1981), and the non-Orthodox Jewish feminists for whom Plaskow 
speaks of reclaiming a place in the Torah (1990), the Haredi feminists do not seek to apply 
feminist activism to religious life. In this way, the Haredi feminists are again doing the work 
of knitting strands of the secular liberal with the ethical fabric of Haredi ethics. The value in 
my study of feminists is threefold: Firstly, in the case of the Haredim, NGO-isation and 
legitimisation may be to the movement’s advantage, which breaks the mould from other 
movements; secondly, the Haredi feminist movement is an example of a feminist movement 
which comes from a place of intersectional oppressions but does not (yet) espouse any 
intersectionalist goals; and finally, there is great value in being the first to document this 
movement at this nascent stage within the scholarly realm. 
This thesis also includes a significant focus on non-Ashkenazim. Ashkenazi Jews are 
Eastern European Jews; non-Ashkenazi Jews includes Jews of any other background in the 
world. I use ‘non-Ashkenazi’ as opposed to Sephardi or Mizrahi, names used for Jews who 
are not Ashkenazi, as much as possible due to the clear scholarly disagreement about the 
choices of these words. This conundrum is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. There 




Ashkenazim in Israel: Smadar Lavie and Ella Shohat. Both argue that Jews who have come 
to Israel from the Middle East and North Africa (which is the majority of non-Ashkenazim) 
are expected to constantly prove their Jewishness through investment in Zionism in order to 
clarify their separation from their Arab roots. Neither Lavie nor Shohat include Haredim in 
their scholarly work in any significant way. Therefore, my work represents some of the only 
scholarship on the non-Ashkenazi Haredi experience in Israel. 
Because this thesis includes a special focus on non-Ashkenazim, the question of 
discrimination arises regularly. Goodman et al.’s newest edition of Race: Are We So 
Different? (2020) has been fundamental to underscoring the theory around racial 
discrimination and racism in this thesis. Much of what I describe falls under the category of 
‘cultural racism,’ which Ben-Eliezer (2004) found to be the prevalent form of racism in Israel 
beginning in the 1980s, with the arrival of Ethiopian Jews. There are many similarities 
between the experiences of Ethiopian Jews in Ben-Eliezer’s article and those of non-
Ashkenazim in this thesis. In this thesis, I do understand discrimination to be based on race, 
not because there is any fundamental biological difference, but because race is the ‘everyday 
way in which we interpret differences and invest meaning into them’ (Goodman et al. 2020, 
2). Ben-Eliezer states, ‘Racism is a way of treating people and determining their destiny on 
the grounds of appearance, phenotypical differences, and “typical” characteristics, be they 
real or imagined’ (Ben-eliezer 2020, 248). Ultimately, all discrimination discussed within 
these pages is based upon the colour of someone’s skin, their characteristics, or their 
phenotypical differences as a result of a family heritage in North Africa, Latin America, or 
the Middle East. It is, therefore, racism. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to scholarly work on ba’alei teshuvah, or those Jews who 
were raised less- or non-religious and chose to become religious later in life. Ba’al teshuvah 




religious people who choose the Haredi life. In Israel, chozrim b’teshuvah is sometimes used, 
but more often for a person who chooses to become Dati Leumi (Dalsheim 2019). Debra 
Kaufman’s book Rachel’s Daughters (1991) examines the lives and choices of ba’alos 
teshuvah in Boston, Massachusetts; she characterises them as anti-feminists. Sarah Bunin 
Benor has also studied the language of ba’alei teshuvah in the United States in her book 
Becoming Frum (2012). Not only do I study both English-speaking and Israeli ba’alei 
teshuvah, I contextualise them in the context of the Haredi community of which they are fully 
integrated members, and therefore view their presence, their values, knowledge, and choices, 




In this thesis, I argue that Haredi identity is a minority identity that formed in response to 
secularism and the state as an entwined religious-political identity; it is subjected to constant 
negotiations between the state, secular knowledge, and religious values, producing new types 
of Haredi political identities that present a range of implications for the future of the state of 
Israel.  
The central question of this thesis therefore became: 
What is the role of women in these changes, both political and social? 
Other questions are implicated within this question. These include: How do Haredi 
women do politics? Indeed, if politics are inseparable from their religious identity, then 
asking how they do politics is asking how they do Haredi-ness. As mediators, literally pushed 
into the breach of this supposed opposition between the religious and the secular, how do 
Haredi women juggle this binary in creating and negotiating Haredi identity? 
At the heart of these negotiations is the agency of Haredi women, who knit together 




Haredi identity and Haredi society. The Enlightenment created the production of a binary 
opposition between the secular and the religious, and the state and religious society. I argue 
that Agudat Yisrael formed as a negotiation with secularisation in order to protect religious 
ethics; Da’as Torah effectively transformed Haredi religious identity into a political identity. 
Under further pressure in the state of Israel, Haredim resisted the machinations of the state 
and secular influences as a religious minority responding to a secular state, and this caused 
increasingly stringent interpretations of Jewish law and tradition. Stringency, therefore, arises 
because of the oppositional state forced upon religious subjects by state secular values. 
However, the Haredim are in constant negotiation with these state and secular forces, and 
these negotiations lead to different articulations of secular and religious values existing 
simultaneously within Haredi identity. These negotiations are chiefly executed through the 
work of women. Haredi women have a great deal of agency, though it is a pious agency 
rather than a secular form of power. Because Haredi women’s roles are centred upon 
protecting and shielding men and the community at large from the influences and temptations 
of the outside world, women have been cast as mediators between the secular sphere and the 
religious interior world. Haredi women critique their society and their culture constantly; 
individuals use agency to selectively absorb secular knowledge and values in order to benefit 
the community. I view these acts of agency as selecting strands of secular knowledge and 
values to knit into the fabric of Haredi society, and their critique as sometimes picking apart 
previous patterns of religious ethics. These stitchings and unpickings act as complex 
negotiations in the face of an untenable social binary. As these negotiations prove more 
complex, different sectors of the Haredi world clash with each other. These critiques and 
negotiations are resulting in a significant proportion of the Haredi world picking apart their 
political identity from their religious identity through a secularising, liberalising process. 




pluralism and socialism; others are aligning with the Right, and incorporating Zionism into 
their theological perspectives. The former wish to keep religion out of the state, the latter 
wish to incorporate religious values and ethics into the state. The choices that these Haredim 
make will have a significant impact on the future of the state of Israel. 
 
Methods and Ethics 
 
I conducted participant observation and informal interviews in Litvish, Hasidic, and non-
Ashkenazi Haredi communities in Israel. I was based in Jerusalem, which was convenient for 
access to Beit Shemesh, El’ad, Bnei Brak, and communities in the West Bank; I also visited 
Haredi communities in Arad, Be’er Sheva, Rehovot, Petach Tikvah, Tiberias, Tsfat, and 
nearby areas in the north of Israel. The majority of my participant observation took place in 
performing arts rehearsals, classes, and performances. Within these spaces, the levels of 
‘participation’ versus ‘observation’ varied; sometimes, I danced with the dance class at 
rehearsal, or sang with the chorus in a rehearsal of a musical, while the cast learned the 
music. My own interest in the performing arts has clearly informed some of the choices made 
in my research. I also conducted participant observation at women’s shiurim [lectures] and 
attended campaign and political events connected with women’s activism. 
I spent extensive time conducting informal interviews with over fifty women. These 
interviews sometimes occurred in their homes; we also met in cafés, at restaurants, and often 
these interviews happened in gaps between teaching dance or rehearsing scenes. In these 
conversations, I tried not to guide the content of the conversation too much. Allowing women 
to speak freely, and control the flow of topics both built trust and rapport, and also allowed 
me to discover more about them than my internal biases and experiences would otherwise 
have allowed (Rosaldo 1986, 93-95). These interviews occurred with women as young as 




women who held no job, and women who have been in the newspaper and on television. I 
have anonymised my interlocutors as much as possible, using pseudonyms for most 
interlocutors, and changing insignificant details in order to further protect them from being 
revealed, should this project provoke ire from their fellow community members. Some 
women could not be pseudonymised or anonymised because of their high profile roles in 
politics, activism, or the performing arts. These women were offered a chance to be ‘split’, so 
that an ‘anonymous Haredi woman’ could share the views and experiences which they did 
not want associated with their public persona. Few chose to accept this offer.  
There are several women who feature prominently throughout most chapters. These 
include both artists and activists, the majority of whom could not be anonymised. The first is 
Esther Goldman and her play The Mask She Wears. To anonymise Esther would be to deny 
her authorship of her work. I use her play as both an ethnographic analytical tool, and her 
perspective as playwright as its own form of ethnography. The Mask She Wears was well 
known within the performing arts circles in which I conducted research; most women who 
were old enough (either marriage or a certain age level is recommended for viewing) had 
either seen it in person or had since watched the DVD which is readily available. I would say 
it is widely watched within artistic women’s circles; outside of the community of women 
interested in the arts it is less well known. The second woman is Lizzi Serling, whose song 
lyrics appear throughout this thesis and whose generous sharing of her art and her spirit will 
always remain meaningful to me. Though I spent time with multiple dance schools, I 
ultimately chose to focus on the school run by Rachel Factor and Lexie Koh. Rachel and 
Lexie are not anonymised despite the absence of any specific art reproduced in the thesis; this 
is because they wished to publicly have their views and approach to dance attributed to them 
and their dance school. 




central to this thesis. She is a politician in the Israeli Labour Party, Avodah. Ruth Colian is 
also included. Ruth started the Haredi Women’s Party, Ubizchutan. Finally, Esti Shushan is 
also a significant part of this project. She is the founder of the organisation Nivcharot and 
regularly appears to speak in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, and on television. A woman 
referred to as ‘Bina’, a pseudonym, also features prominently; she works in politics but not in 
a public-facing role, and so it was possible to conceal her identity somewhat more 
effectively.  
I spent nearly two years studying Yiddish before beginning fieldwork; by the end of my 
time in Israel, I was wishing I had spent more time learning Modern Hebrew. A few 
interviews were conducted in Yiddish; the vast majority of my fieldwork was conducted in 
English. In the performing arts world, most rehearsals and classes were run with a mixture of 
English and Modern Hebrew, and some explanation between students in Russian. Ultimately, 
English did take me far; as I suggest elsewhere, English is becoming a substitute for Yiddish 
in certain parts of the Haredi world as a way of not participating in the Zionist project of 
Modern Hebrew (Munro 2022 forthcoming). However, a few of my key participants did not 
speak enough English to feel comfortable speaking with me without translation help. 
Translators represent complex ethical conundrums in anthropological fieldwork (Asad 1986). 
I therefore chose my translator carefully; she was someone whom I have known for years, 
and with whom I had already been discussing my thoughts and ideas as fieldwork occurred. 
She was interested in the project, but only out of pure curiosity: she volunteers with a variety 
of organisations in Israel, and the only population of which she has had no contact with 
through these organisations is the Haredi community. Furthermore, she has done extensive 
translation in both academic and non-academic settings. She was someone with whom I 
could discuss the connotations of a single word, and ask about the finer points of the science 




She is not an academic, and she possesses one of the brightest wits I know. 
Some of the biggest ethical quandaries I encountered during fieldwork involved a crisis of 
research ethics versus my own moral compass. I encountered racism and violence in the field; 
none of it toward me, but all of it offensive to my deepest held beliefs. ‘When you write 
vulnerably, others respond vulnerably’ (Behar 1996, 16), Behar tells us; what about writing 
vulnerably about callousness? I was most surprised when encountering racism from some of 
the ba’alos teshuvah with whom I spoke. I expected some racism in a few (but definitely not 
all) people who grew up in such a self-contained world, but to encounter it in the newly 
religious people, some of whom had been heavily involved in anti-racist work before 
becoming religious, was surprising. What process could transform an activist who protested 
with the Black Panthers into a Hasidic woman who feared exposing her child to non-
Ashkenazi Jewish children? I was also saddened to hear of and witness Haredi women and 
their families perpetrating violence towards their neighbours in the West Bank. In the pages 
that follow, especially in Chapter Seven, I have done my best to write vulnerably about 
violence and callousness to which I was witness. I must acknowledge my own discomfort: I 
am morally opposed to the settler movement and the Jewish occupation of the West Bank as 
a source of oppression, violence, and death to the Palestinian people. When I set out to 
conduct research with (originally) Hasidic women long ago, I intended to avoid Israel. When 
the only contacts which I could easily establish were in Jerusalem, I compromised with 
myself, because I naïvely believed that Haredim were not involved in the Palestinian conflict, 
nor the occupation. When it became clear that almost a third of my research participants lived 
in the settlements, I considered for a brief time excluding anyone who lived over the Green 
Line. Doing so would have certainly made my life easier from a bureaucratic perspective; I 
would have had to file significantly less paperwork for university required risk assessments. 




portion of my research community. To do so, especially based on my own internal biases, 
would be unethical. I also needed to give them a chance to show themselves to me free from 
my own judgments of their lifestyle (Clifford et al. 1986). Though this sometimes tested me 
in the most extreme ways, ultimately I found ways to manage my distress and allow them to 
continue to reveal themselves and their beliefs to me free of the sense of my judgment. The 
settlements in which they live are not listed, in order to further protect their safety. The 
question remains: What is our responsibility as ethnographers to the victims of the violence 
which our interlocutors produce? 
I am mindful of my own identity as not only Ashkenazi, but also as someone who carries 
the white privilege of often passing for non-Jewish, when writing about the non-Ashkenazi 
women who were my interlocutors. This underscores my efforts to engage ethically when 
interrogating experiences of prejudice, discrimination, racism, and the resultant activism that 
has arisen. Lavie warns, ‘Feminists who write and organize around intersectionality overlook 
the interplay between gender-race-class, religion, and bureaucracy’ (Lavie 2018, 176). I hope 
that my efforts to ‘decenter and rethink the normative frameworks by which we have come to 
apprehend life’ (Mahmood 2016, 24) have not been in vain, and my work recognises the 
intersections to which Lavie calls attention. 
Lefkowitz discusses the benefit of hindsight enriches his understanding of some of the 
first experiences in the field (2006, 32-33). In many ways, I didn’t have to undergo the same 
shock of adjustment to which he refers, because I was conducting fieldwork in a place that 
once was home to me. My contacts were friends of friends, and before I started my masters at 
Oxford almost ten years ago, I was living in Har Nof, a Haredi community in Jerusalem, 
attending a seminary for ba’alei teshuvah. While this was not quite autoethnography, this was 
certainly a form of ethnography of the self, and fieldwork as homework (Lavie 2018, 20). My 




am a part of that community, my former membership no longer prevented women from being 
able to trust my confidentiality. I was outside enough to act as confessor; I was inside enough 
to be conversant in the cultural norms. My status as such elicited a range of reactions. One 
woman’s reaction was revealing: she asked me how I could choose to become religious; she 
was born into it and had no choice, but why would anyone voluntarily become Haredi? Other 
women expected that I wanted to hear specific things; when I disabused them of these 
notions, they became more and more comfortable with me, and trust grew. Either way, I fear 





Chapter Two presents the argument that the Haredi identity formed as a political identity 
as well as a religious one in response to secularism and the state. It sets up the formation of 
the secular-religious binary opposition within society. I suggest that Agudat Yisrael formed as 
a political organisation in order to negotiate for Haredi minority rights in the face of 
secularism and nationalism. In order for a political organisation like Agudat Yisrael to exist 
and not become that which it was resisting, it had to be both a political and a religious entity. 
The investment in Da’as Torah was therefore born; this transformed rabbis into authorities 
on all matters, even non-religious matters. Thus, rabbis became politicians, and the political 
became religious. This translated into the Haredi identity becoming one in which the political 
and the religious were inseparable. This situation was only exacerbated in the state of Israel, 
where the Haredi community functioned as a religious minority, taking a stance in defense of 
its own interests. This translated into increasingly stringent interpretations of religious 
practice, in order to differentiate Haredi life from the society of the other Jews by whom the 




thought, in which religion is the enemy of the secular state, has created more severe forms of 
religious life. Chapter Two continues by arguing that this increasing stringency resulted in 
yeshiva study being the main component of Haredi masculinity. This has meant that men and 
women have different roles in their negotiation of religious values and secular influence. 
Chapter Three argues that the increasing stringency resulted in an increased emphasis on 
modesty for women, and this became one of the central features of pious Haredi womanhood. 
Understanding formations of Haredi women’s piety is fundamental to understanding how 
women’s agency operates, and why women are cast in the role of the knitters of the fabric of 
Haredi identity and society. The modesty focus has created particular conflict within the 
Haredi world concerning non-Ashkenazim, because modesty was defined by Ashkenazi 
standards. Thus, not only is modesty a central pillar of Haredi piety for women, it is a way in 
which non-Ashkenazim can be discriminated against. Chapter Three also argues that women 
are expected to be good mothers and wives, and support their husbands in yeshiva, by 
working outside the home and protected their children and husbands from secular knowledge 
and temptation. Finally, Chapter Three brings together the strands of both Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three to argue that Haredi identity is not anti-Zionist, but rather non-Zionist, and 
that women ‘do’ Haredi politics by not participating in certain state-making projects. 
Chapter Four presents the major elements of change that have effected shifts in Haredi 
identity in the last decade. This includes a significant examination of ba’alei teshuvah and the 
effect which they have had upon Israeli Haredi society. Chiefly, they have shifted a 
fundamental element of Haredi identity: that religious identity is inseparable from political 
identity. The ba’alei teshuvah view their choice as a religious one, and generally view 
political beliefs and religious beliefs as separate but not mutually exclusive as a result of their 
secular upbringing. The ba’alei teshuvah bring change in terms of secular attitudes towards 




suburban values to the Haredi community, such as appreciation for enrichment education, the 
arts, and sports. The introduction of these ideas is widely accepted in the Haredi world in 
Israel, somewhat more so for girls than boys. 
Other changes explored in Chapter Four include improved secular education and the 
opening of Haredi campuses of mainstream universities. Secular education has improved for 
men, and more Haredi men are receiving higher degrees, while women’s access to higher 
degrees appears to have remained steady. Another element of change is the housing crisis 
which all communities in Israel face, though the Haredim perhaps experience the most 
housing pressure because the community has both the highest fertility rate and the highest 
poverty rate. This has resulted in the Haredim moving out of their enclave communities in 
greater numbers in recent years, including to settlements in the West Bank; while some are 
simply creating new enclaves elsewhere, others are living within other types of religious 
Jewish communities, though continuing to use Haredi community institutions. Many 
interlocutors who live in such circumstances chose such environments purposefully, 
eschewing the panopticon of the community. Gradually, rabbinical leadership has recognised 
the need for relaxation of the parochialisms of Haredi life and a plurality of approaches have 
begun to emerge. Women are central to these changes; they use their agency to knit together 
these new strands of influence which are encountered in the non-Haredi world to create new 
patterns in the fabric of Haredi society. 
These elements are all a part of the process of the creation of a new Haredi Middle Class. 
This characterises about a quarter to a third of families in the Haredi sector today, in which 
one or both parents work white-collar jobs, have gone to university, and earn more. Though 
seemingly more secularised, these families are not ostracised by the Haredi mainstream; 
indeed, they are a fundamental part of the economic and political survival of the community. 




identity and drive growth in this Middle Class. 
Chapter Five examines how Haredi women’s agency and critique operates with a wealth 
of ethnographic examples. This chapter again uses much of the theory proposed by Mahmood 
in Politics of Piety. Like the agency of other groups of non-liberal religious women, Haredi 
women’s agency is often grounded in their piousness; however, they use this agency in new 
and unlikely ways, integrating certain types of secular knowledge and values in order to 
imagine new types of Haredi womanhood. Throughout this thesis, but especially in this 
chapter, I use knitting as a metaphor for Haredi women’s agency and critique. I envision 
women’s agency as mediators between the secular and the religious as knitting together 
seemingly oppositional values into a complex, never-ending scarf of Haredi society. Women 
use their agency to select ideas from secular society which they feel would add value to the 
Haredi world, like choosing a particular soft or colourful yarn, and looping it through the 
scarf in concert with the yarn of religion. To me, their critique is like a picking apart, or a 
moment when they must unravel a few rows to reveal the stitch they dropped, and then re-
pearl to repair the scarf. They critique the stringencies in modesty standards for damaging 
women’s mental and physical health, unravelling the existing stitches of the Haredi scarf and 
repairing it with bits of secular yarns of many colours. I consider the proliferation of 
therapeutic approaches, and the acceptance of such, as an element of internal critique as well 
as an adoption of secular knowledge in the form of psychology. Ultimately, women use their 
agency to reform the fabric of Haredi society into one which accepts new forms of Haredi 
ethical womanhood, which unite religious values with secular knowledge. They emphasise 
Jewish unity over Haredi authority, and prioritise women’s health and happiness in a 
constantly changing scarf of many colours.  
Chapter Six examines the Haredi Feminist Movement. The willingness of women to 




navigate the idea of being feminists living in a patriarchal religious society with savvy, and 
through distinction between the extent of religious authority on secular ideas. This is a new 
distinction which is a sign of the changes to and limits on Da’as Torah; it is also a result of 
improved religious and secular education. This is an extension of the agency which has been 
discussed throughout this thesis; the introduction of the secular yarn of feminism into the 
fabric of the Haredi scarf is simply another step in the knitting process; however, it is a 
particularly knotty yarn, full of liberal secular values, which forces bumps and gaps into the 
fabric. The majority of leaders in the Haredi Feminist Movement are Sephardi; they articulate 
discrimination against Sephardim as impetus for their outspokenness for women’s rights. 
Furthermore, there is a divide in the feminist camp which is representative of the larger 
Haredi social divide: whether to cooperate with groups outside the Haredi sphere and 
distinguish between the realms of secular and religious authority, or to apply Haredi values to 
Israeli society as a whole, and refuse to cooperate with those outside the Haredi community. 
Feminist ideology is adopted where it does not conflict with religious law, and applied to 
secular aspects of Haredi community life, like equal pay and the ability of women to run for 
office. This differs from Religious Zionist feminist movements, which seek to change 
religious practice. 
Chapter Seven returns to questions of secularism, liberalism, and nationalism first raised 
in the second chapter. Women are using their unique form of agency to pick apart the 
political from the religious in Haredi identity. This is occurring as a result of the influences of 
the threads introduced in previous chapters. I suggest that this is not a destruction of Haredi 
identity; it is a complex negotiation of both the religious and secular within Haredi identity, 
because the two are neither mutually exclusive, nor fixed categories, as our ever evolving 
scarf has revealed. I explore the ways in which this process is shifting people to the Left and 




While I recognise these two shifts are products of the same process, I nonetheless submit a 
plea that this choice of Left versus Right matters on a practical, human level, and has 




Chapter Two: Formations of Haredi 
Identity 
Secularism and the state transformed the religious identity of early Haredim into a 
political one, which entrenched religious stringencies in the community as time passed. This 
chapter will argue that secularism is essentially a repackaging of European Christian values 
in non-religious philosophy. Because secularism rejects the place of religion public life and 
modern personhood, it forces a (perhaps false) binary opposition in which the secular and the 
religious are at odds. Secularism necessitates the formation of nationalism as a replacement 
for identities that used to be fulfilled by religion. The Jews in Europe were influenced by both 
secularisation and nationalism; the latter became more important as various minority rights’ 
movements failed to protect the Jews. Religious Jewish leaders sought to resist secular and 
nationalistic influences, which they saw as destroying Jewish life in the case of the former, 
and contaminating religious purity in the case of the latter. However, to resist these political 
secular movements, they had to participate in the secular political system so as to establish 
some form of power. Thus, the religious leaders were form a political movement in answer. 
Once this happened, religious leaders were faced with the question of how to avoid becoming 
that which they feared, while maintaining a stakehold in the political arena. In order to make 
secular participation more religious, rabbis became political leaders, and religious authority 
was extended over previously non-religious domains. This transformed identity into one in 
which the political was inseparable from the religious. The external secular-religious binary 





The entrenchment of the political within the religious became further emphasised within 
the state of Israel in the twentieth century. The secular-religious binary became emphasised 
in the Jewish state, which constantly questioned its own identity as either religious or secular. 
Not only were the Haredim establishing their identity in opposition to other Jews, but because 
the government and political system which was being resisted was a Jewish one that 
demanded citizens conform to a certain type of Judaism— and the Haredim do not fit this 
requirement. Resistance therefore serves to strengthen Haredi identity and commitment to 
religion. This has resulted in the increasingly stringent interpretation of religious law and 
tradition in the Haredi world; for men, this articulated itself in an emphasis on yeshiva study, 
which is especially important in establishing Haredi identity in opposition to the otherwise 
universal requirement that citizens serve in the army. Thus, Haredi identity is an entwined 
political-religious identity, which is in constant negotiation with secularism and the state. 
This chapter serves to establish the discourse of Haredi identity (Pratt 2003, 10), based on 
my constructivist approach to identity in the thesis (Ben-eliezer 2004). This ‘treats identity as 
a narrative … organized along two axes. …[A]n axis with a horizontal line running through 
past, present and future. …The other axis is vertical: it establishes who “we” are through 
opposition and the creation of an “other”’ (Pratt 2003, 10). The outcome of this narrative 
reveals that Haredi identity is no less ‘modern’ (Taylor 1992) than the forces which it seeks 
to resist. Haredi identity develops along Taylor’s three major facets of modern identity: the 
inward, inner self; the affirmation of self in every-day life; and the notion that our morals are 
part of our interior selves (Ibid., 9). Ultimately, this chapter establishes the dichotomy which 
Haredi women are faced with throughout the rest of this thesis. It establishes the fabric of 
Haredi identity, the scarf of Haredi society, with which the women work through knittings 





Jewish Life in Europe 
 
Jewish life in Eastern Europe was unmarked by sectarianism throughout the first few 
centuries of the early modern era (Bacon 1996, 9). How, then, did religious difference among 
Jews emerge? The first major disruption occurred with the founding of Hasidism in the mid-
18th century, by Rabbi Israel Ben Eliezer, more commonly known by the title the Ba’al Shem 
Tov (lit. ‘master of the good name’), abbreviated to the acronym Besht. He developed a 
mystical pantheistic version of Judaism based on a religious ethos of love, spirituality, joy, 
religious emotion, and ethics (Biale et al. 2018).1 After his death in 1760, Hasidism developed 
a tradition of small groups of students who followed, and learned from, great rabbinical 
leaders. Each rebbe became founding leaders of specific Hasidic sects, named after the places 
in which the teachers were located (i.e. Liady, Kalisk, etc). Further dynasties have been 
founded since, based on the same model. The teachings of the Besht spread rapidly due to the 
populist turn of his dictate that even the ‘lowliest farmer holding his siddur [prayer book] 
upside down could maintain a personal relationship to God,’ as I was told at a Hasidic dinner 
table. Hasidism also faced enemies among the yeshiva traditionalists, and this became the 
central conflict within Ashkenazi Judaism from the late 18th century through the first part of 
the 19th century. The yeshiva traditionalists became known as the misnagdim, literally 
‘opponents’, a title which to some extent endures today. The more prevalent word is Litvish, 
Yiddish for ‘Lithuanian’, due to the location of the most concentrated population of 
misnagdim. By the mid-19th century the Hasidic movement was more prevalent throughout 
areas which were controlled variously by the Polish and Russian Empires, as well as areas 
which today are in Austria and Hungary. The reasons for the ideological conflict between the 
 




Hasids and the misnagdim stem from differences in hashkafa [commonly translated to 
‘outlook,’ but more complex, encompassing ‘approach’ and ‘theology’ as well].  
However, another movement was growing in Europe during this time. As Enlightenment 
thought and the Age of Reason swept through the Christian centres of learning from London 
to Moscow, Jews were not unaffected. Its proponents championed rationalism and reform 
over the traditionalism of the Litvish tradition and the mysticism of Hasidism. The 
Haskallah, the Jewish Enlightenment, would eventually lead to the birth of the Reform 
Movement, and the first stirrings of secularism in Judaism (Efron 2003, 20). Jews were, 
therefore, the first non-Christian group to encounter the question of secular and religious 
conflict, and grapple with the philosophy of secular modernity. Haredi identity formed as a 
response to secularism, and later, Zionism. I would like to pause, however, and consider what 
is meant by the idea that a religious identity and category ‘formed’ in ‘response’ to 
‘secularism.’ These terms carry significant meanings and complexities, and require 
interrogation. What follows can therefore be understood, to borrow Mahmood’s term from 
‘genealogies of the secular’ (2016), as a genealogy of formations of Haredi identity. I do not 
presume to call it a history, or even historiography; I select too specifically the events which 
seem most relevant to the formation of Haredi ethics. Rather, it is an exploration of the 
elements which transpired to create the specific community as it functions in Israel today. 
 
 Responding to the Threat of Secularisation 
 
Talal Asad, in his seminal work Formations of the Secular (2003), suggests that we live 
with a myth of the secular state today (Ibid., 23), based on the ideology which secularism 
itself generates. We believe that secularism is the domain of all things rational and 
reasonable, and that secularism secures for us the domains of liberty, democracy, and 




Enlightenment and the Age of Reason. However, these terms—secular, secularism—are as 
entwined with a European, and therefore Christian, past, as are the other ideas that they 
construe. First used in the mid-19th century, ‘secular’ and ‘secularist’ became replacements 
for the terms ‘infidel’ and ‘atheist’ (Ibid.), as the latter felt too entangled with the history of 
religious irrationality (Ibid., 24). ‘Secular’ ideas represent a (possibly artificial) rejection of 
religious association, and yet the Enlightenment philosophy in which it is so entwined is 
inalterably wrapped up with the ethics and values of Christianity, especially Protestant 
Christianity. 
The Age of Reason was an outgrowth of the Protestant Reformation. Removing the 
church from religion was only one step ahead of removing God; as the Bible became a piece 
of literature, independent of belief, its values were repackaged into acceptable standards for 
the reasonable, secular European civilisation (Ibid., 8-9). Secularism became an ongoing 
practice in the ‘cultivation of enlightenment’ (Ibid., 60), which furthered the cause of Europe 
as civilisation (Ibid., 165). Such processes have been called by some ‘Judeo-Christian’ (Ibid., 
8-9), but such characterisation ignores the long history of antisemitism rife within this 
process (Mahmood 2016, 8).2 Wintle’s claim, as described in Asad, that ‘Europeanness’ is 
tied inseparably from European history, specifically Rome, Christianity, Enlightenment, and 
Industrialisation (Asad 2003, 166), obviously leaves Jews out of the European equation. 
Furthermore, the conception of ‘race’ as a marker of human difference first emerged in the 
early days of Enlightenment (Goodman 2020, 10), and Jews were not considered ‘white’ 
(Ibid., 48). Furthermore, it establishes a state in which Europeanness begets Europeanness 
(Ibid., 168). The prejudice which is faced today by the Muslim is the same as that felt by the 
Jew for millennia: ‘Prejudice against European Muslims today (and European and non-
 
2 For more information on the history of ‘Judeo-Christian’ and its legacy as Islamophobic and Orientalist 




European Jews of the past) is constitutive of, and emanates from, this self-understanding of 
Europe as essentially Christian and simultaneously secular in its cultural and political ethos’ 
(Mahmood 2016, 8). This myth of Europeanness is, and was, strengthened by ongoing 
violence toward those perceived to be non-European (Asad 2003, 162). 
As Bosnian Muslims are today, Jews were viewed as ‘in’ Europe, but not ‘of Europe’ 
(Ibid., 164). Secularism provided a path for the Jews to gain membership in the European 
club; ‘… as members of the abstract category “humans,” [they] can be assimilated or (as 
some recent theorists have put it) “translated” into a global (“European”) civilization once 
they have divested themselves of what many of them regard (mistakenly) as essential to 
themselves’ (Ibid., 169). For the European majority, assimilation of the Jews was necessary 
and desirable (Ibid., 170); for many Jews, it was no less desirable or tantalising. ‘Secularism 
has an inescapable character that … promises to demolish hierarchies in order to create a 
body politic in which all its members are equal before the law’ (Mahmood 2016, 2). Integral 
to the process of Jewish secularisation was the yearning for true acceptance and inclusion in 
Europe of a group which had always faced exclusion, ostracisation, and precariousness. The 
secularisation of the Haskallah offered a path to acceptance outside of the previously 
ubiquitous religious categories. It provided a way to remain Jewish without remaining non-
European. Secularisation held great promise for the persecuted Jews. But did it deliver? 
One must remember that while secularism gave birth to the myth of modernity, it also 
produced fascism (Asad 2013, 18). The Jews were granted certain forms of ‘conditional 
tolerance’ in Europe as early as the 18th century, but they did not see any substantive equality 
in legal form until the late 19th century: 1871 in Germany, and 1879 in France (Mahmood 
2016, 40-41). In exchange for formal recognition in the law, the Jews also had to surrender a 
great deal of their communal autonomy, including the right to independent law tribunals (Beit 




integration into Europe was predicated upon the dissolution of various forms of Jewish self-
government and their collective subjection to the centralised state and its national laws, 
which came to apply homogeneously to all its subjects. The dissolution of communal 
autonomy was also meant to weaken religious ties, re-aligning Jewish fealty to the nation-
state that now laid claim to the life and resources of all those it governed.’ (Ibid.) 
Furthermore, this state of affairs did not secure the Jews the freedom from persecution and 
acceptance to the European politic as they had hoped. The Dreyfus Affair alone stands as 
testament to this; however, the Jews still presented as the obvious problematic Other, and 
could not seem to escape this status. Even Karl Marx frames his mission to de-politicise 
religion as ‘The Jewish Question’ (Ibid., 12-13). 
 It is in these circumstances that the response to secularism arose within the Jewish 
religious leadership. Mahmood suggests: ‘Jewish emancipation over the long nineteenth 
century was predicated upon the privatization and individualization of Jewish religious life. 
This often entailed both the dissolution of their autonomy over various aspects of communal 
life and [sic] their assimilation into the cultural norms of European nations rooted in 
Christian values.’ (Ibid., 12). It is unsurprising, then, that certain religious Jewish leaders felt 
action against these processes was necessary. There were three early leaders in the opposition 
to secularisation within traditional rabbinical circles: Rabbi Yisrael Salanter in Lithuania, and 
the first Gurer Rebbe in Poland, Rabbi Yitzchak Meir Alter (Bacon 1996, 24); and Moses 
Sofer in Pressburg, Hungary, who established the rulings of the Shulchan Arech as absolute 
over all other rabbinical interpretations (Efron 2003, 21-22). Salanter is more commonly 
known for his founding of the Mussar Movement, which focuses on the development of 
character over the emphasis on textual study or mystical communion with God, and was very 
much a critique of Hasidism. Of note within our current discussion are the projects which 




These included the first publication for the Jews of Eastern Europe, Tevuna. The Gurer 
Rebbe in Warsaw also employed print media, as did Yaakov Halevi Lifschitz, the secretary to 
Rabbi Spektor of Kovno, who ultimately founded HaLevanon, the first publication for 
‘traditional’ Jews (Ibid., 25) in Europe. However, by the mid- to late-19th century, ‘There 
seems to be a clear pattern of a widening circle of rabbinic and lay leaders who sensed the 
need for the traditional masses to organize in order to use their demographic weight to defend 
their interests. The process of politicization went in fits and starts, but made headway, and 
resulted finally in the organized political movements of interwar Poland’ (Ibid., 23). 
Ultimately, these disparate movements would resolve into the international organisation of 
Agudat Yisrael which persists today both as a broad, transnational body and as a political 
party in Israel; but the internal conflicts and battles which characterised its halting and 
tortuously slow generation continue to be at work in Haredi and Orthodox communities 
today.  
 It should also come as no surprise that the result of these responses to secularism, the 
formation of Haredi identity was one of increasing emphasis on stringent religious practice. 
Because secularisation reproduces and disseminates itself, it produces religiously informed 
modes of ‘law, ethics, subjects, and consciousness’ (Brown 2013, ix-x). While this process is 
never-ending, the secular also simultaneously embeds religion in the social life of all its 
citizens, ‘by relegating it to the private sphere and civil society’ (Mahmood 2016, 21). By 
making the artificial opposition of religion versus the secular, this inadvertently places an 
emphasis on religion for the religious because of its perceived exclusion. This naturally 
makes religion more important, especially to those who may be a minority in the greater 
polity (Ibid., 15). The categories of ‘religion’ and ‘secular’ are constantly shifting (Mahmood 
2013, 81-82), creating the project of modernity (Asad 2003, 13). This project claims certain 




of ‘religion’ and ‘reason’ which secularism seeks to create (Ibid., 15). It is the imposition of 
these ways of thinking upon those who lie outside of European norms which Taussig deems 
the ‘institutional interpretation of reason by violence’ (Taussig 1992, 116, as quoted in Asad 
2003, 22). Ultimately, the goal of secularism is to annihilate religion, in a Nietzchean sense, 
but instead it succeeds in placing religion at the centre of family life and civil society. 
 
 The Spectre of Nationalism 
 
If identity had before been established religiously, then the introduction of the secular age 
left a chasm around the question of collective identity in Europe. Previously, ‘nation’ had 
simply referred to people of a certain culture, but by the end of the 18th century nationalism 
became a force within Europe (Calhoun 1997, 9). Both secularism and Enlightenment 
philosophy contributed to the development of nationalist ideology: reason demanded that 
map-making display definite and distinct borders, while European states became increasingly 
powerful militarily, domestic administration became more of a focus, and colonialism was 
the mode of empire (Ibid., 13-15). Secularism demanded a way for people from different 
backgrounds to clarify and consolidate their identities (Ibid., 19).  
 Some, like Geertz, have theorised that nationalism became a replacement for religion 
(Asad 2003, 187-189); Asad suggests instead that if secularised identities ‘retain a religious 
essence [sic]’ (Ibid., 189), it is because these identities have a religious origin. His example, 
that the English Church is a necessary condition of Englishness (Ibid., 190), seems 
particularly apt. Ultimately, however, the formation of nationalism makes sense only within 
the context of secular thought (Ibid., 193), which is, as discussed above, a repackaging of the 
ethics and values of Protestantism. Therefore, while religion does not produce nationalism 
(Ibid., 194), it is a necessary component of it, especially in the European context. Religion is 





 But if religion is a component in the national formation of states, it is not the doctrine 
of the secular nation state. Instead, ‘[a] secular, liberal state depends crucially for its public 
virtues (equality, tolerance, liberty) on political myth…’ (Asad 2003, 56). Essentially, the 
ethics and values of secularism (equality, tolerance, and liberty) become the ethics of the 
secular nation. To be ‘modern,’ society is expected to have a certain level of moral 
homogeneity (Ibid., 186), under which ethics and values are defined by ‘rights’ (Ibid., 129-
134). This discourse of ‘rights’ established itself through European Christian history, starting 
with the status of a Roman citizen, and evolving through the Middle Ages to Molina’s and 
Locke’s interpretations, which ultimately resolved into the ideas of ‘natural’ or ‘inalienable’ 
rights (Ibid., 130-134). In the twentieth century, these rights became ‘human rights’ (Ibid., 
129), which Asad suggests imposes the secular discourse of ‘being human’ upon those from 
disparate ethical systems (Ibid., 124). This, Asad says, puts a certain amount of ‘violence at 
the heart of a political doctrine which has disavowed violence on principle… the violence of 
universalizing reason itself’ (Ibid., 59). By endowing all ‘humans’ with individual autonomy, 
religion can be classified as ‘false consciousness’ (Ibid., 124), and the imposition of secular 
values (under the guise of human rights) is able to ‘redeem’ the religious individual (Ibid.). It 
is in this way that the liberalising or democratising mission becomes a secular reiteration of 
the original colonial civilising mission (Asad 2013, 20-21).  
 The Jews of Europe were, ultimately, the first objects of this secular civilising 
mission; they were also the first test-case for Europe’s assumed mastery of these secular 
ideals of tolerance and equality. As discussed above, legal and political protection of the Jews 
and their supposed rights were a very long time coming, and substantial antisemitic sentiment 
persisted despite these tardy gains (Mahmood 2016: 40-41). However, in the interwar years, 




the former Ottoman states, based on their non-secular (and Muslim) history (Ibid., 31-53), but 
did not deem it necessary to make European states, including Germany, subject to the same 
sanctions.3 Germany, and other European states, as both European and secular, were 
considered free of the contamination of religion, which would precipitate ethnic conflict and 
genocide. How wrong they were. 
 Nationalist ideology did not elude the Jews; indeed, in the face of continuing 
persecution, the promise of national identity seemed like an apt solution for many. Despite 
their distress at the growing secularisation of Jews, even the most vocal rabbis hesitated to 
form an outright political organisation, or to directly oppose the leaders of the Haskallah or 
Zionist movements for fear of creating too great of a schism within the Jewish community, 
which still faced great persecution. Ultimately, the leadership of Theodor Herzl and the 
articulation of a politicisation of Zionism forced a politicisation of the religious opposition. 
Herzl’s policy of ‘kibbush ha-kehillot’, the conquest of the communities, posed a direct threat 
to the rabbinic tradition and their authority (Bacon 1996, 28). ‘With the appearance of 
political Zionism under the leadership of Theodor Herzl, the perceived threat to traditional 
Judaism intensified, for here was a movement which used the symbols and vocabulary long 
held sacred by Jews (the Land of Israel, Redemption and the like), was led by avowedly 
secular Jews, and proclaimed itself neutral on matters of personal religious practice’ (Ibid., 
27). By the beginning of the 20th century there was a clear need within religious Judaism for 
the formation of some sort of organisation for international cooperation, not only to deal with 
the spectres of secularisation and Zionism, but also to respond to mass migration which was 
spreading the diaspora even farther than previously in history, and the lack of well-defined 
professional standards across rabbinical institutions (Ibid., 28-29). In 1903, the first 
 
3 This was largely due to the focus of the Christian European nations on the Armenian Genocide; see 




International Rabbinical Conference was convened in Krakòw by the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi 
of Cairo. From ideals discussed at this conference, the organisation Kenesset Yisrael was 
ultimately founded. Led by Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski of Vilna, it existed only from 
1907-1908, when the Russian government created insurmountable obstacles. However, 
Kenesset Yisrael is important in its articulation that ‘[o]nly an organized orthodox public 
could properly defend the interests of the orthodox masses’ (Ibid., 31), and it sought to unite 
all religious Jews under one banner, while committing to working with anyone who sought to 
widen Jewish rights, improve the economic situation of Jews, and found charitable and 
philanthropic organisations (Ibid., 30-32). Though short-lived, Kenesset Yisrael represents 
the first effective Jewish religious political organisation which transcended the divisions of 
Litvish and Hasidic, in unity against a Zionist foe. 
It is also important to recognise that parallel to Kenesset Yisrael in Poland, Germany was 
host to the Frankfurt Orthodox Separatist Movement. Like Kenesset Yisrael, this movement 
sought to oppose the Zionists; however, it did not espouse the cooperative attitudes which 
characterised Kenesset Yisrael and continued to feature in future religious political 
organisations in Poland in the inter-war years (Ibid., 32). The Frankfurt Separatists were, in 
many ways, more radical in their approach, and also more privileged in their resources and 
political alliances. In 1909, the Frankfurt Separatists, under the leadership of Yitzchak 
Halevi, convened a meeting at Bad Hamburg which allowed for the introduction of the 
German Orthodox to the rabbinical leadership of Eastern Europe, either through their direct 
attendance or through blessings sent through emissaries. Connections created through the 
1909 meeting were utilised when, following the walkout of the religious Zionists in 1911, a 
conference was planned for Katowice in 1912. Katowice, in Silesia, was the site of the 
original Hibat Zion conference in 1884, and sat on the geographic border between East and 




religious elite of Eastern Europe. Most of the great rabbis of the Litvish communities 
attended, and most of the Hasidic Rebbes also either attended or sent emissaries. The Gurer 
Rebbe, Rabbi Abraham Mordecai Alter, did not attend but sent a letter to be read aloud; this 
‘warm message of support’ was so well received that it was tossed into the conference 
audience, where the attendees scrambled for it; it was granted almost instantaneous relic 
status (Ibid., 36). From the 27th to the 29th of May 1912, the European religious leadership 
founded Agudat Yisrael, with plans for a Kenessia Gedola, a great parliament, to convene as 
a supreme international religious governing body in August 1914. Because of the outbreak of 
World War I, however, the Kenessia Gedola would not take place until 1923 (Ibid., 34-36). 
While the international organisation waited for war, and then influenza, to cease, local 
branches of Agudat Yisrael, henceforth referred to as Agudah, were able to establish within 
portions of the religious Jewish world. Poland was occupied by the Germans for most of the 
war; under their control, Jewish communities enjoyed relative safety and freedom compared 
to previous Polish and Russian regimes (Ibid., 37-38). The German occupation preferred to 
use minorities to police their own, and two prominent leaders from the Frankfurt Separatists 
were brought to Warsaw to administrate for the Jews of Poland, Pinchas Kohn and Emanuel 
Carlebach. They arrived in 1916 with a clear list of goals as articulated by Jacob Rosenheim, 
the head of the Frankfurt Separatists:  
1) to ‘reach an understanding’ with the Polish people, where the Jews would not be part 
of nationalist projects,   
2) to politicise the Orthodox Jewish masses,   
3) to rebuild communal life around the basis of Torah, and   
4) to create an educational policy which found a balance between modern culture and 
religion (Ibid., 39).  




secularism. Already, the scarf of Haredi society has some secular yarn knitted into it. The 
educational policy is one of balance between religious knowledge and ‘modern’ secular 
forms of knowledge. This seeks to form a religious ethic, on the ‘basis of Torah’ which 
includes certain forms of secularity; this includes the politicisation of the strictly religious. In 
order to resist the dangerous secular movements, a certain amount of secularity in behaviour 
and approach is necessary and acceptable. 
Kohn and Carlebach helped found the Polish Agudah, which became the most powerful 
local branch of Agudat Yisrael in the world prior to World War II.  Kohn and Carlebach also 
attempted to propagate the Frankfurt’s vision of total separation from non-religious Jewry, 
which completely failed in Poland. ‘Polish orthodoxy turned to politics not to preserve a 
dwindling minority group as in Germany, but to provide a spokesman for a hitherto silent 
majority’(Ibid., 43). 
The inter-war years in Europe were characterised by further power struggles between the 
Zionists and Agudat Yisrael, as well as the Bund, though the socialists were to a certain 
extent absorbed into both camps. The populations over whom these battles were fought were 
the Jewish workers (Ibid., 100-117) and the Jewish youth (Ibid., 118-141); the sites of the 
conflict were the community councils (Ibid., 178-224) and the educational system (Ibid., 142-
177). The Agudah in Poland founded the Tseirei Agudat Yisrael in 1919, its youth wing, 
which offered religious education under adult leadership (Ibid., 119), unlike the more liberal 
approach of the Zionist B’nai Akiva. Like all aspects of the Agudah, Tseirei faced internal 
disputes, usually between the Gurer Rebbe and other leaders, as well as complete rejection by 
the Belzer Rebbe (Ibid., 120-122), but nonetheless enjoyed high levels of attendance 
throughout Poland until the second invasion of Germany. The Agudah enjoyed somewhat less 
success within the worker’s orthodox organisation, Poalei Agudat Yisrael, possibly because 




though, the importance of Agudat Yisrael is fundamental to understanding the Haredi identity 
because it represents the first and thus far lasting instance of religious Jewish groups 
overcoming hashkafic differences in order to unite against secularism; and it unified religion 
and politics in a single identity for the first time. 
 
 Da’as Torah and the Political Religious 
 
Agudat Yisrael faced a significant challenge in resisting secularism, and that is in the 
response to the secular effort to limit and curtail religion and religious authority (Brown 
2013, ix). Once established as both an organisation and a political party in Poland, Agudat 
Yisrael faced a dilemma: if politics are inherently secular, then how can the Agudah exist as a 
political entity representing religious opposition to the secularisation of the Jewish people 
without itself becoming secularised? What power do religious leaders have to ‘combat the 
structural injury’ in which secular terms have sought to define religious concepts (Butler 
2013, 99)? 
Historian Gershon Bacon contends that while the concept of Da’as Torah is mentioned in 
the Babylonian Talmud, the meaning has been significantly changed in its use in modern 
orthodoxy (1996, 51). Bacon claims its Talmudic use is to distinguish between the ‘intent of 
the Torah’ and the probable meaning of the text; he further refers to Maimonides’s 
clarification in the Guide for the Perplexed, which states that Da’as Torah refers to the ‘view 
of the Torah’ as opposed to the ‘view of the philosophers’ or the ‘view of the masses’ on 
theological matters (Ibid., 51). Instead, Bacon suggests, at the turn of the 20th century Da’as 
Torah started to be used by rabbinical leadership to support an ‘extreme notion of rabbinic 
authority’ (Ibid., 48). 
Much of the supposed re-interpretation of Da’as Torah stems from the teachings of Rabbi 




Hungary. The Chafetz Chaim taught that rabbis, through the wisdom of Torah, were able to 
solve all the problems of the world (Ibid., 52).  
‘[O]nly the rabbis, whose opinions were based solely on Jewish tradition, 
could formulate solutions to the problems of the Jewish people in the modern 
era; only a Jewish community conducted according to the Torah by men who 
were the embodiment of Torah could hope to survive in the long run. … It 
gave religious sanction to the views of political orthodoxy by an appeal to the 
moral authority of gedolei haTorah [italicisation in original; meaning the great 
Torah scholars]’(Ibid., 53). 
  
Not only does the concept of Da’as Torah make the political religious, it also makes the 
political infallible and indisputable. 
In contrast, Avi Shafran, the director of public affairs for Agudath Israel of America 
offers the following explanation of Da’as Torah: 
‘What [Da’as Torah] means, simply put, is that those most imbued with 
Torah-knowledge and who have internalized a large degree of the perfection 
of values and refinement of character that the Torah idealizes are thereby 
rendered particularly, indeed extraordinarily, qualified to offer an authentic 
Jewish perspective on matters of import to Jews - just as expert doctors are 
those most qualified (though still fallible, to be sure) to offer medical advice.’ 
(Shafran 2008) 
 
Coincidentally, there is a warning in a banner on the top of the website for Agudath Israel of 
America when visited at time of writing. It looks like a cookie warning at first, but upon 
closer examination, it reads, ‘According to Daas Torah, internet usage is only permitted with 
proper and adequate filtration’ (‘About Agudath Yisrael’ 2019). 
The vast majority of my research participants would take great issue with Bacon’s 
argument; I am sure they would say that he misinterprets both the Talmud and Maimonides, 
and demand to know how rabbinic authority could possibly be separated from the 
interpretation of the intent of the Torah. I am not a religious studies scholar; I do not seek to 
make a sweeping statement about whether or not Da’as Torah is a manufactured concept. I 
am an anthropologist, and what concerns me is the question of what Da’as Torah means for 
the structure and function of Haredi society today. For this research, Da’as Torah is 




1) It established rabbis as both religious and political leaders; 
2) It greatly reinforced the patriarchal and hierarchical aspects of traditional Judaism; and 
3) It created an atmosphere of absolutism within the populace; while the rabbis can 
disagree and debate among themselves (which indeed they do), those who lack smicha 
(rabbinical ordination) cannot question, debate, or lead. 
It is not unusual for this type of response to emerge in non-Christian religious communities 
which are newly introduced to secularism. Rinaldo discussed a similar process in her study of 
veiling practices in Indonesia: she suggested the process of ‘democratization’ of Indonesia 
led to ‘a broad turn toward more conservative understandings of Islam’ (Rinaldo 2014, 825). 
Ultimately, this religious response to secularisation can be understood as both resistance to 
(Asad 2003) and critique of (Asad 2013b, 134) the secular. 
Bacon also suggests that a hallmark of Da’as Torah is the ability to make sweeping 
rulings and mandates without halachic foundation (1996, 55). Whether or not this is the case, 
the differentiation between rabbinical rulings which are founded in halacha [Jewish religious 
law] and those which are not is the focus of many of the women’s movements which are 
discussed later in this project. Da’as Torah was mentioned on occasion in my interviews, and 
it maintains a ubiquitous presence in the background of Haredi life. Ruth Colian, whose voice 
can be found throughout the following chapters, cites Da’as Torah in describing her decision 
to seek a rabbinical ruling in support of her decision to pursue access to a better religious 
school for her daughter. There is also activism towards limiting the scope of Da’as Torah and 
it will be explored in Chapter Six. Da’as Torah is approached and implemented in different 
ways, depending on the group (Baumel 2006, 46). Ultimately, Da’as Torah is of integral 
importance to the question of Haredi identity, and yet is grossly under researched and 
neglected in other scholarly studies. 




political one; it places everything firmly in the religious realm by granting authority to 
religious leaders over all aspects of life. In this way, life is reclaimed from the secular domain 
and secularism is resisted. This is only necessitated by the binary opposition manufactured by 
secularism, because the two cannot remain separate in the body that struggles to conform to 
the impossible binary. Also, by granting rabbinical leadership such authority by virtue of 
their religious wisdom, it allows them to take on the role of politicians. Thus, the ‘structural 
violence’ of secularism can be combatted on religious terms. If the religious is then political, 
however, and the secular is within the purview of religious authority, it stands to reason that 
the political then becomes religious; to vote Haredi is to conform to Haredi ethics. Da’as 
Torah establishes the premise for this; the significance of this will become apparent as we 
explore the formation of Haredi identity within the state of Israel. 
 
 Ottoman Rule, British Mandate, and the Development of Extremism 
 
There is evidence of religious Jews living in the Holy Land continuously since the fall of 
the second temple; in addition, Ashkenazi Jews have been moving to the Holy Land in great 
numbers since the 16th century. Under the Ottomans, Jews enjoyed a relatively high quality 
of life (Mahmood 2016, 34-35), and some Jews chose to make their home in the Ottoman 
Empire after expulsions and persecutions in Europe. One of the reasons for this, Mahmood 
claims, is the fact that the Ottomans did not seek to transform ‘difference into sameness’ 
(Ibid., 35); there was no assimilation and no forced conversion (Ibid., 36). Jews in the 
Ottoman Empire were not restricted as to movement or choice of occupation, nor were they 
exiled or killed for their faith (Ibid., 36). Safed had become a centre of Kabbalistic study, and 
by the mid-16th century there were over 10,000 Jews residing in Palestine, with the majority 
concentrated in Jerusalem and Safed (Efron 2003, 17).  These religious Jews emulated life in 




study religious texts (Ibid., 18). These communities were spared much of the internal conflict 
that plagued Eastern European Jewish communities, including splits between Hasidism and 
misnagdim, and the subsequent Haskallah. It was a shock to them, therefore, when the First 
Aliyah occurred in 1881 and they encountered Zionism for the first time. 
‘Relations between these new settlements and existing Jewish settlements 
were tense from the start. Though many of the new settlers were religiously 
observant— some more, some less— they didn’t admire the Jews they found 
in Palestine. … [t]hey made light of the primitive ways of the Jews who— to 
their eyes— were now far more Levantine than European.  
‘The antipathy was mutual. Jews already living in Palestine found little to 
esteem in the new settlers, who knew nothing and were too arrogant to 
learn. …[T]he religious observance of the neophytes was always suspect (it 
was, indeed, often lax by traditionalist standards). …This friction between 
Zionists and traditionalists would never go away; it has only gotten steadily 
worse in the hundred and twenty years since the first Zionists arrived.’ (Ibid., 
27-28) 
 
Unfortunately, the relative peace which the Jews enjoyed in the Holy Land under 
Ottoman rule was gradually eroded toward the end of their reign, mainly due to European 
interference (Mahmood 2016, 39). Religious Jews began to struggle with the same conflicts 
as those their European compatriots had encountered. This was further amplified under the 
British Mandate, because of the colonial practice of ‘mapping religious identity onto other 
social distinctions (regional, economic, tribal)’ (Ibid., 63). Once Agudat Yisrael was founded 
in 1912, the religious population of Israel was an obvious candidate for a local area Agudah. 
Moshe Blau, a young rabbi, became leader of the first Agudah in Mandate Palestine in 1919; 
he ‘had concluded that the only way to protect “Torah Judaism,” as he called it, was to 
separate it entirely, in its politics and culture, from the Zionists’ community in Palestine’ 
(Efron 2003, 33). In this, Blau had much in common with the Frankfurt Separatists. He 
established schools, courts, civil authorities, and other elements of the Agudat Yisrael 
structure as it existed in Eastern Europe, and continued to negotiate for peace with the Arab 
leaders in Palestine, counter to the Zionist cause (Ibid., 33-34). He led Agudat Yisrael in 




Funeral’ 1946). The development of Agudat Yisrael in the Holy Land, then, followed a more 
extreme path than the moderate compromisers in Poland; religious Jews in Mandate Palestine 
were far more partial to the Frankfurt approach of a complete break with other Jewish 
communities and organisations like the hardline but powerful Frankfurt minority. This would 
set the tone for religious community choices in Israel after the founding of the state, though 
even this early separatist attitude found compromise as the ethnic conflicts increased within 
Palestine in the 1930s (Efron 2003, 36). Already, some thought that the approach of Agudat 
Yisrael did not go far enough, however, and further extremism emerged in Jerusalem before 
long. 
The beginnings of a more extreme approach than that offered by the Palestine Agudah 
can be traced to a 1920 board member Jacob Israel de Haan (Ibid., 33). De Haan had been a 
socialist in Holland, and had married a Christian woman who, even after de Haan’s 
repentance, refused to convert to Judaism; he refused to divorce her despite this. De Haan 
became an ardent zealot in the Holy Land, with special hatred of all things secular, but 
Zionism most of all (Ibid., 33-34). So extreme was his rejection of the Zionist project that he 
refused to speak to other Jews in the nascent Modern Hebrew which was rapidly spreading in 
Mandate Palestine, and instead only communicated in Arabic (Ibid., 34). When de Haan was 
murdered by a sniper from the Zionist organisation Haganah, a paramilitary group that 
became the prototype for the Israel Defence Force (IDF) in 1924, many of the Agudah Jews 
felt confirmed in their belief that the Zionists were ‘evil men and ruffians’, as Rabbi Yosef 
Chaim Sonnenfeld declared (Ibid., 34-35).  
With de Haan as a martyr around which it was possible to rally, Rabbi Sonnenfeld drew 
many more Jews to his organisation, Eidah haChareidi (‘Congregation of Haredi’, here after 
called ‘Eidah Haredi’ or ‘Eidah’) which had been founded in 1921 with the help of other 




created as an alternative to the Chief Rabbinate of Mandate Palestine, as created by the 
British with Zionist rabbinical leaders; the Agudah was somewhat supportive of Eidah early 
in its life but later separated itself from the newer organisation. It should be noted, this seems 
to be the first official use of ‘Haredi’ as a term in opposition to Zionism in the Holy Land; up 
until this point, the word Haredi seems to have been interchangeable with ‘orthodox’, which, 
from this point on, also seems to apply to religious Jews with Zionist leanings (Samet 1988: 
249). Eidah Haredi continues to exist today; their own website claims that they were founded 
because the Zionists created animosity with the Arabs, and that Eidah Haredi was welcomed 
by the Arabs in Palestine: 
‘When the winds of Zionism began to blow through Palestine, the Arabs 
began to change their attitude because of the fact that they heard that the 
“Jews” wanted to grab the Land from them and expel them. Of course, they 
did not distinguish between the Zionist troublemakers and the members of the 
loyal authentic Jewish community that advocated tolerance and peace. There 
were outbreaks of violence here and there, until bloodshed began and many 
people died. 
‘However, instead of learning from this experience that brought suffering 
upon the Jewish People in the Holy Land, and ceasing their dangerous lawless 
behavior, the Zionists used these events as “additional proof” for the need for 
a state and an army to protect the Jews from violence. Jewish blood was of no 
importance to the Zionists in comparison to their “lofty” nationalist goals. 
‘It was clear to the leaders of the Orthodox community that there was an 
immediate need for an organization to confront the Zionist organization, and 
demand that the British desist from endorsing the idea of a Zionist state, and 
resolve Arab-Jewish tensions peacefully…. 
‘It goes without saying that the Eida Haredis [sic] was accepted warmly 
among non-Jews, much more so than was the case with the Zionists – both 
because of the fact that the Eida Haredis represented traditional, authentic 
Judaism against Zionism that openly rejected Judaism in its entirety, and 
because of the fact that the Orthodox position made more sense in order to 
prevent bloodshed and promote harmony in Palestine.’ (‘The Murder of Dr. 
DeHaan’ 1924) 
 
The Eidah Haredi website, which is under the English title ‘Torah Jews’, perpetuates the 
self-definition that Eidah seems to have always espoused as peacemakers and saviours of the 
Jewish nation. The leadership of Eidah Haredi following the death of Rabbi Sonnenfeld in 
1932 exemplifies the extremist bent of the organisation: the most recent leadership has 




headquarters of Eidah Haredi to New York as the ultimate protest to Zionism, despite the 
English name of the organisation, Orthodox Council of Jerusalem, enduring. Eidah Haredi is 
not especially significant to the research within this work, besides further clarifying the 
formation of the identity and category of Haredi, and providing the groundwork upon which a 
different organisation was founded, one which continues to endure in the spaces of Israel 
where my work occurred: Neturei Karta. 
While the above quote from Eidah Haredi website may be conflated with other 
ideological goals, it does seem that conflict between Arabs and Jews increased in Mandate 
Palestine in the 1930s (Efron 2003, 35-36). Meanwhile, there had also been a new influx of 
religious Jews escaping persecution in Europe; these people felt significantly less animosity 
toward the Zionists, likely due to the horrors of Nazi persecution from which they had 
escaped (Ibid., 35). By the mid-1930s, the Agudah had found common ground with the 
Zionists in an effort to protect Jewish communities from the rising levels of violence with 
Arabs (Ibid., 35). In 1934, Agudah member Rabbi Isaac Breuer made an impassioned speech 
to the community, beseeching members to participate in rebuilding the Holy Land, and not 
‘leave Jewish history to the Zionists’ (Ibid., 36). This proved to be the breaking point for 
certain members, as it represented too sharp of an ideological break from what they thought 
were Torah values: that it was counter to the way of God to try and ‘hurry the Messiah’ 
(Ibid., 36) by rebuilding the Holy Land before it was the ordained time to do so.  
In 1935, a group of leaders who had particularly followed the teachings of Rabbi 
Sonnenfeld, split from the Agudah. Originally called Chevrat haChaim (‘Community of 
Life’), they soon changed their name to Aramaic, which endures today: Neturei Karta, which 
literally means ‘Guardians of the City’. Their first leader, Rabbi Amram Blau, was the 
brother of Rabbi Moshe Blau, first leader of the Palestine Agudah; Amram (which is how I 




Amram encouraged zealotry as the only saving grace of Judaism, as it saved the Jews at 
Masada (Ibid., 36-37); he and his followers perpetually attacked the Agudah politically 
throughout the remaining period of Mandate Palestine. Following the creation of the state of 
Israel, they denounced David Ben-Gurion, rejected the state and denied its legitimacy under 
international law, and negotiated with Jordanian diplomats to live under their rule, even 
issuing their own Neturei Karta monetary notes (Ibid., 37). In the 1950s, Amram organised 
the Sabbath Riots, inciting his teenage followers to act out violently against those non-
observant Jews who passed by the Neturei Karta area in Mea She’arim, Jerusalem. Leaders 
of Neturei Karta since Amram have continued to advocate the use of violence and sought to 
undermine the state through shows of support for Hamas and Fatah, the Palestinian parties in 
Gaza and the West Bank.  
My research did not include any women who identified as members of Neturei Karta, but 
there were several women with whom I conducted research who would identify more 
significantly with the extreme fringe groups like Neturei Karta. Since the founding of Neturei 
Karta, new groups who participate in similar levels of aggressive anti-Zionism and reject all 
participation in the state have multiplied. Furthermore, certain established groups whose 
elements were more significantly aligned with Neturei Karta have had sub-sects split from 
the more mainstream Haredi part of the community and follow the extreme teachings of 
Amram and those like him. For the most part, these groups live in Mea She’arim. While the 
majority of my work does not concern women who live in the extreme anti-Zionist fringe, 
one woman, Grune, whom we will meet in Chapter Seven, grew up in Mea She’arim among 
an extreme branch of the Breslever Hasidic sect. Research among these women has taken on 
a certain level of fashionability today likely because of their extreme attitudes (Dalsheim 
2019, 84), but my research was mainly more concerned with women who were more typical 




However, violence against secular Jews has spread significantly to other populations 
within Haredi communities, and Noah Efron, an historian at Bar Ilan University, credits 
Neturei Karta with creating a sort of heroic militarism within the Haredi identity: ‘These 
books are testaments to a new sort of ultra-Orthodox heroism, one that is activist, one that is 
combative, one that owes everything to Amram Blau and his Neturei Karta [my italicisation]’ 
(2003, 41). Stadler, an anthropologist at Hebrew University, found that this identity had 
become integral to the Haredi male identity broadly by the time of her fieldwork in the early 
aughts. She suggests that there is a militaristic imaginary of the yeshiva student as soldier, 
fighting against his yetzer hara, his evil inclination, which she characterises as his sexual 
desires (Stadler 2009, 54), but which I have discussed elsewhere as a broader sense of 
temptation and weakness. Furthermore, modest standards of dress which were first viewed as 
extreme within these types of communities have nonetheless influenced others. For instance, 
even for the most mainstream establishment Haredi groups, it is still common to choose not 
to speak Modern Hebrew, and instead speak Yiddish, as a recognition of the role of Hebrew 
in the Zionist project (Lefkowitz 2006, 16). Therefore, it is important to recognise the 
influence of one extremist group upon others, and contextualise the continued presence of 
Neturei Karta and others like them in Haredi neighbourhoods in Israel as a continuing 
influence on Haredi identity to this day. 
Despite the internal splits within the nascent Haredi community which gave birth to 
Eidah Chareidi and Neturei Karta, the majority of Jews who identified as religious and not 
Zionist in Mandate Palestine remained more strongly affiliated with the more moderate 
approach of Agudat Yisrael. While there were occasional radical departures— for instance, 
the Agudah translated into Hebrew and disseminated Wasserman’s pamphlet suggesting the 
Zionists were to blame for the Nazis (Efron 2003, 45)— the Agudah continued to work in 




Ultimately, Agudat Yisrael was far more receptive to the creation of the state of Israel than 
previous ideology would have suggested. In the minutes of the notes of the Agudat Yisrael 
meeting in Israel on the day of the United Nations vote to establish a Jewish State called the 
phenomenon ‘divine provenance’ (Ibid., 46). Agudat Yisrael, now a formal political party in 
the state of Israel, which joined forces with the Dati Leumi as the United Religious Front, 
gaining 12 seats in the first Knesset (Israeli Parliament); a Haredi rabbi, Yitzhak Meir Levine, 
was chosen to serve as Minister of Welfare. 
 
Israel: Secular Jewish State? 
 
It is my premise, generally, that the Haredi community operates as a minority within the 
nation-state of Israel. They have formed this approach over a long history of interactions with 
the state apparatus, and this approach, as a minority, has in turn affected the formation of 
Haredi identity. Mahmood suggests that a ‘minority’ is not a demographic category, but 
rather a ‘shared sense of collective discrimination, political in that it signifies hierarchal 
difference’ (Mahmood 2016, 54). Ironically, the origins of contemporary contestations of 
minority groups are largely influenced by the history of the Jews in Europe in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The United Nations legal apparatus surrounding 
minorities and human rights emerged from both the Holocaust, and the language of the failed 
Polish Minority Treaty, which American Jewish groups attempted to employ for the 
protection of Jews in Poland before the Second World War, but which was never successfully 
implemented as it was viewed as a threat to Polish sovereignty (Ibid., 56). This treaty 
proposed language around proportional representation of minorities (in this case, Jews), at all 
levels of government, and sought communal control over social, educational, and religious 
institutions (Ibid.). The fact that this protection treaty was unable to be implemented served 




necessary: security within Europe, or self-determination (Ibid., 56-57). Ultimately, the events 
of the Holocaust decided this for both the Zionists and the world. Hannah Arendt suggests 
that the Holocaust proved that human rights were meaningless without membership in a 
nation (Mahmood 2016, 57; Dalsheim 2019, 89). The only true protection was available 
through independent sovereignty (Mahmood 2016, 58), and thus the state of Israel was born. 
Early Zionism, as we learned previously, rejected almost all forms of religion (Dalsheim 
2019, 83). Zionists sought to make Zionism a ‘modern’ movement, with a Westernised 
Jewish polity (Shohat 2017). It was ‘a project that sought freedom from religious persecution, 
and freedom from religion itself’ (Dalsheim 2019, 165). Thus, in the early state of Israel, 
there was a struggle born of this vision, in which the question of democracy seemed at odds 
with a population that sought to maintain religious tradition in their new home.  
A prominent feature of the modern secular state is the willingness to cause pain if doing 
so is in the service of democracy and results in the humanisation of the subjects (Asad 2003, 
62). In this, the early state of Israel was no different than other secularised societies, and 
Israel continues to be representative of this globally shared feature of secular states 
(Mahmood 2016, 10). The ultimate result is that these forms of secular governance ultimately 
lead to an exacerbation of the tensions which predated the formation of the secular state 
(Ibid., 1). This is because a secular democracy is predicated upon two fundamental myths: 
that of elite liberal clarity which seeks to contain and curtail religion and religious life; and 
the inevitable democratic majority which dominates minority groups (Asad 2003, 61). 
Mahmood suggests, ‘Following Talal Asad, I conceptualize political secularism as the 
modern state’s sovereign power to reorganize substantive features of religious life, stipulating 
what religion is or ought to be, assigning its proper content, and disseminating concomitant 
subjectivities, ethical frameworks, and quotidian practices’ (Mahmood 2016, 3). Essentially, 




will conform to specific behaviours and obligations. This leads to certain strategies in which 
the secular state manages difference (Ibid., 60). For the minority, this results in new ways of 
understanding identity within the polity, and how it operates in defense of its own ethics and 
values in the face of a possibly hostile majority (Ibid.). Israel has, in its pursuit of secular 
democracy, developed this relationship with its Haredi minority.4 In this way (among others), 
Israel is no different from its post-colonial neighbours in the Middle East in contending with 
‘a new grid of intelligibility and a form of stratification’ that fails to eliminate religious 
difference (Ibid., 62). In some ways, this process was further exacerbated in the state of 
Israel, which followed the ideology of mamlachtiyut, or ‘stateism’, which centres all power, 
knowledge, and authority in the state apparatus (Ben-eliezer 2004, 247). 
In the face of the majoritarian prejudice which is implicit in all democratic secular states, 
minorities find themselves in an advocacy process which only serves to highlight their 
differences (Mahmood 2016, 67). In Israel, as in Mahmood’s case study of Egypt, this is only 
further complicated when the state takes a role in regulating religion (Ibid., 80). In Egypt, 
portions of religious life remain in state control; in Israel, the state regulates religious life 
through the rabbinate, the kosher food certification system, the religious family courts, 
oversight of the ritual baths, and many other ways. These roles are not seen as a violation of 
secularism; indeed, they maintain a system in which the myth of secularism becomes self-
perpetuating, because this incursion of the state is constantly subject to the demand that 
religion be kept separate (Ibid., 2). This is only possible because of the type of ethics, values, 
and personhood which is expected by the state of its citizens. 
Dalsheim states: ‘In Israel, the sovereign people are not “Israelis,” they are “Jews.” This 
conflation of nation and religion in the definition of the people reproduces a racial 
 
4 Haredim are clearly not the only minority at odds in the secular polity of Israel; the most obvious is the 
Palestinian minority, who is at significantly less advantage in manoeuvring for their own interests. Shohat 
(2017) and Lavie (2018) would also position non-Ashkenazim in a similar minority role, and there are countless 




understanding of belonging at the same time that it requires particular religious rules and 
rituals whose implementation are made to charactarize the national group’ (2019, 167). 
Ultimately, it is only possible to be fully ethically and morally ‘Israeli’ by being Jewish; but 
one must be a particular type of Jew. By including the rabbinate, etc in the state apparatus, 
the nation-state inadvertently put ‘religion’ back in the identity formation of its people. Now, 
the Marxist dreams of the early Zionists are not to be: even if a Jew wishes to work on the 
farm during Shabbat, he cannot, or the food produced will no longer be kosher (Ibid., 26). 
Unfortunately, Haredim are not the ‘correct’ type of Jews, either. Dalsheim suggests that 
this is because they are not adequately part of the labour market (Ibid., 99); while that may be 
so, their lack of participation in labour is only one form in which Haredim do not properly 
participate in the state of Israel. The Haredim are also not good Zionists; they view Zionism 
as a secular ideology (which it is, of course), but even more repugnant to the Haredim is the 
idea of Religious Zionism. Religious Zionism, or Dati Leumi, is now the most prevalent form 
of Zionism in Israel (Ibid., 190). This is an hashkafa that combines Zionist ideology with 
religion; an unsurprising development given the enmeshment of religious regulation in the 
secular Israeli state. It is, however, perceived as even more dangerous than secular Zionism to 
Haredi ethics (Ibid., 101). In return, the state and the majority of the Israeli polity view the 
Haredim as pariahs for their avoidance of army service. Service in the IDF is one of the most 
fundamental roles for a citizen to play (Lavie 2018, 84-85).  
Thus, the Haredim have occupied, and continue to occupy, a place of precarity in the 
Israeli state, as all minorities do in modern society (Mahmood 2016, 6). Agudat Yisrael 
continued to act as a political party with the interests of the Haredi minority as its sole 
concern; in the late ‘80s, a moderate schism occurred between the powerful Hasidic groups in 
Agudat Yisrael and the Litvish leaders, and another political party was formed, called Degel 




HaTorah join forces under the banner of United Torah Judaism. The Sephardi Haredim, who 
will be a significant subject of the coming chapters, also have their own party, Shas (Shomrei 
Sephard, or Sephardi Guardian [of the Torah]) , which formed under Rabbi Ovadia Yosef in 
the mid-1980s. Shas and United Torah Judaism often work in concert in the political life of 
Israel today. Both advocate for the interests of religious minorities within the modern state of 
Israel. It is with this understanding, of the Haredim as a minority within Israel, that the 
remaining portions of this chapter, and indeed much of this project, are understood. This also 
underpins the focus of this work on Haredi identity and Haredi society, because identity is 
most powerfully constructed by those who are placed on the margins of society where 
everyday resistance becomes the most powerful weapon of the weak (Ben-eliezer 2004, 256-
258).  
 
 Increasing Stringency After WWII and Yeshiva Study for Men 
 
When understanding what ‘Haredi’ became in the new state, it is important to consider 
the transformative effect of the Holocaust on Eastern European Jewry, and the refugees who 
came to the new Jewish state immediately following the War of Independence. Ninety 
percent of Polish Jewry had been slaughtered in the Holocaust (Bacon 1996, 281), and the 
religious, especially the Hasidic community, lost proportionally more than any other Jewish 
group. Almost all of the students and teachers of the great yeshivot of Eastern Europe were 
lost, with the exception of the Mir Yeshiva, which was revived first in Shanghai during the 
war, and eventually in Brooklyn. Belk, Kahn, and Szendroi has been studying changes to 
Hasidic Yiddish, and posits that the trauma of the Holocaust has caused over 200 years worth 
of linguistic change in the last fifty (forthcoming 2022); it would seem a similar loss of 
learning and wisdom occurred, which, compounded by the trauma experienced by survivors, 




follow in the Jewish State. Ultimately, as a result, the Agudah’s focus on yeshiva study 
became central to the ideology of re-shaping a post-Holocaust religious Judaism, in order to 
redeem the Jewish people and the world. 
In the 1950s and ‘60s, Agudat Yisrael established a certain level of religious underpinning 
for the Jewish State through political alliances with the Religious Zionists and others on the 
newly formed Knesset. Through the representation of Agudat Yisrael, ‘Haredi’ became a 
recognised and designated sector of the population, separate from other religious Jews. 
Internally, the Agudah solidified the ideology of Da’as Torah, ensuring political power for 
the great religious thinkers who would emerge in the future (Bacon 1996, 296). Ben-Gurion, 
as mentioned previously, offered an initial postponement of mandatory army service to four 
hundred yeshiva students in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, and Safed; this would ultimately transform 
into a complete exemption (Stadler 2009, 99). Ben-Gurion originally set up four streams of 
state-funded school systems, one of which was overseen by the Agudah; in 1953, when that 
system was disbanded, Agudat Yisrael set up an independent school system which met their 
interests even more completely: despite receiving approximately 70% of its funding from the 
government, the system was subject to no government supervision (Efron 2003, 50-51). By 
1958, however, only 56% of Haredi men over the age of twenty-five had ever studied in a 
yeshiva; about 36% of those who did spent more than sixteen years doing so, and the majority 
only spent between one and eight years doing so (Regev 2013, figures 8 & 9). Haredi life still 
remained quite similar to religious Jewish life in Eastern Europe in the 19th century.  
The Haredi population in general was also quite small at this point: in 1960 only 6% of all 
primary and secondary school students in the country were Haredi (Weiss 2019, 34). 
However, over the course of the 1960s, yeshiva ideology began to grow; in 1968 the Knesset 
essentially doubled the number of military exemptions for yeshiva students to 800 (Efron 




thirty-four in the same year had studied or were currently studying in a yeshiva; nearly half of 
that generation of yeshiva scholars would spend more than sixteen years studying in a yeshiva 
(Regev 2013, figures 8 & 9). This was the beginning of the gradual increase in stringency of 
interpretation of halacha by Haredi rabbinical leaders in Israel; as discussed above, this is 
due largely to the loss of wise leaders in the Holocausts, and the Haredi desire to heal the 
world following both the Holocaust and the Haskallah. I would also suggest that the new 
Israeli context provided a backdrop for this strong approach: rather than differentiating 
themselves from a non-Jewish ‘other’, as they had in Europe, Haredi Jews now faced a 
Jewish ‘other’, whose religious practice was laced with secularism. For men, this increase in 
stringency resulted in the increased focus on yeshiva study; women have faced ever-
increasingly strict modesty standards, but this will be addressed more particularly in Chapter 
Three. There has also been greatly increased pressure to produce large families, but that 
burden has really become one that is equally shared, as I will discuss later in this chapter. 
While yeshiva study increased in the ‘70s and early ‘80s, other demographics remained 
similar to before in the Haredi community. In 1978, 76% of Haredi men aged between 
twenty-five and thirty-four had studied or were studying in a yeshiva, and 53% of them 
would spend sixteen or more years doing so (Ibid., figures 8 & 9). However, Haredi men 
were still entering the workplace following these years of study: 85% of Haredi men aged 
thirty-five to fifty-four in 1979 were employed, most of them in non-education sectors, 
meaning they weren’t teaching in a yeshiva (Ibid., figure 13). 58% of Haredi women 
remained unemployed (Ibid., figure 13). Birth rates had not yet increased significantly; in 
1980, only 4% of all primary and secondary school students were Haredi (Weiss 2019, 34). 
However, change was coming. 
The 1977 Israeli election saw Agudat Yisrael back in political power for the first time 




Menachem Begin promised Agudat Yisrael a great many policy changes in return for their 
support for his government; the most important of these was the increase in funding provided 
to Agudat Yisrael schools, and the removal of the cap on military exemptions for yeshiva 
students (Efron 2003, 53). In 1977, it became possible for Haredi families to grow as large as 
possible, without the danger of their sons being forced to serve in the IDF. This shift, 
however, unsettled several of the delicate balancing acts which had been maintained since the 
founding of the state. Other Israelis resented the fact that the Haredim now had significant 
power in policy-making, but still demanded exemptions from civil service (Stadler 2009, 99). 
From the 1980s onward, anti-Haredi politics became a winning platform (Efron 2003, 55).  
The 1977 policy changes also disrupted internal politics in the Haredi community itself. 
Until now, this discussion of Haredi identity has carefully avoided non-European aspects. 
This is not a mistake or an oversight; Ashkenazi Jews have largely defined the Haredi 
identity and created a hegemonic culture which has marginalised many of those of other 
ethnic backgrounds. There were, however, significant numbers of Jews from North Africa 
and the Middle East who emigrated to Israel within the early years of the country’s existence, 
usually fleeing serious persecution. The vast majority of these Jews were very religious, but 
their observance looked very different from the observances of the Jews of the Agudah. A 
significant portion of this dissertation focusses on discrimination against Sephardim in Haredi 
society, and so I will not dwell overlong on that here. Suffice it to say that the new school 
funding was disproportionately distributed in favour of more Ashkenazi areas, at the expense 
of Sephardi neighbourhoods throughout the country (Ibid., 54). In 1984, the newly-formed 
Shas party entered the general election for the first time (Ibid., 54). Many Litvish Haredim 
also supported Shas at first; the Hasidic dynasties, like the Gur, which had held much of the 
Agudah power in Poland had maintained power in Israel, and the old conflicts between 




and created their own party, Degel HaTorah, with the Belzer Hasidim, who had always been 
ideologically opposed to the Gur (Bacon 1996, 304). That same year, Shas received 4.7% of 
the popular vote, gaining them six seats in the Knesset (Efron 2003, 54). Power was shifting. 
The late 1980s did not show too much change from the ‘70s in the number of Haredi men 
enrolled in yeshiva, with enrolment holding steady at 77% (Regev 2013, figure 8). However, 
nearly two thirds of those enrolled would end up spending sixteen or more years studying in 
yeshiva (Ibid., figure 9). The more significant change in the ‘70s and ‘80s was the new de-
emphasis of secular education for men. In 1988, only 39% of Haredi men aged twenty-five to 
thirty-four received a bagrut, the Israeli matriculation certificate, similar to an American high 
school diploma (Ibid., figure 7). While some Haredi men in that generation did complete 
secondary education without earning a bagrut, 38% of Haredi men aged twenty-five to thirty-
four in 1988 had only achieved a primary school level education or less (Ibid., figure 7), 
drastically reducing men’s employability.  This trend would only increase over the next 
twenty years.  
In 1990 and 1995, Haredi male employment overall held steady at approximately 50% 
(Regev 2013, figure 1), but by 2000 only about 42% were employed, and by 2005 Haredi 
male employment had decreased to 40% (Ibid., figure 1). However, the ‘90s saw a significant 
spike in yeshiva attendance: 85% of Haredi men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-
four in 1998 had attended or were attending yeshiva (Ibid., figure 8). A third of them had 
achieved a bagrut, but nearly half had not even received secondary education (Ibid., figure 
7). Meanwhile, ill-feeling toward Haredim had been growing throughout Israel, and in 1999 
the Tax Committee was formed to find a solution to the problem of Haredi draft refusal: they 
created the Nachal Haredi unit (nachal refers to the type of brigade), which operates 
separately from the rest of the army, maintains religious observance, and is not open to 




‘Haredi’ and ‘Dati Leumi’, used for Jews who are both extremely religious and extremely 
Zionist] and Dati Leumi men join this unit, and that while some Haredim do, they are mainly 
yeshiva drop-outs (Ibid., 100) as I will discuss in later chapters. Despite the growing tensions 
against Haredim, however, Shas did extremely well in the 1999 elections, gaining 17 seats in 
the Knesset and establishing itself as the third largest party in Israel (Efron 2003, 54). Many 
non-Haredi voters must have voted for Shas, indicating that while it is a Haredi party, it’s 
secondary goal of Sephardi equality outweighed distaste for Haredim, at least among 
Sephardim. This is an element of Israeli voting behaviour that should not be forgotten in the 
future. 
The first decade of the new millennium saw this gradual increase in stringency reach its 
pinnacle. Yeshiva enrolment was at its highest, at 90% (Regev 2013, figure 8). Only 19% of 
men aged twenty-five to thirty-four had achieved a bagrut, and 58% of the same population 
had only had secular subjects to the primary level or less (Ibid., figure 7). For Haredi men 
aged twenty to twenty-four in 2008, only 5% received a bagrut, and 68% had only a primary 
school education or less (Ibid., figure 7). Efron recounts a chance encounter with two ten year 
old boys in Beitar, a Haredi settlement in the West Bank, in which he chatted to them about 
maths and geography: both boys had ceased study of secular subjects two years earlier; 
neither knew long division, and both thought the USA was in Europe (Efron 2003, 51). 
While the earning capacity of the Haredi men was dropping, the Haredi population was 
exploding. This was compounded by the extremely young age of marriage at the time: 
between 2003 and 2004, the marriage rate of Haredi people aged twenty to twenty-four was 
61% (‘Statistical Report’ 2018, 6). In 2000, 12% of all primary and secondary school 
children in the country were Haredi (Weiss 2019, 34). This is triple the proportion in 1980. 
From 2003 to 2005 the Haredi fertility rate was at its highest peak in the history of the state 




the total Haredi population in Israel was approximately 750,000 (‘Statistical Report’ 2017, p. 
4 figure 1). 
The aughts continued to see a rise in animosity towards Haredim from the general public, 
especially in the form of the Shinui party, a political party whose sole platform was an 
identity as an anti-Haredi party (Ibid.: 100). The founder of Shinui, Tommy Lapid, is the 
father of Yair Lapid who ran in the 2019 elections with Yesh Atid (Efron 2003, 14) and has 
just become Alternate Prime Minister through a coalition government. The Shinui Party won 
fifteen seats in the Knesset in 2003, though a subsequent internal party split ultimately meant 
that Shinui was not a viable party after 2006. However, political rhetoric introduced by Shinui 
continues to be part of mainstream political discourse, including perceptions of Haredi as 
draft dodgers and parasites on the state; there are also aspects of the discourse which mirror 
liberal feminist post-colonial white discourse in that Haredi women need ‘saving’ from 
backwards, oppressive culture (Abu-Lughod 2013, 27-30).  
The most recent decade has shown some significant shifts in the number of both men and 
women receiving advanced degrees, a relative drop in the Haredi fertility rate, some increase 
in employment, and other qualitative change on a fairly rapid scale compared to the gradual 
increase of the past sixty years. Facts and figures only get us so far in comprehending the 
changes in Haredi society today; my ethnographic research instead presents a picture of 
Haredi identity that sometimes confounds definition, and often provides a glimpse of what is 
to come for the devoutly religious of Israel’s future. 
 
Perceptions of Historical Social Change 
 
Women with whom I conducted research are not unaware of the changes in Haredi 
society. Though there is some rhetoric of ‘continuity with an imagined past’ (Fader 2009, 
161), in general women were aware that the current social norms of yeshiva study are 




‘Today, Haredi men hold themselves to a very high standard,’ Bina said, seriously. Bina 
is a frum from birth [expression for people raised in the Haredi world] Litvish woman who 
was born in the New York area, but has lived in the Jerusalem area for more than thirty years. 
She also reflects that men are doing more today; there is a pressure to learn all day, but they 
are also dealing with more familial responsibilities. ‘There’s more learning now, but it used 
to be simpler. You know, the Chafetz Chaim, he achieved such a great level of learning, but 
he also was a very successful grocer. Men used to be able to achieve high levels much more 
quickly. Now it takes more to get to that level.’  
This situates the increase in yeshiva studies as a moral and ethical imperative; the stain of 
secular sin has disadvantaged even those who deny themselves it, and the work of learning 
Torah for tikun olam (literally, ‘healing the world,’ alluding to the fact that all souls will be 
made whole and complete when the messiah comes), is that much more difficult because of 
the illness of society as a whole. Thus, engaging in yeshiva study becomes a constant critique 
of the secular modern. Men removed themselves from the secular-religious binary, and 
ensconce themselves completely in the religious. This further centres women as the ones who 
do the work of knitting, because they have more with which to contend. 
Michal Tchernovitsky, a frum from birth woman who has become a household name as a 
politician with the Israeli Labour Party, Avodah, connects the social changes to political 
changes, specifically those during the alliance of Menachem Begin with the Haredi political 
parties.  
‘So I think that – first of all, it has changed,’ Michal explains, when I ask her about 
yeshiva study. ‘The [Haredi] mainstream has changed. Like you say, it has become more 
radical, more Torah study. All this Torah study is because of Begin, it’s from 1977. No, it 
existed before, but he cancelled the quotas. Until then there were quotas for Torah scholars. 




Haredi families grew, and men's participation in the labour market dropped. At the same 
time. Nothing happens by chance.’ 
Michal reflects on the changes within her parents’ lifetimes, and within her own lifetime. 
She remembers growing up with a television; over time, the family was pressured to use only 
the radio. Her father had a profession while spending time studying in a yeshiva, and the 
family believed in secular education, alongside religious education. 
‘So what I'm saying is that my parents were like that,’ she says, ‘but they were 
completely Haredi. I don't think that anyone would have thought of saying to my parents, 
“You're not Haredi.” They may say it to me—’ she says this with a wry smile. She has 
spoken about how her political life has led people to question if she is really Haredi. She 
continues, ‘—but who would have said that to my parents? I mean it is precisely today, it’s 
strange, like once it was much more— There are indeed processes that Haredi society is 
undergoing – radicalisation etc. But— but I'm trying to think. Like… In Haredi society most 
people worked, most of the men worked, they always did. Maybe some worked without 
paying taxes but they worked. There were always large parts of Haredi society who lived 
with one foot – who did not live in the ghetto, yes? Who lived with one foot here and one 
there… and I'm not even speaking about all the Haredim in the periphery.’ 
Michal knows that society has changed, and in many ways. She says that people lived 
with aspects of both the religious and the secular in their life, but that now, the religious 
world has tried to exclude the secular as much as possible— what she refers to as ‘living in 
the ghetto.’ She calls this increasing stringency ‘radicalisation.’ Furthermore, she suggests 
that these changes have transformed how Haredim see other Haredim, as ‘authentically’ 
Haredi or not, depending on their degree of contact with the secular world. Historically, she 
suggests that a balance of religious and secular life would have still been accepted as 




spend as much time in yeshiva as possible. 
 
 
Haredi Society Today 
 
The statistics do show certain changes in the Haredi community in the last ten years. The 
likelihood of marrying very young has dropped slightly (‘Statistical Report’ 2017, 6), and the 
fertility rate between 2012 and 2014 was down to 6.9 from 7.5 nine years prior (Ibid., 6). The 
Haredi marriage rate remains very high, at 82%, compared to 63% in the general Israeli 
population (Ibid., 5). While the economic situation remains fairly grim— as of 2017, 62% of 
Haredi children lived in poverty (Ibid., 12)— the rate of child poverty is declining gradually, 
and the earning capacities of Haredi households are improving. The last ten years have shown 
a gradual increase in male employment without a corresponding drop in female employment 
(Weiss 2019, 56). This is an indication of significant social change: previously, late 20th 
century, when men entered the workplace around age thirty-five to forty, after studying for 
close to two decades in the yeshiva, typically their wives would leave their employment 
(Regev 2013, figures 11 & 12). Today, Haredi homes are more likely to have double income; 
furthermore, Haredi households spend on average 15% less per month than other Jews 
despite their larger household size (‘Statistical Report’ 2017, 12). However, debt among the 
lowest income Haredim is more likely, and more substantial than among other low-income 
groups (Weiss 2019: 97). Elderly Haredim are also more at-risk, because both men and 
women suffer from loss of pension income due to earlier career breaks for childcare, yeshiva 
study, etc (Ibid., 101). While these numbers show that change has occurred, they do not 
explain the causes and reasons for these changes; fundamentally, that is the more relevant 







Haredi identity formed in response to the dual threats of secularism and nationalism. 
Religion was created as the enemy of the secular state; religious people in turn believed 
secular values were the enemy of religious ethics. They sought to resist secular incursion. In 
order to do so, religious leaders were forced to participate in the secular political system, and 
thus form some form of political representation for religious interests. This resulted in Agudat 
Yisrael, and the principle of Da’as Torah. Agudat Yisrael was both a religious organisation 
and political party, which transformed religious leaders into politicians; Da’as Torah 
established religious authority over all aspects of life. Thus, Haredi religious identity became 
inseparable from Haredi political identity. This became further entrenched in the state of 
Israel, where not only were Haredim differentiating themselves from a Jewish ‘other’, the 
state which claimed to be secular also regulated significant portions of religious life and 
maintained certain expectations of what it was to be a proper Jewish citizen. Haredim 
function within the state of Israel as a minority, and act to protect their own interests and 
resist the demands of the state. These identity formations imposed by the secular-religious 
binary has led to an increase in stringency of observance within the Haredi community in 
Israel, which is articulated as an emphasis on yeshiva study for men, in contrast to the state’s 
expectations of army service. Thus, in this chapter, we can understand how Haredi identity 
formed as a response to secularism and the state, and how Haredim function as a minority in 
the state of Israel, negotiating their own religious values with the impositions of the state, and 
therefore establish the enmeshment of the religious and the political in their identities as 
Haredim in Israel. 
In this chapter, the discourse of Haredi identity has been established, and the initial fabric 
of Haredi society has been formed. This chapter allows us to understand the complex forces 




begins to establish why Haredi women are central to the processes of social and political 
change in their communities, by establishing male identity as one that remains mainly in the 
religious sphere. Women, as we will learn in Chapter Three, are put in the complex situation 
of negotiating their community’s relationship with secular influences. They are cast as the 
knitters in the complex scarf of Haredi identity where the secular and the religious co-exist, 




Chapter Three: What Does It Mean 
To Be A Haredi Woman Today? 
In the previous chapter, I established that Haredi identity was formed as an enmeshed 
political-religious identity in response to secularism and in resistance toward the state; the 
result of these negotiations has been an increase in stringency of observance for the first sixty 
years of the state of Israel. This chapter explores what this increase in stringency means for 
women, as opposed for men, whom we have established have been expected to invest heavily 
in yeshiva study. Women have instead faced increasingly stringent standards of modesty and 
emphasis on gender separation. 
This chapter also seeks to investigate the claim that Haredi identity is built around 
resistance to the state and secularism, which was established previously. What role do women 
play in this resistance? Does this hold true for women who have no role in the yeshiva? If 
women do not resist the state through yeshiva study, how do they enact the political portion 
of their identity? And to what extent is the enmeshment of the political and the religious 
evident in their identity? How do women do Haredi identity? Ultimately, this chapter argues 
that Haredi womanhood is shaped by modesty and gender separation to create women who 
support men in yeshiva study by protecting them from the secular world; Haredi women are 
nonetheless conscious of the political dimensions of their identity and proffer a political 
understanding of their role in Israeli society as much as a religious one. In this way, certain 
secular strands are already knitted into the scarf of Haredi identity. 
I argue that the increased emphasis on modesty for women is an inevitable result of the 
combination of both Hasidic and Litvish tradition in the Haredi present-day community. This 
emphasis on modesty is important in that it is the mechanism which shapes women into 




became part of the Haredi world in Israel. These women have faced, and still face, significant 
prejudice in the Haredi community. Discrimination against non-Ashkenazim maintains a 
discourse centred around modesty and piety, which are features of cultural racism (Ben-
eliezer 2004, 254). Nonetheless, non-Ashkenazim are a significant part of the Haredi world in 
Israel, and the non-Ashkenazi women’s experience is part of the greater picture of what it 
means to be a Haredi woman, and the reasons behind the changes discussed in subsequent 
chapters. Indeed, non-Ashkenazi women are some of the most important drivers of change in 
the Haredi world. This emphasis on modesty shapes women into pious beings who support 
men in yeshiva study; women also participate in their own forms of resisting the state. 
Because other religious women in Israel also invest in modesty and their roles as support to 
their husbands, this political element becomes the part of Haredi women’s identities which 
distinguishes them from their Dati Leumi sisters, because Dati Leumi is, by definition, 
Religious Zionist. Instead, Haredi women are not Zionist. While the most extreme Haredi 
women may be considered anti-Zionist, the majority of Haredi women are not anti-Zionist. 
They are simply not Zionist; they are non-Zionist. Though my research was chiefly 
conducted among women, due to the same standards of gender separation and modesty 
applying to me in equal measure, I believe the political identity explored in this chapter is 
representative broadly of most Haredim, men and women alike. This chapter establishes the 
role of Haredi women in Haredi society, so that we can better understand their agency, their 




Mahmood’s research with Muslim women in the Egyptian mosque movement suggested 
that some religious women are shaped into pious subjects as docile bodies which inhabit the 




that Orthodox Jewish women ‘do religion’ as a ‘semi-conscious, self-authoring concept’ 
(Avishai 2008, 413), much in the same way that Butler proposes we perform gender (Butler 
1990). However, there are many ways in which my interlocutors inhabit norms that are no 
different from the way in which Avishai’s non-Haredi Orthodox women ‘do religion’ 
(Avishai 2008). Therefore, the following chapter concerns the ways in which Haredi 
womanhood has developed as a form that differentiates itself from other Jews in the state of 
Israel.  
Increasing stringency in the Haredi world since the founding of the state of Israel has 
resulted in different consequences for women than for men. Women have experienced 
increasingly strict interpretations of modest standards of dress and comportment. Separation 
of the genders has also become more emphasised, resulting in the exclusion of women from 
previously mixed spaces, such as community festivals and celebrations. This is not 
uncommon in non-liberal religious communities faced with the moral dilemma of secular 
legal frameworks (Asad ‘Free Speech’ 2013, 22-23). These forces of change have shaped 
Haredi women’s identity, both as women and as people with internal religious ethics. 
Womanhood is centred around marriage and motherhood; however, women also must 
support their husbands in achieving Haredi manhood through yeshiva study, and so Haredi 
womanhood has come to also encompass working outside the home and mediating secular 
influences. Haredi women are thus placed in the position where they are provided with a host 
of secular ideas, and they must choose from this basket of yarn what to select for the scarf of 
Haredi society. While the demands of Haredi piety may seem overly harsh, they nonetheless 
provide Haredi women with a great deal of agency, which will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters. Haredi womanhood differentiates itself from other Jewish forms of religious 
womanhood through an investment in the idea of the imminence of moshiach [messiah], 




world] and raising Jewish families. Haredi womanhood is also distinguished from other 
religious Jewish forms of womanhood through attitudes towards the religious texts and 
performance of religious observance, and a rejection of certain types of religiosity which 
appear too nationalistic. Many women still profess a form of Haredi identity that is 
inseparable from a political identity, where Haredi personhood is related to how one votes in 
equal measure to how one observes Judaism.  
Increasing stringency leading to increasingly strict modesty has implications for Haredi 
women’s livelihoods, leadership roles, and self-expression. It is because of the increasingly 
strict modesty standards that women’s-only performing arts spaces have been created and 
proliferated, due to the Talmudic injunction of kol isha, which effectively prohibits women 
from performing for mixed audiences, among other interpretations. Stringent modesty 
standards have also been complicit in the erasure of Sephardi and Mizrahi cultural differences 
within the Haredi world, and modesty is central to the discourse surrounding discrimination 
against Sephardim in the Haredi world. Haredi identity is complex and under multiple, 
contradictory pressures, and women are often at the centre of these pressures and 
contradictions. 
 
The Clothes Make the Woman 
 
The first time I met Esther Goldman in person, the first thing she told me was that the 
costume choices for characters in The Mask She Wears were not meant as a basis for 
judgment of the halachic decisions which the characters make. 
I had only just made the blessing on my water, and was taking a sip as she told me this, 
and I used the time to swallow and set the cup down to hide my confusion about why she was 
leading with this piece of information. 
Why would Esther believe that I thought the costume choices were an indication of how 




possibly for the first time, their outward identities. 
Rivka, who struggles with poverty, was the most chassidish in costume choices: her 
sheitel [wig] was chin length and dark brown, she wore a collared blouse with an argyle 
cardigan, and a pleated skirt which hit mid-calf. Bassi’s sheitel, while longer, was still above 
the shoulder, and though her skirt was sometimes floor-length, her sleeves were always long. 
Shani had a long, beautiful, light-coloured sheitel, and wore more colour and more jewellery. 
Her skirts were also long. Shani’s story contained perhaps the most halachically distressing 
dilemmas, including a husband who doesn’t fulfil his obligations to Hashem [‘the name’ used 
for God], and the contemplation of divorce. 
Was Esther telling me this because people actually believed that the horror with which 
Shani was living was an indictment on her long sheitel? 
Upon further reflection, this is not such a ridiculous concept for those women living 
within the Haredi community. In March 2020, a rabbi in Bnei Brak announced that wig 
lengths were the reason why the novel coronavirus outbreak had struck. A year before that, 
another rabbi had blamed long-haired sheitels for the measles epidemic— long sheitels, and 
smartphones. A rabbi the year before had blamed a deadly car accident on wig-length, and by 
extension, the vanity of women, as well. Women’s bodies, dress, and comportment have 
become a massive focus within the Haredi world; while men have no choice but to pursue 
yeshiva study, women have no option but to conform to stricter and stricter standards of 
modesty or face exclusion from the community. Part of this is a greater emphasis on 
separation of the sexes, as well, and these things have far-reaching consequences in the lives 
of women.5 
Esther didn’t intend for modesty standards to invade the interpretation of her play, but she 
 
5 These themes do not only affect Haredi women; Avishai discusses a rabbi who suggests that women’s 





could not avoid the pervasiveness of modesty culture. Yet upon greeting me, a woman 
entering her home with a clear Jewish identity externally in my dress, she felt the need to 
acknowledge the implications of modesty culture, and warn against the incursion of such 




Modesty is an unavoidable subject in contemporary scholarship surrounding religious 
women, as modesty often becomes the site of secular-religious conflict due to the primacy 
given family law as a place of religious reproduction (Mahmood 2016, 9). With the 
increasing stringency articulating itself in terms of modesty for women, modest dress and 
comportment are central aspects of education and socialisation for girls in the Haredi world, 
both in Israel and abroad (Fader 2009, El-Or 1994). However, within the Haredi world, the 
concept ‘tsnius’ is not simply “modesty”. Rather, tsnius was described to me thus by a 
Karliner Hasidic woman who works in girls’ schools: 
 ‘There was one child, I remember, I think she was a sixth grader [age eleven 
or twelve], and we talked about tsnius because that’s an issue that’s always 
addressed. And I asked them if they could define it. And one girl said, I’ll say 
it in English, but she said, ‘Tsnius is something that doesn’t attract the eye, or 
it’s not out of the ordinary, out of the usual.’ For example, by us, wearing long 
[skirts] is not considered tsnius. Why? Because it’s not the norm. In other 
words, normal is to wear clothes not down to the floor. … And that is a very 
good definition of tsnius. In other words, nothing that catches your eye.’ 
 
Tsnius is about blending in, and conforming to social standards. It is about being  part of 
the greater whole of the religious community, and eschewing attracting attention to 
individuality. 
Ba’alos teshuvah speak about tsnius as a transformative act. “Tsnius is the act of 
presenting yourself as a spiritual entity,” says Yehudis, an actor and playwright. Other 
ba’alos teshuvah spoke about tsnius much the same way as Miriam, a Bostoner Hasidic 
woman in Kaufman’s study: 




of presenting oneself…. It means you should present yourself as caring, soft-
spoken, gentle, you know… in a feminine way. That’s what orthodoxy is 
really all about. [Tsnius] doesn’t just apply to women; it’s meant for all Jews. 
We are supposed to be separate, different, apart… different from a world that 
can do such things as a Holocaust…. The world needs more of what we do as 
women naturally. We must teach and guide men.”’ (Kaufman 1991, 45) 
 
These articulations help clarify several important points of tsnius: first, that it has do with 
conforming and being a part of a larger social whole; second, it is about behavior in addition 
to dress; third, it is connected with a form of femininity which is embodied across genders; 
and finally, it is about forming a Jewish ethical personhood. Mahmood suggests that, in what 
she terms non-liberal religious understandings, the relationship between interiority and 
exteriority is inextricably linked, and bodies become docile, performing Foucault’s 
‘techniques of self’ to create an ethical personhood (Mahmood 2005, 30). Therefore, the 
exterior performance of these docile bodies becomes integral to creating the interior ethics. 
Mahmood states: “[F]or the women I worked with, this relationship between interiority and 
exteriority was almost reversed: a modest bodily form … did not simply express the self’s 
interiority but was the means by which it was acquired” (Ibid., 161). The relationship 
between interiority and exteriority within non-liberal personhood is in direct contrast with the 
modern liberal-progressive understanding of one’s ethical self producing the exterior 
embodiment of the self. In non-liberal religious understandings, the way a person dresses and 
comports themselves can cultivate their ethics: in effect, their comportment can be a strong 
influence on their interior ethics. Tsnius is the embodiment of this personal ethical 
cultivation. A book for ba’alei teshuvah, Gila Manolson’s Outside Inside (Manolson 1997), 
articulates tsnius within the same exteriority-interiority language used by Mahmood herself. 
The body, therefore, becomes the docile subject which is formed through tsnius to create the 
ethical Haredi Jewish personhood. 
The increasingly stringent interpretations of tsnius have manifested chiefly as a focus on 




on the kol isha prohibition which I will discuss below, and the erasure of images of women 
and girls, which I discuss in Chapter Six. The emphasis on standards of tsnius dress has 
become a significant focus of girls’ schools, where teachers may patrol the halls with rulers 
to measure skirt length. The emphasis on dress standards has not only affected the Haredi 
world in Israel; in Fader’s study of women and girls in the Hasidic communities of Borough 
Park, Brooklyn, dress standards were a huge focus of the girls’ schools. Women also 
articulated the power of modest dress to improve their relationship with God and help them 
gain blessings, such as falling pregnant (2009). I found this phenomenon of modest dress as 
negotiation with God was largely limited to the Hasidic women whom I encountered in 
Israel, and even then, stringent dress standards was more of a question of the right level of 
shidduch [marriage match]. A marriage match could legitimately be turned down on modesty 
grounds. 
For example, an older Karliner Hasidic woman told me her niece turned down a match 
because the prospective husband wanted his wife to wear a turban with a bow as her head-
covering. Her choice to reject the match on these grounds was not considered overly picky, as 
other reasons may have been; instead, this seemingly superficial reason was accepted by all 
parents and the matchmaker. The choice itself may have been a symbol for the overall greater 
stringency that may have been represented by households which use the bowed turban; she 
may have been rejecting all the other attached stringencies implicit in the head-covering 
choice. It may have also been a convenient way to reject a match with which she was 
uncomfortable. Either way, it is an example of how a young woman may levy agency during 
the matchmaking process; I explore religious women’s agency in more depth in the fifth 
chapter. It also demonstrates that, in mainstream Haredi society, women are, to a certain 
extent, agents of the level of modest dress to which they adhere. In Fader’s work, women 




women generally chose the level to which they adhered within the spectrum of acceptable 
standards of modest dress in the Haredi world.  
Choice and agency is, of course, mediated by the education and social pressure that exists 
in the community, and the fact that the very nature of tsnius implies conformity. Furthermore, 
groups which are more generally stringent in all aspects of observance are more likely to 
have rabbinical leaders who directly decree how women should dress. For instance, the 
Satmar rebbe dictates that all married women must shave their hair, for immersion purposes; 
other Hasidic women with whom I spoke may have chosen to, but their rebbes did not 
necessarily decree it. The Belzer rebbe dictates that women should only wear short sheitels, 
and in addition, they must wear some sort of hat or other symbolic covering on top of the 
wig, to be doubly sure that a man can see on sight that women are married. At the very 
extreme end, I saw women in Beit Shemesh and the Mea Shearim neighbourhood of 
Jerusalem wearing what some secular Israelis call the frumqa, a combination of the words 
frum and burqa, because it looks exactly like the black burqa worn by women on the Arabian 
peninsula. Other girls and women wore poncho-like shals to hide the space between their 
arms and their sides, and the shape of their bodies. Even the stringent Eidah HaChareidis 
rabbinical court has condemned these practices, suggesting that such coverings are a 
complete misinterpretation of Jewish law; these women were therefore likely part of extreme 
fringe sects like the Lev Tahor.  
Litvish women, however, choose a wide variety of head coverings, including sheitels of 
various lengths and colours, and observe shirt and skirt length standards which vary from 
elbow to wrist, and from covering the knee to the ankle. Many Hasidic groups have similar 
flexible approaches. It is also worth noting that even within these somewhat narrow 
conceptions of dress for women, women have far more ability to express individuality in their 




white; for those few Hasidic sects which instruct men to wear a coloured kirtl or striped 
stockings, all men in the sect wear the same coloured kirtl or the same stripes, thus erasing 
any sense of individuality. In this, we see the conformity of tsnius applied across genders, 
and the idea of a communal religious personhood is made obvious. 
The increasingly extreme separation of the genders has resulted in women being excluded 
from previously shared public spaces and roles. Some women in the community are aware of 
these changes and increases in stringency; they may embrace the change, or they may 
criticise it. Others are unaware of these ideas, instead investing in the idea that they live, 
dress, cook, behave, and even think the same way that their grandmother, great-
grandmothers, and great-great-great-grandmothers did in Eastern Europe (Fader 2009).  
I bring up these changes with Michal Tchernovitsky, a Haredi politician who was, at the 
time of our conversation, on the Avodah [Israeli Labour Party] list. Before I can even finish 
phrasing my question, she exclaims, 
‘Whoah! Yes, so much!’ 
She says the ‘radicalisation’ in the Haredi world is most evident in the separation between 
the sexes. 
‘It’s crazy,’ Michal says. ‘It’s not only tsniut [she pronounces it in the Modern Hebrew 
way]. I really don’t care about the clothes, but as I see it the problem is less the clothes and 
more the separation! It’s simply unbelievable. From age three. And now they're expanding it. 
I mean, if you ask someone today, “What is Haredi life? – What does Haredi life mean to 
you?” “Separation between men and women.” …It’s like – the radical separation between 
men and women came from the Hasidic world and the matter of only studying Torah came 
from the Litvish world and then it became a mixture of [the two].’ 
Interestingly, Michal distinguishes tsnius from gender-separation, suggesting that tsnius is 




schools; the broader understanding of tsnius as applying to comportment, behaviour, and both 
genders, has been greatly de-emphasised in the curriculum. I would, however, place both the 
emphasis on clothing and the extreme separation of the genders under the umbrella of 
stringent tsnius. This is due to the nature of the reasons behind these stringencies, which is to 
protect men from the temptation of their yetzer hara, their evil inclinations. 
 The focus on gender separation is behind two other significant changes: the kol isha 
prohibition, and the erasure of images of women. Both of these stringencies have arisen from 
the emphasis on protecting men from temptation. The erasure of images of women in 
children’s books, newspapers, advertisements, magazines, websites, and more, is part of the 
discussion in Chapter Six, because it is at the heart of the criticisms of the Haredi Feminist 
Movement. Kol Isha, however, needs some explanation before we explore the other topics, 
because it has led to the flourishing by-women-for-women performing arts movement. 
Talmud Brachot 24a contains the single prohibition, kol b’isha erva, ‘the voice of a 
woman is like nakedness’. Historically, this sentence has been interpreted to apply to prayer, 
suggesting that women and men should pray separately, or that women should not raise their 
voices too loudly in singing the prayers in synagogue, lest a man have impure thoughts while 
praying. Some very religious rabbinical leaders have historically applied this to women’s 
singing and speaking voices in general circumstances, but until the twentieth century, these 
rabbis were viewed as extreme. However, as part of the increasing stringency, this has been 
used to prohibit mixed-voice singing, women’s solo singing in front of mixed-gender 
audiences, and women’s public speaking for mixed audiences. In certain extreme groups like 
Lev Tahor, it has also been behind prohibitions against women speaking at all during certain 
times of the day; this has been denounced by almost all other Haredi leaders. 
Most frum from birth women with whom I conducted research were comfortable with this 




to public speaking and women’s leadership roles. Ba’alos teshuvah had somewhat more 
trouble accepting it, especially if they had been singers and actors before becoming religious. 
However, both frum from birth women and ba’alos teshuvah women spoke about kol isha in 
similar terms, citing it as evidence of the ‘wisdom of Hashem’ and suggesting that kol isha 
attributes great power to women’s voices, rather than removing their agency. 
Batsheva, a 32-year-old ba’alas teshuvah who has six children (‘so far,’ in her words) 
and lives in Bnei Brak with her frum from birth husband, tells the story of her marriage, as 
illustration of the truth of kol isha and the wisdom of Hashem.  
‘Do you know how I met my husband?’ she asks me, blushing. 
‘Oh, do tell me,’ I say, ‘I love a good shidduch story.’ 
‘Well, that’s the thing,’ she says. ‘We weren’t a shidduch. We met at a mixed [gender] 
shabbos meal. It was early in my process of becoming religious, and I didn’t know all the ins 
and outs yet. And we were both invited, with a bunch of young people, to this family’s house. 
They’re a little modern— I mean, they’re frum, but they’re maybe a little more modern than 
us now. And so we were mixed singing before we ate. I didn’t know about kol isha then, I 
was still singing in front of men. And he was there and he heard me. And then, like a few 
weeks later, I was at a party in Nachla’ot. I wouldn’t do it now, but back then I was still a 
little secular, and it was a Carlebach thing. And, we, well— we didn’t do anything we 
shouldn’t have, but he asked for my number. And he called me the next day. He had basically 
fallen in love with me because he heard me singing.’ 
She was blushing brilliantly pink by this point, which was highlighted by her naturally 
ginger hair showing at the edge of her tichel. Before becoming religious, Batsheva was a 
vocal performance major at one of the most well-known conservatories in the United States. 
‘I put him off, I told him to call me back in a year, if he still wanted to date me. But he 




‘Well, it seems to have worked out,’ I say, remembering the natural rapport I had seen 
between her and her husband on a shabbos at their house. 
‘Yes, but that’s the thing. It shouldn’t have worked,’ says Batsheva. ‘I asked the Rav 
about it later, and he said it shouldn’t have worked, but it did. But that’s why it’s not hard for 
me to follow kol isha now. There’s no denying the dynamic. Hashem made it very obvious 
for me. There is so much power in a woman’s singing voice. And yes, in case you were 
wondering, I still sing for my husband. But there’s more to our relationship now, obviously.’ 
Kol isha attributes incredible seductive power to the female singing voice; while the 
feminist movements discussed in Chapter Six dispute the use of the kol isha prohibition when 
used to prevent women from speaking in public, there is no significant organised push-back 
against the prohibition as it relates to singing. This may be due to the incredible women’s-
only performing arts world that has been created around it, which I discuss at length in 
Chapter Five. Ultimately, all aspects of kol isha as it is interpreted today are as a result of the 
increasingly stringent modesty standards in Haredi society in Israel today. 
 
Modesty, the Sephardi Olim Encounter, and Discrimination in the Haredi World 
 
This process of increasing stringency presented a unique dilemma to certain groups of 
religious Jews who moved to Israel as olim during the first years of statehood.6 In the first 
decade and a half of the existence of the Israeli state, more than 1.4 million Jews, from 
mainly Muslim nations, moved to Israel (Lavie 2018, 51) in ‘traumatic displacements’ 
(Shohat 2017, 4). Jews coming from North African and Middle Eastern countries had very 
different traditions, practices, and lifestyles than their Ashkenazi counterparts. Zionist 
 
6 Some non-Ashkenazi Jews were living in the Holy Land prior to the creation of the Israeli state; some had 
always lived in the land and were Palestinian Jews, and others were recruited by Zionist settlers in Ottoman and 




discourse in the new State relied on the idea of Arab ‘otherness’; essentially, Jewishness was 
defined by its non-Arabness (Lefkowitz 2006, 263; Shohat 2017, 3). Lavie suggests that the 
goal of the early Israeli state was to secularise the Mizrahim in order to Judaise the State 
(Lavie 2018, 20), and Shohat concurs, adding to that mission the effort to ‘cleanse Sephardim 
of their Arabness’ (Shohat 2017, 44). Indeed, Shohat and Egorova view these tasks as forms 
of colonialism (Egorova 2015, 502), and the role of European Zionists as similar to other 
colonisers in the guise of a ‘civilizing mission’ (Shohat 2017, 3). The result of this has been 
an ongoing ‘three-way identity struggle’ (Lefkowitz 2006, 263) between Ashkenazim, 
Mizrahim, and Arabs within Israeli society which endures today. By the late 1990s, there was 
a 40% income gap between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim within Israel (Lavie 2018, 11), which 
is accentuated by the extreme gender pay gap in Israel, resulting in the harshest of 
disadvantaged situations for Mizrahi women (Ibid., 13-14). 
 These groups were no less religious than the Ashkenazi Haredim who were powerful in 
the new state. Lavie notes that working class Jews from North Africa were particularly 
observant (Ibid., 48). Indeed, some Mizrahim, such as the Bukharan Jews from the Central 
Asian Plateau, were known for their incredible levels of religious learning. Yet, as they 
arrived, these olim were told that if they were religious, the boys would go to yeshiva and the 
girls would learn to be modest wives and mothers. 
This expectation, to conform to a specific type of religious Judaism, has been applied to 
new immigrants in Israel again and again. Ethiopians were subjected to such expectations, 
among other ordeals, in their aliyah [‘going up’, term used for Jews who immigrate to Israel 
through the Right of Return] (Schwartz 2001), as have the Chinese Jews of Kaifeng 
(Bernstein 2016), and the Bnei Menashe of India (Egorova 2015). In the case of the Bnei 
Menashe, Egorova notes that ‘transnational migration can involve consolidation of specific 




categories to suit the political agenda of the “host” society’ (Ibid., 494). In the case of Bnei 
Menashe, the Jews of eastern India conform to ‘look Jewish’, especially through dress (Ibid., 
499), but also through embracing certain types of religious behaviour, observance, and belief 
(Ibid., 494). Whereas for the Bnei Menashe this has been a source of ‘positive self image’ and 
feelings of religious superiority (Ibid., 495), the same cannot be said for the non-Ashkenazi 
members of the Haredi world to whom I spoke. 
Modesty, or the Ashkenazi understanding of it, became central to the assimilation of the 
Sephardi and Mizrahi olim in the Haredi world. This represents a form of cultural racism 
present in Israel long before Ben-Eliezer’s Ethiopian Jews encountered such (Ben-eliezer 
2004). Many of these olim were exceptionally modest, according to the countries from which 
they had originated, which meant that their modesty standards were aligned with the majority 
Muslim culture of their diasporic contexts. For instance, a Yemenite Jewish woman was 
likely to cover herself from head to toe, but these coverings would be colourful, covered with 
intricate embroideries and embellishments. Men’s shirts would be similarly decorated, as 
might their head-coverings. For men, this did not find acceptance: they were instructed to 
dress in the black-and-white uniform of the yeshiva, or face exclusion. 
For Sephardi and Mizrahi women, the modesty assimilation question remains central to 
their Haredi identity even generations after their parents made aliyah; despite being fully 
assimilated, Sephardim face strong prejudice in the Haredi world, and for women, the 
rhetoric of discrimination suggests that Sephardi women are innately immodest and sexual. 
This likely originates from early encounters between Hasidic Haredim, who view bright 
colours, especially the colour red, as provocative and sexual, and the colourfully dressed 
olim. The enduring prejudice also reeks of Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Orientalist ideas of 
ars erotica (Foucault 1990); it is the myth of sexual permissiveness which pervades cultural 




Esti Shushan is one of the leaders in the new Haredi Feminist Movement. She is a 
founder of Nivcharot, a Haredi women’s rights organisation which I discuss at length in 
Chapter Six. Esti is also not Ashkenazi. Her family history is representative of the olim 
experience. 
‘Originally I am from the north. I was born in Tsfat [Safed], and my parents originally 
came from Morocco. They are both olim. But when they came here to Israel they were 
teenagers and they came to Haredi schools. Then they got married and they made a whole 
Haredi family. I was the oldest child, in a big family of 12. My mother got married—she was 
very young. She was about 17, and she didn’t give birth in the first five years. And she tried a 
lot, and went to the doctors, the hospitals, tried to understand what’s happening. But the fact 
is that I didn’t want to get born to a child! Because she was a child! Always, I told her, what 
do you want? I don’t want to be raised by a child! I just want to wait. So, after five years, 
they got a blessing from one famous rabbi, and they become parents and I was the first one. 
After that, it became a large family, bli ayin hara, twelve children.’ 
Esti’s parents arrived in Israel as young, impressionable teenagers, and were immediately 
enrolled in Haredi schools; schools which rapidly assimilated them into the Ashkenazi norms 
of Haredi culture. School is often a way to force rapid assimilation (Ben-eliezer 2004, 251). 
Here, Esti also displays her wry sense of humour, as well as her engrained self-image as 
strong-willed and rebellious. But she recounts her own upbringing as the same process of 
Ashkenization, assimilation to Ashkenazi cultural norms in the Haredi world. 
‘I grew up in Beit Yaakov [the Modern Hebrew pronunciation of Beis Yaakov], it’s the 
Haredi school. For seminary I studied here in Bnei Brak. I came to Bnei Brak to study,’ she 
says. Her husband is also Sephardi, and both he and her father have spent much of their lives 
studying at yeshiva.  




said, here there are mainly Ashkenazim. Obviously, there are also Sephardim but…,’ she 
pauses. ‘The Sephardic yeshivas are Ashkenazi too. They are pseudo-Litvish.’ 
What Michal and Esti are talking about is the separate-but-equal (Goodman et al. 2020, 
73) educational world for Sephardi Haredim. Due to the gradual exclusion over time of 
Sephardim from Ashkenazi Haredi educational institutions, Sephardim have founded their 
own Haredi yeshivas and religious schools. Rather than being sites of Sephardi cultural 
reclamation, however, these institutions reinforce Ashkenization, following the same dress-
codes and traditions as their Ashkenazi counterparts. The yeshivas mirror the Litvish yeshivas 
which they emulate, and are sometimes even counted as Litvish institutions in government 
statistics (Regev 2017). The Sephardi Haredi education system has effectively become a tool 
to impose a form of acceptable Ashkenized Haredi-ness, a site of Haredi cultural production 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1977).  
The erasure of Sephardi and Mizrahi culture through Ashkenization has taken multiple 
forms. Lavie describes the obscuring of Mizrahim through the state census process; it is more 
likely for Mizrahi women to marry Ashkenazi men than it is for Mizrahi men to marry 
Ashkenazi women, and the children who result from these unions are thus classified as 
Ashkenazi (Lavie 2018, 4). This process is accentuated in the Haredi world, where, in all 
marriages, the family follows the minhag [custom, practice, or tradition] of the husband, and 
wives’ non-Ashkenazi identity disappears. These are erasures of non-Ashkenazi culture 
entirely; but there are also erasures of distinctive cultural difference among different groups 
of non-Ashkenazim.7 Ultimately, this essentialises cultural, ethnic, and racial distinctions in 
favour of a ‘brown’ (Sephardi) and ‘white’ (Ashkenazi) rhetoric (Goodman et al. 2020, 45-
52). 
As Esti and I spoke, she began to use ‘Sephardi’ and ‘Mizrahi’ interchangeably.  
 




‘In education, as a Mizrahi girl,’ she said, ‘I was educated in Ashkenazi schools.’ 
‘Right,’ I said, ‘Beis Yaakov.’ 
‘Beit Yaakov, yes,’ she answered. ‘I have Sephardi friends, but we were a minority in the 
Beit Yaakov in Tsfat.’ 
‘Wait,’ I stopped her. ‘Mizrahi? Not Sephardi?’ 
‘Mizrahi, Sephardi, it’s the same,’ she answered, dismissively. She clearly did not believe 
this was an important point to clarify.  
‘It is?’ I said, confused. 
‘It is the same, yeah,’ Esti said. 
‘Ok,’ I said. 
‘Here, it’s the same,’ Esti explained, seeing my confusion. ‘Like, it’s not the same 
meaning, but in Israel, when you say “Sephardi” or “Mizrahi”, it’s the same. It’s all the 
people that came from the Islamic countries, to Israel.’ 
‘Yeah,’ I say, ‘But North Africa is different than Yemen, yeah?” 
‘Yes,’ says Esti, ‘it’s totally different. But here, we are all in the same class.’ 
‘Ok,’ I say, nodding. ‘They are not Ashkenazi.’ 
‘Yeah,’ Esti says. ‘They are the “others.” So, as the “other,” I think that’s one more 
reason for my politicism. But when you’re a Haredi girl, you’re not used to voicing your 
opinions. In my family, my mother always told me I had chutzpah [brazenness, audacity, 
gutsiness]. It’s like, I have an opinion, and when I talk, it’s like a bad thing.’ 
Our mutual confusion over terms is unsurprising. It seems that the academic world is also 
confused by these terms, and use ‘Sephardi’ and ‘Mizrahi’ almost interchangeably. Shohat 
uses ‘Sephardi’ and ‘Sephardi Jews from Muslim countries’ (Shohat 2017, 37) to describe the 
same historical events and themes as Lavie describes using the term ‘Mizrahi’ (Lavie 2018, 




umbrella term ‘Mizrahi’ for the vast plurality of cultures and ethnicities included therein, 
from the Jews of China to Middle Eastern Jews to Ethiopian Jews. Lavie claims that 
‘Sephardi’ refers to a certain style of liturgical melodies rather than an ethnicity (Lavie 2018, 
1). Shohat uses ‘Sephardi’ universally in her 2017 volume at the exclusion of any other term 
for non-Ashkenazi ethnicity, and suggests that the Mizrahim are an ‘imagined community’ of 
Zionist invention (Shohat 2017, 113). I learned, growing up as an American Jew, that 
‘Sephardi’ meant ‘the Jews of Spain’ and could be used to refer to Jews from North Africa 
and Latin America, the places to which Jews fled the Spanish Inquisition. ‘Mizrahi’ was a 
term I learned as an adult, and I understood it to apply to any Jew who was not Sephardi or 
Ashkenazi, as suggested by Goldberg and Bram above. Shohat recounts the birth of the term 
‘Mizrahi’ during the Israeli Black Panther movement in the 1970s (Ibid., 70-113), and Lavie 
suggests it was not fully adopted within Israel until the 1990s (Lavie 2018, 4). Lavie uses 
Mizrahi exclusively as a term of empowerment; Shohat has done the same by reclaiming the 
term ‘Arab Jew,’ which became an anathema to the Zionist ideal (Shohat 2017, 3). Suffice to 
say, the confusion of terms which I encountered in my interaction with Esti is rooted in the 
greater Israeli discourse around Jewish identity, and the implications of erasure and 
oppression of non-Ashkenazim are evident in the Haredi world as much as in the greater 
Israeli context. 
It is important to note that Esti, in her upbringing, is corrected for her un-womanly 
behaviour with a Yiddish word, chutzpah, a distinctly Ashkenazi language, so complete is her 
mother’s assimilation. Here, we see the erasure of the distinctions between Sephardi and 
Mizrahi made obvious, but also a clear understanding of the implications of these erasures in 
Esti’s articulation. Lavie tells us that race and class completely overlap (Shenhav and Yonah, 
2008 [Hebrew] and Yitzhaki 2003 [Hebrew], as cited in Lavie 2018, 24). Esti says that what 




aware that it is her race which makes her disadvantaged in Israel; in the Haredi world this is 
further emphasised through the separate sphere in which the Ashkenazi elite majority8 keep 
non-Ashkenazim. 
Esti’s explanation also highlights another element of prejudice surrounding Sephardim: 
their origins in majority-Muslim countries. ‘“Arab” and “Jew”… came to form mutually 
exclusive categories, with “the Arab-Jew” becoming an ontological oxymoron and an 
epistemological subversion’ (Shohat 2017, 4). This distaste for the idea of the Arab-Jew is 
present, and perhaps even more accentuated, in the Haredi world. While there may not be 
significant discourse around the Arab-Israeli conflict in Haredi communities, there remains a 
high level of prejudice towards Arabs, Palestinians, and Muslims in general. All non-Jews are 
worthy of distrust, and non-white non-Jews are more worthy of distrust than most. This is 
unsurprising, given the reliance of the construction of the Haredi identity discourse on 
‘othering’ (Pratt 2003, 10), and the fact that racism is the national evolution of 
ethnocentricity (Goodman et al. 2020, 11). Many of the Chasidic conversations I have heard 
around race display blatant anti-black racism. However, the worst level of racism in the 
Haredi world is directed at anyone who is perceived to be Muslim, including Arab Christians, 
because some Haredim are not educated enough about other religions to be able to know the 
difference. Indeed, non-Arab Muslims are also considered ‘Arab’ in Haredi discourse, and 
anything ‘Arab’ is considered to be essentially bad. 
When speaking with Miriam, a Litvish mother of thirteen in Modi’in, I mentioned that 
some of the women with whom I conducted research were Sephardi Haredi. I suggested that 
their experiences might be different from her own. 
She frowned. 
 
8 In the Haredi world, non-Ashkenazim are the minority. However, non-Ashkenazim are the majority of 




‘Yes, there is a problem today in the Haredi world with Sephardim,’ she said. ‘There is a 
difference, I don’t know why. Their homes are more violent, maybe because in Arab society 
there’s more violence.’ 
Her statement was offered straightforwardly, and almost naïvely: she truly wondered why 
these people might be so different from her. She views Sephardim as a ‘problem’ and it is 
almost difficult not to make the comparison between her words and the so-called ‘Jewish 
problem’ of European history (Shohat 2017, 75). Furthermore, she draws a conclusion about 
Sephardim based on a prejudice concerning Arabs, and she categorises Sephardim with 
Arabs, the ultimate non-Jewish Other, rather than viewing them as Jewish, as one of her own 
people. This is classic cultural racism, which is based on based on distancing oneself from 
‘the “other” fundamentally different [culture], an invader who must be kept at a distance and 
who has no place in society’ (Ben-eliezer 2004, 249).  
Miriam is not remarkably more racist than any other Haredim, nor is she seemingly 
conscious of her words being racist. She is simply voicing the accepted cultural norms, things 
that she and her peers would say to each other. She likely has no awareness of the perception 
of her words as essentially racist, both towards Arabs and Sephardim. Though in the moment 
as the ethnographer I struggled to hide my disappointment in her response, I did manage to 
conceal my own feelings, and the conversation moved on without incident. 
Not all parts of Haredi society are as comfortable with prejudice as these experiences 
suggest. Bina worked for Shas for twenty years, though she is Ashkenazi. When I asked her 
about prejudice, discrimination, and inclusion of Sephardim in Haredi society, she declared: 
‘In ten years it’s not going to matter. No one cares these days. My nephew just married 
this beautiful Moroccan girl, she’s so dark and lovely. Their kids will just be Jewish. 
Everyone is intermarrying now, by the next generation we will all just be Jewish. The 




On the surface, this looks like an affirmation and acceptance of Sephardim in Haredi 
society. On closer examination, there are several problematic statements. Bina’s words, ‘The 
differences will be gone’ are revealing. What Bina means is that Sephardim will be 
assimilated; the non-Ashkenazi elements will have disappeared. Complete cultural erasure 
will have been achieved. When she says, ‘…by the next generation we will all just be 
Jewish,’ what she really means is that by the next generation they will all just be Ashkenazi. 
In this moment, Bina is revealing her unconscious participation in an over-arching trend in 
Israel, where Ashkenazim of all backgrounds claim that discrimination against non-
Ashkenazim do not matter because the differences among Jews are disappearing (Lefkowitz 
2006, 15). The myth of the prevalence of mixed-marriages is a part of the Zionist ideology of 
the in-gathering of nations (Lavie 2018, 4), though I am not sure Bina is conscious of 
performing nationalism; perhaps this is an example of Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 
1995). Nonetheless, this positivistic claim of acceptance is actually an encouragement of the 
erasure of non-Ashkenazi difference and a tacit acceptance of the erasure of diversity. This 
erasure is a fundamental part of cultural racism (Ben-eliezer 2004).  
Furthermore, Bina describes her new niece as ‘beautiful’ and ‘dark and lovely.’ However 
kindly meant, this is an exoticisation of Sephardi women, as mentioned above in terms of 
Orientalist erotic tropes (Foucault 1990). Though Bina’s sexualisation of her Sephardi niece 
takes the debatably more positive form of exoticism, sexualisation of Sephardi women and 
girls is a rampant form of prejudice in the Haredi world, and usually is not as innocuous. In 
cultural racism, a ‘litany of familiar terms [are] invoked again in order to display the “others” 
as ignorant, irresponsible, and having a different conception of sex and sexual permissiveness 
that differed from the … norm’ (Ben-eliezer 2004, 254). Tzirele, a Chasidic woman, heard 
my question about prejudice toward Sephardim, and was quick to correct me: 




can get in. But if not, then you’re not fit to go to that school. I don’t want my sweet 
chassidishe [Hasidic] little girl exposed to that. Because Sephardi culture is more… 
expressive… they’re just less refined. They’re loud. It’s about refinement.’ 
This is cultural racism as both fear of contamination and over-sexualisation (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, Tzirele suggests that the ultimate problem with Sephardi culture is a modesty 
problem. ‘Refinement’ acts as a code-word within the Hasidic world (Fader 2009); a 
‘refined’ woman is one who is properly Hasidic, properly tsnius, and does not draw attention 
to herself. By calling Sephardim unrefined, she is essentially calling Sephardim vulgar and 
immodest. This is further emphasised by her choice of ‘expressive’ and ‘loud.’ 
Tzirele’s attitude typifies a theme in discrimination against Sephardim in the Haredi 
world. Ruth Colian, a Sephardi ba’alas teshuvah who is the founder of U’bizchutan, the 
Haredi Women’s Party, has experienced extraordinary exclusion and discrimination based on 
her Sephardi identity. Though she has been subjected to abusive language in multiple 
circumstances, her battle for her daughter’s inclusion in a majority Ashkenazi religious 
school will be the focus of this analysis.  
Where Ruth lives in the Petach Tikvah area, there are two different Haredi religious girls’ 
schools: one, the Beis Yaakov, is primarily host to Ashkenazim, and the other, a Shas 
sponsored Ma'ayan HaChinuch HaTorani school, was designed specifically to educate 
Sephardi Haredi girls who were excluded from the Beis Yaakov. Exclusion from school is 
another mainstay of cultural racism (Ben-eliezer 2004, 254-255). The Beis Yaakov has a 
much better reputation, and provides a higher quality of education, both secular and religious. 
Ruth naturally wanted her daughters to attend the Beis Yaakov, but when she called to enroll 
her oldest daughter, after they asked her name, she was told the class was full. 
‘When somebody tells you you can’t do something,’ Ruth says, ‘it actually shows you 




Ruth set out to fight for her daughter’s place at the Beis Yaakov. 
Cleverly, she called the school again, and when they asked her name, this time she told 
them an Ashkenazi name; not only an Ashkenazi name, but a name with a high level of 
yichus attached. Yichus is status, based on ancestral heritage of the Torah learning of the men 
in the family. By nature, it is impossible for non-Ashkenazim to have established yichus 
because the yeshiva tradition is so new to those outside of Eastern Europe. 
‘I called, and I said that my name was Grennemann,’ Ruth said. ‘And the secretary said, 
“Ok.” I said, “Are you sure? There is a place for my daughter at the school?” But the 
secretary said, “Yes, it’s ok, we have a place for her for sure.”’ 
Armed with the knowledge that openings existed— and with a recording of the phone 
conversation— Ruth went to the school office.  
‘The next day I went to the school, and…’ Ruth points to her face, ‘and I am not 
Ashkenazi. And so she says, “Your daughter cannot go to school here.”’ 
Though Ruth made her case politely, the woman was adamant. Ruth felt humiliated. She 
revealed that she was the woman named Grennemann, who called about the place; the 
secretary denied any memory of the conversation, and Ruth revealed that she had made a 
recording of the conversation.  
‘She told me I did not have enough modesty for the school,’ Ruth explains. 
Because of the strict modesty standards which schools expect, the dress code can be a 
tool of school exclusion. Combined with the prejudice that Sephardim are immodest, this 
becomes a de facto form of school segregation. After repeated attempts to get her daughter 
enrolled in school, Ruth wrote a letter appealing to the Ministry of Education for Independent 
Schools, under which religious school jurisdiction falls. 
Finally, two days before the school year was going to begin, Ruth was contacted by the 




daughter in the Beis Yaakov, but that she would have to come to the Office and sign some 
papers.  
The day of her appointment, which was also the day before the start of the school year, 
there was a suspicious object at the bus station in Jerusalem, and she was delayed because of 
the evacuation. Ruth therefore arrived late to the appointment. Though the bomb scare was 
common knowledge in Jerusalem that afternoon, the Supervisor for Independent Education 
chose to condemn her for her lateness. 
‘“Shame on you! Lots of people have been waiting for you! And you’re late! And you… 
speak! I’m sorry, we won’t accept you today,”’ she repeated the Supervisor’s words to me.  
Again, later the same day, he came up to Ruth as she prayed, and in the middle of her 
silent prayers, he again shouted at her, ‘“You don’t have any shame! You dare to insult us, 
this is so rude!”’ 
The rest of Ruth’s story will be revealed in Chapter Five; what I would like to highlight 
here is the characterisation of Ruth by the Supervisor for Independent Education, who is an 
Ashkenazi Haredi rabbi, as shameless and rude. These words suggest that whatever Ruth has 
done wrong is somehow immodest in both dress and comportment; his further accusation, 
‘And you… speak!’ suggests that she is displaying further immodesty simply by daring to 
open her mouth. This is also part of what Lefkowitz describes as ‘inscribing culturally 
devalued forms of emotional comportment onto… Mizrahi Others’ (Lefkowitz 2006, 264). 
Inappropriate emotions and inappropriate ways of carrying oneself are viewed as particularly 
non-Ashkenazi, and by suggesting that Ruth has no shame, the rabbi has associated her 
comportment and emotions with inappropriate non-Ashkenaziness. He has also ascribed her 
with being ‘primitive or immature… a central mechanism of cultural racism’ (Ben-eliezer 
2004, 254). 




‘First thing, I went to Shas,’ says Ruth, ‘because Shas is against this discrimination, Shas 
is fighting discrimination, and Shas is for Sephardim. And the Shas representative told me— 
listen, I am ultra-orthodox,’ she clarified for me. ‘I cannot do anything without Da’at Torah 
[Modern Hebrew pronunciation of Da’as Torah]. It’s like the rabbi confirms the act you want 
to do…. So I asked him to [prove to me that it’s ok to fight for my daughter’s place at the 
Beis Yaakov - original in Modern Hebrew]. … And then I spoke with the Rabbi Meir Mazuz. 
He’s well-known in the Haredi community— now he’s big in the Eli Yishai party. … Then 
he was with Shas. … He said, “My daughter, she is also in that school. I am afraid that they 
would take revenge on my daughter if I helped you.” I was really confused,’ says Ruth. ‘Shas 
was supposed to help me.’ 
Despite being founded in order to fight Ashkenization and discrimination, the 
representatives of Shas do not necessarily help Sephardim in positions of exclusion; Shas 
creates separate schools, which are of lesser quality, as an alternative to the Beis Yaakovs of 
the Haredi Ashkenazim, essentially furthering the unequal status of non-Ashkenazim in 
Haredi society. The Shas officials don’t even want to send their own children to these 
schools. 
That Sephardim exist in Haredi society is clear and yet unseen: many people, Haredi and 
otherwise, have asked me in surprise, ‘There are Sephardi Haredim?’ That Sephardi Haredim 
exist, and that their experience is one of exclusion and discrimination, needs to be addressed 
by the academy. That Sephardi Haredi women’s bodies are at the heart of this prejudice, and 
subject to everyday political violence, also needs to be part of the greater understanding of 
modesty in the Haredi world in Israel today. Sephardim are not the only Haredi Jews of 
colour; in my research, I encountered Haredi women from a wide range of ethnic 
backgrounds, including East Asian, African American, Ethiopian, North American 




experience of Haredi women of colour within this work, but further research is called for, and 
there is a rich diversity in the Haredi world that needs to be made more visible. 
 
 
Mothers and Wives 
 
Sephardi and Ashkenazi women in the Haredi world experience the same expectations of 
marriage, wife-hood, and motherhood, regardless of their ethnic background, though the 
confluence of race and class will inevitably affect each woman’s experiences of these 
expectations. 
‘When a Haredi woman graduates from high school, she enters the world of shidduchim,’ 
says Michal. The process of matchmaking, finding one’s shidduch, is complex; other 
scholars, such as Ayala Fader (2009), have written extensively about this process; my 
research surrounding shidduchim is more concerned with women’s agency within it, as 
discussed above and later in Chapter Five. Suffice to say, there is incredible pressure to make 
a match fairly quickly, though there is room to reject matches and choose. ‘We joke that a 
girl is an old maid if she’s not at least engaged by eighteen,’ an older woman in the Karlin-
Stolin Chasidic community told me. ‘But the pressure’s the same on the boys. They get 
married the same age these days, or at most a year or two older.’ 
There is also incredible social pressure to have children as soon as possible; this is 
especially true in the more stringent communities, but it is changing in some Hassidic 
communities and much of the Litvish world. Before marriage, men attend lessons with 
chasan ‘husband’ teachers, usually a rabbi; and before marriage women take classes with 
kallah ‘bride’ teachers, either one to one or in classes, known as kallah classes. These classes 
now often continue through the first year of marriage; in certain sectors of Haredi society, 
there is increased emphasis on taking things slow and using the first year of marriage to ‘get 




have children, whenever it may happen. In certain communities, the pressure to have a baby 
by one’s first wedding anniversary remains. 
‘I got married at about 19. My husband is from the North, so, not from Tsfat, but from 
[Tiberias],’ Esti tells me as we sip our drinks in a cafe. ‘I became a mother at 20. At about 26 
I had my third, no, fourth child. … The Haredi women have a unique lifestyle. They get 
married early. They don’t have the time for themselves. They are big sisters for families of 
sisters, of large families, and after, they just grow up, they get married. Most of the time they 
don’t have education. Like me! I am the story of a lot of women, a lot of Haredi women. … 
And they become mothers very early.’ 
One Saturday evening, late, I attended a melave malka [‘escorting the Queen’, a joyful 
event at night after the sabbath has ended to prolong the feeling of the sabbath] at one of the 
large wedding halls in the Haredi neighbourhoods of Jerusalem. It was a fundraising gala for 
the organisation Ateres Kallah, which acts as a charity to support brides and new wives who 
come from very little financial means. I was told about the event by a Hasidic woman, and 
the location was at the junction of the Ezrat Torah and Kiryat Belz neighbourhoods, so I was 
not surprised to see a mostly Hasidic audience coming into the hall over the first few hours. I 
was attending because one of the most well-known singers in the Haredi women’s arts scenes 
would be performing; I was also eager to hear the shiur to be given by Rabbanit [a Rabbi’s 
wife who is respected for her wisdom in her own right] Yemima Mizrahi, who was listed on 
the advertisement as the main feature. I arrived early, having caught the first available bus 
when they started running again after the sabbath ended, and a young Sephardi woman who 
also arrived early attached herself to me. We watched the other women arrive over the first 
two hours, and she exclaimed over the beauty of the Belzer Chasidic women as they came in 
groups of two, four, and ten. 




almost girl-like enthusiasm towards a group of her friends. She had a chin length brown wig, 
made of real human hair, with the customary hat on top; her hat was a cloche with black lace 
with touches of real, white pearls. Diamonds glittered at her throat and on her ears, and on 
her ring fingers where she clutched a fur stole across her chest. 
‘Oh, no,’ the Sephardi woman said, ‘I see them walking on the street and they always 
look this good. I don’t know how they do it. I never look nice.’ 
For nearly an hour she waxed lyrical about the beauty of the Hasidic women, and how 
refined they were, and how much she wanted to be like them. While this seemed most 
flattering to the Hasidic women, I could not help but feel this represented an element of 
internalised racism following my discussions with other women. The language which women 
had used to condemn non-Ashkenazi women was now being espoused by this Sephardi 
woman as her ideal, the thing she wanted to be and could never achieve. 
I opened the pamphlet which I was given at the door. It was emblazoned with the words, 
‘Small acts, blossoming results,’ and then informed the attendee, ‘Through Ateres Kallah, 
every kallah [sic] receives a complete package of top quality housewares delivered to her 
door! With the finest in kitchen, bath, home goods and bedding, each Kallah [sic] is able to 
begin her future with true simcha [sic] [joy].’ There was a list of donation amounts and the 
items which each amount would contribute: Dairy Pots NIS100, Meat Pots NIS200, Shower 
Curtain NIS35, 2 Mattress Protectors NIS88. The back read, ‘Each year, Ateres Kallah 
distributes hundreds of packages to needy kallahs [sic] in Eretz Yisrael [sic] [the Land of 
Israel]. Contact us to find out how you can get involved.’ And: ‘A branch of Ateres Kallah, 
Gemach [a free loan society, usually themed around specific objects] Beis Freidah was 
opened six months ago in response to an overwhelming demand. We wanted to offer each 
kallah something new towards her chasuna [wedding ceremony] and our gemach is designed 





The hall was becoming quite full by this time, and seats were becoming scarce. Chayelle 
Regal, of Regal Productions in Beit Shemesh, took the stage, and introduced the ‘guest of 
honour’, Tammy Karmel. Tammy was wheeled to the front of the room; she has ALS, and is 
unable to speak, or use her arms or legs. Her personal nurse attended her, a Filipino woman 
and the only person in the building dressed in trousers, with a huge smile the entire time. 
Lizzy Serling sang Aishes Chayil, a song sung at shabbos based on the text of Proverbs 31, to 
Tammy, and then a video played with a message from Tammy.  
In the video, the narrator explains to us,  
‘Mrs. Tammy Karmel heard that there was an opportunity for her to speak to 
you from the depths of her heart. Because of the ALS which she is suffering 
from, she now communicates by charting, looking through a plastic chart 
which has the letters of the alphabet printed on it. Someone then reads those 
letters. It’s a slow and painstaking process—a two minute message she 
prepares for you can take up to two hours to chart.’ (‘Tammy’s Project’ 2021) 
 
Tammy’s message comes across the video:  
‘So, my dear friends, it’s about believing Hashem is the only power in this 
world, even if he is hiding from you. Know that he is there! Ayn od milvado 
[there is none besides Hashem]! I’ve been on the akeida [bound, implying 
relinquishing control to Hashem] for the past four years and I’ve been saying 
hineni [here I am] for whatever Hashem wanted from me, and let me tell you 
how that has been an experience that has brought me to a place of 
contentment, and the lack of battle has been exhilarating.’ (Ibid.) 
 
This video, and the adulation of Tammy in general, is meant to be inspiring, and Chayelle 
described her as ‘an inspiration to all of us’ as she was wheeled away from the stage. 
However, what this video serves to do in function is suggest that no matter how bad things 
may be for the women in the audience, they could be worse: they don’t have a life-
shortening, debilitating disease. Furthermore, the woman who does, Tammy, is able to have 
complete faith in Hashem, and trust Hashem no matter what is happening to her. Therefore, 
whatever another woman is dealing with, she must trust God and not complain about what 




agency from the women who watch by suggesting that they should not struggle, complain, or 
seek to find a way out of their current difficult situations, whatever they might be. 
This message is further underscored by Rabbanit Yemima Mizrahi, when she eventually 
arrived close to midnight. She spoke for close to forty-five minutes, about many topics, but 
there were several parts which offered particular insight into understanding Haredi 
womanhood. 
‘Every Jewish life is a wedding,’ she said, gazing with love on the crowd. While she 
spoke, she always smiled, if not with her mouth than with her eyes. She did not speak 
loudly— even with the microphone, her voice was soft, and small. Despite the clear evidence 
of her age on her face and around her eyes, her demeanour was almost girl-like. ‘Every 
Jewish life is a wedding, because every one of your children is going to get married. And 
each of those children will be a wedding. And each wedding is a jewel in the crown on 
Hashem’s head.’ 
She said this last part so quietly it was almost a whisper. The room let out a sigh at the 
image. 
‘And these jewels, each wedding, brings us closer to moshiach [messiah].’ 
A murmur, almost a moan, echoed around the wedding hall. 
‘Women, weddings, we are the jewels on Hashem’s crown. And you know? Ima,’ she 
said to the crowd, calling each of them Ima, mother, ‘all women are the mothers of Hashem 
because of bat ayin. You are the daughters of Hashem’s eye, and Hashem is in each Jewish 
life. Each life is a world, and you are the imas of each Jewish life. You are the ima of 
Hashem.’ 
She encouraged each mother to show love to her children who were doing well, doing 
good, doing the right thing, suggesting that the matriarch Rivka showed Yaakov love, but did 




with a challenge to the room: not to complain from then until the eighth day of Chanukah. It 
was about three weeks before the beginning of Chanukah, and so this suggested a month of 
avoiding any complaint. Then she asked us to direct our intentions to making every girl a 
kallah, and we davened [prayed] together, and the event was over. 
The Rabbanit’s message suggests, in conjunction with Tammy’s earlier video, that there 
is an expectation for women to take on their roles as wives and mothers without complaint or 
resistance. There is a clear acknowledgement that Haredi women are presented with a range 
of challenges, but that rather than complaining they should instead trust completely in 
Hashem, who both meant for them to face these challenges, and will help them in surviving 
the situation. This is a message of acceptance and submission rather than agency and 
resistance; however, there is much agency and resistance in Haredi women’s lives, as 
explored in the remainder of this work. 
The Rabbanit’s speech also reminds us of the purpose of becoming a wife and mother: to 
bring the messiah, which will of course end any need for suffering or complaints. Women 
bring moshiach by getting married and having children; the wedding itself brings closer the 
day that moshiach will come. Each child born is the potential for another wedding, and more 
children to be born. Fundamental to this is also the role of the wife, who supports her 
husband in his study at yeshiva, which is also tikkun olam [healing the world] to bring 
moshiach. 
Several times early in my research, when I was only working with Hasidic women, I tried 
to understand the balance of responsibility in marriage, and would ask questions about how 
much husbands were home, helping with the childcare, and doing other household tasks. 
‘The most important thing is that my husband study,’ was the response I would receive, 
repeated over and over again, until I ceased this line of questioning. Outside of the Hasidic 




from Litvish women. We would move our conversations to other parts of the house if it 
would distract from a husband’s studying, or interviews would be scheduled during night 
seder [a period of study]. Being a good Haredi wife means making it as easy as possible for 
one’s husband to learn.  
The Mask She Wears offers a clear vision of the ideal Haredi womanhood, though the 
play’s purpose is not to instruct, but rather to break down the distinction between the 
individual and the social through women’s identification with the drama they see unfolding 
on the stage. Through the words of the characters Rivka, Bassi, and Shani, it becomes clear 
that a Haredi woman should raise children and support her husband as he studies in yeshiva, 
preferably in Israel. These two things should be the deepest desires of Haredi women. 
‘“Leave Eretz Yisrael? Leave kollel [yeshiva]?”’ exclaims Rivka in scene two (Goldman 
2016). ‘“This is all I’ve ever wanted. To support my husband in learning. To raise my 
children in the kedusha [holiness] of Eretz Yisrael.”’ (Ibid.)  Upon hearing that Rivka’s 
husband is a successful student later in the play, Shani’s Thought Shadow exclaims, ‘“I wish 
my husband would go to kollel!”’ (Ibid.) 
 Bassi’s husband, Yitzi, also seems to excel at his yeshiva; whenever Bassi reaches out 
to him for comfort, that is where the phone call reaches him. In one such conversation, we 
hear them commiserate together: ‘“I feel like such an outsider,”’ Bassi says. Yitzi responds, 
‘“It’s like we live in a parallel universe. Our whole society is based on families, on having 
children.”’ Later in the play, Bassi pleads, “Hashem, I don’t know what you want from me. 
I’ve davened my heart out, done teshuvah [repentance], we’ve tried every school [of thought] 
that exists. Is there nowhere out of this never-ending nightmare? [. . .] I see pregnant women, 
babies, kids, everywhere I go! It’s all I see! It haunts me, every second of the day, wherever I 
go! It’s become an obsession! I’m sick of it! If I’m not a mother, then who am I? Hashem, 




Haredi woman if she is not a mother; there is no other way in which to be a Haredi woman. 
These women, their goals and their struggles, exemplify Haredi womanhood today. 
Because Haredi women are expected to bear children and support their husbands in yeshiva 
study, because these are the types of values that a pious woman should shape herself to want, 
the characters become universal to Haredi women; the struggles of these three women thus 
make them relatable to the Haredi audience. 
These requirements on women can lead to a false rhetoric of empowerment within the 
Haredi world. One night, when I was asking a million questions about women’s childcare, 
education, and role in society, Bina declared, ‘The Haredi world thinks women are 
superheroes. Companies seek out Haredi women to work for them, because they’re such 
skilful multitaskers. I mean, Haredi women are superheroes! We never sleep, we’re doing the 
kids and we’re making the money, and look, I mean, it comes at a cost. I wouldn’t be this size 
if there weren’t drawbacks. But it’s worth it.’ 
I heard the myth of the woman multitasker (and the man who can’t) many times 
throughout my fieldwork. One Hasidic woman in the Hornisteipol community joked that she 
left her husband with the kids for one night only, and when she got home from her evening 
engagement, the kids were all still awake. ‘“What,” he said, “you wanted me to do that too?” 
when I asked him why the kids were up.’ The five other women in the room laughed. And 
yet, this myth of the woman as multitasking superhero is simply an excuse to ask women to 
take more on, and to expect more unpaid labour. 
‘But,’ says Bina, ‘it’s worth it.’ 
It is worth it because it keeps Haredi society running, allows men to study more in 
yeshiva, and these things together make tikkun olam, healing the world to bring the moshiach. 
In the dance school one night right before the big end of year recital, the advanced lyrical 




teacher, shouts to keep them in place, ‘Wait! Hold!’ 
They pause in their final forms, awaiting further orders. 
‘Slowly, now! Drop your arms and stand up — slowly! Gracefully! And look towards the 
audience. You’re looking forward, out, at something distant on the horizon. Hold your gaze 
there! Now, that’s right. Walk forward to the edge of the stage— but keep looking! Slowly, 
slowly. It doesn’t have to be a perfect line. You’re still looking out there. What’s out there? Is 
it a little bit scary? A little hopeful? What is it? Is something coming? Is it a bomb? Is it 
moshiach?’ 
The girls and women gaze off into the imaginary distance, looking for, hoping for, in awe 
of that thing which they are all working towards, that elusive moshiach, the world that is 
whole and perfect. Marriage, motherhood, and supporting their husbands in yeshiva study, all 
without too much complaint or despair: this will make them Haredi women and bring 
moshiach soon. It also positions women as the mediators between outside and inside, secular 
and religious. While potentially overwhelming, this also allows women to have agency in the 
negotiation between the secular and the religious. They are the ones who choose the yarns of 
secularism that entwine themselves in the scarf of Haredi society. Women indeed do make 
the Haredi world go around; and they define it and shape it as they do so. 
 
 
Not Zionist, but Not Anti-Zionist 
 
Michal Tchernovitsky’s family background is extremely typical of mainstream Haredi 
Israeli families. As she puts it, her family is ‘Haredi all the way back.’ Her paternal 
grandfather is Polish, and her paternal grandmother was in the Agudas Yisrael youth 
movement in Hungary, before both families moved to the Holy Land prior to the Holocaust. 
Once married, her paternal grandparents followed the teachings of the Chazon Ish, Rabbi 




Palestine and advised Ben Gurion on religious matters in the early days of the state of Israel. 
Michal’s maternal family is a mix of Hasidic backgrounds, both Polish and Hungarian. She 
says that her various maternal cousins follow many different Hasidic traditions, but the 
majority are either Belz or Vozner Hasidim. 
This mixing of different types of Hasidic approaches, and the intermarriage of Litvish and 
Hasidic backgrounds is fairly typical of Haredi society in Israel today. The differences in 
religious interpretation which were of such great importance in pre-War Europe have faded in 
favour of instead emphasising a general Haredi identity in the face of secular identity and 
other types of religious backgrounds. Many of the marriages discussed within this work 
reflect this mix of Hasidic and Litvish, or two different types of Hasidic backgrounds. 
Generally, the family is raised following the father’s traditions. 
Michal’s parents married and raised a family in Bnei Brak, of which Michal is the 
youngest. Her childhood reflected the changes in stringency in the Haredi world: when she 
was young, they had a television, but got rid of it as she got older; they kept the radio, and 
had a mix of religious and secular books in the house. Her parents raised her with the 
expectation that she would attend university, not realising that the religious girls’ school she 
attended was not preparing her properly. 
She married at age twenty-one, but she and her husband struggled with fertility issues, 
and they didn’t achieve a successful full-term pregnancy for the first six years of marriage, 
until they turned to assistive reproductive technologies, and Michal gave birth to twin boys. 
They also have another son, and a daughter. While four children is well below the average for 
Haredi families, Michal’s small family size is more likely due to the expense and challenges 
of fertility treatments than because of her unique and radical choices which I will discuss 
later in this work. Michal’s insight into her own community is breathtaking, yet she still is 




therefore simultaneously a typical example of Haredi-ness, while offering a deeper level of 
understanding of why she and other Haredim think and act in these ways. 
When I ask Michal what it means to be Haredi, she swiftly responds, ‘The Haredi 
community is Shas and Yahadut HaTorah [United Torah Judaism].’ The answer is almost 
glib, and she seems to feel the glibness, because she immediately frowns and begins to 
contemplate a deeper answer. And yet, her answer reveals much about certain intrinsic 
meanings behind the categorisation and identification of Haredi. Some women—maybe all 
women—do Haredi-ness by voting for Haredi parties.  
Chana, a mother of nine in Beit Shemesh, reflected that ‘Haredi’ felt like a political word. 
‘I vote Haredi,’ she clarified. Both she and Tsirele, a Biala Hasidic woman, referred to 
‘Haredi’ as an ‘ichy’ word, which indicates their disgust with it, and suggests that they have 
absorbed the negativity with which the Israeli media refers to Haredim. 
‘The way it’s used in the media leaves me with just sort of a dark, black kind of feeling,’ 
says Chana. ‘If I had to choose, I would say I’m a Torah Jew.’ Though Chana’s allusion to 
the media seems surprising coming from a woman who does not possess a television or a 
radio, it is less so given her Israeli context. Lefkowitz discusses the ‘overwhelming presence 
of public discourse— media— in modern Israeli life’ which dictates first encounters with the 
‘Other’ (2006, 266). Though he was speaking of the Arab, his words could as easily be 
applied to the Haredi, who have become, in many ways, the unacceptable Jewish form of the 
‘Other’ in contemporary Israeli discourse (Efron 2003). The Haredi encounter with their own 
‘othering’ in Israeli media must be as dismal as Chana suggests. 
Sarah, who is Litvish like Chana, has a similar hesitancy towards identifying herself as 
‘Haredi.’ She is young, only twenty-seven to Chana’s mid-fifties, and grew up in the 
Jerusalem neighbourhood of Har Nof. Now, she lives in Arzei Habira, another 




long hours studying in yeshiva. When I asked her if she identified as Haredi, she promptly 
replied, ‘I’m not Haredi!’ 
I attempted to hide my surprise, and asked her instead what she would call herself. ‘I’m 
Jewish,’ she answered, which I found quite common in younger Litvisher women. It suggests 
both that there is unity in the Jewish people and in essence it is simply Jewishness that 
matters; it also serves to de-legitimise to a certain extent other forms of Jewish observance, 
because it is part of the discourse that Haredi Judaism is the only authentic form of 
observance. 
In order to clarify how Sarah thought of herself, I asked questions to understand how she 
compared herself with other Jewish groups. 
‘Would you be open to living in the Gush Etzion?’ I ask, referring to a settlement in the 
block inhabited by fairly moderate National Religious groups (Hirschhorn 2017). ‘Would you 
be interested in performing in a Raise Your Spirits musical, then?’ 
Sarah is active in the Haredi by-women-for-women theatre arts world, and Raise Your 
Spirits is also by-women-for-women; it is, however, very Zionist in approach and ideology. 
Formed during the Second Intifada, its mission is to bring women together and help them 
find strength and joy in community in order to have courage to continue living in often 
dangerous situations in Judea and Samaria. 
‘No,’ says Sarah. ‘I wouldn’t live in the Gush [Etzion]. I mean, I’m starting to meet some 
people from there, and I’m realising they’re maybe more frum than I originally thought, but 
I’ve always thought of them as not religious enough. And I wouldn’t do Raise Your Spirits, 
because they always do Tanach [Hebrew Bible] plays. I don’t like Tanach characters. They 
do, like, the Tanach modernised. It makes me uncomfortable. The Tanach is kind of 
untouchable in my head.’ 




perceptiveness about the political undercurrents of Raise Your Spirits theatre. For instance, 
one of the original musicals which they wrote and produced is Ruth and Naomi in the Fields 
of Bethlehem. This is, as Sarah says, a modern-imagining of the book of Ruth, which is 
scripture in the Tanach. But it also takes on a uniquely political element, because it was 
created to be performed by Jewish women in Efrat, a settlement located on a hill overlooking 
the fields south of Bethlehem. The play therefore becomes part of the political-religious 
ideological effort of those people living in the Gush Etzion: it is part of the discourse and 
rhetoric of Jewish ancestral rights to the lands of Judea and Samaria. It is taking the sacred 
text of the Tanach, which is of significance to all religious women, Haredi and National 
Religious alike, and conflating it with Zionist ideology. 
Sarah’s rejection of this type of politicisation of both the art and the Tanach itself marks 
her as a Haredi woman; she comes to this realisation herself over the course of the 
conversation. Some Haredi women do Haredi-ness by not participating in the conflation of 
Jewish liturgy with Zionist ideology. 
‘We’re not Haredi and we’re not modern,’ she says, using a common codeword in Haredi 
language: modern equates to secularised. ‘We’re in between.’ A few minutes later, she says, 
‘We’re in the Haredi world because there’s nowhere else to fit in.’ 
Chana eventually comes to the same inevitable conclusion. ‘If I had to choose,’ she sighs, 
‘“Haredi” is what I would choose [to define myself].’ 
Ultimately, what ‘Haredi’ is is defined more by what it is not. Perhaps this is the root of 
Chana’s reluctant acceptance: she excludes all other possible categories before recognising 
her adherence to Haredi society and cultural norms. 
‘The Haredim are not anti-Zionist,’ says Michal, continuing the conversation that started 
with her declaration that Haredim are, simply, the Haredi political parties. ‘They’re not anti-




don’t speak. We weren’t raised with it. And Haredim are indeed not Zionist. But they are 
very— most of them— they are good civilians. They have a very good civic conception. 
They’re even patriotic.’ 
This hearkens back to the night of Rabbanit Mizrahi’s address at the melave malka. She 
told a story of a soldier-girl with her story of aliyah, in Ethiopia. ‘She was born at only seven 
months,’ she tells us, and the room emits a collective clucking of concern. ‘Her mother was 
carrying her as they were fleeing for their lives, and she was born in the middle of the desert. 
And they came here to Eretz Yisrael.’ She uses the term the Land of Israel, which Haredim 
use to avoid referring to the country by its name, Israel. It is a subtle refusal to participate in 
Zionism. 
In response, the murmured phrase ‘Baruch Hashem’ [‘bless God’] flutters around the 
room, a thousand women whispering, ‘Bless God.’ The Haredi audience thanks God that 
Israel exists: thank God there was somewhere for her to go. Thank God the mother and child 
are safe, and living in the Land of Israel. Thank God they lived to have the chance for the 
daughter to go to the Rebbetzin’s classes, and learn about God, and become a good, religious 
Jewish woman. 
The true anti-Zionists are the groups at the fringe: the Neturei Karta, the Lev Tahor, and 
the other groups that fall under the umbrella of Eidah HaHaredis. These groups are, to a 
certain extent, shunned by general Haredi society, and some groups are viewed by 
mainstream Haredim as not even legitimately Jewish.  
‘But at least as far as the establishment is concerned, … it is either Haredi or Religious 
Zionist,’ Michal explains. ‘So the difference is the Zionism, like the attitude to the state. It is 
a completely different religion, a different theology. It’s like whether I think the state is 
sacred and the army is sacred and whether I say Hallel on Independence Day, meaning my 




the same. There is no difference. Maybe the opposite. So I think that's the difference.’ 
The majority of Haredi society negotiates Zionism and religion as separate ideologies, 
and can even espouse a certain amount of Zionist views, as long as these views do not 
contaminate the purity of religious observance and belief. Many other religious Jews are seen 
to have confounded religion with politics, and therefore the Haredim must seek a political 
identity that stands in defense of purity of religious ideology. Thus, Michal’s off-hand 
response, that Haredi identity is effectively a political one embodied by the Haredi parties, 
can be understood. Haredi women select the threads of politicisation from the secular yarn 
basket, but reject the threads of Zionist theology when knitting the scarf of Haredi identity. 
 
 Army Service: Resisting Zionism or Secularism? 
 
Army service is a prime example of the idea that Haredi identity is defined more by what 
it is not than by what it is. In the middle of our discussion of Haredi attitudes around 
Zionism, Michal paused suddenly, seemingly at a loss for words, a rare occurrence. 
 ‘But the matter of the army,’ she began, and trailed off. Then, ‘Most of the Haredim don't 
enlist in the army.’ 
But she was swift to clarify that the choice not to serve in the army was not necessarily 
connected with the general Haredi disengagement with Zionism. Interestingly, Michal 
distinguishes between the ideas of ‘secular’ and ‘Zionist’. This may be due to another 
division in Israeli society, that of the left-wing secular Jew and the right-wing Zionist 
(Dalsheim 2019, 3); this is further discussed in Chapter Seven. However, because the Haredi 
identity is formed through equal resistance to both Zionism and secularism, and nationalist 
ideology is, essentially, a result of secular ideology as discussed in Chapter Two, I do not 
make this distinction. 




not about being in the army. I don't think it has anything to do with the army. But I do think 
that ultimately today you do see Haredim going out to work, but still they're not eager to 
enlist in the army. Some do,’ she allowed. 
The IDF has recognised that Haredim fear army service for their children because of 
secular exposure, and has created a religious, men’s-only division, which was historically 
called Nahal Haredi and is now known as Netzah Yehuda Battalion. Yet enlistment remains 
low. Michal suggests that it has more to do with Haredi cultural norms and expectations than 
an active rejection of the military. 
‘Because really, I think, let's ask why secular people enlist in the army. It’s not because of 
the law. I mean it is because of the law but the law has become a consensus because that's 
what people are educated to do from the moment they are born. Like, going to the army is the 
Israeli thing to do. It’s like, I graduate…. Of course it’s the law but that wouldn't have been 
enough, I mean you don't have to catch people here and drag [them] from [their] homes and 
threaten them with jail. How many cases like that do you have? People enlist. Not everyone, 
but they enlist…. So, [it’s] part of society.  
‘This simply does not exist in Haredi society. I mean, they are not educated to enlist or 
anything like that. They are not part of Israeli statehood. They are not part of the Israeli story. 
It’s like an autonomy, like living in an autonomous state.’ 
Essentially, Haredim don’t serve in the army because other Haredim don’t serve in the 
army. In the general Israeli population, army service is part of the process of growing up: 
children know that they turn eighteen, they receive their bagrut, and then they go to the army 
for at least two years. When they finish, maybe they travel, maybe they go to university, 
maybe they go straight into work— often with skills that they gained in army service. 
Haredim grow up, and they think about shidduchim and yeshiva. 




component of their Haredi identity. 
I met with a Sephardi Haredi woman named Yael often, because she genuinely enjoyed 
chatting with me in her kitchen. Her youngest had started full-day school the year before and 
she said I made her house feel less empty. She was also unafraid to think critically about 
many of the more difficult questions I posed to her, and was an incredibly secure questioner 
of her own faith and assumptions. She had taught herself English, and read secular books in 
English to expand her vocabulary. Early in our interlocutor relationship, I wasn’t sure she 
would identify as Haredi, but by our third meeting, I felt I could ask her directly. 
‘Yael, would you call yourself Haredi?’ I asked, as she drained noodles in the sink. 
‘Yes!’ she exclaimed, forcefully. ‘My husband says it all the time, we are Haredi.’ 
Yael’s declaration was easily the most enthusiastic embrasure of the ‘Haredi’ label I 
encountered in the full seven years I have spent visiting the field. 
Surprised, I asked, ‘What makes you Haredi?’ 
Without even pausing, she set down her colander and said, ‘It’s all about the army. 
Absolutely no army service for my kids!’ 
Another woman, Tovah, who is an American ba’alas teshuvah, answered similarly, 
saying that not serving in the IDF was what she felt defined her as Haredi, and though she 
was open to her daughters potentially doing Sheirut Leumi [national service (an alternative to 
army service for religious non-Haredi girls)], she didn’t think her husband would be. She 
paused in our conversation, and asked herself, ‘Is it [her opposition to army service] because 
I’m Haredi, or because I’m American?’ 
Nonetheless, non-participation in the army seems to be central to a significant proportion 
of women’s perceptions of Haredi-ness, even though even in the National Religious camp 
many women do not serve, choosing instead to do Sheirut Leumi. Women feel strongly that 




While Michal doesn’t relate it to the Haredi aspect of identity surrounding not being Zionist, 
Yael suggests otherwise. 
‘We are very strongly against the army, and we are very strongly against the occupation,’ 
Yael explains. She has recently moved to a new house, and like many Haredi families, they 
struggled to find a place they could afford. 
‘We are always really careful about not living over the line in East Jerusalem,’ she 
explains. Surprised, I raised an eyebrow. The ‘line’ to which she refers is the Green Line, 
which signifies the pre-1967 border of Israel and Jordan. It runs through the middle of 
Jerusalem, but it is invisible: there is no border fence, wall, checkpoint; the line only 
officially exists on maps. Most of my interlocutors who were religious their whole lives, like 
Yael, wouldn’t even know what it is, let alone where it is. Indeed, the Haredi neighbourhoods 
of north Jerusalem are criss-crossed by it repeatedly, and I have regularly crossed it multiple 
times within a day. The vast majority of the Haredim disregard the officialdom of 
international law as part of the de-emphasis of any secular authority, generally; though they 
are not ideologically invested in Zionism, neither are they part of the international discourse 
surrounding the conflict in support of the Palestinian right to self-determination. 
‘That’s hard, if you’re Haredi, avoiding living over the Green Line,’ I say. 
‘It can be, yes,’ says Yael. ‘There were some really affordable places in Ma’alot Dafna, 
and a place in Givat HaMivtar that had a garden, which I wanted for the kids, but we 
absolutely refuse to go there.’ 
‘Even within Jerusalem?’ I ask, amazed. ‘I mean, many people— most people I talk to— 
don’t even consider those places settlements, or whatever you want to call them.’ 
Yael is nodding. ‘My husband takes a very hard line, and I really support him in this,’ she 
says. ‘Sometimes I almost think it’s why he became Haredi.’  




come up before, and because it is fairly unusual for a person who was always Haredi to marry 
someone who is newly religious. 
She nodded. ‘He was raised Dati Leumi,’ she says. ‘So he served in the army. He was 
actually stationed in the West Bank.’  
She uses the English term that the international community uses for the disputed area to 
the east of Jerusalem: another surprise. 
‘Look, it’s not my story to tell, but something horrible happened to him in the army,’ says 
Yael. ‘It was really traumatic. His head was not ok for a long time. And he became ok by 
becoming religious. I mean Haredi. And so he’s really against the occupation, and he won’t 
go anywhere that is supposed to belong to the Palestinians.’ 
The peculiarities of Yael’s husband’s situation may suggest that the connection between  
non-enlistment and resisting Zionism may not be universal for all Haredim who view army 
service as non-Haredi, but it does suggest that, where there is a political awareness, army 
service may be perceived to be connected to Zionist ideology. Furthermore, this suggests that 
Haredi life is considered an alternative to expectations of Right Wing Zionism for Sephardim 
(Lavie 2018, Shohat 2017), as discussed in Chapters Two and Seven. At the very least, army 
service is seen by all Haredim, even those who choose to serve, as participation in the secular 
world. Ultimately, in the Israeli context, the secular may be to a certain extent inseparable 
from Zionist beliefs. For some women, doing Haredi-ness means not serving in the army—
which is about avoiding secularism and Zionism. 
I sit back and sip my tea. She is quiet for a minute, frowning, and then she looks up and 
smiles. ‘Anyway, we found this place,’ she says, gesturing to the flat. ‘I love it here. It’s so 
peaceful. We’re at the back of the building and there are all these trees, and it stays cool all 
summer, we don’t even need the mazgan [air conditioner]. We are going to stay here for a 







 Overall, we begin to understand through these examinations of the way in which 
Haredi women construct their identity, of the label of ‘Haredi’, and of other Jews, that Haredi 
women’s identity is still informed by the historical roots traced in the previous chapter. 
Women’s Haredi personhood is a type of internal religious ethic that is shaped through the 
external practices of tsnius, which not only emphasise modesty in dress, but also certain 
forms of comportment and conformity to community norms. The first sixty years of the state 
of Israel saw a gradual increase in the stringency of interpretation of these modesty and 
gender separation norms, with a special emphasis on the prohibition of kol isha, which both 
prevents women from taking on certain types of leadership roles, but also has fostered a 
thriving women’s-only performing arts scene. 
The emphasis on, and interpretation of, modesty standards has been extremely 
subjectively cultural, which created dilemmas for the Sephardi and Mizrahi religious 
immigrants to Israel over the course of the twentieth century. Haredi models of modesty 
exclude many clothing choices valued by Sephardi culture. Though devoutly religious, 
Sephardi lifestyles were markedly different than those of the Ashkenazi Haredi groups which 
had only just begun to establish themselves in Israel. Religious Sephardim encountered an 
attitude under which they could either conform to Ashkenazi norms, or be excluded from 
strongly religious life in their new homeland. This resulted in the erasure of Sephardi and 
Mizrahi culture within the Haredi fold, and the process of Ashkenization. It also provided 
fertile ground for prejudice against Sephardim to flourish, and this has endured. The Sephardi 
Haredi experience is no less legitimately Haredi, but is marked by discrimination and 
exclusion by their Ashkenazi peers. This is articulated in specific rhetoric relating to 
modesty, or perhaps rather Sephardi women’s innate lack of it. This prejudice is not unrelated 




further offer a discourse of otherness around Sephardim. Sephardi women nonetheless 
articulate their Haredi-ness in similar ways as Ashkenazi women: it is both a political identity 
and a religious one, and a woman’s role is to be a wife supporting her husband in yeshiva 
study and a mother raising religious Jewish children, as many as Hashem will provide. 
Women are, however, expected to be certain types of wives and mothers: ‘superheroes’ 
who multi-task, rarely sleep, and approach their work with joy and without complaint. 
Through the support of their husbands, and the work that they do as wives and mothers, 
Haredi women are doing tikkun olam, repairing the world, and bringing moshiach, whom 
many believe is imminent. This both grants power and meaning to mundane tasks, and 
bolsters strict interpretations of traditional gender roles. It also puts them in unique positions 
as negotiators of the secular-religious binary. 
Yet women struggle with the label of ‘Haredi’ itself, though ultimately most of them 
accept it, however grudgingly. It is, ultimately, understood to be a political identity as much 
as a religious one. It involves a participation in the politics of the community, and operates to 
distinguish the group from the rest of the country, both secular and religious nationalist. It is 
not, however, as strongly anti-Zionist as some of its founding roots would have suggested; 
while extreme fringe groups like Neturei Karta and Lev Tahor endure, they are not 
representative of the majority of Haredi attitudes. While Haredim may not say Hallel on 
Israel’s Independence Day, the vast majority profess a mild form of support for the state and 
the ideals of mainstream Zionism, including the importance of the safety for Jews proffered 
by the existence of a country for Jews. Instead, the Haredi women distinguish themselves 
from their Dati Leumi counterparts in subtle ways, such as choices surrounding types of 
performances and interpretations of Jewish holy texts. 
Ultimately, Haredi womanhood is defined by the entanglement of the religious and 




and wifely roles, which in turn shape an internal religious ethic. This internal Haredi ethical 
womanhood is one of support for her husband, children, and community, placing her own 
needs, wants, and individuality to the side, in order to do her part in tikkun olam and bringing 
moshiach. This has, undeniably, proven an ideal with which women struggle and often resist; 
in the next chapter I explore the changes which are shifting this ideal, and creating a more 
complex society than envisioned by the expectations of Haredi norms. 
Thus, in this chapter, we see how Haredim understand their identity as both religious and 
political, and formed in opposition to secularism and the state. Women negotiate between 
their religious values and the demands and expectations of the state, resisting through non-
Zionism and establishing a self-identity that functions as a minority identity in defence of its 
religious values in the state of Israel. This role makes women central to the processes of 




Chapter Four: Currents of Change 
The changes discussed in this chapter have led to shifts in Haredi identity and politics, 
and they are due to negotiations between the state and religious needs and values; 
negotiations largely navigated by Haredi women. In the previous chapters, I discussed the 
formation of mainstream Haredi identity up until approximately 2010. In the past decade, 
modes and models of Haredi personhood have shifted significantly in comparison with the 
previous sixty years. There are specific circumstances which have created change. The most 
significant influences have been the inclusion of a large number of ba’alei teshuvah (those 
who were raised less religious and became Haredi as adults), improved secular education, and 
housing in new and different places. These have led to the creation of a New Haredi Middle 
Class, which is an acceptable form of Haredi personhood while being more influenced by 
secular knowledge, and sometimes more participatory in the state. Women have been central 
to all of these processes. 
In this chapter, I argue that ba’alei teshuvah, and especially ba’alos teshuvah, are an 
important factor in understanding change during the last decade in the Haredi world. 
Because, broadly speaking, they view their choice to become Haredi as a religious choice, 
rather than a political one, they constantly negotiate their secular middle class knowledge and 
values with their new religious identity. They value arts and sports enrichment for children, 
as well as secular education and higher degrees. Because their choice to become religious is 
the ultimate critique of secularism, their secular knowledge and values are more acceptable to 
the Haredi world, and offer an opportunity for negotiation between the secular and religious 
at a community level.  
I further argue that the sixty years of increasing stringency in the Haredi community since 




improved secular education for both men and women in the past decade. Women’s secular 
education had been improving throughout those sixty years of change, while men’s secular 
education had significantly decreased, as mentioned in previous chapters. This led to what 
my interlocutors dubbed ‘the newly-wed crisis’ in which the religious values of patriarchy 
and male-headship in the home were confounded by wives with more education than men. 
This crisis led rabbis to advocate for better secular education for boys, and more 
opportunities for higher education for men. This change led to more school choice in 
haskafically Haredi schools, and the opening of Haredi campuses of major universities. This 
represents a negotiation between Haredi values of marriage and peace in the home, and 
secular knowledge; it also represents a certain victory for the state and its goal of 
transforming Haredi men into productive citizens. It is also a victory for women, who have 
not lost opportunities for higher education while men have gained. 
My third part of the argument of this chapter concerns new spaces of Haredi housing, and 
how this has led to contact with different types of Jews and ways of being religious. These 
new areas of housing, both Haredi-only and diverse, offer the Haredi community 
opportunities to maintain religious values of large families, while keeping housing costs 
affordable. However, these new areas, especially in the West Bank, have turned the Haredim 
into agents of the state expansion project in the Occupied Territories. What this chapter 
makes abundantly clear is that the Haredi community is just as influenced by national and 
international policy shifts as any other society. Despite their avowed lack of political interest 
in Israeli expansionist policies, the Haredi leaders (for the most part) chose to benefit from 
these policies when given a choice. The implications of this for Haredi identity—and how 
women participate in these changes—will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
All these changes have led to the creation of a New Haredi Middle Class, in which one or 




family is economically secure. More often than not, it is the wife who has the higher degree, 
if only one, or the first degree, if two. These families are fully embraced by the mainstream 
Haredi community; indeed, the community relies upon them for significant economic 
support. Furthermore, the existence of this new Middle Class offers a certain amount of 
appeasement to the state. The New Haredi Middle Class represents the ultimate negotiation 




A significant source of change in the Haredi world are ba’alei teshuvah. These newly-
religious people downplay their own influence; indeed, much of their general focus is 
conforming as much as possible to frum cultural and community standards (Benor 2012). 
However, my research has revealed that the impact of both Israeli ba’alei teshuvah and so-
called Anglo (because they speak English, not because they come from England) ba’alei 
teshuvah have changed attitudes in multiple fields of the Haredi world in Israel. Some 
changes, such as the wide introduction of artistic activities for children and adults alike, are 
motivated equally by the Israeli ba’alei teshuvah attitudes and the Anglo ba’alei teshuvah 
attitudes. Other changes are really stemming from the Anglo side, because of the 
backgrounds of people who become ba’alei teshuvah in Australia, North America, England, 
and South Africa. By and large, Anglo ba’alei teshuvah come from middle- to upper-middle-
class backgrounds; most grew up in suburbia, and most have attended university; many have 
attended elite universities, including the Ivy League and Oxbridge. It is important to 
understand that Anglo ba’alei teshuvah view becoming religious as a purely religious choice, 
rather than a religious-political choice; they have therefore maintained the internal division 
between the aspects of their identities which are political and those aspects which are 




complex identity has meant that Anglo ba’alei teshuvah have also brought with them certain 
middle-class, secularly-educated, suburban values. This is especially true of women, who are 
focussed on raising their children with these combinations of suburban values and Haredi 
ethics. These include a desire to raise well-rounded children who have access to enrichment 
activities after school, and who are physically fit as well as Torah-observant. For many 
ba’alos teshuvah, city life is a bit of an anathema, and they choose to move to places that 
offer the suburban ideal with which they grew up. Many Anglo ba’alos teshuvah also 
maintain an expectation that their children will attend both university and yeshiva or 
seminary; this translates into a demand for higher quality secular education for both boys and 
girls. These ba’alos teshuvah knit their middle-class suburban values into the ever-evolving 
scarf of Haredi society. Many of these changes are widely accepted, and even welcomed, by 
the frum from birth Haredi mainstream. Some of these things hold true as well for Israeli 
ba’alei teshuvah, but ba’alei teshuvah who grew up in Israel tend to be from very different 
backgrounds than their Anglo counterparts. Many of them tend to come from more 
marginalised backgrounds, and have experienced some form of exclusion from mainstream 
secular life in Israel. Within this work, three of the women with whom I conducted research 
were Israeli ba’alei teshuvah; two of them grew up in care because their parents were unable 
to properly look after them, and two of them were Sephardi or Mizrahi. Furthermore, because 
the identity of ‘Haredi’ is so politicised in the Israeli mainstream media, Israeli ba’alei 
teshuvah were more likely to view their choice to become religious as both a religious and 
political choice, and to perceive their own Haredi identity as a political identity, as much as it 
is a religious one. 
 
The Israeli Ba’alos Teshuvah Experience 
 
Ruth Colian is an Israeli ba’alas teshuvah. Her story of becoming religious is not 




individual ever represent the whole? Rather, her story is an example of many experiences 
which may happen for some ba’alei teshuvah; her response to these experiences is anything 
but ordinary. Ruth is a remarkable force of will power, energy, and intention, and her story is 
valuable in its exceptionalism. Nonetheless, some of her personal processes of becoming 
Haredi seem very representative, especially the way in which she has adopted a unified 
religious-political identity, and her attitudes towards the secular world. Her story is as she 
told it to me, in a mixture of Modern Hebrew and English; I have paraphrased her words to 
avoid the long linguistic tangents which we sometimes took, when Hebrew and English terms 
needed clarification or caused amusement. 
Ruth was born in 1981 into a Sephardi family in Petach Tikvah, a city in the central part 
of Israel which acts as a bedroom community to Tel Aviv, and also hosts its own industry and 
business. She is the second oldest of four girls. By the time Ruth was seven years old, she and 
all of her sisters had been placed in children’s homes, where they lived the remainder of their 
childhoods. Her father was an alcoholic, and abused her mother, making the home unsafe for 
the four young children. She lived in care until she was seventeen and a half, when she fell 
pregnant by a boyfriend. This seems to have been a time of confusion and searching: she 
started attending religious shiurim at the same time as she was involved in the relationship 
that resulted in her pregnancy. Her boyfriend wanted her to get an abortion, but she refused. 
‘I told him that if God wanted to kill the baby, he doesn’t need my help,’ she told me. ‘So 
he disappeared.’ 
Ruth gave birth to a baby boy, alone, at age eighteen.9 She moved with her son to 
Jerusalem, where she attended shiurim in increasing numbers, and she began to take on 
religious observance.  
 
9 Ruth is unusual in her situation as an unmarried single mother. Though most single mothers are Sephardi 
in Israel, the vast majority of these mothers were married before their pregnancy, and left by their husbands 
some time after having children within the marriage (Lavie 2018, 8). To learn more about Sephardi and Mizrahi 




One night, in the middle of the night, her baby boy started coughing, choking, and 
struggling to breathe. Ruth took him to the hospital in Jerusalem, where he was diagnosed 
with laryngitis and asthma. Concerned for her child’s health, Ruth returned to live with her 
mother, because the best children’s hospital in the country, Schneider Children’s Medical 
Center, is in Petach Tikvah. However, her son did not improve with the treatment that was 
given. Ruth took him to the hospital many times in the first year and a half of his life, and 
repeatedly told the doctors that she thought something else was wrong with him, something 
they were missing. 
When her son was one and a half, he was admitted to hospital due to the severity of his 
illness. The doctors discovered upon this admission that he had cancer in his stomach. The 
cancer had been missed for nearly a year previous despite multiple hospital visits. A week 
and a half after he was admitted to hospital, Ruth’s son died. 
The period following her son’s death was very bad for Ruth. She was deeply depressed, 
and fell into debt. She credits a close friend with saving her from this ‘bad time;’ this friend 
would force her to leave her bed and her house, and took her to religious shiurim. After about 
eight months, Ruth started to recover, but she still was in danger of being incarcerated for her 
debts. She took legal action against the hospital which had missed her son’s diagnosis, and 
she became a surrogate for a friend who had fertility struggles. Between the surrogacy 
compensation and the lawsuit award, Ruth was able to fully pay off her debts. She married 
another ba’al teshuvah, and entered her religious life free of any encumbrances. 
Ruth’s story is tragic, and her resilience is admirable. However, her story is similar to 
many Israeli ba’alos teshuvah stories in the way she frames her life before and after 
becoming religious, and the process therein: before, she didn’t know any better, but because 
she was taught about religion, she knows how to live a good life, following mitzvot, and it 




common among the three Israeli ba’alos teshuvah with whom I spoke. Religion saves one 
from the dangers and sins of a world without a moral compass.  
‘I look at the girls I was in the children’s home with,’ Shulamit tells me. She became 
religious in her teen years, and went directly into a shidduch upon leaving the home. ‘Some 
of them are ok, but so many of them are screwed up bad [sic]! Some have terrible men, they 
are with the abuse. Some are even on drugs! Or they drink! Chas v’shalom! [‘have mercy’ or 
‘heaven forbid’] I am so thankful, baruch Hashem, that I became religious, that I was saved 
from everything. I married a good man, baruch Hashem, and we are safe, I am safe, my 
children are having such a good life, with both of us making them a home. One of the girls I 
was with, what do you call it? We slept in the same… yes! Dorm, this girl in my dorm, she 
had a little girl and now that girl is in a children’s home… My children will have a better 
childhood than I had. That is what matters.’ 
Israeli ba’alos teshuvah view religion as saving them, both in the literal sense of 
providing security, structure, and family in a world that has largely been unkind to them, and 
in terms of saving them from transgressions and immoral behaviour. Ruth is Sephardi and 
Shulamit is Ashkenazi, which suggests that marginalisation is the common theme, rather than 
ethnic background; however, an argument could be made that certain ethnicities are more 
likely to face marginalisation in Israel than others. Israeli ba’alos teshuvah are more likely to 
present a narrative where religion is the ‘right’ and ‘true path’, which is likely influenced by 
easy linguistic access to religious texts like Derech Eretz and Pirkei Avos. Anglo ba’alos 
teshuvah access these texts later in their transformative processes through education (if at 
all); the Anglo attitudes and experiences show a more complex process of transformation 
which critiques the secular world from which they come, and allows more negotiation with 






Anglo Ba’alos Teshuvah and Religion as Critique 
 
Ba’alos Teshuvah who are so-called ‘Anglo’, broadly meaning that they speak English 
(though some who are considered ‘Anglo’ are possibly French-speaking Ashkenazim, or 
similarly ‘Western’), generally come from more privileged backgrounds than their Israeli 
counterparts, though this is of course not without occasional exceptions. Most have grown up 
in suburbia or well-to-do urban households, have attended elite schools, and may or may not 
have had dysfunctional home lives. How and why they become religious often differs from 
their Israeli peers, and these reasons are important to understand when examining how they 
view their religious identity. 
In general, most Anglo ba’alos teshuvah grew up with some nominal Jewish identity. If 
they were from the United States or Australia, they were more likely to have been Reform, 
Conservative, or not attended any synagogue as a child, whereas Canadians, South Africans, 
and British Jews were likely to have had more observant homes in their childhoods, mainly 
Masorti/Traditional, Conservadox, or even Modern Orthodox. Some may have had a bat 
mitzvah, some may have not; Americans were more likely to have attended public [state] 
school or a private, non-religious school, whereas the others were more varied in their 
educational backgrounds, including Jewish day schools which were not Haredi, and Christian 
parochial schools. Some grew up in homes with divorce, some did not; most had siblings, and 
all but one came from homes where there was an expectation to attend university. Most did 
attend at least some university; many graduated. Some have continued on with masters, 
doctorates, and other professional certifications. All became interested in a religious Jewish 
life after an encounter with a kiruv [outreach] organisation; some encountered those 
organisations in their home countries, often on their university campuses, while others 
encountered these organisations on a funded trip to Israel. Almost all pursued their interest in 




teach ba’alos teshuvah. 
Miriam’s story of becoming religious was typical of many. She was born in the greater 
Chicago area, the only daughter in a family of five. She says she always had a strong sense of 
her Jewish identity, even though she went to public school and had to fight to have a bat 
mitzvah. 
‘I wanted kiddusha [community],’ she says, ‘but I didn’t know how to find it.’ 
She says that while she was in high school, she decided that she was a ‘feminist atheist 
who wanted to be a “humanistic” rabbi. Can you believe that?’ she laughed to me. ‘What 
even is a rabbi without Hashem?’ 
She started college at Barnard College, Columbia University in autumn of 1997, and 
declared a double major in Africana Studies and Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies by 
the end of her first year. She also became heavily involved in activist movements both on and 
off the campus, including a budding student-led branch of the Black Panthers. Early in the 
second semester of her sophomore year, a Black man named Amadou Diallo was murdered 
by police without cause.  
‘The campus, especially the Black Power groups, were up in arms, and there was a 
protest like every week,’ she told me. ‘I really felt this Jewish connection with the Black 
experience, I really empathised with the Black experience. I was even in this house that was a 
Jewish-African American dorm.’ 
She said she was at one protest that got particularly violent, and someone shouted at her 
that she should ‘Go back to Westchester!’ It really shook her up, because she saw how others 
must see her: as a privileged, entitled white girl. ‘I thought to myself, “Who’s got my back?”’ 
Later that evening, when she was wearing her favourite jean jacket, of which she had sewn a 
giant Che Guevara face to the back, one of the Panthers glanced at it and then turned to her 




and you should get to know them.’ 
His comment made a huge impression on her. She was in the process of deciding where 
to study abroad, and had been considering Tanzania or Edinburgh. ‘In that moment, I decided 
to study abroad in Israel,’ she told me, ‘and I enrolled at Hebrew University.’ 
While at Hebrew University, she started attending the Beit Midrash, a campus program to 
teach non-religious students about religion, which several of my interlocutors had attended 
early in their transformative processes. Through this group, Miriam (which was not her name 
before she was religious) went on a shabbaton [a sabbath spent as a group with special 
programming, often in a special location] to Ascent, a centre for spiritual exploration and 
discovery, in the old city of Tsfat. There, she had her first exposure to Hasidic Judaism. 
‘The second I tasted it, I said, “I want more,”’ Miriam tells me, her eyes alight. ‘It had the 
depth that I was craving without the darkness that usually comes with the depth. This was 
depth, but it was light [sic] and uplifting.’ 
Halfway through her year abroad, Miriam left Hebrew University and started studying at 
Neve, a seminary program for ba’alos teshuvah in Jerusalem. She also met the man who was 
to become her husband, and they made a commitment to each other, and to traditional 
Judaism. Once they were back in the States, they were married in Miami, where his family 
was from, and she finished her college degree at the University of Maryland, where he was 
also studying. They both then moved to Israel, and her husband studied at Ohr Sameach, a 
yeshiva with a program for ba’alei teshuvah. Miriam studied at Neve until their first child 
was born.  
Chana’s story was similar to Miriam’s: she also attended the Beit Midrash program at 
Hebrew University. However, she was at Hebrew University as a gap year before she started 
college. Her parents had sent her to Israel ‘to get it out of her system’; her father had said that 




been attracted to Judaism, however: her passion had been ignited by a six week Israel trip 
with a Conservative Jewish summer program between her junior and senior years of high 
school, in the late ’80s. 
‘I so didn’t want to spend six weeks with a bunch of Jews,’ she told me, but said her 
cousins, who had completed the program in previous years, had convinced her to go. ‘I came 
from a strong Jewish home, and I was always excited about being Jewish. It’s just that certain 
things felt… goyish.’ She used the Yiddish term for something that is non-Jewish. ‘But then 
we had this amazing experience at the Diaspora Museum [Museum of the Jewish People at 
Beit Hatfusot] and the madricha [youth counsellor] made me realise that in order to preserve 
Judaism, I had to observe Judaism [sic].’ 
In her senior year of high school, she started attending synagogue every week, and would 
drive— she rolls her eyes at her own ignorance— to the services blasting klezmer music out 
her windows through her southern California town. When it came time to apply for college, 
she found none of the options appealed to her. She only wanted to go back to Israel. And so 
her father sent her to Hebrew University, and she started attending classes at the Beit Midrash 
program.  
‘I fell in love with Torah,’ she said, ‘I would leave on such a high.’ 
Like Miriam, she went on shabbaton to Tsfat, to Machon Alte, the Chabad Lubavitch 
seminary, instead of to Ascent as in Miriam’s case, and decided to make a deep commitment 
to living a religious Jewish life. She returned to Jerusalem, and transferred out of Hebrew 
University and enrolled in Neve, like Miriam, but almost ten years before Miriam was a 
student there. 
‘I returned to California, and I had a really difficult conversation with my parents,’ she 
said. ‘I told them I wasn’t going to go to college. And I went back to Neve to study more. My 




or two. But after Neve, I went back to the States, to Monsey [New York], and I was studying 
at the Jewish Renaissance Center there when I met my husband. The shadchan [matchmaker] 
saw both of us each in Purim shpiels [plays]. We got married, and six weeks later we moved 
to Eretz Yisrael.’ 
Originally, they intended to stay for a year, but after seven years of visa extensions, 
Chana said they finally realised they were never leaving. Her husband started following the 
Biala rebbe, and they had nine children. Their children attended Yiddish-speaking schools, 
and integrated into the Chasidic world completely; all are now married with their own 
children, bar the youngest daughter, who has serious medical problems. This has caused 
Chana and her husband to move to Jerusalem with her, so that they can access the necessary 
medical care. The rest of Chana’s children live in Bnei Brak, and she is unhappy living so far 
from them. 
Menucha is slightly younger than Miriam and Chana; she was born in 1989 in the Boston 
area. She never attended any Hebrew school or synagogue while growing up; her mom, who 
is her Jewish parent, sometimes made a Passover seder and latkes on Chanukah, but nothing 
was regular and consistent.  
‘Judaism just wasn’t a priority for my family,’ she says. ‘It wasn’t like a major part of our 
identity. I mean, yes, my parents were busy, but it wasn’t really that they were too busy to do 
anything, it just wasn’t a priority.’ 
Menucha started college at the University of Pennsylvania in 2007, and stumbled upon a 
programme called Me’or. This is a kiruv program where emissaries [the name for observant 
Jews who move to less-observant areas in order to help and teach Jews] hold classes on 
Judaism and teach religious texts. The Me’or website advertises, ‘Inspiring, educating, and 
empowering a new generation,’(Meor 2016) and lists twenty-one campus locations across 





‘Me’or was amazing, it was like it opened me up to this whole new world, and I couldn’t 
stop learning,’ Menucha tells me. She went to Israel on a summer program with other Me’or 
students, and when she came back she decided to start taking on more Jewish observance. 
‘I started only eating in the Kosher cafeteria, and I went to Chabad every Friday night,’ 
she says, ‘and then I added Saturday lunches, too.’ 
The next summer Menucha returned to study at a seminary. ‘I tried Pardes [a Modern 
Orthodox co-educational Beit Midrash], but it was too Modern. So the second half of the 
summer I studied at Midreshet Rachel v’Chaya.’ Midreshet Rachel v’Chaya, often referred to 
as ‘MRC’, is another seminary for ba’alos teshuvah. It is known for its rigorous academics, 
focussing on a wide range of texts and Jewish ideas. ‘I really liked MRC, but it almost felt 
too masculine. Like, I liked the learning, but I wanted to feel more in touch with my 
femininity.’ 
Menucha finished her studies at Penn, saying she struggled because by her final year she 
wanted to live in single-gender, Jewishly observant housing, and she was much more 
observant than the majority of her peers. She used her summers to travel to Israel and study. 
‘I tried Mayanot, too,’ she said, referring to the seminary program run by Chabad Lubavitch 
in Jerusalem. ‘But Chabad just wasn’t my cup of tea.’ 
After completing undergraduate studies, Menucha made aliyah, and enrolled full time at 
Shearim, yet another seminary for ba’alos teshuvah. ‘Shearim was a really good fit,’ she told 
me. ‘I felt like I was a woman there.’ 
Menucha eventually met her husband, a ba’al teshuvah, through a shadchan; he studies 
with the Hornisteipoler Rebbe, and they send their children to a mixed Hasidic cheider. ‘In 
the end, Hasidic life spoke to us more than other versions of Judaism,’ Menucha tells me.  




ba’alos teshuvah, their stories have much in common. The unifying elements are: first, their 
encounter with some sort of kiruv organisation, be it the Hebrew University Beit Midrash or 
Me’or; second, their attendance at a seminary for ba’alos teshuvah. The kiruv programme 
ignites the interest; the seminary solidifies the commitment.  
Kiruv programmes take two different types of approaches. Some focus on food, 
hospitality, and chaplaincy, offering a nurturing, home-like environment which students 
crave when they are away from home. Others offer learning, with discreet tastes of Jewish 
wisdom. This latter type seems to be the most influential in the lives of the Anglo ba’alos 
teshuvah with whom I conducted research. These kiruv programs, of which there are a 
plurality throughout the English-speaking world, are usually co-educational, and focus on a 
single topic each term. Once students are involved in these kiruv programs, those who are 
most interested in deepening their Jewish studies are encouraged to go to Israel on a study 
programme, either with one of the seminaries or yeshivas, or with a Taglit-Birthright 
associated organisation. Those who become ba’alei teshuvah usually return to Israel to study 
for a year or more in a seminary (for women) or yeshiva (for men). Some of these seminaries 
are incredibly academically rigorous in their religious course offerings, in order to meet the 
needs of the highly educated women who come to them.  
Not everyone who becomes a ba’alas teshuvah is brought to religious life through kiruv; 
some are drawn more to the land of Israel itself, or find themselves in Israel and discover 
religious observance serendipitously.  
Sitta grew up in a very Zionist, Israel focussed home in Galveston, Texas. Though the 
family was not at all religious, she always felt a strong sense of Jewish identity with Israel. 
After she finished high school, she went to Israel with the scouting programme Chetz 
v’Keshet, a program that offers both rugged outdoors tourism, and a taste of service in the 




of going to university she wanted to serve in the Israeli army. They flatly refused her request, 
and told her if she still wanted to after she got her degree, she was welcome to return in four 
years. At the end of the summer she returned to the United States, and began her degree at 
SUNY Potsdam.  
‘I hated the snow,’ Sitta told me ruefully. ‘Every summer I went back to Israel, doing 
whatever I could to spend the most time in the land. I feel such a connection to the place. It’s 
hard to describe.’ 
One summer, Sitta decided to spend a few days in Jerusalem before she went north to 
work on a kibbutz. A student on a budget, she chose to stay at Heritage House in the Old 
City, a hostel-like establishment that offers free or low-cost gender-separate dormitory 
housing to anyone Jewish. While there, the director of the women’s House asked her why she 
came to Israel and what she planned. 
‘She said, “You didn’t come here to pick lettuce,” and she was right,’ said Sitta. ‘I guess I 
was also open to thinking a little bit about religion. I was reading The Year of Living 
Biblically [(Jacobs 2007)], and it was making me think about the connection between the 
religion and the land. I wasn’t really thinking about becoming religious, I just was interested.’ 
Upon her urging, Sitta cancelled her kibbutz plans and signed up for Livnot, a Tsfat-based 
programme that combines hiking and outdoor activities with informal Jewish mystical 
education. While she was attending Livnot, Sitta met and fell in love with the man who 
would become her husband. They dated for several more years; he gradually became more 
religious, while she found herself unable to commit. All she knew for sure was that she 
wanted to live in Israel. 
At the end of her undergraduate degree, Sitta made aliyah to Israel. She was faced with a 
choice: become religious and marry the man she loved, or break up with him. 




When she speaks of this, Sitta almost removes her own agency from the process. 
Nevertheless, she allows herself to acknowledge that she is content in her choice. 
‘I felt like it just sort of happened to me,’ she said. ‘Like, I was single and doing yoga in 
Sacher Park one moment and then the next I was married and had a baby. But then this one 
day, I was pushing the stroller up the hill in Har Nof, and you know— that’s a huge [sic] 
hill— and suddenly I realised I was happy. Like, really happy. I had this wonderful, beautiful 
family, and this community, and I was happy.’ 
Within each of these stories, a critique of secular society begins to emerge. Sitta wasn’t 
unhappy before she became religious; none of the other women articulated any misery about 
their childhoods or family situations, either. However, by choosing religious life, they have 
all found contentment and fulfilment through choosing traditional female roles, within a 
patriarchal religious society. Rather than assuming these women are rejecting liberal-
progressive ideologies of gender equality— indeed, as discussed in further chapters, they are 
not— we must instead understand these choices to be a form of critique of the secular 
mainstream culture in which they were raised. Whereas Israeli women who are ba’alos 
teshuvah are motivated by the stability and security offered by the religious community, 
Anglo ba’alos teshuvah are attracted to the paradigm shift that religious life offers. In our 
knitting metaphor of critique, they are unpicking the inner scarves of their secular identities, 
and re-knitting themselves with some threads of the old, and other new yarns of religious life. 
Singer-songwriter Lizzi Serling’s music is rife with critiques of the mainstream secular, 
especially in terms of the status and value of women. Lizzi is a ba’alas teshuvah, originally 
from California, who has formed the band Be’er Mayim Chaim (‘The Well of the Water of 
Life’) with two other ba’alos teshuvah, one of whom plays violin, the other cello. She plays 
guitar and is the lead singer, with the other two women as backup voices. Their music draws 




Country Western. They hold concerts for women, and Lizzi offers voice lessons and directs a 
choir, which sometimes performs with the band. One of Lizzi’s most popular songs, 
‘Enough’, is a critique of secular values and ideals around femininity, and an affirmation of 





What if, what if women were enough? 
What if, what if I don't need the love  
of an audience of men to know that my art's relevant 
I'm doing fine 
I'm enough 
 
And what if, I'm not worried about my size? 
And what if, I don't need to scrutinize 
if my belly's round or flat, if I'm skinny or I'm fat 
I'm doing fine 
 
When I chose to live this way,  
you know I made the choice to say,  
I know it: I’m enough 
 
’Cause there is more to life than fame,  
and I am more than just my name,  
I'll say it: I’m enough 
 
We're on a journey with our bodies and our minds 
To know we're doing what we can with our time 
Don't want to look back one day and say  
I wasted life away searching for some empty prize  
or feeding into culture's lies 
I'm enough 
 
What if, I'm not trying to get rich? 
And what if, I just want to show my kids 
That I'll give them what they need and the rest is luxury 
We're doing fine 
 
When I chose to live this way, you know  
I made the choice to say,  
 




I know it: I’m enough 
 
’Cause there is more to life than fame,  
and I am more than just my name,  
I'll say it: I’m enough 
 
We're on a journey with our bodies and our minds 
To know we're doing what we can with our time 
Don't want to look back one day and say  
I wasted life away searching for some empty prize  
or feeding into culture's lies 
I'm enough 
 
I'm enough (No matter what I weigh) 
 
I'm enough (No matter what they say) 
 










I'm enough, and I've… 
 
Had enough (of body shaming) 




What if…  
What if women are enough? 
 
‘Enough’ exalts in the forms of womanhood discussed in Chapter Three, and critiques the 
various ways in which secular society is in opposition to Jewish values. ‘What if I don't need 
the love of an audience of men to know that my art's relevant, I’m doing fine, I’m enough,’ is 
a celebration of the prohibition of kol isha, under which women do not sing in front of men; 




commentary on one’s insecurity and lack of confidence. She has unpicked the thread of her 
secular childhood spent on the stage. Her repetition of ‘I’m enough’ constantly recentres the 
derivation of value within the self, and a rejection of external validation.  
The second verse critiques the superficiality of secular life, with ‘And what if, I'm not 
worried about my size? And what if, I don't need to scrutinize if my belly's round or flat, if 
I'm skinny or I'm fat, I’m doing fine.’ This suggests that the secular culture of focus on body 
shape, of fat-shaming, and size-obsessed culture is mediated by religious life; religious life 
values women for their internal personhood rather than superficially judging them for their 
weight or shape. She similarly condemns the secular pursuit of riches and fame, suggesting 
that religious life offers women the chance to feel completely valued and fulfilled; to feel 
they are ‘enough.’ 
In many ways, Lizzi’s and other women’s choices to become ba’alei teshuvah are no 
different than women of earlier generations who chose to join communes, or other parts of 
the counterculture, choosing to stop shaving or marrying, and sometimes even eschewed 
clothes (Gerhard 2010, 112-115). Lizzi and many of her ilk are seeking a paradigm shift, a 
change in value systems and social context. Kaufman’s work (1993) also found women 
became ba’alos teshuvah because they were looking for a new value system; however, she 
suggests they are ‘post-feminist’ (Kaufman 1993, 10) and that clearly does not hold for the 
majority of the ba’alos teshuvah I encountered, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Lizzi’s critiques of secular life are, inevitably, influenced by her life experiences, and her 
journey is somewhat remarkable in that she made the transition relatively quickly, and at a 
younger age than many North American ba’alei teshuvah. Her childhood was full of the 
pressure of fame: by the time she was four years old, she had her own agent, and she spent 
her childhood acting on television and in professional stage shows. Her homelife was 




illness. Lizzi still struggles to find the balance of maintaining a relationship with them, while 
keeping a healthy distance.  
She had no exposure to Orthodox Judaism growing up, with only a nominal bat mitzvah 
ceremony in a Reform synagogue. She was not looking for religious learning or growth in 
Israel, but was signed up through local Jewish community networks to have an interview for 
a Birthright-Taglit trip after she turned eighteen. She had just suffered a bitter disappointment 
when the call for her Birthright interview came: though she had been promised the lead in the 
workshop of Coraline opening in San Francisco, the part was given to someone else. When 
the interviewer called, it seemed like the perfect time to take a ten day trip to Israel. 
Her programme was Israel Free Spirit, run by the Orthodox Union, and though it is more 
religious than other Birthright programmes, it doesn’t generally operate as a kiruv 
programme. However, it gave Lizzi a glimpse into observance, and she wanted more. She 
chose to extend her stay in Israel with the Jewel programme, a women’s introduction to 
Jewish learning, and from there she transferred directly to Neve, where she studied for two 
years. She only went back to California once, at the end of her first year in Neve in 2013, for 
two weeks, to collect her personal belongings and make her aliyah formal. She has only 
visited home once more in the last seven years. 
‘I chose this because I am trying to live a truthful life,’ Lizzi says. ‘There’s a unique 
potential over here, in Eretz Yisrael. Women really do support each other. It’s kind.’ 
Though Lizzi’s story is more unusual than Menucha’s, Sitta’s, Chana’s, or Miriam’s, all 
women share their choice to become Haredi, and a critical view of the secular culture and 
society from which they came. Their choices are direct critiques of that society, and 
especially of the position of women within secular society. These are critiques, rather than 
simply criticisms, because they carry certain values with them, and retain secular sensibilities 




haven’t burnt their internal scarves of secular identity; they have unravelled certain rows and 
re-knitted them, with new yarn from the scarf of Haredi identity, forming something changed 
but not completely new. Religious Jewish life offers them a different value system, one that 
honours women for being ethically religious, wives and mothers, and celebrates their 
traditional role. 
 
Soccer Moms in Sheitels 
 
Anglo ba’alos teshuvah embrace their new lives as a religious choice; however, certain 
other values, which have no apparent religious importance, are more slow to change. Culture 
can be difficult to change, and while certain Israeli cultural inevitabilities are embraced— the 
balagan [chaotic mess] that is driving, the insanity of government bureaucracy (Dalsheim 
2019, Lavie 2018)— many ba’alei teshuvah have certain expectations for their lives, and 
their children’s lives, which are remnants of their middle-class, suburban upbringings. This 
especially applies to their attitudes around after-school enrichment activities and sport; it also 
applies to the pervasive culture of the home and beliefs about childhood. 
Recently, Amazon.com has started delivering, via their American site, to Israel. This new 
access to American consumer goods emerged part way through my fieldwork; for the Anglo 
ba’alos teshuvah and frum from birth women, it was all anyone wanted to talk about for 
about a month. In Israel, it is fairly easy to get certain American goods, especially in terms of 
more expensive items and clothes lines that are available at the big malls in Jerusalem and 
Tel Aviv, but women were excessively excited about small convenience items that they had 
been missing, sometimes for decades. 
‘I can’t believe I am getting zip lock bags [sic] tomorrow from Amazon!’ Menucha told 
me one day. ‘I am sending my son to cheider [Hasidic primary school for boys] Sunday with 
bamba in a zip lock bag. I only bought one box, that’s plenty. I can wash them. It feels like 




In this moment, it is clear how ba’alos teshuvah knit together Haredi values with North 
American middle-class suburban secular culture. Menucha wants to be a mom like her peers 
in the Greater Boston Area who pack their children balanced lunches to take to school, and 
pick them up in minivans to bring them to their after-school activities like dance and 
baseball; she also attributes all things gained through parnassah [livelihood or economic 
survival] to God, and behaves in a frugal, grateful way towards her material goods, in an 
attempt to minimise her consumerist tendencies. 
So great was the hubbub around Amazon coming to Israel, that Lizzi Serling was inspired 
to write a song about the tensions of ba’alos teshuvah’s consumerism and their new lives of 
faith and meaning, if also of occasional deprivation. 
 
Long Way Home 
Lizzi Serling 
 
It's a long way home, it's a long way home 
It's a long way home to the place where I was born and raised 
 
And it's a long flight gone, it’s a long flight gone 
Oh, it's a long flight gone to the place where I was born and raised 
 
Little package on a ship, moving ’cross the ocean 
Little relics of a life, my shallow devotion 
Little package on a ship won't you bring me some emotion 
Like a dove that's so far flown 
’Cause it's a long way home 
 
There's a flood on the town, and there is mud on the ground 
And I am never coming down to the place where I was born and raised 
 
Lizzi’s song both pokes fun at the Amazon purchases she and other women are making, 
and yet also acknowledges that these things are bringing them ‘relics of a life’ that they have 
left behind. It is a condemnation of secular life, as in her song ‘Enough,’ which is ‘shallow,’ 
and she associates home and the life she’s left behind with ‘mud’ and ‘coming down’, an 




making aliyah, which literally means ‘going up.’ And yet, through this small consumerist 
weakness, she is allowing ba’alos teshuvah to recognise it will bring them ‘some emotion,’ 
while elevating them as ‘doves’ who have ‘flown so far,’ and re-establishing their 
commitment to religious life: ‘I am never coming down to the place where I was born and 
raised.’ 
Ba’alos teshuvah believe that certain aspects of their secular lives were worthwhile and of 
value; they bring these aspects to the Haredi world and introduce new ideas and forms of 
Haredi personhood, which are generally accepted and sometimes fully embraced by the 
Haredi mainstream. This is a duplication of the knitting process in which all Haredi women 
participate. One of these things is after-school enrichment, including sports and arts 
programmes. 
‘Enrichment is really new to the Haredi world,’ Tovah tells me. She is a ba’alas teshuvah 
from Toronto. ‘Like, there’s nothing for kids to do from like 4pm [sic] to bedtime. Especially 
the girls. And I firmly believe that my children are children, they should have childhoods 
[sic]. We don’t have television, and reading options are really limited, so what are they going 
to do? I’m so happy they have dance and gymnastics and drama now.’ 
Tovah’s comment reveals both an investment in a suburban middle-class enrichment 
attitude, and a subtle condemnation of frum culture; she wants her children to have a 
childhood, meaning that she doesn’t want to turn her older children into babysitters and 
housekeepers, which she and I discussed at length. She understands why traditional religious 
households enlist help from older siblings, and give teenage girls greater responsibility, but 
she cannot shake the suburban middle-class values with which she was raised.  
‘If my daughter wants to help me cook for shabbos, and she often does, that’s fine,’ 
Tovah explains. ‘She’ll usually make a dessert or something, and she likes doing that. But I 




This suggests a perceived cultural difference between ba’alei teshuvah houses and frum 
from birth houses, in which children who are raised by frum from birth parents might have 
more expectations put upon them, and fewer opportunities for fun. While I would suggest 
that expectations of children varied by household in my research, and were equally variable 
in frum from birth houses as in ba’alei teshuvah homes, the novelty of ‘fun’ was a much-
discussed topic.  
‘Fun is a new thing in the religious world,’ Sarah told me. ‘No one necessarily thinks it’s 
bad, it’s just new. The idea that you can go out with your friends, and see a Regal show, and 
leave the kids with Tatti [Dad in Yiddish] for the evening, that’s really novel. But people are 
getting used to it and it’s becoming more normal.’ 
Regal produces massive, professional West End type musicals in a by-women-for-women 
setting in Beit Shemesh. Sarah is frum from birth; she has always been involved in theatre 
and the arts. Her Beis Yaakov school11 where she grew up in New York put on yearly musical 
productions, and she has been involved in the performing arts in Israel since she came to 
Jerusalem at age eighteen for seminary. She has performed in plays with Esther Goldman, the 
Women’s Performance Community of Jerusalem, the Modi’in group Women in Theater, 
Regal Productions, and is a member of a Playback Theater troupe.  
Esther had similar opportunities as Sarah in school growing up in Queens, but 
acknowledges how the ba’alei teshuvah have contributed to the growth of the arts in the 
Haredi world. These contributions are not simply limited to Anglo ba’alei teshuvah, either; 
the renowned Israeli Rama Burshtein, director of Fill the Void, is a ba’alas teshuvah with 
secular film school training from her pre-religious life (Skinazi 2018, 189-192). Ruth Colian 
is a songwriter. A high proportion of ba’alos teshuvah seem to have artistic talent and skill. 
Many ba’alos teshuvah have therefore started after-school enrichment programmes in 
 




whichever artistic field they have expertise. This serves to fill the demand for enrichment 
while also providing modest income. These chugim [electives] charge modest fees which are 
accessible to much of the Haredi world, and generally also offer scholarships for children 
from less economically secure families. Rachel Factor and Lexie Koh teach dance to over one 
hundred women and girls, Lizzi directs a choir and has a waitlist for her voice lessons, Kerry 
Bar-Cohn teaches tap and drama, and many others teach various instruments, and so on. 
These programmes have, by and large, been enthusiastically embraced by the Haredi 
community at large. Rachel and Lexie teach in one of the most respected Beis Yaakovs. The 
children are from a range of backgrounds, including the children of both ba’alei teshuvah and 
frum from birth parents; Chasidic, Litvish, and Sephardi families are enrolled in their dance 
classes.  
One of their dancers, Chavi, spoke with me about her choice to dance with Rachel and 
Lexie, and now help teach. ‘I started dancing in eighth grade,’ she tells me quietly. ‘I missed 
out doing dance in ninth grade because I wanted to do drums. But I liked dance more and so I 
went back to it in tenth grade and got more serious. I wanted a chug, something to do in the 
afternoons. That was all at first, but then after, it got more serious.’ 
Chavi is the youngest of twelve children in a Litvish family from Unsdorf. For school, 
she attended the prestigious Beis Yaakov in Mattersdorf. She studies in the Ma’alot Beis 
Yaakov Seminary; this is one of the many post-high school seminary programmes based on 
the Beis Yaakov system which has been created for Haredi young women in Jerusalem, and 
elsewhere in Israel. She is looking for a shidduch, and assisting Rachel and Lexie at the 
dance school. Her parents were born in Monsey, one of the religious Jewish communities in 
upstate New York. She was born in Jerusalem. For Chavi, dance has been a welcome 
distraction from the pressures of school, while also helping her to realise other goals. 




tests. It’s kind of like to daven, when I’m dancing. We have a dance about, like, a wedding. 
Like under the chuppah [wedding canopy]. I like that one.’ 
This very secular form of dance, in a secular after-school enrichment model, is 
transformed into a religious experience of prayer and a promotion of Haredi womanhood; this 
makes it permissible for the Haredi world, and relevant to girls like Chavi. Chavi comes from 
one of the most strictly religious Litvish backgrounds; while there are many Gurer Hasidim 
involved in the performing arts, it hasn’t made as many inroads in other Hasidic 
communities. 
At the melave malka for Ateres Kallah, a wide range of performances are offered while 
the audience awaits Rabbanit Mizrahi’s arrival. Lizzi Serling sings religious songs, not her 
own compositions. There are many Belz women there, and it’s a very Hasidic audience. 
Chayele Regal, of Regal Productions, a major producer of Haredi women’s musical theatre in 
Beit Shemesh, is the Master of Ceremonies; she calls forward two young girls to do some 
gymnastic tumbling for the audience. These girls will be performing in the upcoming Regal 
musical. They are impressively nimble, and the audience is appreciative. One of them sings a 
little and says a few lines from the play. Then she explains to the attentive audience how 
much she loves doing the play, and how it helps her be better in school, because she has to 
finish all her homework before rehearsal. This is clearly encouraging for some women in the 
audience, who busily start chattering after the girls step down. Not only has the Haredi world 
accepted enrichment and fun, even the most stringent sectors are beginning to embrace these 
new options for children. This is all a result of women’s agency, knitting together the secular 
values of enrichment with the religious world’s ethics. 
There are, however, markedly fewer options available for boys. It is more difficult to 
change attitudes surrounding boys’ education, where Torah learning has taken such primacy, 




had more success than art in the Haredi world for boys; physical activity is viewed as 
preferred because it helps boys release their excess energy so that they can concentrate on 
their studies. It is something that weighs on the minds of many of the mothers I interviewed, 
both ba’alos teshuvah and frum from birth, who have sons who may not be suited to study in 
the long run. 
 
External Influences: Housing and Secular Education 
 
There are also external pressures that are influencing change in the Haredi world in Israel. 
The housing market is in crisis; there is too little land approved for building in the most 
densely populated central region of the country, and therefore what housing exists is subject 
to extortionate market inflation. This disproportionally affects the Haredi community, which 
has the highest fertility rate of any sector of the population. As a result, Haredim are seeking 
housing in areas which are not customarily Haredi neighbourhoods; in some places, these 
moves are changing the character of non-Haredi areas to be more Haredi, but in other places, 
Haredim are living among other types of Jews. This has led to higher exposure to other ways 
of being observant Jews, and has broken down some of the Haredi identity which was 
developed in opposition to a Jewish ‘other.’ Certain activities, especially within the by-
women-for-women arts world, have also contributed to this. Furthermore, the ministry of 
education has opened several ‘Haredi campuses’ of major universities in Jerusalem and Bnei 
Brak, and so secular education is generally on the rise for both men and women in the Haredi 
world. All of these various influences are contributing to the creation of the ‘New Haredim’, 
which is essentially a new Haredi middle-class. This middle-class is not excluded from 
mainstream Haredi society; rather, it is embraced by the Haredi mainstream who rely on 
these educated, relatively affluent Haredim for both monetary and social support, through the 





Increasing Stringency and Improved Women’s Education: A Volatile Mix 
 
 To counter the losses in earnings from men due to their increased preoccupation in the 
yeshiva, Haredi female employment had increased significantly by the aughts, as had the 
number of women earning higher degrees (Regev 2013, figure 5). Future career plans 
continue to be an important feature of young women’s marriage match profiles, and having a 
career is becoming more broadly a part of the ideal pious woman (Avishai 2008, 419). 
However, women are still expected to only pursue certain types of degrees, in certain ways. 
Michal was raised with an expectation from her parents that she would attend university, 
but her parents did not realise how limiting the Beis Yaakov curriculum had become in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.  
‘When I did very well on my exams in school, the head sat down with me and said, 
“Look, you’re smart, so you should do what this other girl did and do a CPA course.” But I 
wasn’t really into that,’ she tells me. She wanted to be a politician, or a veterinarian. A few 
years later, she signed up for the first class of women in the pilot Haredi women’s campus of 
Machon Lev in Jerusalem, and earned a degree in computer science. In addition to programs 
like Machon Lev, the Open University also created more opportunities for Haredi women to 
earn degrees on their schedule, at home. 
‘The Open University became the university of Haredi people,’ Esti Shushan tells me. 
‘Because for them, it’s like… it’s special, for them. Because they are married, they are 
working, they don’t have time, and they want [sic] education.’ 
By 2013, 15% of Haredi women had higher degrees, whereas only 11% of Haredi men 
had academic degrees (Regev 2013, figures 2 & 3), and more than 60% of all Haredi women 
aged twenty-five to sixty-four were working outside the home (Ibid.). Only just under 38% of 
Haredi men of the same age were employed (Ibid.). Even those women without higher 




even earned a bagrut. However, men are supposed to be the leaders of Haredi households in 
all things, religious and otherwise. 
Haredi women’s earning capacities were hampered by a severe gender wage gap which 
has affected all women in Israel; it continues to be one of the grossest gender wage gaps in 
the OECD (Weiss 2019). In 2008, the employment situation in the Haredi sector was as 
illustrated: 
Haredim aged 25-64 
Demographic Employment Rate Monthly Salary Avg 
Men w/o Academic Degree (~89% of 
men) 30%  NIS 7,580 
Men w/ Academic Degree  
(~11% of men) 71%  NIS 13,565 
Women w/o Academic Degree (~85% 
of women)  50%  NIS 5,236 
Women w/ Academic Degree (~15% 
of women) 76%  NIS 8,970 
(data drawn from Regev 2013, figures 2 & 3) 
 
As the table shows, while 76% of women with academic degrees were employed, their 
earning capacity was still almost five thousand shekels a month less than a man with a 
degree; the majority of women did not have a degree, and therefore had the lowest earning 
capacity of any Jews in the nation, and yet were the main source of income for their family, 
which could easily be as large as ten people, often more. It should be noted that the 
communities with the largest educated gender wage gaps were Bnei Brak and Beit Shemesh; 
these were also the Haredi communities with the largest average number of children per 




On a cold, rainy night in February, I met Bina at the Waffle Bar in Ramat Eshkol, 
Jerusalem. She and I had been conversing for months, and my notes were checkered with 




too rainy for him to walk home. We were looking forward to finally having almost a full hour 
to chat. Bina works full time at a non-profit organisation that focuses on Jewish unity through 
the cooperation of multiple non-profit organisations. The change is recent; she used to work 
behind the scenes for Shas, and sometimes for United Torah Judaism, and has enormous 
insight into Haredi politics. She’s happy she left politics in favour of a non-profit; she says 
she has shifted to working outside the political system because she was starting to feel 
ineffective. Now, when she talks about her work bringing the chesed [‘kindness, caring, 
compassion’, used for charity; either charity organisations or charitable activities] work of so 
many Jews together, her face lights up. 
 I had been thinking a lot about the changes I’ve been seeing in higher education, so 
once we are settled, I ask her about them. 
 ‘It all comes to a head in marriage,’ she says. 
 As women gained more secular education, there started to be a crisis in the home. A 
man, who was used to being the authority on Torah matters, would come home to his new 
wife and she would correct his math. ‘It was hard for him. So this increase in women’s 
secular education created friction.’ 
This friction has widely been referred to as the ‘newly-wed crisis.’ Kallah teachers 
throughout the Chasidic communities with whom I worked were preoccupied by this new 
conflicted state of just-marrieds in their communities, and spoke with me about it at length. 
Many rabbis have now mandated that husbands and wives continue attending classes with 
their kallah and chasan [groom] teachers through the first year of marriage, because of the 
issues arising from these new marital crises. But rather than condemning it, the kallah 
teachers suggested it was acceptable change. 
‘It must be Hashem’s will,’ Freidy, a kallah teacher in the Boyaner Hasidic community, 




but she believed that it was part of what God wanted for her community; it was acceptable. 
This represents a stark change from things just a few years previous, when Stadler was 
studying the same crisis as it was arising. 
In 2009, Nurit Stadler published Yeshiva Fundamentalism: Piety, Gender, and Resistance 
in the Ultra-Orthodox World. Her fieldwork had been conducted throughout the first decade 
of this millennium with Haredi men in Israel. She painted a picture of a community at the 
cusp of an internal crisis; men were simultaneously stifled by their yeshiva learning and 
frustrated by the burdens placed on their wives (Stadler 2009, 117). Some rabbinical leaders 
were not unsympathetic to the situation, and some social change did start to be introduced; 
rather than changing the educational or economic structure, however, these changes came in 
the form of addressing the mental and emotional stress of poverty and over-burdened wives. 
This does, however, show a change in perception of psychology and mental health, and the 
pamphlets given to yeshiva scholars evidence awareness of new-age self-help literature (Ibid., 
32-33). These booklets encouraged men to spend more time with their wives, and redefined 
yeshiva masculinity and fatherhood to include a ‘more emotionally involved relationship with 
the children, the family, and the community’ (Ibid., 33). Stadler focussed on shifting types of 
masculine piety and the effect which these things were beginning to have on the relationship 
between husband and wife; meanwhile, the changes in female forms of Haredi piety were 
also taking place and further affecting life in the home. 
 Now, however, there have been direct pleas from the rabbinical leaders in the Haredi 
world for better secular educational opportunities for men, under circumstances which are 
acceptable for Haredi men to learn. This has led to the opening of Haredi campuses of many 
Israeli universities, usually located in Jerusalem or Bnei Brak, for men; these have male-only 
enrolment and instruction.12 Furthermore, this represents a negotiation with the state goal of 
 




transforming Haredi men into productive, worker-citizens (Dalsheim 2019). While this seems 
to have restored some balance within the modern Haredi marriage, women are now feeling 
like they are losing out on certain opportunities they once had, Bina explains, because the 
government funding has been shifted towards men’s programs and away from supporting 
Haredi women pursuing degrees. Statistics show that Haredi women and men are both 
continuing to earn higher degrees, however, and the number is increasing (‘Statistical Report’ 
2018, 11).  
 
Hashkafah and School Choice 
 
There is increasing plurality of choice in educational options for boys today in the Haredi 
world, as a result of the increasing acceptance of secular education for boys. Bina, who is 
frum from birth and Litvish, acknowledges that girls’ secular education is better over all, but 
she says she and her husband are concerned with their sons receiving both a good religious 
education, and a good secular education, especially since she believes one of her sons will not 
do so well ‘sitting all day in a yeshiva.’ They send their sons to a new school, one that 
maintains a high level of both tracks of education. Yeshivat Divrei Yechezkel, the school, is 
being used by the Ministry of Education as an example to model other hybrid yeshiva high 
schools for the nation, Bina tells me proudly. She describes the school as a hybrid Talmud-
Torah and secular high school. 
Tovah only has one son, who is her youngest; he has just started Talmud-Torah. She tells 
me she is worried about him in the Haredi school system in the long run.  
‘He has ants in his pants,’ she says, also lamenting the limited options for sport available 
to him. ‘He’s not one to sit still.’ 
Her girls attend a Beis Yaakov, but an unusual Beis Yaakov, with a lot of secular and arts 
 




classes as part of the normal school day. She laughs. ‘The teachers at the school, they don’t 
view it as a normal school. They view it as like, kiruv.’ Still, she is happy with the education 
her daughters receive there.  
Tzirele, a Boyan Hasidic woman, sends her children to a Beis Yaakov and a Hasidic 
cheider. Her oldest child has learning difficulties. 
‘It was hard to sort out his school,’ she says. ‘He needed extra support and other stuff— 
lots of hands on, tactile learning. So he goes to this really special school in Har Nof, instead 
of the cheider near to us.’ 
She has struggled to find the right balance for her children, whom she characterises as 
shy. ‘I don’t want to go out of the Haredi school system, but I want more from the Haredi 
schools.’ 
Tzirele’s sentiments are likely representative of a growing attitude broadly in the Haredi 
community. Like Bina’s school, there are new schools opening across the country which are 
hashkafically Haredi, meaning their outlook, approach, and interpretation are Haredi, but 
which also balance secular study with religious study for boys. Girls’ education is not seeing 
as much choice arise as of yet; this is likely due to the previous increases in secular education 
in general in religious girls’ schools. However, I would expect to see some more school 
choice for Haredi girls appearing within the next decade, as parents become increasingly 
dissatisfied with the parochial approaches of Beis Yaakov, which I discuss in more detail in 
the next chapter. 
Chava Ewa Darski Kovacs, a Haredi stand-up comedian, has a part of her routine that 
never fails to draw a big laugh, but also highlights the growing discontent with Beis Yaakov. 
‘My youngest is a year and a half, and I get these little looks and questions, and I’m going 
to put it out there: People are wondering if I’m pregnant. People are wondering if yes, maybe, 




She pauses a beat. 
With a beatific smile, glancing upward, she says, ‘Baruch Hashem, I’m due in eleven 
months. I’m really excited.’ 
The audience laughs. 
‘Ok, thank you for laughing. Thank you for laughing because it means you know a little 
bit about biology, and a little bit about math, and that’s really commendable. I told a friend 
the same thing, and she just put a big smile on her face. She said, “Baruch Hashem,” and she 
walked away. And I’m thinking, that’s wonderful, but at the same time, this is why the Beis 
Yaakov education is not going to hold you for the rest of your life.’ 
The audience laughs hysterically. 
When the school has become the butt of a communal joke, inevitably change will come. 
 
 
 Housing Crisis 
 
The central area of Israel, between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and north along the coast 
from Tel Aviv, is where the majority of the country’s population lives. It is an area of 
massively dense housing, in which people are squeezed to maximum capacity. Suburban 
towns boast high rise apartment buildings, because building up is the only way to gain more 
space. Jerusalem sits in a nook of the West Bank; the disputed territory balloons outward on 
either side of the city towards the coast, with the narrowest point between the separation 
barrier and the Mediterranean fewer than ten miles across. Much of the Haredi community 
lives in this central region as well; historically, Haredim in the central area have been 
concentrated within north Jerusalem neighbourhoods, Beit Shemesh, Bnei Brak, El’ad, and 
Ashdod. However, the Haredi birth rate remains the highest in the country, even as the Arab 
Israeli birth rate has dropped (Ibid.), and Haredi families are, on average, between eight and 




or fifteen people before the eldest children begin to marry and leave home; these family sizes 
are nuclear, and grandparents do not tend to live with their children and grandchildren. 
Housing is in extremely high demand for Haredim, and most Haredim need affordable 
housing with plenty of space.13 
As a result, Haredim have moved to neighbourhoods and cities which were not 
traditionally Haredi in increasing numbers. Neighbourhoods in south Jerusalem, which were 
historically National Religious or even secular, now have the black hats of the Haredim 
among the knitted kippot [skull cap] at bus stops. Petach Tikvah, Rehovot, and Netanya are 
host to significant Haredi communities. Areas outside the central area have also become new 
Haredi strongholds; sometimes, to the exclusion of the people who lived there previously, 
which increases resentment of Haredim. This has occurred in places like Tiberias and Arad; 
Tsfat and Be’er Sheva have also hosted Haredi communities both historically and currently.  
However, one significant option both in terms of space and affordability, which has 
become increasingly popular is the possibility of moving to the West Bank settlements.  At 
the time of writing, approximately thirty percent of the Jews living in the West Bank are 
Haredi (Magid 2017). Some settlements, like Modi’in Illit, Beitar Illit, Emanuel, and Nahliel, 
are recognised centres for Haredi communities. They maintain a fairly even half and half split 
between Hasidim and Litvish. The Haredi move to the settlements represents the first time 
that the state has legitimised the self-segregation of the Haredi community and the high 
Haredi birth rate; this is only because in moving to the settlements, Haredim became a tool of 
the state expansion project (Cahaner 2017). This negotiation, and its impact on the Haredim, 
will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
One of the Hasidic groups which has largely moved outside of their former Jerusalem 
 
13 The housing crisis has also disproportionately affected Mizrahim (Lavie 2018, 11), and therefore I would 




home of Mea Shearim is the Karlin-Stolin, whose rebbe has made his court in Givat Ze’ev, a 
‘settlement neighbourhood’, so-called because it is a new-build, over the Green Line, and 
offers a suburban-like atmosphere, but it is on the Jerusalem side of the separation barrier. 
The Karliners with whom I spoke said that the rebbe made the decision to move his people to 
Givat Ze’ev because he wanted them to have a better quality of life. 
‘It’s very overcrowded in Mea Shearim and Ge’ula,’ Bubbie Brenner, a Karliner 
grandmother, told me. ‘It’s not so nice, the houses are old and you’re right in next to each 
other. He wanted us to have space, and fresh air, and some peace and quiet. It’s better for 
everyone.’ Her husband is a former secretary to the rebbe, and they have a beautiful, 
spacious, airy flat with a garden terrace in the back, shaded during the day from the sun by a 
sheer cliff face, and in the evening you can smell jasmine. Her son’s family have a flat in the 
next building over, on the top of the tower, with two terraces that look out across the Judean 
Hills, facing west. While spending a shabbos with them, Mrs Brenner indicated the moment 
we could see the sun slip below the horizon, the moment of shkia [sundown]. We spent much 
of shabbos looking out at the view, often foregoing talking, soaking in the silence. 
‘It’s so peaceful here, and the air is so good,’ Mrs Brenner affirmed. 
Fresh air and freedom from overcrowding are often articulated as the reasons for moving 
to the West Bank.  
‘My husband and I made the decision [to move to the settlements] about two years ago 
and I have never been happier,’ says Shaindel, a middle-aged woman. ‘We have such 
beautiful air and freedom, it’s the best thing we could have done. My husband still learns in 
Yerushalayim, we still use the community for schools and everything, but we live out and I 
love it. My children can be free.’ 
Shaindel is representative of a different type of Haredi settler: rather than moving to an 




is less established, and which has no other Haredim living within its community. The 
majority of her neighbours are ideological settlers, who moved to this place in the West Bank 
with the express goal of claiming more territory for the Jewish people, and who see living in 
the land as fundamentally connected to living a Jewish life. They are devoutly religious, but 
they are not Haredi; hashkafically their schools, synagogue, and outlook are entirely 
different. They would be understood to be either Torahni or Chardal, the latter of which I will 
use to avoid confusion with the Shas girls’ school, though it has somewhat negative 
connotations, according to a woman who identified as Torahni. Chardal is a combination of 
the Har in Haredi, and the words Dati Leumi, which means National Religious. Chardal Jews 
are both extremely stringently religious, and extremely Zionist. 
Shaindel, and others like her, maintain their Haredi identity by continuing to use 
community institutions in Jerusalem and elsewhere that are hashkafically Haredi, but live 
outside of the community in settlements with other kinds of Jews. Shaindel’s choice to do so 
was not necessarily informed by the political context of the settlement which she chose, 
though Shaindel and her family have become somewhat politicised through their 
environment, which I will discuss further in Chapter 7. Instead, Shaindel, and most like her, 
shrug and tell me they were just looking for fresh air and a little independence. 
‘Borders don’t mean much to Hashem,’ Shaindel says, when I ask about her choice. 
‘International law, who cares? Torah matters, and Torah is what we are all living.’ 
The Karliners with whom I spoke had similar lack of concern for what they viewed as 
arbitrary and invisible impositions from the non-Jewish world. Yael’s conversation, however, 
in the previous chapter, suggests that there is some political engagement, and that these non-
Jewish arbitrations of law and border do hold relevancy for some. Ultimately, what matters to 
Jews who move ‘out of town,’ as they put it, is relief from the pressures and oppressiveness 




‘People don’t thrive in a more close structured community, or I haven’t,’ says Lexie. She 
and her family live in a more Modern Orthodox neighbourhood in Jerusalem. ‘You’re at the 
mercy of the rav.’ Both Lexie and Esti Shushan are surprised when I discuss how many 
people have moved to settlements from the Haredi world. 
‘Really?’ said Esti. ‘I don’t understand why they’re doing that. They don’t have to. They 
could move somewhere else up north or something. It’s dangerous.’ 
Bina agrees with Esti’s assessment of the danger of moving to the West Bank. ‘These 
people are taking a risk moving to the settlements,’ she tells me. ‘Their kids could get locked 
up by the authorities without any reason. If you move out there, you’re making a choice. 
You’re subject to the whims of a dictatorship, basically. All of the West Bank is under this 
one guy, who can say anything is a security risk and just take you from your house in the 
middle of the night.’ Her assessment is reminiscent of the complaints of the Palestinian 
people living in the same area. I am surprised, and I tell her so, because I thought that Jews 
were treated with more privilege in the West Bank. ‘There’s no rule of law,’ she declares. 
 Still, she says, she sees why it might be worth the risks. ‘It’s a different land authority 
under him,’ she clarifies, referring to the Israeli head of security in the West Bank. ‘So there 
are different laws, and it’s easier to build a place, have some grass and green space. Stuff like 
that. So for some, it’s worth it.’ 
Ultimately, the choice to move to the settlements is a lifestyle one, rather than a political 
one, for the majority of my interlocutors. For ba’alei teshuvah, it is also often part of their 
suburban middle class sensibility: they would like their children to grow up with a ‘back 
yard.’ The choice to leave the community, however, whether it be to the West Bank or to a 
less religious area in Israel, is bringing many more Haredim in contact with other types of 
religious Jews, both Dati Leumi and Chardal, and breaking down much of the alterity that 




becoming more broadly oriented towards religious people in general, as opposed to 
specifically Haredi participation. 
One of these areas of commonality and overlap is within the by-women-for-women 
performing arts world. Many religious Jews, not just Haredim, are not comfortable with 
mixed performances, and thus performers from different religious backgrounds have started 
to mix within the women’s-only arts space. The Women’s Performance Community of 
Jerusalem is one of these mixed spaces, where Haredi women encounter women from other 
Jewish backgrounds. Sarah, the Litvish woman from Arzei Habira, has performed with them 
in their recent original musical, Hidden: The Secret Jews of Spain. She has struggled with 
aspects of mixing, but in general has enjoyed the exposure to other approaches. 
‘It’s a real nisayon [struggle] for me to listen to women talk about performing with men,’ 
she tells me, telling me about women’s conversations concerning their other performance 
experiences. ‘I just don’t want to be associated with that. But it’s so nice not being in an only 
Haredi play. I can breathe, I can feel free.’ 
Recently, there was a question of imposing shomer negiah upon a relationship portrayed 
in the play. Shomer negiah refers to the foregoing of physical touch between men and women 
who are not either married to each other or closely related. In the play, two characters (played 
by women, of course) are engaged to be married, but are not yet wed when they are told they 
have been discovered as Jews and must flee Spain. The character Sarah plays was directed to 
cling to her future husband in fear. If shomer negiah was imposed, the two would not be able 
to touch until the final scene of the play, under the chuppah. 
‘First of all,’ Sarah says in irritation, ‘it’s not historically accurate because shomer negiah 
wasn’t a thing in the seventeen hundreds in Spain. I mean, like, they wouldn’t have known, 
and it didn’t make them bad Jews for not knowing. But also, when I cling to him [the 




as a character in that moment. [Imposing shomer negiah] feels like giving in to the Haredi 
community. It’s going back to my life and that’s not fun.’ 
This reveals a great deal about Sarah’s awareness of the changes in stringencies of 
modesty and gender separation over time, and her feeling of stifling oppression with the 
current situation. She does not find her life enjoyable. She enjoys escaping into a different 
part and a different life. She is exposed to other ways of being Jewish, and though parts of 
these things make her uncomfortable, she feels ‘free’ to ‘breathe’ and be ‘natural’ in the 
space outside the community. The same is happening when Haredim move to areas outside 
the community. They see that there are alternative ways to live as good Jews, and they 
embrace certain differences, while rejecting other things that conflict with Haredi hashkafah. 
Gradually, there is a blurring of lines, and there emerge increasingly complex ideas of what it 
means to be Haredi. 
I ask Sarah if she would ever move to the Gush Etzion, a settlement block in the West 
Bank, where many of her co-stars live. 
‘I don’t know,’ she says. ‘I used to think they weren’t religious enough, but now I’ve 
realised a lot of them are really, really frum.’  
Over time, as the Haredi population approaches fifteen, and then twenty, percent of the 
population of Israel by 2030 (‘Statistical Report’ 2018), increased contact and mixing will be 
inevitable, and this will naturally create more change and further complexities within Haredi 
identity in Israel. 
 
 
The New Haredi Middle Class 
 
All of the changes and influences on and in the Haredi world over the last ten years have 
led to a new type of class structure within Haredi society. Many of the changes discussed 




the ‘New Haredim’. I will use the term Haredi Middle Class or New Haredi Middle Class to 
refer to the ‘New Haredim’ because I want to avoid confusion with ba’alei teshuvah, and 
because the ‘New Haredim’ are essentially ‘new’ because they are middle class. There is also 
a strong and enduring Haredi mainstream, and then a bottom sector of society which is 
neither middle class nor mainstream, and these are the struggling and marginalised segments 
of Haredi society. 
Michal explained to me, sitting at her kitchen table, ‘The Haredi world is very divided as 
it is. One minute. No, you know the regular division into Hasids, and Litvish and Sephardic 
and all that, but the real division of the Haredi public—’ she grabbed my pen and notebook, 
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Michal launches into explanations. ‘Like, there are a million Haredim in Israel. 
Something like 40%, let's say, that's the mainstream, okay? It doesn't matter, its Hasids, 




They're like Haredim several generations back, they are conformists, they go to the good 
schools.… All the Haredi establishment is here. All the politicians, the rabbis, the activists, 
are here,’ she explains, pointing vigorously at the centre column of the chart.  
Mainstream Haredim are the largest group of Haredim, but only by a small margin in her 
estimate. Michal thought that forty percent of Haredim are conforming to mainstream 
expectations of full-time study in yeshiva for men, and very little secular education. Less than 
half the Haredi population is therefore living according to expectations and social norms. 
Conformity, however, is powerful within the Haredi world, and the leaders of the Haredi 
world all exist within that mainstream conforming portion of society. The rabbis whose 
teachings and edicts dictate acceptability within Haredi society conform to the mainstream, 
and are slow to accept changes to the accepted values of Haredi society. Living a mainstream 
Haredi life allows for potentially greater agency within the Haredi world. However, this is 
not the same as yichus as discussed in the previous chapter; people with good yichus exist in 
all three columns above. 
Michal moves her finger to the right. ‘This is what they call New Haredim,’ she says. 
‘Haredim who went to [university]…. People like me, like my husband, maybe like my 
parents. Who work, who are not in the kollel, who go to university, … some of whom enlist 
in the army. Usually, they are better off economically. They are also less dependent on the 
community. And they usually work outside the community. These are not teachers in Haredi 
schools. Rather, they work in high-tech in Tel Aviv or somewhere else – in a lawyers' office. 
I'm mixing things here, but they usually also have less children, they're usually also less 
religious. It goes together. Less fundamentalist.’ 
I ask her, ‘They have only five [children] maybe?’  
‘Yes, five, not ten,’ she answers. ‘This is good.’ 




discussed in this chapter. They are using the opportunities available to them to obtain 
university degrees, and work outside the home in middle class, white-collar jobs. They make 
a reasonable income to support their families. She suggests that they have fewer children; 
statistical reports indicate that families with higher degrees in the Haredi sector have one 
fewer child on average than families without higher education (Regev 2013, 16). My own 
research found very little evidence to support the theory that the New Middle Class has fewer 
children, because most of the women whom I met with higher degrees had larger families; 
however, they are more comfortable in their lifestyle because of the improved level of 
income available to them. Michal also distinguishes these New Middle Class Haredim as 
‘less religious;’ that is a value judgement based on her own subjectivity, which perhaps also 
indicates community perceptions and how she views herself. There is certainly a fear in the 
community that secular education will diminish people’s commitment to religion. However, I 
did not find this to be the case. 
Bubbie Brenner, the grandmother in the Karlin-Stolin community, was sent by the 
Karliner rebbe to obtain a Masters in Social Work in New York before she and her husband 
made aliyah to Israel, over ten years ago. 
‘I have a degree in social work,’ she told me. ‘I went to school with the rebbe’s bracha, I 
would not go without asking him. And I went to a public school, I mean, a public university, 
Hunter University of New York, and I knew I wasn’t going to be with any, um, I went with 
one close friend, we were the only Orthodox in my class. But I went with the rebbe’s bracha. 
And as soon as I got the degree, the masters, the following year we came here [Jerusalem]. 
And the rebbe instated me in all his schools as a guidance counsellor. In all the schools, so I 
work with the children and the parents and the teachers, because he was very much for that, 
he wanted that.’ 




education, especially for women. Bubbie Brenner is representative of a not insignificant 
population of Hasidic women who are extremely stringent in their adherence to the strictest 
Hasidic and Haredi standards, beliefs, and identities, yet would fall under the classification of 
the New Middle Class. Michal’s assumption that these families become less religious reveals 
how pervasive the attitude that secular education is dangerous. Bubbie Brenner is not part of 
Michal’s exception, her statement that the New Middle Class does not include teachers in the 
Haredi schools, because while Bubbie works in the schools, she has a high-paying, 
professional level job, and she works across the Karliner girls’ school network, Beis Bracha. 
Michal moves on, pointing to the column on the left, now. ‘And this is the weakest part of 
Haredi society,’ she says. ‘If you spoke about classes— I think it’s more. It’s all the ba'alei 
teshuva. Not all, because there are always those who managed to get in [the mainstream]. 
Ba'alei teshuva. The very poor.’ 
‘Anglo ba'alei teshuva are maybe more like this?’ I ask, pointing to the New Middle 
Class. 
‘Yes, right,’ says Michal. ‘Here,’ she points to the New Middle Class— ‘you can put all 
the Anglos here, not only ba'alei teshuva. Put all the Anglos here [in the New Middle Class]. 
That's just where they are.’ 
While Michal is convinced that all English speaking Haredim are part of the New Middle 
Class, I am not in full agreement with her. I believe they probably have more exposure to 
secular life, purely through their ability to speak English, and their language skills also create 
more opportunities for higher paying jobs. But many Anglo frum from birth people are firmly 
in the mainstream. Anglo men may study full time at a yeshiva for decades, and their wives 
may not work at all outside the home, or may work in low-paying teaching positions in the 
Haredi schools. Therefore, I do not necessarily consider all Anglo Haredim to be part of the 




Jews in Israel hold a certain amount of privilege and power due to their ability to speak 
English (2006, 266). This understanding of Anglo privilege may be behind Michal’s assertion 
that all Anglos are part of the New Middle Class. Almost all Anglo ba’alei teshuvah are New 
Middle Class, by virtue of their tendency to be educated and from a middle class background 
to begin with; indeed, they are arguably the original New Middle Class Haredim. However, a 
few Anglo ba’alei teshuvah fall in the marginalised category, in which Michal places most 
Israeli ba’alei teshuvah. 
‘Ba'alei teshuva, divorced families – women and men. All of them,’ she says, pointing to 
the left-hand column. ‘Those with children who dropped out of the educational system. It’s 
not only the children, sometimes it marginalizes the entire family. They are thrown over 
here.’  
A remarkable number of children are excluded over time from the Haredi school systems. 
Beis Yaakov, especially through its focus on strict modest dress codes, has developed an 
increasingly inflexible ethos; the boys’ schools can be similarly inflexible. Once a Haredi girl 
is excluded from Beis Yaakov, there are very few options for her education that allow her to 
remain within the Haredi world. Attending a non-Haredi school and continuing to live at 
home places the entire family at risk, both of secular contamination for the other children, but 
also in terms of future prospects of getting good shidduchim and attending respected 
yeshivas.  
‘The very poor – that often also marginalizes them,’ Michal concludes. 
The mainstream Haredim are not economically secure; they are in general fairly poor due 
to the nature of conforming to Haredi social norms. Men do not work and women work in 
low-income jobs within the community. When Michal says ‘the very poor’ she is describing 
the absolute worst off; those whose fathers and husbands have become schnorrers [beggars], 




occurrence, sometimes happening two or three times each evening in Haredi homes. Most 
households keep a change container by the door, and give one or two shekels to each 
schnorrer, the equivalent of twenty-five or fifty American cents. This is considered giving 
tzedaka, a mandate of Judaism, and part of being a good Jew. Some of these schnorrers are 
also studying full time in yeshiva, and thus people view their begging as worthwhile if 
somewhat marginal. 
‘Now you have to understand something,’ Michal declares. ‘I’ll give you an example 
from my own family. We're here, we were always here [the New Middle Class] – three 
generations back - here.’ She points to the column on the right.  
‘Okay. But my brothers moved to here – no, let's say one moved to here,’ she says, 
moving her finger to the mainstream column. ‘Because he – they went to black [hat] 
yeshivas, didn't take bagrut and all that, like didn't study secular subjects. Studied in black 
yeshivas. He is a yeshiva student, was one for twenty years. He has ten children, his wife is a 
teacher in a seminary and he teaches in a yeshiva. 
 ‘So we're [New Middle Class], my brother moved to [mainstream], okay? Now, his 
eldest son got married this year. He married someone and she is too, from a family with some 
twelve children. She's the youngest. All her brothers are yeshiva students etc. etc. And then I 
came to the engagement party and asked her, “What are you studying?” And she said, “I’m 
studying nursing.” So you understand, they moved to [the New Middle Class].’ 
What Michal is trying to explain is that there is high mobility between these three classes 
of Haredi society, and within a single family, there can often be people in different classes. 
Yet they are all accepted as members of the family; no one is excluded because they have 
joined the New Middle Class by getting a degree. None of these classes indicate a different 
level of acceptability by the Haredi mainstream. 




here—’ she indicates the mainstream— ‘but then the parents divorce. Boom, they are thrown 
over here,’ she says, pointing to the marginalised column.  
‘Now, there can be a family that is [marginalised]– ba'alei teshuva from Bat Yam [a 
secular Israeli area] who came to live in El’ad [Michal’s community, a Haredi city]. They 
have no economic basis, their children are not accepted to the good schools; rather, only to 
the not so good schools. And then their kid drops out of the educational system and from age 
fourteen to eighteen he's on the streets and does not go to school,’ Michal illustrates. This is 
unfortunately not uncommon; because of the risk of contamination for the other children, 
drop-outs are often kicked out by their parents, or otherwise leave voluntarily due to other 
issues that may have contributed to their school exclusion. 
‘Okay?’ Michal continues. ‘But then he enlists in the army, he goes to the Nahal Haredi 
[the Haredi unit], and then after the army he studies for a bachelor's degree. And then he 
jumps from here to here.’ She jumps her finger from the marginalised column to the New 
Middle Class. ‘Not the entire family, but the situation is very mobile.’ 
Michal’s introduction of the army into the social equation is note-worthy; often army 
enlistment is seen by the general Israeli public as the way to turn Haredim into more 
mainstream, secularised members of society. However, in Michal’s story, army service 
transforms her marginalised Haredi boy into a Haredi Middle Class member, rehabilitating 
him as a Haredim but not transforming him into a secular Israeli. 
Michal doesn’t see army service as the fundamental transformer of Haredim into 
secularised Israelis; she believes that must come from the schools and the educational system. 
‘It is necessary to understand the true correction should be made there [in the schools],’ 
Michal says. She thinks army service will follow on from there. ‘It’s simple. So, some will 
enlist, and more do enlist, and every person who enlists and appears with a uniform draws 




past, teens who didn't go to yeshiva and who dropped out of the educational system did not 
enlist in the army. Today in El’ad they are encouraged, the municipality encourages them to 
enlist. It’s considered a success. A child whom they manage to push forward and get him into 
the army is a success.’ 
This represents a somewhat triumphant moment for the state; the embrasure of army 
service for yeshiva dropouts is a significant foothold in the Haredi world in terms of forming 
Haredim into good citizens. However, the negotiation on the part of Haredi leaders is also 
successful in that they have limited this to dropouts. This serves to spare yeshiva attendees 
from some pressure. It also seems to possess the potential to keep these dropouts within the 
fold of Haredi life; as Michal suggests, they have the potential to be transformed into Middle 
Class Haredim. The alternative is that dropouts become radicalised, within the extreme 
fringes of both the Haredi world and Far Right Zionism, which is discussed further in 
Chapter Seven.  
She continues, ‘This is something that is changing radically, but I still believe that it 
hinges on bringing the Haredim into Israel. And this is through [schooling] and through 
employment and through the army. But so long as it is not done through the educational 
system, only the margins are affected.’ 
Haredim do serve in the army, but only the marginalised sector of Haredim are serving in 
significant numbers currently. However, army service is transforming the bottom, 
marginalised third of the Haredi world into the New Middle Class, promoting more affluence 
and less poverty, and more openness to change. The New Middle Class is where the majority 
of change is occurring in the Haredi world, and yet it is not considered a betrayal of the 
Haredi mainstream. On the contrary, the New Middle Class, and the changes it brings, is 








The rapid changes of the most recent decade within the Haredi community in Israel are 
the result of the constant negotiation of religious values with the state and secular knowledge, 
managed for the most part by women. Secular knowledge is not completely rejected; but it is 
used in ways that are understood to ultimately benefit religious values and ethics. This will be 
further explored in the upcoming chapter. Ba’alos teshuvah are fundamental to the 
introduction of secular knowledge and values into Haredi life. Improved acceptance of 
secular learning and higher education has also widened these opportunities to the greater 
Haredi community. Acceptance of secular knowledge reflects an approach which defends 
minority religious interests, by couching the secular educational institutions within religious 
ethics, such as maintaining gender separation. This also represents a negotiation with the 
desires of the state to transform Haredim into productive workers, and therefore better Israeli 
citizens. Therefore, these Haredi educational options with better secular studies represent 
incursions of the state, and continued negotiation of Haredi identity in the face of these 
incursions. 
The changes in Haredi housing situations have also been a negotiation between the state 
and the religious values of Haredim. Haredim value large families; they also live 
disproportionately in poverty as discussed in previous chapters. Furthermore, the centre 
region, where the Haredim are disproportionately located, is also where non-Haredi Jews 
need to live in order to work in the best jobs available. Like the Mizrahim have been pushed 
to the periphery (Lavie 2018), the Haredim were similarly pressured by lack of building 
permits in the centre. This policy furthered the Israeli state’s agenda to displace growing 




of the state’s expansionist agenda. This will be further explored in Chapter Seven; the 
implications of it for this chapter are such that the Haredim who moved out of the original, 
historical Haredi neighbourhoods encountered new ways of thinking about and doing 
Judaism. The maintenance of the non-Haredi ‘other’ was broken down. There was more need 
for negotiation of Haredi ethics with other values than ever before. 
Finally, all these changes led to the creation of a Middle Class within the Haredi world. 
This type of Haredi family, with financial security and stability, has been welcomed by the 
Haredi mainstream for the support which they offer the rest of the community. Furthermore, 
it presents a way of negotiating secular knowledge and values with religious ethics, and this 
supports the continued viability of the Haredi community in the state of Israel. Thus, this 
chapter explores how Haredim operate as a minority religious community in negotiation with 
the state and secular knowledge to maintain religious ethics and values. The subsequent 
chapters will clarify the ways in which this is affecting Haredi political identities and 
relationships with the state. 
All of these changes are being mediated by women, in their roles as negotiators with the 
secular. In the next chapter, we will examine closely how Haredi women’s agency operates, 
following the knitting metaphor we have established, in order to negotiate these complexities, 




Chapter Five: Agency and Critique: 
'I Want to Fix the Problems, I Don't 
Want People to Leave' 
This chapter argues that Haredi women use their pious agency to critique Haredi society, 
and to incorporate certain secular knowledge and values into the Haredi world in order to 
remake forms of Haredi womanhood. They critique by examining and unravelling some of 
the scarf of Haredi society, and only retaining those threads which they find acceptable. They 
re-knit this scarf with yarn borrowed from the basket of secular values, selecting only those 
types which complement Haredi yarns and build a stronger, perhaps a warmer, scarf. Much of 
this happens in the by-women-for-women arts space. Opportunities in the arts, performing 
and otherwise (Harris and Skinazi, 2020), have blossomed in the religious world in recent 
years. However, Haredi women still live in a patriarchal religious society, non-liberal and 
anti-secular in nature. How do Haredi women operate in their daily lives? To what extent do 
they have the power to achieve their goals? How do women shape their society and their 
futures? 
The arguments in this chapter are grounded in three anthropological concepts. The first of 
these is ‘agency,’ the second is ‘critique’ and it is inextricably connected to the first. These 
terms are defined and detailed in the paragraphs which follow in this section. Within all of 
these are debates around assumptions and acceptances of meanings of terms like ‘liberal,’ 




personhood, especially womanhood; these ethics and values are fundamentally implicated in 
the discussions of agency and critique which unfold below.  
Saba Mahmoud introduced the idea of ‘agency’ to anthropological understandings of 
religious women in Politics of Piety in 2005. Her study was conducted with women who 
joined the Mosque Movement in Egypt. She challenged assumptions about oppressed and 
coerced conservative religious women, and suggested that women may choose patriarchal 
religious communities, and within these communities they have power, though it may take 
different forms than secular women’s power. Mahmood describes agency as ‘the ability to 
autonomously ‘choose’ one’s desires no matter how illiberal they may be’(Mahmood 2005, 
12). Fundamental to her understanding of agency is the concept of the religious ethical person 
as docile (Ibid., 29-30). As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘embodied practices and 
virtues’ lead to a ‘pious disposition’ (Mahmood 2013, 72). Many since Mahmood have taken 
up the idea of agency, and broadened understandings and applications of it. Avishai 
underscores the idea that what we describe as agency does not always constitute purposeful 
conduct, and should not always be equated with resistance (Avishai 2008, 412). In her study 
of Dati Leumi women in Israel, she proposes a form of agency which furthers a religious 
purpose, rather than a goal that is contradictory to religious personhood (Ibid., 428); the 
women in her study often choose to do things simply because it is the religious thing to do. It 
is because they want to reproduce religion that they choose to do religious things. I would 
argue that she is speaking about the same type of agency as Mahmood but simply using a 
different vocabulary to do so. Indeed, the agency I describe below involves both docile 
bodies, like that of Mahmood, and promotes the continued production of religious persons 
within the Haredi world, like that of Avishai. My exploration of agency contributes to 
understandings of how religious women negotiate secular knowledge and values with 




ethnographic data to the study of agency among religious women, not least because it is with 
Jewish women. I envision these women’s agency as their ability to knit together seemingly 
opposing strands of secular and religious values, sometimes picking apart both their internal 
identities and the fabric of Haredi society to do so. This scarf that they knit remains purely 
Haredi; it is full of complex twists and turns of secular values with religious ethics, but the 
presence of these two types of yarn are meant to benefit the scarf, maintaining its Haredi-
ness, but knitting it to be warmer and stronger. 
The final significant question is that of critique: what is meant by ‘critique’ and how is it 
employed in this discussion. Critique is inextricably bound up with the work of agency in my 
understanding; we cannot have agency, the act of knitting, without first critique, the act of 
recognising that something in the pattern needs to change. If we start at the beginning, 
critique, in its Greek origins, simply suggested the ability of reason to reveal error (Brown 
2013, 3). This, on its own, offers a problematic definition, due to the confabulation of 
‘reason’ with Enlightenment liberal philosophy (Asad ‘Free Speech’ 2013, 15-17). For some, 
Foucault’s (1997) claim that reason and critique are the hallmark of the secular modern 
serves the argument that the religious is necessarily unreasonable. By establishing the 
existence of critique in the religious world of Haredi women, I not only undermine these 
binaries (Brown et al. 2013, viii), I also diminish the secular claim of a ‘monopoly on self-
reflection’ (Ibid.) and provide examples of the secular and religious in coexistence within the 
religious world. But, if critique is not secular per se, then what is it? It is not simply criticism, 
though in practice there may be overlap in forms between these two linguistically linked 
ideas (Asad ‘Reply’ 2013, 138). But, as Butler says, ‘Criticism usually takes an object, and 
critique is concerned to identify the conditions of possibility under which a domain of objects 
appears… to interrogate the taken-for-granted categorical schemes through which phenomena 




modesty, for example, but the extent to which modesty has been extended within religious 
women’s and girls’ lives. It is within the same-sex art space that the conditions for ‘ethical 
and epistemological promise of “critique”’ emerges as opposed to criticism (Asad ‘Reply’ 
2013, 138). Critique of modesty picks apart that section of the scarf, and reknits it in ways 
that look similar, but are made warmer and stronger with secular yarn from psychology and 
secular understandings of the body. Contributing to these conditions are the changes which 
have been discussed previously, especially that of the establishment of the Haredi Middle 
Class, as has been seen in similar situations elsewhere (Rinaldo 2014, 842-843). 
Perhaps one of the most promising premises upon which we can establish understanding 
is Rinaldo’s Pious Critical Agency (Ibid.). Indeed, the examples below are pious in the sense 
of being enacted within the ethics and values of Haredi personhood, and they are both critical 
and agentival. However, Rinaldo’s ‘critical’ involves critique in the sense of Islamic 
engagement with religious text (Ibid., 825), much like the ‘critique’ described in Irfan 
Ahmad’s work on Islamic critical thinking (Ahmad 2017). Generally, in this work, this is 
critique which is independent from grounding in religious texts, though it does share a 
similarity in the differentiation between what is dictated by religion, and what is simply an 
established cultural norm (Rinaldo 2014, 838). Like Avishai’s modern orthodox women 
(2008), the women who appear in this chapter seek to use religious agency to further 
religious goals, and like Rinaldo’s women (2014), they combine secular ideas and religious 
values to achieve this. Ultimately, the goal is to improve Haredi society, rather than undo or 
destroy the Haredi world. As Malha says to me later in this chapter, ‘No one is saying that 
there is nothing wrong in the community. We know there are problems. But I want to work to 





Haredi Women’s Agency: Ruth at the Office of the Supervisor for Independent 
Education 
 
Ruth Colian’s battle for her daughter’s acceptance at an Ashkenazi Beis Yaakov is a 
demonstration in the effectiveness of religious women’s agency within religious society and 
institutions. Ruth’s struggle against the bureaucracy is not unusual for a single Sephardi 
mother (Lavie 2018); the fact that this struggle is set against the backdrop of the Ministry for 
Independent Education is the only factor which distinguishes it as a uniquely Haredi 
encounter. In some ways, this story is representative of what Lavie terms, ‘Divinity of 
Chance’ in which ‘serendipitous magic [is] required for a lower class mother to accomplish 
goals’ (Lavie 2018, 23 & 228). However, as we see in the story to follow, Ruth is not simply 
lucky enough to have serendipitous magic grant her a blessing on this day. It is in fact her 
agency, and the particular agency granted her as a non-liberal religious person, which allows 
her to achieve her goal. In Chapter Three, I discussed the aspects of prejudice which arose 
throughout her struggle; the culmination of her efforts brought her to the Office of the 
Supervisor for Independent Education. The Supervisor shouted at her, and accused her of 
inappropriate deployment of emotion (Lefkowitz 2006, 264). Her story of that day is an 
illustration of pious agency, in that she invests in, and inhabits, forms of femininity that 
illustrate and clarify her piety, and which are therefore above criticism by the rabbi. 
Ultimately it yields a result for Ruth. Here, we see that the relationship between oppression 
and resistance is proportional, and that emotion can be leveraged as a weapon of both 
hegemony and of the weak (Ibid., 265). 
‘I go again to Jerusalem and there was a suspicious object in the central bus station in 
Jerusalem and so I was late,’ she tells me. Ruth seems to need to tell this story; as she retells 
it, she is reliving each moment. ‘And so when I came to the rabbi in the education office, I 




‘And I said, “Why? You told me that I just need to come and sign, so what’s the 
problem? Give me the papers and I will sign!”  
‘“No! Shame on you! Lots of people waiting here for you! And now you’re late, and you, 
you speak! Ok, no, I’m so sorry, but I won’t accept you today.”  
Ruth continued, ‘I left his office, and I asked the secretary, “Ok, when does the 
committee meet again?”  
‘And she told me, “Wednesday. Next Wednesday.”  
‘“Ok, so I will wait here,”’ said Ruth.  
‘“What? You will wait…No, not today, honey! Next Wednesday!”  
‘I said, “Ok, I’m staying. I’ll stay here. I’ll stay here or downstairs or outside, but I’ll 
wait!”  
Ruth’s decision to stay and not move from the Office of the Supervisor for Independent 
Education is reminiscent of nonviolent protest, as employed by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King, Jr; there is also something very Jewish about her choice. In this way, it is a 
secular tool (Asad 2003, 147), but it shows chutzpah; this is a Yiddish word referring to a 
quality of gutsiness or confidence, almost brazenness. In young children, it is often 
discouraged in the Haredi world, but as an adult, a certain amount of chutzpah will earn one 
respect (Fader 2009). Ruth is showing her chutzpah by choosing to ‘sit-in.’ 
Ruth continues, ‘She said, “No, you can’t stay here.”  
‘I said, “Look, I will tell you something. Today, when I left home, I told my daughter that 
today we are going to buy a new backpack for school. And that’s what I’m going to do today. 
So I will stay here, and I will not go back to my home until I know that I can take my 
daughter the same day to buy a backpack.” She thought that I must be joking, but I stayed, 
and started to read tehillim.’  




considered within the Orthodox tradition to have a special power especially for women. 
Women form tehillim groups, which pray together to expedite finishing the entire book of 
tehillim in a timely fashion. These groups pray for a multitude of things: healing the sick, 
finding marriage matches for themselves or for single women in their community, praying for 
children. Ruth’s choice to ‘sit-in’ and read tehillim is a way of marking both her piousness 
and her femininity; it gives her agency to refute the accusations of shamelessness and 
rudeness thrust upon her by the rabbi. 
‘She told me that it would be better if I could leave the office,’ Ruth tells me, ‘so I said, 
“Ok, I’ll sit downstairs on the second floor.”  
‘I was reading tehillim and crying. Other people walked by me, and a woman came up to 
me and said, “Don’t worry, everything will be fine, don’t worry,” and she is Ashkenazi, 
everyone who works there is Ashkenazi. She sees a Sephardi woman, reading tehillim and 
crying, she knows exactly why I’m crying! She knows, because the discrimination is all over 
the place! Everybody knows, if you see a Sephardi woman crying, you know exactly why 
she’s crying! And she tells me, “Everything will be fine, don’t you cry, God will help you.” 
But I didn’t take my head out of the book, because I was in the middle of a tehilla.’ 
Ruth is outraged at this woman’s dismissal of her plight; her words suggest that she feels 
the woman is condescending, or perhaps morally superior in a holier-than-thou way. Yet 
Ruth does not respond with words or action. Instead, she continues to pray and read tehillim. 
She does the most correct thing, religiously speaking: she does not interrupt mid-prayer, mid-
psalm, but ignores this woman and continues to pray. Strictly speaking, one should not 
interrupt a prayer mid-blessing or mid-psalm, though of course people do all the time. By 
ignoring her and continuing to pray, Ruth is marking her own piety, almost in reaction to the 
false promises of God’s help from the Ashkenazi woman. 




going out for a smoke or something, and he saw me.  
‘He came up to me and said, “You don’t have shame! All of the people waiting for you 
and you dare to insult us, this is rude, and you’re staying here!”  
‘I heard him but I didn’t listen to him,’ Ruth says, ‘and I just kept crying and reading 
tehillim. Then he saw me when he was going back up again.’ 
She doesn’t use his passing to entreat him; nor does she respond to the abuse he rains 
upon her. Ruth persists in her piety, her only proof that she is a good woman. Furthermore, 
she does not interrupt her prayer to respond to him; this is the correct thing to do, 
halachically, and therefore she is in that moment more pious and more righteous than him.  
‘And after two hours [more], I think, maybe just one and a half hours, the secretary called 
me, saying, “Hi, you still downstairs?”  
‘I said, “Yes, it’s not Wednesday. I’m going to be here until next Wednesday.”  
‘“Ok, come upstairs, the rabbi wants to speak with you.”  
‘And then I go upstairs, and he says, “Ok, here’s the paper, make your signature, and I 
hope I don’t see you again!”’ She laughs, her relief palpable even years later. 
Ruth’s choices may seem like inaction to the non-religious, but in fact her prayers and 
tears are far more effective than letters, protests, or any other form of action. The Supervisor 
for Independent Schools is Haredi; he oversees mainly Haredi schools, rather than expensive 
private schools. He lives in the Haredi world and expects women (and men) to behave in 
certain ways. Ruth’s only hope of success was through her piety and modesty as a Haredi 
woman. Her prayers, literally, worked; the rabbi could not ignore her, nor could he continue 
to characterise her as a shameless, rude Sephardi woman. Ruth nonetheless also behaves as if 
she is in a ‘sit-in’, a feature of non-violent protest in the 20th century and beyond. She knits 
together this approach with the values of Haredi piety, and achieves her goal. 




secularity and Haredi values, especially in the face of Da’as Torah and the combined role of 
politician and religious leader. Ruth was seeking better religious education, a better religious 
life, a better future for her daughter in the religious world; it is a religious school, but a 
ministry official oversees it. The ministry official is, of course, a rabbi, so he is both an agent 
of the establishment and an agent of the religious institutions in power in the Haredi world. 
Ruth must operate as a religious woman within these structures. Her piety will allow her 
success, rather than her anger, eloquence, or even the legal system.  
 
Agency and Critique in the Dance School14 
 
Modest dress and tsnius are a huge focus of the dance school with which I conducted the 
most extensive ethnography. Rachel Factor’s Jerusalem Center for the Performing Arts  holds 
classes for adult women during the day at a public library in Ma’alot Dafna, and after school 
at a Beis Yaakov in Sanhedriya HaMurchevet. Rachel, a convert, was a professional dancer in 
Hollywood and on Broadway before her marriage and conversion. She teaches modern lyrical 
dance; her co-teacher, Lexie Koh, a ba’alas teshuvah who received classical dance 
instruction growing up, teaches ballet and pointe. The Center also offers tap, gymnastics, and 
drama classes. They maintain a high level of rigor and professionalism in their dance school, 
which has gained a good reputation throughout the observant world. It is because of this 
reputation that I chose to concentrate on the Rachel Factor school over other dance schools 
for this chapter. 
One evening, when I was getting on the public bus after an unrelated arts performance, I 
helped a Hasidic woman visiting from London with directions to a distant area of Jerusalem. 
She said, ‘Are you going there, too?’ 
 
14 This section is in large part published in the summer edition of Shofar; some minor changes have been 




‘Neyn,’ I replied in Yiddish, which we were speaking. ‘I don’t live there, but I go to 
dance classes there every week.’ 
Her eyes grew wide. ‘You dance with Rachel Factor?’ she asked with awe. 
I smiled. ‘I’m not very good.’ 
‘But that dance school is the best,’ she said to me. 
This woman’s knowledge of the school, and her admiration of it, are important for several 
reasons. She is marked by both the Yiddish she prefers, and the turban with which she covers 
her hair, as an extremely stringently observant Hasidic woman, who was raised within the 
Haredi world. Yet she has heard of this dance school, and moreover, approves of the school. 
The Rachel Factor Dance School is not only accepted by the Haredi mainstream, it has 
achieved some limited sense of fame within the Haredi world. Occupying this place of 
prestige is something that Rachel and Lexie have invested thoughtfully and carefully in 
achieving, but it is also a precarious position, fraught with ethical danger, which needs to be 
continuously mediated. This precarity is at the heart of the story of Shoshi Brody, another 
dance teacher who achieved similar levels of respect and renown in the Haredi world, but, 
shortly before I began my fieldwork, foreswore dance for the rest of her life as the result of a 
spiritual catastrophe.  
Shoshi Brody, though frum from birth, had the privilege of private dance classes with 
world-class teachers while she was growing up. Her dance school taught tap and modern 
dance, and she required all her students to dance in tsnius attire. In a 2007 newspaper 
interview, she said, ‘Most of the girls come from ultra-Orthodox homes and the concept of 
modesty is ingrained into their psyche to the extent that they see it as wrong to appear 
immodestly clothed in front of anyone…. There are many Haredim who consider any form of 
dance immodest as it places emphasis on the body’ (Keller 2007). Brody’s classes became 




Later in the 2007 interview, she says, ‘Unlike the majority of the pupils who only perform at 
the end of year show, these girls perform to women throughout the country. They are 
interested in pursuing dance professionally and although there are limited opportunities for 
religious women in this field at the moment, I believe that with the increasing number of 
talented religious performers making their homes in Israel, this will start to change’ (Ibid.). 
Brody did much of the work of breaking down religious barriers to performing arts and 
dance in the Haredi world. It is relevant that she was frum from birth; her status allowed her 
to facilitate change within the politics of Haredi piousness. However, a few years ago, Brody 
abruptly shut down her dance school, and according to the rumours I heard throughout the 
women’s performing arts world, declared she would never dance again. Yehudis told me that 
Brody felt the body focus had become ‘too unhealthy,’ and while her dancers were outwardly 
tsnius, the mentality had become ‘un-tsnius’, with too much pressure to be thin. Another 
woman told me she heard that there were dancers in the Brody school who had developed 
eating disorders. These are rumours, and therefore may not be true; they are much more 
significant as indicators of the perceptions surrounding dance in the Haredi world, and the 
prevalence of the concern that dance will lead girls to become too focussed on their bodies. 
In the Haredi world, dance is considered dangerous in terms of its capacity to destroy the 
interiority of tsnius: that tsnius is reduced to simply an external habit, and the dancer’s focus 
can transition from piety to superficial physical considerations of beauty. It also situates the 
psychological illnesses classed as disordered eating as non-Haredi and therefore secular, and 
thus secular psychological problems can be avoided by maintaining Haredi ethical 
personhood.15 Understanding tsnius and dance in light of the implications for the formations 
of piety, and in the context of the history of Brody’s dance school, clarifies the Factor dance 
 
15 For scholarly research on eating disorders in the Haredi world, please see Bachner-Melman and Zohar 




school’s approach to tsnius, and complicates the further issues of embodiment which I 
discuss below. 
‘Tsnius was important to us [me and Rachel] from day one,’ Lexie tells me as we sit on a 
low wall outside of the Beis Yaakov. She says the younger girls were fine—it was the adult 
women who shocked her by stripping down to nothing but a leotard at their first classes. 
‘Even the Hasidic ones!’ she exclaimed. At least four of the adults in the school are members 
of the Gur community. ‘So from right then, it became important to keep the tsnius factor 
high.’ 
Inside, the assistants (a role developed for the older girls by Rachel and Lexie to promote 
mentoring and leadership) are showing Rachel the dance they’ve choreographed themselves 
for the end-of-year show. She encourages them and praises them, excitedly revelling in their 
creativity. As she turns off the music, she says to them, ‘We’re going to have to think about 
the costumes you will be wearing. With those moves you have at the beginning, we are going 
to need to be sure your skirt will stay covering your knees.’ The girls and Rachel debate the 
merits of certain modifications to their skirts versus the dancers’ ability to have full range of 
movement. Two weeks later, at the performance, I notice that the beginning of the 
choreography has been modified somewhat to remove some of the most problematic moves, 
such as the girls lifting their bodies heavenward from the floor by leading with their pelvises. 
A smoke machine is also employed, creating a wall of fog at the beginning of the dance so 
thick that I am unable to clearly see what is happening on stage. It gradually dissipates as the 
teenagers move on to less tsnius-ly questionable movements, away from hip-swerves and 
abdominal flexes. 
Superficially, the focus on tsnius at the Rachel Factor Dance School could simply be seen 
as an extension of the increasing stringency throughout the Haredi world. Under examination 




impeccable reputation, and reassure parents who entrust their daughters to Rachel’s and 
Lexie’s oversight. Thus, tsnius allows Rachel and Lexie agency in their goal of forming their 
dancers into ethical Haredi subjects. 
Rachel tells me about the work she does in schools, where she is invited to teach dance 
and drama to girls who may not already be enrolled in her dance classes. Following the 
common dramatic partner-based exercise of staring deeply into each other’s eyes for a 
protracted, silent moment, she says girls start to feel comfortable sharing their most 
vulnerable thoughts with the group. ‘The tell me they’re doing it, they’re staying religious, 
for the social aspects. They do their religious practice by rote, they don’t feel anything, they 
don’t feel connected. They have questions about God. In the community, everything has to be 
perfect. People are afraid to show they are struggling, and the community isn’t very good at 
addressing it. People wear masks.’ 
‘I haven’t thrived in the community,’ says Lexie. ‘Maybe it’s my streak of American BT 
[ba’alas teshuvah] independence.’ 
Lexie and Rachel offer a critique of Haredi society: that superficial community social 
norms are at fault for preventing young women from developing a pious Haredi personhood. 
The teachers use dance and drama techniques—secular techniques of embodiment—to 
develop the interior Haredi ethic in their students’ docile bodies.  
‘I get them to dance tehillim,’ Rachel tells me. ‘Dancing a tehilla [singular, ‘psalm’] can 
be so much more meaningful than just saying the words. They can connect with it. Dance 
gets them thinking, connecting with their emotions. We are saying the words with all of 
ourselves. You can see it in their faces, they’re expressing their struggles, they’re dealing 
with it. They are taking off the mask.’ 
Using the secular technique of dance, once eschewed16 by the Haredi community for 
 




immodestly focussing on the body, now allowable through Rachel’s and Lexie’s agency due 
to their commitment to tsnius, the dancers reinforce Haredi ethical personhood via a new 
form of embodied piety. Not only has tsnius allowed the dancers the space of critique, the 
space has itself created a new mode of embodiment to form the Haredi ethical self. Dance is a 
radically new way to shape the docile bodies of its subjects into a pious formation. 
The dance school space has also been a space of critique of tsnius, or rather the length to 
which tsnius has been taken, despite tsnius being a component of dancers’ agency. Rachel 
and Lexie both spoke about the obstacles formed by some attitudes adopted as part of the 
stringency of tsnius in the Haredi world. 
‘A lot of frum women don’t know anything about their bodies, and that’s really 
dangerous,’ Lexie tells me one evening, while we look out over the valley between 
Sanhedriya and Ramat Shlomo. ‘They’re having babies, and they don’t know what’s going 
on with them.’ 
She describes beginner dance classes, in which she instructs girls to contract or tighten 
certain muscles, and they have no idea what she means. They can’t name the parts of their 
bodies. She is concerned women don’t know how to take care of themselves or recover after 
giving birth. ‘I see these dance classes as improving body awareness and body comfort.’17 
 ‘We have to teach the girls how to use the mirror,’ Rachel tells me. During class, I 
hear her urging the dancers to check their form in the mirror. Despite a wall of mirrors at the 
front of the rehearsal space, the girls don’t often look at their reflection.  
 ‘They’re told they’re not supposed to be looking at themselves in the mirror,’ Lexie 
explains. ‘They’ve been told it’s not modest.’ 
 For the first several years, Rachel and Lexie avoided touching the dancers at all, 
 
17 Possibly without being aware of such parallels, Lexie is articulating the same goals and processes as 
embodied agency in the treatment of teens with anorexia nervosa in Meekums ‘Embodiment in Dance 




instead explaining to them what to do, and demonstrating it themselves. But the year that I 
spent with the school was the first which they decided they had to start directly positioning 
and adjusting the dancers’ forms physically, as any other teacher would in any other dance 
school. ‘We were nervous about it in prior years,’ Lexie explains, ‘but now we’re being more 
physical. We will see if there will be any fallout. We haven’t heard any complaints yet.’ 
 She describes how many of the girls flinched the first time she gently lifted an arm or 
corrected a shoulder. Though they don’t flinch anymore, there is often plenty of giggling 
when she’s repositioning a girl. ‘And there are still places I don’t touch. I don’t do any of the 
hips in isolation. Do you know that for these girls, tuchus [Yiddish for ‘rear end’] is even a 
bad word?’ But she struggles with her pointe class; they don’t understand how to activate 
their gluteus muscles, the engagement of which is fundamental for correct form. 
 Rachel and Lexie articulate a secular-liberal understanding of psychology (Asad 
2003, 53). While investing in the non-liberal habitus (Bourdieu 1990) of the tsnius exterior 
forming the Haredi ethical interior, they nonetheless also inhabit the secular habitus of the 
scientific body. They therefore seek a tsnius which includes these values of body 
consciousness; they articulate them as ‘healthy,’ suggesting that the detachment of the Haredi 
habitus from the physicality of the body is dangerous. Indeed, given the public health issues 
surrounding delayed breast cancer detection in the Haredi community and resultant increased 
morbidity, it would seem, from a secular-liberal understanding which values medical 
intervention, that there is in fact mortal danger in the Haredi habitus if taken to the extreme. 
In Rachel’s and Lexie’s shaping of dancers’ docile bodies, they seek to create a Haredi 
ethical personhood that values medical intervention and the secular value of body comfort to 
promote the physical health of Haredi women. This critiques current increases in stringency 
as harmful to women, and presents a new form of tsnius and Haredi ethical personhood, one 




of the interior intellect which inhabits a physical body. 
Rachel and Lexi have examined the scarf of Haredi identity around modesty issues and 
found it insufficient. They undertake a practice of unpicking the rows upon rows of stitches 
of modesty, breaking these down in themselves and in the women and girls in their dances 
school. Using yarn from secular ideology around psychology and body positivity, Rachel and 
Lexie re-knit the scarf to be warmer, and stronger. These analogies, of warmth and strength 
in the scarf of Haredi society, are particularly apt in this instance. The ways in which Rachel 
and Lexie invest in a new production of Haredi modesty is meant to support young women 
who might otherwise be lost to Haredi society, and to maintain their Haredi identity and 
feelings of inclusion and support within the community. They are truly building a warmer, 
stronger Haredi identity and society. 
 Two days before the end-of-year show, I lean back against a wall with Malha, the 
mother of some of the dancers, as we watch the littlest girls turn circles with their arms over 
their head to the song ‘Singing in the Rain.’ Malha grew up frum in Jerusalem, with 
American parents, and so we speak in English. We have been discussing the rise in morbidity 
of breast cancer in the Haredi world, and the way women and girls are taught to feel and 
think about their bodies. Malha pauses as we watch the little girls, her brow furrowed in 
thought.  
 ‘No one is saying that there is nothing wrong in the community,’ she says, her face 
serious. ‘We know there are problems. But I want to work to fix the problems, I don’t want 
people to leave.’18 
 As the tiny girls reach for the sky on their highest tiptoes, one of the older girls 
shouts, ‘B’simcha [with joy]! Thank Hashem for the bracha of rain!’ Their tiny faces shine, 
 
18 This quote was published in Shofar Summer 2020 with the word ‘people’ missing; that is an error, and 




and one of them closes her eyes in prayer-like concentration. Her little skirt hangs below her 
knees, and in that moment, her interior piety, shaping itself already at age six, is visible. 
While many other Haredi girls do not receive these opportunities, the Haredi community’s 
support and respect for Rachel Factor’s dance school indicates a growing acceptance of these 
new modes of piety and Haredi ethical personhood, and a Haredi society which will continue 
to accommodate select secular values to create an enduring though dynamic Haredi future. 
 
The Mask She Wears: A Different Kind of Musical 
 
The Mask She Wears opened in December 2015 in Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh, with 
indications of the thematic elements that were considered sensitive for Haredi audiences: the 
posters and program listed rabbinical guidance, and there was an age warning in addition to 
the normal kol isha warning. In brief, the musical examines the lives of three young women: 
Rivka, Bassi, and Shani. Each of them harbours secrets, three different struggles that, while 
common, each feels the need to hide. Rivka faces growing debts and abject poverty, which 
could be remedied if her husband takes a job offer in the United States; he is the star of the 
yeshiva, however, and they are loath to leave Israel. Bassi and her husband are undergoing 
fertility treatments, having been married for nearly seven years without conceiving. Shani 
hides the fact that her homelife is nearly unbearable due to her husband’s mistreatment of 
her. In order to see the internal struggles of each woman, the play uses the mechanism of 
‘Thought Shadows,’ in which a separate actress personifies the thoughts and emotions of 
each of the main characters. The play portrays these women’s struggles and the pain that they 
inadvertently cause each other. Each storyline reaches a realistic resolution, which allows the 
play complexity. 




display the struggle that is at the centre of the Haredi ethical formation of the self. In order to 
form the pious self, Haredi teachings dictate that every Jewish soul struggle against the yetzer 
hara, the evil inclination, which is innate to all humans. While the Thought Shadows often 
articulate emotions that the women keep to themselves, they also sometimes display the 
struggle against the yetzer hara that is part of the inner formation of the pious self, especially 
in Rivka’s story. Rivka is at home in the second scene, where she has just phoned her 
husband to tell him that they cannot afford a chicken for shabbos. As she reflects on their 
financial struggles, she thinks about her friends Shani and Bassi. ‘When you have money, 
everything looks different,’ she mutters, allowing herself a moment of jealousy. For the first 
of only two times in the play, her Thought Shadow turns, and they acknowledge each other’s 
presence. With a raised eyebrow of disapproval, her Thought Shadow clears her throat. Rivka 
quickly says, ‘But that’s not important. Hashem gave me everything I need.’ She turns to the 
Thought Shadow and says, ‘Good save,’ to which the Thought Shadow replies, ‘Anytime.’ 
 This is one of the few times the play is directly instructive; it acknowledges the fact 
that jealousies arise and creates the example of the pious self that triumphs over the jealous 
feelings of the yetzer hara. The audience chuckles, a brief breath of embarrassment and 
relief: while those feelings of jealousy are condemnable, they are also relatable. In this way, a 
moment of togetherness is created; these moments occur throughout the play and amplify the 
pious critiques and agentival power of the play. However, this scene serves to underscore the 
prevalent message in Haredi society that women should thank God for what they have, rather 
than covet what they do not. Many feminist scholars would classify this as an example of 
internalised oppression (Myers 2002, 5-6); however, like Mahmood, I read these religious 
women’s agency in their ability to achieve what they want (2005, 10), and there is much 
more to be gained from examining this conversation in context. 




Before she covets the money of the others, she thinks about becoming a nurse, like Bassi. 
This vocation would give her more income, which would mean that her husband could 
continue to learn in yeshiva. Therefore, this situation is one of virtue: she is trying her best to 
uphold Haredi values and form herself into a pious wife. Ultimately, her Thought Shadow 
presents the real obstacle: ‘But you would need all that training’ (Goldman 2016, scene 2).  
Within this context, the scene suddenly becomes a critique: if Rivka had more skills, she 
would be able to get a better job, earn more money, and support her husband in yeshiva. This 
message, that if Rivka had more skills, the family could stay and her husband could continue 
to learn in yeshiva, is reiterated in scene 5 at the office of a career advisor. To Rivka’s list of 
skills, the woman responds, ‘Well, darling, in today’s job market, that’s like saying that 
you’re very good at breathing’ (Ibid., scene 5). It becomes apparent that Rivka has no useful 
skills. Esther Goldman’s play offers a critique of Haredi society for limiting the secular 
education of women. Esther’s agency for this critique stems from her choice to frame it as 
limiting Rivka’s ability to fulfil the requirements of Haredi ethical womanhood. 
 This critique is underscored by the shiur offered by the learned and respected 
Rebbetzin Fein near the end of the play. The Rebbetzin occupies a place of authority, 
especially in the absence of male characters, including rabbis. She is, essentially, the agent of 
the absent rabbi. The scene opens on the end of the shiur, where she is speaking about 
Hishtadlus, or the idea that God only helps people who have first exerted the necessary effort 
themselves. The Rebbetzin says, ‘You do your Hishtadlus, and leave the rest to Hashem.’ 
Therefore, there is a context in the play, rooted in Jewish teachings and the Haredi value 
system, for the argument that a person must do the best that they can before God gives them 
what they need. By articulating this Haredi value of Hishtadlus, the critique that Haredi 
society has left Rivka without skills, and this has led to the cessation of her husband’s yeshiva 




unable to exert the maximum effort—she cannot achieve Hishtadlus—because of the limits 
set by social norms. Like tsnius in the dance classes discussed previously, Hishtadlus offers 
agency to the playwright in critiquing Haredi society within Haredi ethical boundaries. 
In Chapter Two, we witnessed the scene in which Shani confesses her marital problems to 
Rebbetzin Fein. The scene, again, is as follows: 
Shani: ‘So, Rebbetzin, you were saying tefillah [prayer] is a conduit for all bracha.” 
 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Correct.’ 
 Shani: ‘And if you’re davening, you’re doing your Hishtadlus.’ 
 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Davening, with other Hishtadlus, yes.’ 
 Shani: ‘What if a person doesn’t daven?’ 
 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Ever? Oh, even if she has children, a woman still has an obligation 
to daven at least one tefillah a day.’ 
 Shani: ‘No, I meant—’ [pause] ‘I—’ [pause] ‘I meant, a man. If a man doesn’t 
daven.’ 
 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Oh. A man.’ 
 Shani begins to cry. She tells the Rebbetzin about her struggles. 
 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Thank you for coming to me about this, Shani. You’re doing the 
right thing.’ 
 Shani: ‘I am?’ 
 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘But Shani, this is an unacceptable situation.’ 
 Shani: ‘I know. I haven’t been trying hard enough. I need to take more shalom beis 
[peace in the home] classes.’ 
 Rebbetzin Fein shakes her head and speaks forcefully. 
 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘No, Shani. The way your husband is behaving—’  




 Rebbetzin Fein: ‘This is not the way a Jewish husband treats his wife.’ 
 Shani: ‘But it’s me. I must be doing something wrong.’ 
 Rebbetzin Fein, shaking her head again: ‘From what you’re telling me, you’re doing 
everything you can to repair the relationship. And making yourself miserable in the process’ 
(Ibid., scene 13). 
This conversation between Shani and Rebbetzin Fein can be seen as a critique of the way 
Haredi society has shaped wives: Shani believes that she is solely responsible for her 
husband’s happiness, and his ethical failings are her responsibility:  
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘But a healthy relationship takes two healthy people to make it work. 
Sounds like Avi is unhappy, too.’ 
 Shani: ‘But isn’t it my fault, then? Isn’t it my job to make my husband happy?’ 
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘No, no, no, Shani. Avi’s a big boy.’ 
Shani: ‘But, I thought, if my husband’s so unhappy, I must be a failure.’ 
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Oh, Shani, what a heavy burden you’ve been carrying’ (Ibid.).  
This, therefore, is a critique of the earlier understanding of virtuous Haredi womanhood, 
in which a woman’s purpose is to support her husband. The Rebbetzin’s correction of this 
misunderstanding is particularly unassailable, again, because of the earlier introduction of the 
idea of Hishtadlus; when the Rebbetzin tells Shani she has done all that she possibly can, and 
it is not her fault, Esther has given the Rebbetzin the agency to absolve Shani and clarify this 
portion of the formation of Haredi ethical womanhood. 
 Like the dancers, Esther’s writing also reveals an introduction of the secular 
conceptions of health and well-being. The Rebbetzin talks about ‘healthy’ marriages and 
‘healthy’ people: 
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Shani, you must start therapy. At the very least, by yourself. You need 




productive to have everything trapped inside your head.’ 
Shani: ‘But Avi just makes fun of me every time I bring up ways to communicate better.’ 
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Shani, you’re at a crossroads in your marriage.’ 
Shani begins to cry again. 
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘You must make that clear to Avi. He has to be willing to work on this, 
the marriage, to survive. You may be enabling his unhealthy behaviours by protecting him 
from their consequences. If he’s unwilling to go to counselling with you, then he’s crossed a 
red line. I may not be a therapist myself, but I know that the right therapist can help you air 
your feelings in the right, safe environment.’ 
Shani: ‘A safe environment?’ 
Rebbetzin Fein nods. 
Shani: ‘Where? How do I find—?’ 
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘Be in touch after shabbos. I can refer you to people that I really trust.’ 
Shani: ‘Thank you so much, Rebbetzin Fein.’ 
Rebbetzin Fein: ‘No, Shani. Thank you for coming to me for help’ (Ibid., scene 14).   
This scene reflects the acceptance of secular psychology in the Haredi world. The 
Rebbetzin’s advice to see a therapist and seek couples’ counselling displays familiarity with 
and investment in secular understandings of psychology and therapeutic treatment; her 
further distinction between herself as untrained and a professional indicates a respect for the 
secular education and qualification systems. The Rebbetzin does not suggest they enter 
couples’ counselling with herself and the Rav, though working exclusively with rabbinical 
authorities and their affiliates would not be uncommon in the Haredi world. Given that the 
script was under rabbinical supervision, I believe that the Rebbetzin’s advice is part of the 
overall shift in the Haredi world toward a trust in secular therapeutic expertise, which I 




who is a member of the Haredi community and has received higher education.  
In the acceptance of psychology, we see the agency of women at work, and how this 
agency achieves chance across the whole of society. Women have endeavoured to weave in 
the yarn of psychological therapeutics, strengthening the scarf of Haredi society. Therefore, 
within Shani’s story, we see an example of Haredi social change in the employment of 
secular knowledge and expertise to support and improve the Haredi community; in order to 
accommodate such a shift, there also must be a hybridisation of how Haredi people 
understand embodied personhood, to be both a pious self but also one made up of the 
separate entities of psyche and body. 
As the play closes, upstage is transformed into the Western Wall, the actresses facing it 
with their backs to the audience. As they mime the actions of praying, the voice of the 
playwright speaks: 
 ‘Every one of us wears a mask. Sometimes, when you’re at the kosel [Western Wall], 
you can look around and see each woman taking off the mask she wears, and crying her heart 
out to Hashem, who hears all thoughts. Hashem knows your deepest wishes and fears. He’s 
not fooled by the mask. He sees us all as the precious souls we are, longing to come close to 
Him. All of us want the same thing, in its infinite variations. We want Hashem to take care of 
our problems, big and small, make them all go away, so that we can serve Him properly. 
And, if it is His will that they not go away, that He gives direction on how to change our lives 
so that we may cope with them. You can hear the echo of the heartfelt tefillos [prayers] left at 
the kosel for the tsurah [Yiddish, ‘troubles’] each woman bears in her heart. She wipes her 
tears, composes her face, and puts her mask on again, then turns around to face the world. To 
face’ [pause] ‘you’ (Ibid., scene 16).  
 In this final speech, the audience experiences togetherness, and compassion. In the 




clarified. ‘This play is intended to raise sensitivity in the klal [group], [and] to increase 
awareness that other people are dealing with other nisyonos [trials and tribulations] than you 
are. My goal in bringing this into the public arena will have been achieved if everyone walks 
out with a resolve to be more careful about making casual [and] not-so-casual comments that 
may be painful in ways that she never understood before,’ reads the Note from the 
Director/Playwright in the playbill.19 Esther reiterates this message when I visit her at her 
home in Ma’alot Dafna. ‘The play touched something very deep for a lot of the women who 
have seen it,’ Esther tells me. ‘My point was about getting people to understand that other 
people in Haredi society are grappling with different issues than they are, and increasing an 
awareness of those issues, in order to raise people’s sensitivity to one another.’ In this final 
scene, Esther has brought the audience a feeling of togetherness, where her critiques can be 
accepted, and indeed shared by the women watching, in order to fundamentally change who 
they are and how they relate to each other. 
 There is, at the heart of this, a critique: that people become isolated, consumed with 
their own problems, which eclipses their thoughtfulness towards others. It resonates with the 
critique of the dance teachers, that the Haredi community demands its members hide any 
imperfection. Esther’s mode of instruction to the docile bodies of the women who are her 
audience is to reshape each woman’s individual struggle as part of the social: because all 
women bring their problems to God, though all women feel alone in their problems, God’s 
compassion for all women’s suffering reframes the individual as a member of the group. 
Therefore, the ideal Haredi womanhood becomes enmeshed in the social, as much as within 
the individual, in a way that is perhaps more compassionate toward the individual and less 
focussed upon conformity. She has examined the scarf of Haredi society, and found it lacking 
in similar ways to Rachel and Lexie; like them, she has attempted to reknit this section with 
 




greater use of the yarn of community building in the women’s space of the arts. 
 
Music, Catharsis, and Truth 
 
As discussed in the section concerning The Mask She Wears, secular expertise in 
psychology and therapeutic counselling techniques have become increasingly accepted in the 
Haredi world. Many rabbanim have recognised the need for these things within even the most 
closed sectors of Haredi society, and psychology, counselling, and social work are some of 
the most popular degrees in the Haredi world. Women are most often the ones who are sent 
to earn these degrees. The Karliner rebbe is among the leaders on this type of initiative, as his 
former secretary told me: 
‘[The rebbe is] interested in seeing that things remain, uh, happy, uh, healthy, actually, 
relationship, even kids. You know, if some guy has a problem he has no problem with 
sending him to a psychologist or a therapist or something and so on. And he’s very up to date 
in these things. Extremely up to date in keeping things well balanced.’ 
This was the reasoning behind Bubbie Brenner’s pursuit of a degree at Hunter College, 
discussed in the previous chapter. This casts women in the role of the bearers of secular 
expertise, and this is sometimes what allows them agency to do some extremely powerful 
knitting of the secular into the religious. Their expertise is respected by these community 
leaders that allow it, and it is sought after. Despite the growing prevalence and acceptance of 
seeking psychological therapy, however, there continues to be hesitancy in many parts of 
Haredi society. Instead, my interlocutors found that many women use artistic exploits as 
therapeutic outlets, and indeed many artistic instructors take on roles that are part teacher, 
part therapist. 




she discusses how she focuses on ‘breaking down the voice, and then building it up again.’ 
‘Sometimes it’s almost like I’m breaking down the singer and building them up again,’ 
she confesses. ‘Teaching has been really special. My students open up about how learning 
has enabled them to be strong and confident.’ 
Lizzi enjoys teaching voice more than she ever expected, because it is such a different 
experience than her own growing up. ‘It’s more about the voice, and less about the ego. I 
make space for my students to experiment. 
‘There’s something really vulnerable and emotional about the voice and singing,’ she 
says. ‘Some of my students have a really difficult home life, and the lessons make them feel 
like they’ve expressed themselves. It’s really like therapy.’ 
There is, she says, a darker side to being treated as people’s therapist. ‘I hate being made 
into a BT dog and pony show,’ she says to me. I ask her to clarify. 
‘There are these kinds of shows where people want me to talk about my life, how I chose 
to be frum, for a crowd,’ she explains. ‘I feel like there are questionable motives behind this, 
like this insecurity. Like, are things actually better outside the community? I’m not sure how 
much I’m a representative to make people feel better about that. BT stories can be really 
dehumanising. I’m a singer, I’m not a rebbetzin. I’m not inherently wise.’ 
Within the voice lesson studio, though, she loves the way she can help her students 
transform. ‘I can help anyone, no matter what’s up at school or at home, feel like they’ve 
accomplished something, and developed a skill,’ she says. ‘But really, it’s more than that. I 
have personally experienced real catharsis with music, and if I can help others experience 
that, then I’m doing my job.’ 
There is, at the heart of this, a mild critique of Haredi homes in which children cannot 
find these supports and transformations; of schools that stifle and make children feel 




stitches of pain in their identities, and helps to reknit them in ways that are informed by her 
values from the secular world, but maintains their Haredi identity. There is also concern over 
a society that looks to ba’alei teshuvah for legitimisation and proof that Haredi life is the 
correct path. Lizzi’s song ‘I Can’t Be’ speaks to the enormous pressure on performers, 
ba’alos teshuvah, and women that exists within the Haredi world: 
 
I Can’t Be 
Lizzi Serling 
 
Do I offend you when I’m walking down the street? 
And should I pretend to be something I can’t be? 
Should I wonder what you think at the end of the day? 




I can’t be, I can’t be, what you need me to be. 
And I can’t see, I can’t see, what you need me to see. 
Do you live your life through another’s eyes? 
Do you paint your story with little lies? 
 
Did I say the right thing? Did my words seem free? 
Are my songs too raw? Do I make myself too seen? 
Should I put my guitar under lock and key? 




Do you like my hair? Do you like my clothes? Do you like my lyrics? Do you like my 
prose? 
Do you like my fingers? Do you like my toes? 
Do I know my friends and do I know my foes? 
 
 
If you see my face, will you say hello? 
Or will I fade into names that you don’t know? 
Am I too strict or am I too free? 









Layer 2: Do you like my hair? Do you like my clothes? Do you like my lyrics? Do you 
like my prose? 
Do you like my fingers? Do you like my toes? 
Do I know my friends & do I know my foes 
 
Layer 3: I can’t be, I can’t be, what you need me to be. 
And I can’t see, I can’t see, what you need me to see. 
Do you live your life through another’s eyes? 
Do you paint your story with little lies? 
 
Lizzi’s song questions the Haredi preoccupation with levels of stringency, asking ‘Am I 
too strict or am I too free?’ She reminds people that this concern with women’s modesty, 
women’s ‘hair,’ ‘clothes,’ ‘fingers,’ and ‘toes,’ has perhaps gone too far into superficiality, 
asking, ‘Do I offend you when I’m walking down the street?’ She suggests that society would 
be better to focus on human relationships, ‘If you see my face will you say hello?’ and that 
perhaps people should practice less judgement: ‘Do you know what you don’t like about 
me?’ Finally, she suggests that people should look for their own answers within themselves, 
rather than seeking ba’alos teshuvah narratives to confirm their fears and make them feel 
vindicated for staying frum. ‘Do you live your life through another’s eyes? Do you paint your 
story with little lies?’ 
When this song is taken in comparison with Lizzi’s earlier work, ‘Enough,’ it is a harsh 
critique. Lizzi embraces religious life, and is fully committed to staying frum and continuing 
to be part of the community, but that doesn’t keep her from critiquing those aspects of Haredi 
society which she finds troubling. Lizzi uses song to examine the dropped stitches in the scarf 
of Haredi society. Her words from our previous conversation resurface: ‘I chose this because 
I’m trying to live a truthful life.’ Lizzi uses her art to hold Haredi society to account for its 
dysfunctions and hypocrisy, to critique those aspects she finds disingenuous, and to live her 





Art as Therapy, Therapy as Art 
 
Bridging the worlds of performance and therapy, Playback Theater has become hugely 
popular of late in the Haredi world. First conceived by Jonathan Fox and Jo Solas as 
informal, improvised group theatre with influences from psychodrama and the American 
experimental theatre movement, it has a significant reputation for meaningful community 
building, identity formation, and conflict resolution in a wide range of applications, as well as 
providing mental health benefits (see Fox 2007, Rivers 2015, Sanders 2008). In a Playback 
workshop, an audience member shares a personal story with the group; something that has 
haunted them, or something with which they are struggling. The Playback Theatre group then 
acts out the story for the audience. By doing this, the audience members can develop empathy 
for their antagonist, as well as for themselves. 
‘We seek to symbolise their world in a way that is empathetic,’ explains Yehudis. 
The proliferation of Playback can be understood two ways: one the one hand, women 
may be using their agency of being in a caring role in order to participate in improvisational 
theatre— the fact that it offers a form of care is what allows so many women to participate in 
theatre. Or it could work the other way around: the fact that by-women-for-women arts is 
acceptable allows women to provide therapeutic opportunities for their community. I believe 
it is the latter for two reasons: firstly, there are a few Haredi women’s improvisational 
comedy groups, and so there is no reason why the women who do Playback couldn’t join a 
non-therapeutic theatre group (and indeed some women are in both); and secondly, the vast 
majority of women whom I encountered doing Playback are also therapists or counsellors of 
some type in their professional lives. Instead, I believe Playback offers a way for these 
women to reach and help more people in their community, which is their ultimate goal. These 
women want to help Haredi women, and improve the Haredi community, using their secular 




Playback is an opportunity for Haredi women to enact agency. In the place of the 
women’s-only performance space, women knit their secular therapeutic skills with the 
everyday lives of Haredi women, and help produce a new form of the scarf of Haredi 
identity. Women who attend these sessions can grasp these yarns of psychological healing, 
and knit them into their own internal identities, strengthening and bolstering themselves.  
Playback performances are not only spaces for empathetic community building, like 
Esther’s play; they also serve as spaces for safe critique, in which girls and women can 
express their frustration, anger, and struggles with certain strictures of Haredi society, like the 
girls at the dance school. The troupes with whom I conducted participant observation went to 
special efforts to create this space as both confidential and condoned. Yehudis always began 
by going around the room, and looking directly into every woman or girl’s eyes, and insisting 
on waiting for everyone to hold eye contact with her before beginning. Like Rachel Factor, 
she believed that there was an intimacy and connection through the eyes. If anyone had their 
head down, she would call them out, though she did so kindly. After she made clear that the 
space of Playback was confidential and respectful, and that everyone kept each other’s 
secrets, Sarah would step forward and tell the audience that they didn’t ‘just do this for fun. 
We have the blessings of many ravs to be with you here today, and the ravs require that we 
do this every time.’ In this way, the women and the space which they create are clearly pious, 
because male religious leaders have endorsed these performances, and these practices of 
ensuring confidentiality. The patriarchy has invaded the women-only space, but only so that 
women may feel even more secure in their participation in a pious activity, allowing them 
agency to critique their world. 
Many of the critiques that arose in Playback were around strict modest clothing standards. 
One young girl shared a story of a time she became hopelessly lost after dark in the Mea 




it is completely Haredi, very Hasidic, and also home to the fringe extremist groups like 
Neturei Karta and Lev Tahor. 
‘I was wearing a red shirt,’ she explains to the theatre troupe. ‘I’m Litvish and we’re not 
that strict about red, but I know that the people in Mea Shearim think red isn’t tsnius, and I 
was afraid I was going to get shouted at, or, I don’t know, maybe attacked or something. And 
I was really, really lost, and it took me like two hours to find my way home again.’ 
‘What happened? How did you resolve it?’ Yehudis asked gravely. 
‘I eventually made it back to Yaffa Street,’ the girl said, her face so red by this point that 
it was nearly purple. ‘Luckily no one really saw me, I think they were all still inside mostly.’ 
Yehudis nodded. She grabbed a red scarf from the prop box, wrapping it around her black 
shirt to turn it red. The other actresses fell into place around her, as the voices of fear.  
‘Oh no, oh no, I’m so lost, I don’t know where I am, and the streets are so dark, and so 
narrow, and so dirty. Is that a street or just a doorway? Is that a person? Oh, no, it’s just a 
pole. It’s just a garbage can. Oh, my!! That cat scared me!’ she jumped. 
‘Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear,’ said the next. ‘I’m in the middle of Mea Shearim, and I’m 
wearing red! Why, oh why did I wear red today of all days?’ 
A third fear moaned, ‘What if someone sees me? What if one of the men is angry at me? 
What if they start shouting at me? What if they start throwing things at me? What if they 
want to hurt me because they think I’m not tsnius enough?’ 
As she watched, the girl drew her knees up to her chest in her chair, and buried her chin 
in her lap. Just her eyes peered over her knees as the drama unfolded before her. One of her 
friends put her arm around her. 
‘Look,’ said Yehudis. ‘Is that a light?’ 
Sarah ran across the front of the stage, and made the characteristic sound of the Jerusalem 




‘Oh, look, it’s the train!’ said Yehudis, and runs towards the edge of the stage. ‘Oh, 
baruch Hashem, I am finally back at the train! I know how to get home!’ 
The troupe cheered, and everyone broke scene. 
‘How did it feel to watch your story happen on stage?’ Yehudis asked.  
The girl unfolded herself. ‘Like, it made me feel less silly for being scared,’ she said. 
‘Like, I was really scared again, while I was watching you, and then I was really relieved, 
when you, I mean me, when you got out. I feel like I’m not as scared to walk by myself any 
more. Like, I know now I can find my way home again.’ In this moment, too, the audience 
felt her fear as well; in the togetherness created by watching the drama unfold on stage, she 
was no longer alone. Because they felt fear, she judged herself less for feeling fear. 
Another girl brought her story of once being excluded from school for her clothing to the 
Playback troupe. She was sent home for wearing a skirt two inches too short. She expressed 
feelings of being singled out, and frustration at both the lost learning time and the 
inflexibility of the school. After her scene was performed, she thanked the Playback troupe, 
telling them she felt validated. The Playback troupe therefore filled two very important roles: 
they allowed and supported her critique of the school dress code and strict modesty standards, 
and they helped this student feel reinvested in her membership in the Haredi community. This 
is of no small importance; dress code violations are one of the principal reasons why girls are 
excluded from Haredi schools, and once a girl is excluded from school she is at risk of 
homelessness and other dangers, such as those described in Michal’s hypothetical situations 
in the previous chapter. They validated her critique of the focus on technicalities around 
modesty in schools, and buoyed her agency as a pious young woman who would rather learn 
than miss school. 
Sometimes, there are more serious psychological or psychiatric issues that emerge in the 




trauma; other times, they have had audience members in mental health crises, such as mania 
or psychosis. These are moments when it is fundamental that every member of the Playback 
troupe has therapeutic training. In these moments, the troupe mediates the situation for the 
audience, and uses emergency triage psychological techniques. Usually, one of the members 
then takes on the person’s onward care, or refers them to psychiatric services for more 
serious care.  
Yehudis runs a therapy practice out of a small office in the centre of Petach Tikvah, in a 
location which is both easily accessible to many Haredi communities in Bnei Brak, but also 
anonymous because it is a business area. She sees a wide range of clients, including both 
children and adults. She is one of several trusted counsellors in the community to help 
children who have been victims of sexual abuse; she also helps adults who are survivors of 
the same. Some of her clients are going through difficult divorces, others are struggling with 
being single long after the normal age of marriage. She has two psychology degrees, which 
she received from Haredi-only (and women-only) programs.  
Another woman in Yehudis’s Playback troupe, Chana, is a movement therapist. She only 
works with adult women, but her clients have similar struggles to those who visit Yehudis. 
Movement therapy is an unusual approach, but Chana says that it is especially useful in 
‘unblocking’ her clients; often they have been unable to speak about their trauma, or 
articulate their emotions. 
Chana presented me with examples, so that I could understand how movement therapy 
operates as a therapeutic method, having no familiarity with it. First, she told me about a 
woman who was undergoing infertility treatments, and was experiencing anxiety attacks, 
either because of the medications or the circumstances. Chana worked with her to improve 
her relationship with her body, and this in turn calmed her anxiety. Chana said the client told 




you, body, for taking care of me. I appreciate this process. My body is my best friend, and it 
has always worked for me before.’  In this case, movement therapy serves a similar purpose 
as the dance school; it helps women redefine their relationship with their body to conform to 
secular ideas of body familiarity, and integrates this into a new type of Haredi womanhood. 
Chana offered another example. ‘I had a woman who was in a bad marriage come to me,’ 
she says. She practiced breathing with her: facing each other and matching up their breathing 
to be in sync. They moved on to mirroring; the women would move in ways to show how she 
felt, and Chana would move as a mirror, so she could see it reflected back. 
‘She stood, and went to the hall, and I’m with her and moving after her, and she opens the 
sliding door, and then freezes,’ Chana told me. ‘Then she moved out of it and came to talk to 
me. She said it was amazing for her because she wants to leave, and she opened the door, and 
the fear came flooding back. She realised it was a fear of being alone. It wasn’t about the 
relationship. She said to me, “The relationship is over but I’m not ready to be alone.” She 
wanted to get out her anger with me. I helped her do it through movement, and she really 
needed it. It’s so different than talking it out.’ 
Much of frum therapeutic work highlights the limitations of language. An extraordinary 
proportion of frum therapists work with techniques that de-emphasise spoken words. 
Furthermore, these therapeutic approaches are often physical. In the standard Western 
therapeutic relationship, touch is taboo, yet for Chana, and sometimes for Yehudis, touch is 
fundamental to the process. 
Chana offers a final example. 
‘I had a woman in with attachment issues,’ she tells me. ‘One thing we worked on was 
the endings. She found the end of the session hard. We practiced slowly letting go of each 
other’s hands, with the understanding it was safe to stop, and to hold, when you hit a feeling. 




Chana takes a moment to explain some of her anecdotal findings from experience. ‘I see a 
lot of emotional neglect,’ she tells me sadly. ‘There is definitely more from frum homes. 
Sometimes they are ba’alei teshuvah, but then it’s more typical abuse.’ Chana is critical of 
Haredi society in this moment. She clearly doesn’t like what she is saying, but she knows it to 
be true from her experiences, and she wants to change this. She may not be able to stop it 
from happening, but she has a way of using her secular expertise to help Haredi women 
recover from these past wrongs. 
‘She had just told me some terrible things about her trauma,’ Chana says, continuing this 
woman’s story. ‘And I was crying. She wasn’t. I said to her, “I have the tears and you don’t.” 
She asked me, “Can I touch your tear and see that it’s real?” And she reached out and 
touched the tear on my cheek. Later, she called me from home. She wanted to come back and 
take another tear home with her. And the next session, she cried.’ 
Chana’s story is heartbreaking, but it also offers hope and a vision for the future of the 
Haredi community. She, Yehudis, and others like them are using their newly acquired secular 
expertise to change the Haredi community, and to create a vision for Haredi personhood and 
Haredi society that combines secular knowledge with Haredi values for the benefit of the 
community. 
‘Sometimes,’ Yehudis tells me, ‘it’s a moment of, “Wow, I have feelings!” It’s brave.’ 
The choice of therapeutic roles is in itself a form of critique; there is an acknowledgement 
within this choice that the community has troubles and trauma which need healing. These 
therapeutic roles act as gateways for women to re-knit other women. It is also a further 
example of the use of outside secular knowledge, combined with pious values and ethics, in 
order to benefit the Haredi community and perhaps change the community in a way that these 
women perceive to be an improvement. Women are using their agency as wage-earners, 




transform it into something that is still Haredi but, in their eyes, and in the eyes of the 
community leaders who endorse them, improved. 
 
Secular Incursions and Jewish Unity 
 
Thus far, this chapter has focussed on elements of the secular which have been accepted 
into the Haredi community, and are welcomed as tools to benefit Haredi society. Not all 
secular incursions are welcome, however; the Haredim, despite trying to build a separate 
reality, are living in and part of modern Israel. 
I was sharply reminded of this during dance rehearsals. One of the advanced lyrical 
choreographies was Shir Hama’alos, danced to Psalm 121 as sung by Kineret, a religious 
woman singer. In the middle of the psalm, during an instrumental interlude, small groups 
acted out scenes from daily life: one featured a gunman who pursued dancers fleeing in fear 
across the stage, another focussed on a woman weeping over the dead body of a loved one. 
The first time I witnessed these elements, I was shocked by the introduction of harsh images 
of real, brutal life in the midst of a deeply spiritual dance. 
I realised the dance had been choreographed less than two years after a summer of rocket 
fire from Gaza; the same year, on the morning of the 18th of November, Kehilat B’nai Torah 
synagogue in the neighbourhood of Har Nof had been the site of the deadliest terror attack in 
Jerusalem since 2008. Har Nof is a Haredi neighbourhood with a significant Anglo 
population, and many families in the dance school live in Har Nof. While Haredim do not 
serve in the military (for the most part) and try not to participate in mainstream Israeli life, 
they are not spared from the realities of living in Israel, and the dangers that are associated 
with living in a country in conflict. 




opportunities. In the dance school, the girls in these scenes spared themselves no emotion; 
they felt the fear, anger, and sorrow that lurks in the background of their lives. Lizzi uses 
song to process her emotions around these challenges, and her audience processes them with 





I heard the siren, I heard the screams 
And time was racing just like a dream 
And though I'd have it be another way, I hold my son in my arms and I say 
I made it through today 
 
I read the headlines and so did you 
I prayed to G-d that it wasn't true 
And though I'd have it be another way, the ones who read the paper stop and say 
I made it through today 
 
On misty mountains there sits a town 
With golden air and a stony ground 
And though we'd have it be another way we know that some don't get the chance to say 
I made it through today 
I made it through today 
I made it through today, I made it through today, I made it through 
 
Lizzi’s song allows people to recognise their own fear and the commonality of each 
other’s experiences in her music; she offers a moment of togetherness in the fear, and like the 
girls at the Playback performance, or the women at the play production, the feeling of 
togetherness makes the emotions less overwhelming. There is sorrow: ‘we know that some 
don’t get the chance to say I made it through today,’ yet she allows space for the gratitude 
that they ‘made it through today.’ 
Lizzi’s music chiefly seeks to emphasise shared experiences and help women find 
strength through togetherness; much of the arts community is turning towards this goal, and 




valued as others. The arts have become a place to combat the prejudice which is discussed 
elsewhere in this project. The dance school hosts an incredible amount of diversity. There are 
African Americans, South Asians, Sephardim, and Ashkenazim at the school, which focuses 
on the welcome and acceptance of all Jews over all other considerations; Rachel Factor is 
herself a Japanese American who grew up in Hawai’i. Gurer Hasidic women dance holding 
hands with African American ba’alos teshuvah. Lizzi’s concerts, which are always fully 
booked due to her popularity, reflect a similar diversity.  
Kerry Bar-Cohn is similarly committed to this vision of unconditional acceptance of all 
Jewish women; whereas in-person activities like dance and concerts are somewhat limited by 
geography, she has taken to the internet to use art to create an unconditional community of 
Jewish women. She started a Facebook group called Kol Isha: For Jewish Women and Girls 
ONLY, where women are invited to post videos of themselves singing or performing, no 
matter how shy or unprofessional. Though it does conform to the prohibition of kol isha, she 
chose the title because she felt like the prohibition was, at its heart, negative and demeaning, 
and she wanted to transform it and ‘turn it on its head.’ 
‘I wanted to promote women’s confidence, and be empowering,’ she tells me late at night 
in her dining room in Beit Shemesh. ‘I wanted a way for women to connect, a way for 
women to feel like they were a part of it. It’s a play on kol isha, because it promotes the voice 
of women.’ 
She says she was frustrated by the feeling that so many creative Jewish women were 
isolated and unaware of each other’s talent, and she wanted women to discover and celebrate 
each other. 
‘Jewish unity is important to me,’ she says. ‘I don’t really care whether or not you’re 
religious.’ 




group; at the time of writing, there are over 7,000. ‘It speaks to the fact that it fills a need,’ 
Kerry says. I suggest to her that it also speaks to her energy and investment; she is a woman 
always in motion, and she brings boundless joy to her videos on the group. She shrugs that 
off, saying, ‘I do a lot of tone setting, deleting certain comments, things like that. I want it to 
be a place of positivity. My only hard and fast rule is no posting while driving.’ 
Since the interview, she and a few other women have taken more active roles as 
moderators and started enforcing strict no-advertising rules. Such is the nature of growing 
popularity. 
‘I love the inclusivity, it’s definitely not just for frum women,’ says Kerry. ‘It’s about 
connecting creatively, connecting joyously. It’s also about the safety of a women’s-only 
space. We encourage and empower other women. It brings Jewish women together. There’s 
no faith connection, really, just that I want to use the skill bank I have to help the world.’ 
Kerry’s act is both a critique of the extreme interpretation of kol isha in the frum world, 
and an act of agency to create a society which she envisions as welcoming and inclusive. She 
wants to shape the future of her society, and promote Jewish women of all backgrounds. To 
her, being Haredi is incidental, and all Jewish women matter. 
‘I want to be a good person, and do the right thing. That’s it,’ she says. ‘God gave me the 
gifts of being uninhibited, coordinated, and talented, and I have to use those things. Now, 
with Kol Isha, there’s a format, maybe in the future I can create a Kol Isha non-profit, and 
really help the world. There’s a limit to what I can do all by myself. To me, right now, it’s 
just about empowering women.’ 
She says there has been no resistance from the Haredi establishment, and no pushback 
from the community. She believes that anyone who knows about it would not have a problem 
with it, and those who would have a problem with it do not know about it. ‘They’re not on 





‘Use Your Voice’ 
 
It’s night-time on erev shabbos [Thursday evening] in Jerusalem, and women are 
gathering in the Old City for a Be’er Mayim Chaim concert. The hall is packed. The concert 
sold out in advance. Some women have brought their daughters, or babies who are still 
breastfeeding. Seminary girls sit in groups together. Older women are dotted around. Some 
heads are covered in sheitels, others in tichels; one in a hat and one in a turban. There is every 
shade of skin colour imaginable in the room. 
The trio take the stage to enthusiastic applause, and play tune after tune for the audience’s 
enjoyment. Later in the evening, Lizzi’s choir joins them on the stage: single girls and 
married women, sheitels and tichels, black and white and brown skin. Outside, the streets 
have slowly been emptying; it is time for their final song. 
The hall is silent. 
Serling gently strums an arpeggio chord. 
‘Now please don’t you feel silenced,’ she sings, her voice floating on the air. 
The women gaze at her. Liora and Miriam hold their bows, waiting to play. 
‘Like you should be ashamed,’ Lizzi continues. She has everyone’s attention, now, and 
they are hanging on every word. ‘Of feeling something strongly…’ she pauses. ‘Or a feeling 
that can’t be named!’ She finishes the line lightly, high. 
‘’Cause we puuuuuuuuuuuut,’ she sings, opening up on the vowel, letting the sound soar, 
‘ourselves in boxes, but it’s we who hold the key.’ She is completely inside the emotion of 
the song, now, and the audience is feeling it with her. She has them, she has created 
communitas. 
‘Let the words come pouring out of you, do you dare to be free?’ 




critique, via the arts, in order to shape it and form a more perfect vision for the future. It 
critiques the downfalls of Haredi society while celebrating Haredi ethics and values, and 
imagining a future society that embraces certain secular ideologies insofar as they strengthen 
Haredi life. 
 
Use Your Voice 
Lizzi Serling 
 
Now please don't you feel silenced, like you should be ashamed 
Of feeling something strongly or a feeling that can't be named. 
'Cause we put ourselves in boxes, but it's we who hold the key. 
Let the words come pouring out of you, do you dare to be free? 
 
We hide our inner thoughts sometimes for fear that we're alone 
Or maybe you have tried to speak but then the words were gone 
But I'm begging you, whether it be a tefilla or a cry, 
Speak out your fears and hopes, sister, open up and try 
 
To the girl who heard the rocket siren, use your voice, use your voice 
To the widow who's so tired of crying, use your voice 
To the woman who has felt the pain of birth, and to those who'll never know 
Use your voice, oh use your voice, use your voice 
 
To the girl who was her sister's mother, use your voice, use your voice 
To the ones who learned to love each other, use your voice 
To the ones who used to sing but lost themselves so very long ago 
Use your voice, oh use your voice, use your voice 
 
Now I've had my own journey, you too I have no doubt 
And my only hope in singing is to bring some simcha out 
'Cause we all are moving mountains with our fears and dreams and joys 
We may not have lived each others' lives, but we can share one voice 
So whatever you are feeling now be it gratitude to G-d 
A hope for the future or a pain that's deep and raw 
We've all felt those things in our own way, you are not alone 
So even if it's just in song, make your feelings known 
 
To the girl who heard the rocket siren, use your voice, use your voice 
To the widow who's so tired of crying, use your voice 
To the woman who has felt the pain of birth and to those who'll never know 





Now sing it with me 
I am not alone 
I am not alone 
I am not alone (repeated)  
I'm not afraid to say I'm not okay, I am not alone 
 
To the girl who heard the rocket siren, use your voice, use your voice 
To the widow who's so tired of crying, use your voice 
To the woman who has felt the pain of birth and to those who'll never know 
Use your voice, oh use your voice, use your voice 
 
To the girl who was her sister's mother, use your voice, use your voice 
To the ones who learned to love each other, use your voice 
To the ones who used to sing but lost themselves so very long ago 
Use your voice, oh use your voice, use your voice 
 
Lizzi’s ‘Use Your Voice’ reflects the many themes of this chapter. She knits secular ideas 
into this song, while ultimately proffering a Haredi whole. ‘Now please don’t you feel 
silenced… We hide our inner thoughts sometimes for fear that we’re alone,’ mirrors the 
concerns which Lexie and Rachel are attempting to address in the dance school, especially 
the situation in which people feel they cannot openly speak about their struggles in the 
community. Like Esther in The Mask She Wears, Serling emphasises the shared experience of 
these struggles, and thus creates togetherness in the women’s only space: ‘To the woman who 
has felt the pain of birth and those who’ll never know… ’Cause we all are moving mountains 
with our dreams and fears and joys, We may not have lived each other’s lives, but we can 
share one voice… So whatever you are feeling now… a hope for the future or a pain that’s 
deep and raw, we’ve all felt those things in our own way, you are not alone….’ She echoes 
the criticiques of Yehudis, Chana, and the Playback artists and therapists when she mentions 
‘the girl who was her sister’s mother… to the ones who learned to love each other… to the 
ones who used to sing but lost themselves so very long ago….’ In addition to these critiques, 
Lizzi and the therapists also highlight how some circumstances have led women and girls to 
disconnect from their emotions, and they struggle to loosen these suppressions: ‘…like you 




put ourselves in boxes… Or maybe you have tried to speak but then the words were gone.’ 
While accepting that these unfortunate situations exist within her community, Lizzi also 
seeks to correct this, by creating the togetherness of this artistic women’s only space, in 
which ‘I am not alone,’ is repeated over and over as almost a ritualistic mantra. Women are 
not alone because they have shared this with each other; women are also not alone because 
God is always with them. Throughout the song, Lizzi shows her ethical piety, like Ruth: ‘But 
I’m begging you, whether it be a tefilla or a cry, speak out your fears and hopes, sister, open 
up and try… Now I’ve had my own journey, you too I have no doubt, and my only hope in 
singing is to bring some simcha out … So whatever you are feeling now be it gratitude to G-
d,’ all underscore Lizzi’s identity as a pious and ethical Haredi woman; furthermore, because 
they carry this message it allows her audience to listen to her music without concern for 
compromising their own piety. Once piety has been established, she can safely make the 
critiques mentioned above. Lizzi further creates a feeling of togetherness through the 
familiar: ‘To the woman who’s felt the pain of birth…;’ and, like the dance school, the shared 
trauma of living in Israel: ‘To the girl who heard the rocket siren… to the widow who’s so 
tired of crying.’ Ultimately, this allows Lizzi’s lyrics to take on the task of critique, and leads 
her to her goal of transforming women into people who are unafraid to ‘use their voice.’ The 
comparison between the title and refrain in the song, ‘Use Your Voice,’ and the kol isha 
prohibition is unavoidable. It seems to me to be an obvious point of critique— not necessarily 
of the prohibition itself, as Lizzi values it in its intention, but in the over-extension of it in 
women’s lives. ‘Now please don’t you feel silenced, like you should be ashamed…’ leads to 
Serling’s ultimate imperative: ‘… but it’s we who hold the key. Let the words come pouring 
out of you, do you dare to be free? … Use your voice, oh use your voice, use your voice.’20 
 
20 Lizzi also invests in a very Jewish idea of what it means to be ‘free’, and therefore further reveals her 




Like the others, Lizzi imagines a world in which Haredi ethical womanhood is maintained 
without harming women, and she uses her art, and the women’s only space of performance, 




In this chapter, we have seen that critique is very much a part of religious life in the 
Haredi world. The arts space fosters this, by allowing women to create togetherness in which 
they can be agents of change. Haredi women’s agency is pious; they inhabit pious forms of 
womanhood which invest in modesty, faith, and belief. Their agency is pious and therefore 
they can critique religious life, because they are not rejecting religion or Haredi ethics and 
values. Instead, their critiques are made in the effort of improving religious life for women 
and girls, so that they can ‘fix the problems,’ and create a better community for those who 
may otherwise wish to leave. In order to do this, they incorporate elements of secular 
knowledge and value systems into Haredi religious ethics. This is a knitting process in which 
women sometimes unpick and re-knit, as well as knitting afresh, the scarf of Haredi identity 
internally, and the scarf of Haredi society. They slip in yarn from the basket of secular values 
and knowledge, and use it to transform the scarf into a warmer and stronger fabric. Women 
use their agency to negotiate their Haredi ethics and values with secular knowledge and 




Chapter Six: Feminism 
The Haredi approach to a feminist movement is the consummate example of negotiating 
between religious ethics and secular values. Indeed, it is the natural extension of the types of 
agency discussed in the previous chapter. Haredi women have been exposed to the yarn of 
feminism; they select skeins from the basket which, in their view, strengthen and warm the 
Haredi scarf without making it no longer Haredi. They knit together religious ethics with 
secular feminist values. Mahmood cautions against misattributing ‘feminism’ to non-liberal 
religious women, for fear of creating a false concept of political consciousness (Mahmood 
2005, 8). I would like to make it abundantly clear that I do not falsely attribute feminism to 
these Haredi women, rather, it is a label which they take upon themselves. Women have 
begun to organise around more formal forms of activism in the last decade, and the ‘New 
Haredi Feminist Movement’, as the activists call their movement, has caught attention 
outside the Haredi world as it has gained momentum (Eglash 2017, Littman 2019, Kraft 
2020). Feminism implies a certain level of liberal normativity (Mahmood 2015, 10), and 
indeed, the Feminist Movement is representative of the acceptance of secular values; we have 
seen in past chapters that this is not unusual in the Haredi world. This chapter establishes that 
the prevalence of the acceptance of feminist attitudes is still low, but growing across all 
sectors of the Haredi community in Israel. This chapter also seeks to establish that it is 
possible and not contradictory to hold feminist values and a feminist identity while accepting, 
and indeed embracing, patriarchal religious hierarchy and authority. I will argue that Haredi 
feminism is straightforward, equal rights feminism which distinguishes between applying 
feminist ideology to secular aspects of Haredi life while preserving religious ethics which are 




life, Haredi feminism is a negotiation to absorb certain secular values which not 
compromising religious ethics. 
This chapter also seeks to compare the Haredi Feminist Movement with other Feminist 
and Women’s Movements, and differentiate what distinguishes this Feminist Movement from 
other activist movements. Of particular focus is the leadership of non-Ashkenazi women; 
nearly universally, they claim that their feminist activism would not have arisen had they not 
already felt discriminated against for their ethnicity. In that way, the movement represents 
intersectional interests of the dual strife of racism and women’s inequality; but that is the 
limit of the intersectionality of this movement. The women of the Haredi Feminist Movement 
almost self-consciously avoid talking about the other forms of oppression which women may 
face, and the movement does not seek to redress other forms of discrimination. Finally, this 
chapter seeks to document the two most significant Israeli Haredi Feminist organisations, 
Nivcharot and Ubizchutan. While these documentations are of value in their own right simply 
as documentations, they also demonstrate the two different approaches which Haredi 
Feminists take; these in turn are reflective of themes which will be explored in Chapter 
Seven. Ubizchutan is the Haredi Women’s Party founded by Ruth Colian, and she maintains 
purity of Haredi ethics, refusing to work with anyone or any organisation which is not 
Haredi, and insisting that Haredi values be applied to the country of Israel as a whole. 
Nivcharot, is an NGO that lobbies at the Knesset and conducts leadership programs for 
Haredi women. The women of Nivcharot cooperate with a wide range of organisations and 
leaders, both inside and outside the Haredi world. Ultimately, however, both groups share 
similar goals and agendas in their pursuit of equal rights for Haredi women. 
I would also like to take this opportunity to clarify that I understand that the term 
‘feminism’ itself carries a great deal of weighty intellectual baggage, but it is not my 




to understand it anthropologically; that is, how my interlocutors use and understand it, what 
purpose it serves them, and how it is part of the greater question of women’s role in the 
changes in Haredi society today.  
 
‘At Least Those Women Aren’t Having Any Children’ 
 
In the summer of 2013, I was a young and earnest researcher conducting fieldwork 
among the Hasidic communities of Jerusalem. It was a bit of a turbulent time— when is it 
not?— in the religious Jewish world of Jerusalem: Neshot haKotel, The Women of the Wall, 
were investing great vigor into their campaign to obtain a Torah scroll and use it at the 
Western Wall for women-only minyans [quorum necessary for prayer]. Their activities had 
elicited responses from the rabbinical leaders in the Haredi community, and school girls from 
Haredi schools had been sent to fill the women’s section at the Wall to capacity, effectively 
blocking Neshot haKotel from gaining access. 
I was sitting in the dining area of a house in the Karliner community of Givat Ze’ev one 
day with two women, one middle-aged and one already a grandmother many times. A 
newspaper lay on the table, and the front page story concerned Neshot haKotel. Seeing the 
headline, the middle-aged woman shook her head, and said, 
‘These poor, misled women.’ 
Her mother nodded. ‘They think they are doing right and they are so confused,’ she 
agreed. 
‘The older ones are to blame,’ said her daughter. ‘They are leading these beautiful young 
Jewish girls into their madness.’ 
‘What’s this?’ I ask. 




‘women’] I won’t even say it. They are so confused. If they just did what Hashem intended 
for them, they wouldn’t feel the need to make such a ruckus.’ 
Her mother nods. ‘It’s a balagan, complete craziness. They’re crazy women. I think 
they’re lesbians? Or something? Something unnatural.’  
She seems unsure, but she seems to think that they are somehow representing something 
outside the norm. 
Her daughter says to me, ‘If you haven’t heard of them, I don’t want to tell you too much 
about them. They are so unhealthy, so confused and twisted. It’s better for you if you don’t 
know, don’t think about that stuff.’ 
Her mother smiles. ‘Well, at least those women aren’t having any children!’ 
They laugh, and the conversation moves on. 
I did, in fact, know quite a bit about the Neshot haKotel at that time. I was simultaneously 
taking classes with one of the members, and she had invited me many times to join in the 
protests. This woman was not Haredi; she was a Modern Orthodox woman, with a degree in 
Talmud, and she lived in the Gush Etzion. Though I was tempted to join these ladies, I 
declined due to fears of my picture being snapped by a newspaper. Such a picture would 
completely destroy my ability to conduct research in places like the Karlin-Stolin community. 
Feminist Orthodoxy had a long history in the Modern Orthodox and National Religious 
world by the time I was beginning my research project in 2013. Blu Greenberg’s prediction 
that traditional Judaism would be unable to avoid the feminist encounter (Greenberg 1981, 
ix-xi) was proven to be the case; however, this was strongly resisted, like other secular 
movements, by the Haredi world. Like Greenberg, who founded the Jewish Orthodox 
Feminist Alliance, Modern Orthodox feminism has attempted to apply, to a certain extent, 
feminist theory to the practice of Judaism; movements like Neshot haKotel and the founding 




smicha. Even these things were not initially within the imagination of Greenberg, who 
suggested in her 1981 Preface: ‘What position can we as committed Jews take toward 
feminism? What can we integrate, what must we reject? Where must we separate ourselves 
from mainstream feminism, and what are the pressure points in our tradition that, because we 
are women, we must locate? How and where ought the pressure to be applied so that tradition 
will neither discriminate nor close off certain parts to us? How can we become more 
responsible, fully equal members of a holy community? What claims do women have on 
tradition and Halakhah [sic] as the Jewish people move through the fourth millenium of their 
existence?’ (Ibid., ix-x).  
Indeed, Greenberg’s early words may be more aptly applied to the current Haredi 
Feminist Movement; she promotes the process of integration and rejection of feminist 
ideology, and this is the approach which has been adopted by the women with whom I 
conducted research. While perspectives like those of the Karliner women endure, there is a 
widening acceptance of feminism and feminist ideology among women in the Haredi 
mainstream, as well as a proliferation of feminists in the New Middle Class. For my 
purposes, it is not relevant to situate these women’s feminisms within the greater scholarship 
of feminist theory; rather, I seek to understand how they adopt feminist ideology within 
certain spheres of their life, and reject it in other areas, in order to create new ontologies. 
Their attitudes toward and relationship to feminist ideology is at the heart of my analysis. The 
feminism, even of the most radical, is tempered by a respect for and circumvention of 
halacha; women have adopted feminism around economic parity and bodily autonomy, but 
do not seek to expand women’s roles and rights within the religious sphere. For the women 
who were my interlocutors, the religion remains unassailable, while feminist values are 
applied to secular aspects of life. This has meant that women use their religious knowledge, 




which Da’as Torah and religious authority can be applied, such as in the case of the removal 
of images of women and girls. Yet women do not tend to seek to overthrow the patriarchal 
structure of their homes or communities, and accept their husbands’ authority, purely by 
virtue of his wealth of knowledge and learning. 
 
The Patriarchy is OK by Me 
 
Male rabbinical authority is a fact of Haredi life; even in the women-only space of 
performing arts, we see the primacy of the rabbis. 
‘It was such a huge thing when the Rav gave me this chug,’ Rachel Factor told me. She is 
referring to the rabbi who is the head of the Beis Yaakov where she holds dance classes. ‘It 
was like I was in. With this rav, at this school, like, everyone knew I was ok.’ 
In Playback Theatre, the mention of ‘ravs’ and the fact that they supervise the Playback 
troupe holds gravitas for audiences: at seminaries, the girls grow more serious and sit up a 
little straighter, and in more mature audiences, nods of encouragement greet these 
announcements. The Mask She Wears script was supervised by a multitude of rabbis, who 
read the script as Esther Goldman developed it, some of whom are listed on the posters, DVD 
case, and in the playbill. ‘I am deeply grateful to the rabbanim and rebbetzins, including R’ 
Yitchak Breitowitz, R’ Zev Leff, and R’ Dovid Orlofsky, who took time out of their busy 
schedules to review the script and provide hadracha [rabbinic rulings or allowances, plural of 
heter] on the suitability and accuracy of the situations portrayed in it. I owe a tremendous 
hakaras hatov [‘recognising the good’] to Rebbetzin Rena Tarshish for providing guidance 
and encouragement from the genesis of the initial idea through the final product,’ Esther’s 
Director’s Note reads in the playbill.  




society through Shani’s story. In one of the scenes in which Shani’s difficulties at home are 
revealed, Shani is trying to wake her husband, Avi, so that he will be able to ‘make the last 
shacharis [morning prayer] in the shtiebel [a small room used for prayer].’ (Goldman 2016, 
scene 6)  Avi, whose voice we hear from an off-stage recording, shouts at Shani. She 
approaches the bedroom door again, and says, 
‘Seder [a period of learning at yeshiva] already started, Avi.’ 
Avi: ‘Who died and made you my mashgiach [kosher supervisor]?!?’ 
Shani: ‘Chas v’shalom!’ 
Avi: ‘Then stop acting like one!’ 
Shani dithers, and then tells Avi that the cleaning lady is coming, and he can’t be alone 
with her. 
Avi: ‘I’m in bed! Just tell her not to come in here!’ 
Shani’s Thought Shadow: ‘Um… yichud [literally ‘seclusion,’ refers to the halacha 
prohibiting an unmarried man and woman from being alone together, lest they commit 
adultery]?’ 
Shani: ‘What about yichud?’ 
Avi: ‘According to the [unclear], it’s ok as long as you’re in the city, you’ll be shomer ani 
[the keeper of me]. [Unintelligible Hebrew]. And she should leave the door open! . . . It’s 
fine.’ 
Shani’s Thought Shadow: ‘Um, I never heard of a heter [rabbinic allowance] like that 
before.’ 
But Shani does not question Avi on this claim and changes the topic. (Ibid.)  
In this exchange, we see the dysfunction of Shani’s marriage and the difficult position in 
which she finds herself as a result of patriarchal authority within Haredi society. Shani, as a 




Haredi value system; however, because the husband is the authority on religious matters in a 
Haredi home, she cannot debate with Avi beyond a certain point on religious matters in the 
household. Her interpretation is the one that conforms to Haredi ethics, but she is subject to 
the authority of her husband, despite his current failure to behave according to Haredi ethical 
personhood. Shani’s agency is limited in matters of religious knowledge, and though she is in 
fact the pious one in this exchange, in order to remain pious by obeying her husband, she 
must allow her house to become a space where Haredi values are not upheld. In this way, 
Shani’s story becomes a critique of the structures of patriarchy within Haredi society, which 
limit Shani’s agency to maintain a pious home, which is integral to her formation of Haredi 
ethical womanhood. 
While this is so, I feel it is unlikely that Esther wrote this scene with the purpose of 
critiquing the patriarchal systems; rather, she was more likely trying to illustrate how far Avi 
had fallen. Esther is not necessarily among the women who would call themselves Haredi 
Feminists; her goals in her creative process is to help women empathise with each other, 
develop women’s thoughtfulness and sensitivity, and help women realise that many others 
share their struggles. 
And yet, of those women who do proudly bear the label of ‘Feminist,’ many of them are 
quite comfortable with the maintenance of male religious authority, both in the home and in 
the greater social sphere. Indeed, it is not unusual for non-liberal religious women to take 
critical stances in certain areas of their lives while investing in the religious status quo 
simultaneously (Rinaldo 2014, 828 & 843). 
‘Men are in charge,’ says Tovah, frowning. ‘In the house, in my house, that is completely 
ok. I don’t know, it’s a challenge as feminist. I’m ok with it at home because my husband 
knows more. He learns, and so he knows more about the halacha and stuff. I don’t know, it’s 




community. I know it’s a sort of contradiction, but I’m ok with it at home. I’m ok with living 
with the contradictions.’ 
Tovah tells me that the recent #metoo movement had a real effect on her— this 
conversation occurred in the autumn of 2018. 
‘How do I rationalise the Me Too Movement as a Haredi woman?’ she says. ‘How do you 
have a voice? Is it appropriate?’ 
Despite the general resistance to technology within the Haredi world, there were definite 
reverberations of #metoo felt around the Haredi world.  
‘Frum women grow up sheltered, but women who are modern enough have heard about 
it,’ she says. ‘I don’t like how the religious community can sometimes hide behind their 
religiousness. Frum women have taken some of the #metoo stuff on, too.’ 
She says she remembers growing up, the men around her made sexist jokes on a regular 
basis, but it never occurred to her not to accept it. She says she’s pleased that by growing up 
in the Haredi community in Jerusalem, her daughters have never experienced harassment. In 
this way, she reframes Haredi society as better for women, while straightforward in its 
patriarchy. 
‘But now, frum women are coming forward, and there are more horror stories coming out 
about how women are not being properly serviced by the rav and the community,’ she says. 
‘Feminism is still a bad word in the Haredi world, but there’s beginning to be a division even 
on that. People are starting to say, “Let’s suss out the definition.”’ 
Tovah thinks of herself as a feminist; while she espouses feminist beliefs, she does not 
participate in any of the activist organisations connected to feminism, like Nivcharot or 
Chochmat Nashim. She is one of the many quiet, at-home Haredi feminists. 
‘I’m a closet Haredi feminist,’ Batsheva tells me with a grin while we sit on her living 




the first place.’ 
Batsheva and Tovah share similar concerns: they worry about women’s health, the lack of 
services within the community to support women, the erasure of images of women, and the 
wage disparity for women in the community, which effectively holds families in poverty, 
because women remain the chief earners. 
Some Haredi feminists become independent activists, taking action because they feel they 
have no other choice, whether or not they are part of activist organisations. Such is the case 
for Kerry Bar-Cohn, founder of the Kol Isha Facebook group. She lives in Ramat Beit 
Shemesh, which has been the site of some of the most well-known controversies surrounding 
the removal of images of women, and the self-policing of strict modesty standards.  
‘Yes,’ she says to me vehemently, ‘I am a feminist!’ 
She tells me about the moment she chose to act upon her feminist sentiments, when the 
situation in Beit Shemesh had finally reached a climax for her. Her home is less than a block 
away from the infamous billboard advertising construction of an old-age nursing home; the 
wall the length of the construction site was an advertisement for the future building. There 
was only one problem: the pictures only showed elderly men. 
‘I went out and I stuck pictures of the Golden Girls on the ad,’ she tells me with a grin. 
‘Then I  made a sign, with Gal Gadot, in her Wonder woman costume and cape,’ she 
says. ‘It said “Have a WONDERful Shabbat” at the bottom!’ 
She also created posters that were slightly more on the nose, and read: ‘Not Showing 
Women’s Faces Hurts Them Economically and Pushes Them Into Poverty.’ 
‘I believe women need an equal stake in society,’ Kerry tells me. ‘There should be 
equality in pay, and in other things.’ 
When I ask her how her feminism matches with her religious identity, she says, ‘Borders 




women. It’s just about empowering women.’ 
Kerry understands how the goals of feminism and the values of religious life can fit 
together, and work in concert to create a type of Haredi life that is safer and more secure for 
women. She sees a Haredi future that is feminist and yet still Haredi. This is evident in her 
activism; none of what she does contravenes Haredi ethics. She wishes people a wonderful 
shabbat, and uses humour and posters to make a point. Posters are one of the most universal 
forms of communication in the Haredi world; in every Haredi area in Israel, the streets are 
plastered with posters advertising special services, a yahrzeit, public education, or 
community information. Kerry’s posters join the rest, with a woman-centric message and 
image. She integrates secular culture and knowledge with Haredi values, showing Gadot and 
the Golden Girls in images that generally conform to Haredi standards of modest dress, but 
refuses to remove women from the visual culture of Haredi life. 
Not all women can envision such a future. One woman, whom I will keep entirely 
anonymous, put her head in her hands one night as we talked in her Beit Shemesh kitchen. 
We had been discussing the friction in Beit Shemesh, and how she felt about living in a 
community where people have become so aggressive about modesty standards.  
‘I don’t know!’ she said into her hands, her voice almost a sob. ‘I don’t even want to be 
Haredi anymore!’ 
Her head came up sharply. She appeared shocked at her own words.  
‘No, hang on, I don’t mean that,’ she said to me, holding her hand out in a ‘stop’ signal. 
‘No, maybe I do. I don’t know. It’s just so hard.’ 
It is not surprising that many women also continue to actively reject the title of ‘feminist’ 
within the Haredi community.  
Batya, who is frum from birth and living in Modi’in Illit, told me, ‘I wouldn’t use the 




to have worth. But I am a true feminist. I’m all about celebrating womanhood. I celebrate my 
womanhood by walking down the street, and saying, “This is my body.” I watch these videos 
on LinkedIn, with women who are all made-up and wearing low-cut shirts, and I think, 
“What are you valuing?” It’s such an ironic outcome of feminism. Women treat themselves 
in a very trashy way.’ 
I ask her if she has heard of Ruth Colian, and the Haredi women’s party which Ruth 
started, called Ubizchutan, which loosely translates to, ‘and to the merit of women.’ 
‘Ugh, no, but I’m already turned off to it,’ she says. ‘Just that name: ubizchutan! Like, 
what’s the point? It feels denigrating. It feels like women who feel their worth is by doing 
what men do. I’m a woman. I’m way past that.’ 
Batya’s reaction is far more typical of the majority of Haredi women with whom I spoke. 
A distaste for the label remains, yet women have a fairly sophisticated pro-woman ideology, 
which is reminiscent of Second Wave Feminism, as Kaufman suggested in her work on 
ba’alos teshuvah (1993, 145). There is not a feeling of anti-feminism so much as a distaste 
for the perception of what feminism represents to the Haredi community. It is perceived as 
anti-man, or as wanting a woman to become a man, like Batya suggests. As more women 
become more comfortable taking on the identity and ideology of feminism within Haredi 
society, these perceptions are slowly changing, and this will allow less taboo to be associated 
with the idea of being an Haredi feminist in the future. The yarn of feminism is gently 
wending its way into the greater scarf of Haredi society, and it is not being cut out so 
vigorously as it may have been in the past. Rather, some traces are being left behind, and 





The Advent of Haredi Feminism 
 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the denouement of increasing stringency 
was coming to fruition. Women had high levels of secular education, while men had the 
lowest levels of secular education since the Second World War. The focus on yeshiva study 
had created a strange form of role reversal, in which men had taken on large portions of 
domestic duties while women worked outside the home, but were still expected to be 
authoritative heads of their households. 
‘The whole issue of Haredi feminism is obviously a result of— You sent us like to study 
in academia, to study and to work, and the men stayed at home,’ says Michal. ‘That also 
changed the role division at home. Like you know, you walk around Bnei Brak and El’ad and 
see the yeshiva students. Who takes the kids to school in the morning? It’s the husbands. [A 
rabbi] says, “What have we come to, yeshiva students cooking for Shabbat?” It obviously 
mixed everything up.’ 
Michal had wanted to be a veterinarian while she was in high school; after 
discouragement from her school counsellor, she ultimately was one of the first Haredi women 
to pursue a certificate in computer science, which is now an extremely popular choice for 
women. Michal works outside the home in the secular world; work outside the community 
tends to present opportunities which open the door to women’s involvement in leadership or 
activism. Some people have simply come to activism naturally. Esti Shushan’s activism 
began before she even left working in the Haredi world. One of her first jobs was writing for 
Mishpacha [Family] Magazine, one of the most widely circulated Haredi publications. 
‘My mother always told me that I have chutzpah,’ Esti says. ‘I wanted to write in the 
politics section. It’s not the women’s paper.’ Mishpacha has separate sections for women, 
men, and children; generally, women and men write for women, whereas only men write for 




your children, and about how to decorate the table, and all of that stuff, and this sort of stuff 
never interested me. So, I wanted to write in the men’s place, and I have the skills to do that, 
and the editor knew that before I started. But he said, if you want to be taken seriously, you 
have to hide the fact that you are a woman. It was like an issue that we discussed, and we 
decided what name under which I will write. So, he decided to hide my first name, and all the 
time I wrote there, it was under [Aleph] Shushan, like my initial. With the aleph, they don’t 
know if it’s Avraham or Esther. I wrote for Mishpacha for about two years, and that was 
enough for me. Not because of the fact that I had to hide my gender identity, that was not the 
thing. The thing is, the Haredi media is like, they are a part of the establishment, and they 
serve the Haredi establishment, and you have to work like a pen for hire. You cannot write 
what you want to write. And I always had issues that I deeply cared about and that I wanted 
to write about, I want to criticise— when I am a publicist, I have issues that I want to talk 
about, and in this place [Mishpacha Magazine] a lot of the issues that I wrote, they didn’t 
want to publish them. Because it is like criticism of the system. I knew the borders 
[boundaries], and I felt like I could not live with it. It’s like tzviut, tzvuah. Hypocrisy.’ 
Esti left and started working in an advertising agency, outside of the Haredi community. 
This begs the question, what comes first? Dissatisfaction with the Haredi establishment, or 
working outside the community? Do the Haredi women who work outside the community do 
so for a reason, even unvoiced? Or do they begin to work outside the Haredi community, and 
then come across secular ideologies which engender discontent? It is likely a mixture of 
many of these influences. 
Esti’s nonconformist attitudes extended into her personal life choices as well. ‘At about 
twenty-six I had my third, no, fourth child. And then I understood I had to stop. To relax. 
Because all the time I always asked the rabbi to give me, like, permission to stop to give 




told my husband that we are not going to ask anybody about our decision, and now, we’re 
going to stop.’ 
While Esti’s decision to stop having children is clearly brave, and part of her ‘chutzpah’, 
her gutsiness, the method she chose is not unusual. Rather than ask the rabbi, only to be told 
no, Esti chooses instead not to ask. Kasstan’s discussion of vaccination decision-making in 
the Haredi community of Manchester, England, discussed this same technique: if someone 
knows the rabbi’s answer will not be the answer they want, then they simply do not ask the 
rabbi for an opinion (Kasstan 2019, chap. 2, ePub). Esti’s description of her approach, ‘I told 
my husband’, also reveals the inner workings of household authority, which is similar to 
other patriarchal religious communities (Abu-Lughod 1993, Mahmood 2005), in which, 
despite patriarchal authority, husbands will yield to their wives’ most adamant convictions.  
These acts of resistance and non-conformist choices existed within the Haredi world as 
stringencies grew; as discussed in the previous chapter, they are a fundamental part of the 
making of Haredi society. Until around 2010, Haredim who questioned Haredi authority, or 
disagreed with the status quo, did so in isolation, often assuming they were the only people 
who felt that way. The yarns of secularism which women had wound into the scarves of their 
identities inevitably led to the introduction of feminist skeins before long. But it was only 
when women encountered other women who had accepted and created similar changes that 
this became a force within Haredi society. Togetherness, the community of other women, 
was what shifted these changes from the individual to the social. 
‘Before the internet came, if you had a problem with something, you might think that you 
are crazy,’ Esti tells me. ‘Something is wrong with you, because nobody talks about it. After 
the internet came, the thing that happened was — I think a significant thing that happened 
was there were a lot of [online] forums, Haredi forums— this was a significant step for the 




Esti’s description hearkens to the critiques in Chapter Five, the words of the dance 
teachers and of Esther. There continues to be an over-arching sense that problems are hidden 
in the Haredi community; there is emphasis on maintaining appearances, and preserving 
reputations, both of individuals and the community, above all else. The subtle critiques and 
agency in everyday life begin to break these barriers down, as discussed in the last chapter, in 
order to improve the community. Members of the New Haredi Middle Class, the New Haredi 
Feminists, and other leaders have more recently turned to activism to address these issues and 
pursue change. Those who have the opportunities and education to gain perspective on their 
community, those with ‘one foot in and one foot out,’ like Michal said, have turned to secular 
models of change-making in order to help the Haredi community. 
‘But you have to understand that women are still – I work, but think that – not most 
[women work], because most of the Haredi women are in a terrible condition,’ Michal tells 
me from her vantage point as insider and outsider. ‘They’re paid low wages, their horizon is 
non-existent, and they have ten children and poverty and everything. But there are still the 
10% who can already be CEOs of companies…, but then— I can’t be in politics? And it’s 
also in the religious sphere— I can’t be in the synagogue? It just becomes stupid. It becomes 
abnormal, the discrepancy.’ 
Michal suggests that the minority of women who have secular education and economic 
opportunity are naturally seeking more meaningful forms of leadership within the Haredi 
world. They have the perspective to be able to question the edicts of the rabbis and the 
prohibitions of the establishment. Furthermore, they are acutely aware of the situation which 
the majority of Haredi women face: poverty, many children, and no representatives to 
advocate for them. Therefore, Haredi women with opportunity and advantage have naturally 
sought to become advocates and leaders for women’s rights in the Haredi world. It is a 




It is also an intersectional choice, which is driven by multiple aspects of women’s identities, 
as is evidenced by the high percentage of Sephardi women who are activists and identify as 
Haredi Feminists. 
‘As the “other,” that’s one more reason for my politicism,’ Esti says. ‘As a Mizrahi girl, I 
always see around me the racism. That’s something that I understand from a very young age. 
I understand that there are two classes, and I am not in the right class. That’s something that I 
understand very, very well. Since I was very young. And all of those kinds of things, it’s not 
something you can… discuss.’ 
Esti ultimately founded the organisation Nivcharot, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Ruth Colian similarly feels that her Sephardi identity is entwined with her women’s 
rights activism. 
‘When I went there [to the Beis Yaakov] to take the [book] list, I saw a Sephardi mom 
with her two daughters,’ Ruth tells me, concluding her story of her fight to get her daughter 
access to the Ashkenazi school, as described in multiple previous chapters. ‘She and her girls 
were Haredi, they had huge modesty. And this mom was crying to the principal, and saying, 
“You don’t have shame! You send them to [the state run national religious school]! No one 
religious goes to school there!” She left, and I went in. And I said, “How can the Shechinah 
[the female in-dwelling of God] be here if this school is built on the tears of mothers?”  
‘I spoke to my friend, and she said, “Ruth, listen. This is the best school for your 
daughter. She can go to the best high school after it. You just leave her there, that’s it.”  
‘I said, “Ok,” but I promised to myself that I would not forget this mom. And I promised 
myself, then, that some way, somehow, in the future when I’m in a position where I have the 
opportunity to fight for the Sephardi moms, I will do it.’ 
Ruth gradually took on more advocacy roles within the Sephardi Haredi community, 




led her to found Ubizchutan. 
The question remains why Esti and Ruth turned to feminist activism, as opposed to anti-
racist activism. Lavie suggests that Mizrahi women’s agency is almost impossibly curtailed 
by the necessity of proving their Jewishness, as opposed to their Arabness, and the Zionist 
demands on their identity structure (Lavie 2018). Mizrahi women are compelled to 
continuously prove their Zionist loyalty (Ibid., 24), thus rendering them incapable of 
critiquing the government bureaucracy (Ibid., 26-27). They are too busy proving themselves 
to be worthy of citizenship by supporting the saviour narrative of the State to be able to 
separately criticise the State’s oppression. In the Haredi context, the Zionist narrative is de-
emphasised, but the status of non-Ashkenazim is even more precarious within the 
community. The prejudice and discrimination are even more blatant in the Haredi world, and 
are often openly condoned by Ashkenazi leaders. Therefore, perhaps it is safer to approach 
inequality through feminist activism, where there are Ashkenazi allies like Michal. Perhaps, 
too, this is a way of stressing integration and participation, as opposed to stressing difference 
(Mizrachi et al. 2012, 438). The Haredi Feminist Movement is not intersectional21; it does not 
attempt to seek redress for inequalities women face as a result of other parts of their identity 
which are not gender. Rather, by seeking equal-rights feminist change for all Haredi women, 
the feminists are implicitly making change for non-Ashkenazi women, as they are perhaps 
disproportionately affected by the problems facing women in Haredi society. 
Ultimately, the seeds of the Haredi Feminist Movement were sewn through the natural 
processes of a community which increasingly relied on women’s education for survival, 
while simultaneously restricting the choices and opportunities for women. Like other feminist 
movements, the Haredi feminist movement cannot be understood in isolation from race, 
 
21 Goodman et al. 2020 define intersectionality as ‘the process by which various socially and culturally 
constructed categories of discrimination interact on multiple levels to maintain systemic, almost caste-like social 




ethnicity, and class. It is, however, not a movement which seeks to destroy Haredi society, 
but rather looks to negotiate Haredi society in ways that support women, and balances secular 




In the years since her fight to have her daughter admitted to Beis Yaakov, Ruth’s activism 
had increased. She had also studied law at one of the Haredi campuses; she is now 
completing her internship at the Federal courts in Tel Aviv. As she grew in confidence, Ruth 
found herself advocating on behalf of women in her community more and more frequently. 
‘[When I was fighting to get my daughter in the school] this was the first time I realised 
that Shas was not serving me,’ Ruth says. ‘They’re not helping me, and they actually don’t 
care about me.  
‘The second time was when there was a woman involved in a car accident, and some 
people died, unfortunately. But she was pregnant, and she had babies who were nine or ten 
years old. And the court said that she needed to go to jail. And she appealed to the mechozi 
[regional] court and to the Supreme Court and she was rejected. And I saw her in the media 
and in Channel Ten. And I called her lawyer asking if she needs help because she intended to 
go to jail with her baby, [and bring her children to jail]. So I told her I could help, and I went 
with her and her husband to the Knesset. … It made me understand that the most significant 
decisions in Israel [are made] in the Knesset. That was one conclusion from this trip.’ 
Ruth became a natural leader within the Sephardi Haredi community. Her advocacy on 
behalf of other women ultimately put her in a role of mediator between the Haredi world and 
the secular state. When her work brought her to the Knesset, and she saw the machine of the 




within the state. 
‘The other conclusion was— so the MKs can sign the document which goes to the 
president so he can pardon her. The first was an Arab MK, and then another Arab MK said he 
would, and then a non-religious MK, and then a woman— and only Shas was not [saying 
they would sign], and we could not see them. So, I vote every election for Shas, and I want to 
see them, my party, too, in this shlichut [commission].’ 
Ruth organised a petition for a pardon on behalf of the woman. This petition was then 
sent to the President, who would hopefully grant the pardon. Ruth was outraged that while 
she voted for Shas, the Shas Member of Knesset (MK) chose not sign the document of 
support for the Sephardi Haredi woman’s pardon. She voted for Shas because Shas is 
supposed to represent the interests of the religious Sephardim, and she became frustrated that 
they were not doing so.  
‘And then I went to Eli Yishai’s office— he was the head of Shas at that time,’ Ruth 
continues. ‘And so I went into his office, and I saw him. He was sitting next to the table, and 
there were three men standing close to him. I went up to him and said hello, and I said, 
“Look, I am a Haredi woman. I am helping a woman, she is Haredi, she is really not in a 
good situation….” and I started to explain. And suddenly all three men who were standing 
there next to him said, “How can you speak without waiting in the line? You don’t see that 
there is a line? How do you dare to speak? Why are you pushing?”’  
Ruth said, ‘“You said hello to me, and you welcomed me, and you were quiet, all three of 
you.”  
‘So I said, “OK, I’m sorry.” … I left, and once I was outside, I was like, “Whoa, what’s 
happened? How can you have humility before God if people have to stand in line to talk to 
you?” He could see me… [and he] knows that I am voting for [Shas],…  and you just sit 




say, OK, calm down, maybe she made a mistake? How can he have humility in front of God 
if he doesn’t get up and stop them from shaming me? And he was the guy I was voting for 
every election. 
‘This, together with what I had been through with my daughter, I came to the conclusion 
that, OK, Haredi women don’t have anybody, don’t have any official to go to when they need 
help. And the rumour had wings [Israeli expression, meaning the rumour spread], that I had 
successfully registered my daughter [for the Beis Yaakov]. Another woman, and another, 
came to me and asked me to help them. And I realised that there was [no one to whom Haredi 
women could address their concerns], and no one to be for them.’ 
Ruth was outraged by the way in which she was disrespected by the Eli Yishai, the man 
who was the head of the Shas party at that time. Like the Minister for Education before, he 
treated Ruth with the same destain and outrage, and transformed her forthrightness into an 
inappropriate brazenness. However, Eli Yishai is a Sephardi man, who is supposed to 
represent the interests of Sephardi women and men in the Haredi world. Ruth felt it was 
indicative of a general lack of respect within Shas, both for the struggles of Sephardi 
Haredim, and for women. She decided to take a more active role in representing the interests 
of Haredi women within the greater secular machine of the state, which she was coming to 
recognise for its power. 
‘And then [first] I decided to run for the city council election,’ Ruth explains. ‘And then 
the representative of Shas said, “Why are you running? You maybe won’t succeed. And if 
you’re not going to succeed, then you’re taking votes from other parties” — and he means 
from Shas.  
‘So I said to him, “Ok, no problem, let me run with you.”  
‘He said, “No, it’s against halacha.”  




‘So he says, “Ok, let’s go see Rav Bar Dani,” because Rav Bar Dani is in the rabbinical 
council of Shas.’ 
However, Shas continuously delayed the meeting, first asking her to wait a week, and 
then two, and then telling her to wait until after the holidays, which meant waiting nearly a 
month. Eventually, she realised she was running out of time to enter the election. She 
attempted to collect signatures for a petition to the municipal election committee, but they 
ultimately denied her request. 
‘I just stood and cried in the street, I just felt so cheated, like they cheated me! …I told 
[my friend], “I really feel like I could make a change!”’ 
Ruth ultimately chose to bring a lawsuit against Shas for discrimination against women. It 
was her attorney who suggested that she make her own party. When the supreme court 
initially ruled against her, she decided it was time to create a new political party. 
‘When I was rejected by the court, I decided that if I could not use the legal system, I 
would try the political system,’ Ruth says. 
‘I sat on my bed, and I begged “Oh, God, tell me what to do? What to do?”’ Ruth tells 
me. ‘And I thought, maybe one day, Sheryl Sandberg will read [about me] and it’s very 
important that she knows that I understand what I have to do. Because I [received] threats 
against making my Haredi women’s party.’ Ruth was scared, she says. 
‘And on the other [hand], it has to be done!’ she continues with vehemence. ‘There is no 
other option. And there was nobody who could do it for many years. And I was at a tzomet 
[crossroads]. And then I remembered the sentence that I read in Lean In, she says think of 
what is the most frightening thing that you are afraid to do, and go out and do it! And this 
made me feel like I could do it.’ 
Ruth says that reading Sheryl Sandberg’s Lean In was one of the biggest influences in her 




so) memoir, and gradually takes on more and more of a secular approach to resistance within 
the Haredi world. She becomes an activist; then she becomes a law student, and has now just 
become a lawyer; and finally she becomes a politician. She is Haredi, but she is secularised in 
her activism. 
‘So I did it, I made Ubizchutan,’ Ruth says with a grin, ‘but I didn’t have a budget. And 
you need 45,000 shekels to start a party, and I don’t have any shekels! So I started calling 
other political parties, seeing if I could [attach my ticket to theirs]. No one said yes, and there 
were parties that just hung up on me. I called thirteen or fourteen parties, and they all said no. 
And then the La’or party, the New Wave party, which is run by Dr. Yaakov Hisdai, … — it 
was my last option. … I begged him on the phone…. I told him he was my last chance. He 
said he had to ask his wife, and see what she thought. … [The next day he called me and 
said] that his wife liked the idea! And so we met, and I signed. I didn’t have money, a budget 
[for a campaign], for a press conference.’ 
Ruth’s next challenge was in getting publicity; she ultimately held a press conference 
through cooperation with the Zionists of America, but she was struggling to reach Haredi 
women. This is evident by how few women with whom I conducted research had ultimately 
heard of Ubizchutan. Under Israeli election law, she was permitted to advertise for free 
within the media; however, the two major Haredi newspapers in Israel refused to publish her 
advertisements. She petitioned the election regulator, a Supreme Court judge, for 
enforcement of her rights, but he rejected her claim, suggesting she instead file a civil suit. 
She brought a civil lawsuit first to the Shalom courts, the small courts in Israel, but they then 
sent her to the Mechozi courts. The regional court ultimately ruled in her favour, but it was a 
victory in name only. The ruling was handed down less than an hour before the beginning of 
shabbat, and the papers therefore could not print her advertisements in time. The election was 




appealed the decision to the Supreme court, and the decision was overturned. The right of the 
papers to reject her advertisement was upheld. 
Ruth’s party Ubizchutan ultimately received only a few thousand votes in the 2015 
election, and she did not receive a seat in the Kinesset. Though she has not run again since, 
she tells me that the party is not dead.  
‘I had to press pause because I’m in my court internship,’ she tells me. ‘I’m not allowed 
to show my political ideas while I work for the court. But when I’m done at the court, I am 
back to Ubizchutan.’ 
Ruth’s fight may not have had much success yet, but it is representative of the growing 
willingness of feminist activists within the Haredi world to use secular and state apparatuses 
to achieve their goals. In the simplest terms, someone needed to be first, and Ruth decided 
that she would be the first: the first to stand up to the male party leadership, the first to found 
a party, the first to try and run for a seat in the Knesset within the Haredi world. Ruth would 
not have been the first Haredi woman in the Knesset had she won; that honour lies with Tzvia 
Greenfeld, a Haredi woman who held a seat with the left-wing Meretz party in 2008. 
Greenfeld, however, has more in common with Michal Tchernovitsky, whose political views 
will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Ruth is the first Haredi woman to run for the Knesset on 
a ticket that reflects Haredi values and ethics. Loyalty and adherence to Haredi ethics is 




While Ruth was battling for the rights and representation of Haredi women in the 
Kinesset, Esti Shushan was undergoing a similar transformation along a parallel path. 




from being a Haredi mainstream good wife and woman, now into a feminist,’ Esti tells me. 
‘There are people who are saying that I’m a radical feminist. I want you to understand it, 
what happened. You have to understand the process that happened in the Haredi community.’ 
Esti and I are meeting in a café in Petach Tikvah. She tells me that she often works in this 
cafe; it is Kosher, but there are no other Haredim anywhere near. It is located in a mixed 
commercial and industrial area, and was somewhat challenging for me to find. I wonder if 
she chooses it for its anonymity; certainly, from what she tells me, anonymity is necessary for 
much of the work she does, if not for herself, then for others. 
‘It was a [chat room] named Hyde Park,’ Esti explains. She says it draws inspiration from 
Speakers’ Corner. ‘[In London] all the people come and shout their opinions. It’s like a 
virtual platform in Israel. There were a lot of forums about a lot of issues, but in this 
platform, the interesting thing was that everyone wrote under nicknames. It’s not like in 
Facebook where everybody sees you and knows your identity. It’s, like, anonymous. And 
after those anonymous nicknames, people wrote everything that was in their hearts.’ 
Internet use in general is discouraged within the Haredi community, but like all things 
verboten anywhere, the use of the internet is naturally widespread in the Haredi world. In 
2013 when I began research, nearly everyone had ‘Kosher phones’, which both had limited 
data capability, and also offered cheap plans for weekdays, with surcharges for use on the 
sabbath. I kept my Kosher phone for the duration of my various field trips; by the end of 
2018, it was woefully out of date. By then, everyone in the Haredi world had ‘Kosher 
Smartphones,’ which were smartphones that blocked certain types of social media and 
internet browsing. Everyone I met had their teenage daughter or son hack the phone, so they 
could use WhatsApp, Facebook, and YouTube. WhatsApp was the preferred mode of 




things that I should be watching or joining online, rather than vice-versa.22 
‘Everything that I wanted to write about, and that the media wouldn’t let me publish, 
everything!’ Esti exclaims, remembering her joy in discovering the forums of Hyde Park. 
‘Thousands of Haredi people, but you didn’t know who they were, we only knew their 
anonymous identities. Just yesterday I was talking about it, just to remember, while I was 
sitting with friends. And one of them told me, “You know I wrote in Hyde Park.” And I said, 
“What was your name in Hyde Park?” and she told me and I said, “Oh my god that was your 
name? I remember!” I remember the nicknames and now, I am just making the connections 
between the people and the nicknames. It was like a secret. You know the expression, 
‘outing’? Everybody respected that rule. Nobody knows who the people were that they were 
talking with.’ 
Throughout the story of the founding of her women’s rights organisation, Esti uses 
language of queerness: ‘outing,’ ‘in the closet,’ ‘coming out.’ Her language is suggestive of 
the level of taboo associated with feminist ideology in the Haredi community. Like being 
queer in much of the world, being a feminist is dangerous in the Haredi world; anyone who 
becomes public in their activism is risking their position in the community, and the 
reputations and future prospects of their husbands and children. 
‘So, for the Haredi people, I think it was a level of their development to the next step— to 
Facebook,’ Esti continues. ‘Because now, there are a lot of Haredi people on Facebook. Huge 
groups of women writing about everything. But it was not legal in those years. For some 
groups, it’s still not legal. But I think the horse is out of the barn.’ 
Esti uses the word ‘legal’ as if using social media is a criminal act within the Haredi 
world. In practice, as mentioned above, internet use and social media is widespread. 
However, it isn’t acceptable, and must be hidden still. When my iPhone fell out of my bag at 
 




dance rehearsal, the girls standing near me stared openly, in a mixture of shock and 
fascination. Their mothers, meanwhile, sent me friend requests on Facebook. 
‘Even six years ago, when I started my activities,’ Esti explained, ‘in Facebook there was 
no group of Haredi women. That was the situation before six years ago. What happened 
before six years? It was before the elections of 2013. It was the end of the year 2012. I had 
just started studying filmmaking, and in that year a lot of things changed in my life. I had 
friends, I knew them from the forums. We just texted with each other. At first we were afraid 
to say who I am, and I didn’t know— we just knew the nicknames. But after some years, we 
met. And we sat together for an evening, and we met in a coffee shop, and talked, and I told 
them, “You know, there is an election again” — because in Israel there are a lot of 
elections— “there is an election, and we are not part of this game.” You understand? You 
can’t talk about it, you are not part of anything, nothing!  
‘I told them that I wanted to change that, I wanted to do something, but I don’t know 
what. But that evening, I came home, and I sat down at my computer, and I thought to 
myself, “What do I want to do?” I have a lot of things, a lot that I want to give, a lot I want to 
get out there. And I opened a Facebook page, and I called it Lo Nivcharot, Lo Bocharot. No 
Representation, No Voting, or No Voice, No Vote.’ 
Within this modern, secular act, there are echoes of the American Revolution. The slogan 
of the Sons of Liberty was ‘No Taxation Without Representation,’ which represented their 
grievance against the Crown for being taxed, at high levels, without being represented in 
Parliament. It is no coincidence that Esti chose a similar phrase for the name of her 
organisation. America is the ultimate experiment in secularism; separation of religion and the 
state was first proffered by Thomas Jefferson in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 
1801 (Jefferson 1801); it has become more central to American law and interpretation of the 




the American Revolution suggests a similar movement for independence from the Haredi 
establishment for Haredi women.  
‘… After the elections, I published some columns, I had an interview— for the first time 
in my life, on the TV show, and I speak,’ Esti continues. ‘A lot of Haredi women— the first 
one was Michal— she just wrote me a message on Facebook, “Oh, I’m so excited to know 
that there is one more Haredi woman in the world that is interested in politics!” She was in 
the closet, she didn’t know. From this time, I knew Michal. …[M]e and Racheli [Ibenboim], 
we met in one of the TV interviews … to talk about the issue of Haredi women and 
representation, and from this point we became friends. And we understand that we want to do 
something. And after that we just established a forum in the real world for Haredi women. 
After the election, we just started to meet. [They] came, and sat in a circle, and talked about 
this issue of Haredi women and politics, how it can work and how it can happen. And not 
only that, all the issues regarding Haredi women. At first it was a very secret group, most of 
the women were afraid that somebody would know that they were meeting with other women 
and talking about politics. It’s things that they hide. We met in basements and secret locations 
in Bnei Brak and those kinds of places.’ 
The first of these meetings was described to me by Michal. It was a turning point for her; 
it was a moment that changed the course of her life. The first meeting has taken on a mythos 
of its own; though it wasn’t long ago, no one can decide for sure exactly when it happened, 
perhaps it was late in 2014, or maybe it was 2015. Esti says it was in a secret basement in 
Bnei Brak, Michal thinks it was in a café in Tel Aviv, somewhere with no Haredi people 
nearby. She describes the circle: everyone arrived, and they sat, and everyone was shy, and a 
little bit scared, and no one spoke at first. Esti, or perhaps it was Racheli, asked everyone to 





‘But it was more than that,’ Michal says. ‘Each woman, as they went around, shared her 
entire life story.’ 
They confessed their hopes and fears, their frustrations and dreams, their trauma and their 
inner most thoughts. ‘I was last,’ Michal says. ‘I was seated right next to Esti and they had 
gone around the circle the other way. And so when they came to me, after hearing all the 
other women, that is when I announced, “Ok!  I am going to run for the municipal election in 
El’ad!” Because I had heard all these other women say all the things I had been thinking, and 
I knew I was not alone.’ 
This declaration was not as sudden as it seems; Michal’s journey to this point will be 
explored further in Chapter Seven. It does, however, underscore the importance of the work 
of the artists as discussed in the previous chapter; the ability to openly communicate is 
fundamental to the creation of community. Not all of the women at this meeting became 
activists; yet the knowledge that they were not alone in their critiques, opinions, and struggles 
allows women agency and helps them resist as they so wish. 
A number of the women who came to these meetings did, in fact, become activists, and 
created Lo Nivcharot, Lo Bocharot, in which they ultimately brought their resistance to the 
public sphere. 
‘But, in time, we started to work in the Knesset,’ Esti explains. ‘It’s not like an official 
lobby, but we made a connection with the head of the committee for women’s rights in the 
Knesset. Her name was Aliza Lavie. She is not Haredi but she is religious. We had three 
discussions, regarding the health of Haredi women, regarding the education, and work. So, 
we understand that these three issues are very important in Haredi women’s life. For 
example, in the health discussions we gave a lot of data about diseases that Haredi women 
suffer from, like they are more at risk from breast cancer. Haredi women have no awareness 




discussions, we invited the Haredi MKs, male MKs, to come, and nobody showed up. From 
these discussions, we all understood that we really have a problem. Because the women who 
were leading this group didn’t agree with me. They said, “You can’t fight with them. It’s like 
a protest to say, ‘No Voice, No Vote,’ it’s something that can create a reaction against us,” 
but from these activities, they understood that we have to fight.’ 
The decision to take their grievances directly to the Knesset is another sign of the 
secularised way of thinking which the activists had adopted. Whereas Lexie and Rachel 
discuss the same problems within the Haredi community, their agency and forms of 
resistance exist within the Haredi ethical framework. Lo Nivcharot, Lo Bocharot instead used 
secular legal-political frameworks to create change. 
‘And in 2015 there was another election, and we were five women— it was me, Racheli, 
Esti Rieder, Michal, and Tali Farkash,’ Esti continues. ‘We were, like, in the media, a 
campaign, and there was a lot of reaction, a lot of bad comments. But we were like, out of the 
closet, because we were under our real names, our faces were in the media, everywhere. We 
were under the flag of, “Stop voting for those parties, they don’t give you a place! As 
women!”’ 
‘Coming out’ had serious repercussions for many of the women involved, which I discuss 
further below. After the women of Lo Nivcharot, Lo Bocharot were officially known in their 
communities, Esti took action to create a more official home for the movement, within the 
recognised legitimate structures of mainstream Israeli society. 
‘At the end of 2015, I established an amutah, it’s like an NGO,’ she explains. ‘It’s a non-
profit organisation. An official organisation. I understood that we needed money for our 
activities. I wanted to publish and disseminate materials. We needed money for this, and 
that’s the way you can do that. From 2016 until now, that’s what I’m doing, working in 




league? It’s a double meaning.’  
Nivcharot takes a two-pronged approach, working on projects both within the Haredi 
community, and through external channels, outside the community, using secular legal and 
political structures in Israel. This hybrid approach is not unusual for grassroots organisations 
(Dave 2012, Heywood 2018, Rinaldo 2014), especially grassroots organisations which seek 
to improve the status of women. However, the NGO-isation of women’s rights and queer 
activist movements has been harshly criticised both internally by activists, as well as by 
activist-scholars and scholars in general. Dave’s work with lesbian activists working 
alongside feminist activists in India suggests that the transformation of movements into 
legitimate NGOs limits these movements, because the organisations become answerable to 
outside funders who possess their own agendas (Dave 2012, 100). Within Israel, Lavie 
suggests that Achoti, the Mizrahi women’s movement, surrendered significant power and 
leverage by becoming an NGO because they became beholden to the leadership of the New 
Israel Fund (NIF) (Lavie 2018, 4-18). The NIF controls NGO’s relationship with the media, 
and the NIF is fundamentally a Zionist agency, according to Lavie (Ibid., 12-14). This 
exacerbated the identity crisis faced by Mizrahi activists, in which their ability to criticise the 
state is curtailed by the effort they must exert to perform and prove their Jewishness through 
Zionism (Ibid.). 
In the case of Nivcharot, however, there may be significant advantages to becoming an 
NGO and establishing more legitimacy for the Haredi Feminist movement. Whereas Dave’s 
and Lavie’s activists were both working to change the way the respective governments 
treated women, and to correct unjust laws (Dave 2012, Lavie 2018), the women of Nivcharot 
are attempting to shift attitudes and standards within a community. Working in concert with 
the state in this situation is both an act of rebellion, in that Haredi ethics resist state 




part aligned with the goals of the feminists. The state seeks to transform Haredim into proper 
Israeli citizens, and feminist ideology, inasmuch as it is secular, is one path to do so. But it is 
because of this alliance and agency as an NGO that Nivcharot may, in the long term, face 
more significant challenges in their task within the Haredi community. Wittingly or 
unwittingly, this relationship makes Nivcharot an agent of the Israeli secular state’s ‘saviour 
mission.’ As Abu-Lughod says, ‘[w]hen you save someone, you imply that you are saving 
her from something. You are also saving her to [sic] something’ (Abu-Lughod 2013, 46-47). 
In this case, the state seeks to save Haredi women from their perceived oppression, in order 
to transform them into better, meaning more secularised, Israeli citizens. It is inevitable that 
the Haredi establishment will see this state agency in the activism of Nivcharot. Nonetheless, 
the support offered by the state may make the associated risks worthwhile for Esti and her 
compatriots. 
‘The two main channels were are working are— one of them is out of the community, 
one of them is in the community. Within the community, we have made a lot of conferences, 
a lot of writing, raising awareness, with writing, with being in the media. And in the last two 
years, we’ve made HaNivcharet, it’s like ‘The League,’ [a newsletter]. I understand that if we 
want change, we have to train Haredi women in leadership. So that’s what our goal is to do. 
To train women, to take Haredi women, to make a process, to train them in mentor skills, and 
knowledge about how to be a leader, what does it mean, what do you need, to fight with 
them— to understand the real world, the politics world. That’s what we are doing. We have 
also lobbied in the Knesset, we are a Haredi Women’s Lobby at the Knesset, women from 
Nivcharot are a part of committees in the Knesset. They are giving position papers. They are 
speaking, and that’s their chance to understand the world of the Knesset. We have our digital 
stuff, for all the PR, all the writing, these things.’ 




‘within the community’ because the organisation is teaching other women, from within the 
Haredi community, how to do these things. She is focussed less on the presentations in the 
Knesset, which are nonetheless important, and more on the development of other Haredi 
women to be able to take these roles on. The focus of Nivcharot within the Haredi world is on 
leadership development.  
‘And in the outer channel [outside the community], the significant thing that we did was 
appeal to the supreme high court. We are not an official part of this appeal, but we joined and 
helped the petitioner with what to do. I’ll explain what the appeal was about. Agudat 
Yisrael— you know Agudas Yisrael? [sic] It’s part of United Torah Judaism. All those parties 
have statutes. In their statutes, it’s written that a woman can’t— the Hebrew, it’s a very 
gendered language. It’s written by males, that only men can be a part of that party. And they 
have another section where they write that women, they have like a group, Neshot Agudat 
Yisrael [the women of Agudat Yisrael]. It’s nothing, and especially it’s nothing in the politics.  
‘So, the Supreme Court, after three years, they tried to ignore it and fight it, the courts say 
that they have to change the section in their statute. So they declared they are going to change 
that section, but we are not going to change the practice. So for us, it was like, we win, but 
not really. It’s like a symbolic win. For us, it’s still winning, because it gave us the 
opportunity to raise this issue, to the public agenda, and to talk about this, and to give people 
the understanding — the Haredi women, the Haredi men, all of Israel— to give them the 
understanding that we have a problem. It’s a democratic state, a state that wants to treat all 
their citizens with equality and all of these things. And a group of women cannot be a part of 
the public sphere, of the decision making point. It’s crazy when you think about it.’ 
Ruth also filed a lawsuit, against Shas rather than Agudas Yisrael, as mentioned in the 
previous section. These two petitions were separate; however, as the appeals process 




Advancement of the Status of Women, a legal clinic that is part of the Bar-Ilan University 
Faculty of Law. Therefore, this victory is also a symbolic victory for Ruth Colian. 
Nivcharot has been constantly running classes and workshops, all of which are fully 
enrolled. 
‘Next week we start the second group of women training, and it’s very exciting,’ Esti tells 
me, animated. ‘Yesterday we just finished a group, a class we made, for women to practice 
speaking without fear. Women came and practiced their talk. So that’s the thing we are doing 
now— empowering women to speak. Yesterday it was very, very exciting to hear the women. 
It came with a lot of fear, “How to speak? I don’t know. I have no confidence.” To give them 
the confidence so they can stand and talk was very, very exciting. On Monday we are 
opening the leadership one— it’s another course. It’s not only speaking, how to stand on the 
stage, it’s how to work, how to be a leader, it’s mentoring, a lot of stuff.’ 
To date, Nivcharot has trained over fifty women, according to their updated website 
(Nivcharot 2018). Esti is creating a veritable army of feminist leaders for the future, Haredi 
women who can operated as activists within the secular state machine to achieve change in 




The choice to become an activist is not without fallout. Taking on any sort of public role 
as a Haredi woman attracts attention; becoming a feminist activist can result in social 
exclusion. I asked Esti, Michal, and Ruth about the community responses to their activism. 
‘At first, they just ignored me,’ Esti responded. ‘One crazy woman from Petach Tikvah, 
she opened a Facebook page for her friends to stop voting for the Haredi media. OK, she is 




But as Esti’s activism became more public and attracted more attention, her children felt 
the impact. They were excluded from school within the Haredi world; they were forced to 
attend a school which is hashkafically Chardal. 
‘It’s hard,’ she said. ‘It’s like, first they tried to ignore. I do not exist. After that, they tried 
to fight. One of the rabbis— he’s not a famous rabbi, but he’s a rabbi who has a lot of 
followers, people who come to his [lectures]. It was before the last elections that he said that 
those Haredi women, that want to be elected or want a presentation in Haredi politics, they 
are schizophrenics and they need psychiatric help. Because you cannot be a feminist and be 
Haredi. If that’s so, then you are schizophrenic. He diagnosed us. That’s the kind of 
response.’ 
Whereas in the previous discussion, in the Haredi world of the performing arts, secular 
knowledge and modern psychology are used as a tool of resistance, here they become the 
tools of oppression. Mental illness has long been one of the most strong taboos in the Haredi 
world, and one of the most feared afflictions. Labeling feminists as mentally ill therefore 
becomes a tool of deterrence: people do not want to be labeled as ‘crazy,’ and so feminists, 
feminist ideology, feminist sympathies will be avoided at all costs. It also serves to 
delegitimise the information from Nivcharot. 
 ‘A lot of shaming on the internet,’ Esti continues. ‘If I published an article on a Haredi 
website, you can read the comments. You cannot handle it. It was hard. Also, my children, I 
had to move them to other schools. But I feel that it was good for me because as a Mizrahi, if 
I wasn’t a feminist and an activist, then I would have my own problems to get [access] to 
these schools. From the Beis Yaakov I had to move them to the schools of the Chardal— it’s 
like National Haredi. Very strict, but they are more open. So, it was a hard situation, …. I 
experienced a lot of banning. But every time I am with the circle…’ she trails off, suggesting 




Ruth’s children were not excluded from Beis Yaakov, but given her history with the 
school, I believe that the school and the Supervisor of Independent Schools would not dare 
remove the children. In addition to the two lawsuits mentioned above, Ruth has also brought 
two other lawsuits: one against the hospital for the wrongful death of her infant son, and one 
against the Shas campaign for using, without asking permission or compensating her, a song 
she wrote about Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. Both were successful. Ruth’s daughter was removed 
from class several times, however, and questioned by the school and by Haredi party 
officials. For a short time, the police offered Ruth’s daughter protection. 
Michal did not experience the same level of exclusion within her home community in 
El’ad; this suggests that there is some level of protection in being an Ashkenazi women, and 
likely because she has good yichus as discussed in Chapter Three.  
‘It could have been worse,’ Michal said. Her children were not excluded from school, nor 
were they harassed. ‘The children’s teachers make jokes to them, like, “When your mom is 
on the Knesset we can get this fixed!” Maybe this is because the children aren’t in the typical, 
hard-core Haredi schools. They’re in like modern-Haredi schools.’ 
At the time of the interview, Michal said that it was also a little easier on her husband, 
because he works outside the community. However, since the interview, Michal has now 
announced on social media that she has separated from her husband and is getting a divorce. I 
did note, when I was making field notes, that he seemed a bit weary of finding yet more 
strange women talking to his wife in the apartment when he came home during our first 
conversation. Slightly less than a year after Michal, Esti also shared on social media that her 
husband had granted her a gett; she never disclosed any problems in her marriage to me a 
year and a half previous. Ultimately, these women’s activism creates stress within the family, 
and pressure on the family members from the rest of the community. Some families may 




reason for her marriage ending; Ruth is also divorced, but she says it was an amicable split 
that was completely unrelated to her activism. The divorce happened years before she formed 
Ubizchutan. 
Ultimately, despite exclusion, the Haredi Feminist Movement has had broad 
repercussions throughout the Haredi world. Esti recognises that Nivcharot has sparked a 
movement, but she says that it has grown beyond her and her small group of activists now. 
Though people may keep it a secret, the feminist movement is widespread within the Haredi 
world. 
‘I have a closed [Facebook] group, it’s called Haredi Feminism, but people are talking 
there, men and women, talking about [these] issues,’ she tells me, almost as an afterthought. 
‘But these issues are really there, really cared about. Because it’s like things in the family, not 
only the politics and all of that, it’s in the house, like the relationship between men and 
women. It’s about women, and sexual harassment, and all of those issues that were hushed 
up. And now people are talking, and I’ve heard Haredi women say, “You gave us the courage 
to talk.” So I understand it’s not something that I can stop. It’s not in my hands anymore.’ 
Esti’s work, and the approach of Nivcharot, reveal that these women activists, and those 
who may sympathise with their cause, view the Haredi world as part of the larger national 
context of Israel, and part of the secular system of a democratic nation. Though Michal 
recognises that the Haredi community tries to maintain a separate reality, and creates a type 
of fiction that Haredi society is apart from the rest of the country, Nivcharot presents Haredi 
society as part of the national context, and instead suggests that the alternative value systems 
and ethics by which the Haredi world lives creates a disenfranchised class of women. While 
Esti and the others are labeled as ‘radicals’ and ‘crazy’ by the mainstream Haredi 





Two Approaches In Contrast 
 
Having spoken to both Ruth and Esti separately, but recognising the similar trajectories 
both feminist activists had followed, I finally asked Esti one day why she and Ruth had never 
worked together. Why wasn’t Ruth a part of Nivcharot? Why did Nivcharot not support 
Ubizchutan? 
‘At that time that we made the campaign [Lo Nivcharot, Lo Bocharot], Ruth started her 
party,’ Esti answers. She looks strained for the first time, like she is trying not to show any 
emotion. ‘She tried to join us to her party, but I understand— the first thing, that I didn’t want 
to join her party, because I know that there is no chance to win. It was, like, very early, from 
my perspective, because the field, I know, the reactions, the comments that I got, I know that 
they are not ready for this. That we have to work for some years and to do things with the 
community, before we want them to change all their perceptions and vote for women. I don’t 
say she’s radical, because it’s the same thing that people say about me. That’s her own way.  
‘Another reason why I didn’t join her was because she didn’t have any resources. I don’t 
want to just crash—  I understand we have a long road before we try to be a party. 
Additionally, the limit here in Israel to be a party is like four mandatim, four mandates [the 
equivalent of four seats in the Knesset]. It’s huge. They made a law to prevent small parties 
from joining the Knesset. So you have to have four mandates— every mandate is, I don’t 
know, a lot of people. You need a lot of money. You need to see that the people know you. I 
felt it was not the time. I know that Ruth was angry with me about that. But I think that I 
cannot do that. So she went her own way, and established the party, and we just became a 
movement. And all the time we emphasise that we are not a political movement. We are 
talking about politics but it’s not the only issue. We have a lot of things to deal with before 





Esti believes that the first thing which needs to happen is to create a shift in the Haredi 
community’s values, outlook, and perceptions. She feels that going forward with a Haredi 
women’s party before the community is ready for it could potentially do damage, and make it 
even more difficult for a woman to be elected in the future. Esti’s approach is based in 
grassroots organising, whereas Ruth’s approach is to courageously lead. 
I see Ruth again, about a week after I spoke with Esti about her attitudes towards Ruth. 
Ruth presents a somewhat different view, highlighted by her characteristic enthusiastic 
vehemence. 
‘Yes, I know Esti,’ Ruth said. ‘We don’t have such good relations. Because when I 
wanted to start the party, she and Esti Rieder— you know Esti Rieder? So, Esti Rieder called 
me and threatened me.’ 
Ruth said that Esti Rieder told her not to link herself or any of her activities with 
Ubizchutan to Nivcharot. She also suggested that Ruth was taking money away from Lo 
Nivcharot Lo Bocharot’s cause, because they both were conducting crowdfunding 
campaigns. Ruth suggests that she was threatened with legal action by them, if she related 
any of her activities to Nivcharot or any of the two Estis’ activism. 
‘I now understand the really sick illusion,’ Ruth says, ‘A really sick way of thinking that 
they have.’ 
Ruth also suggests that Nivcharot ‘stole her idea’ for a Knesset lobby; she says she had 
been trying to create a Haredi women’s lobby for two or three years, and miraculously, after 
she mentioned it to someone connected to Nivcharot, they had the lobby. In order to create a 
lobby in the Knesset, there needs to be support from MKs. Ruth had support from the 
opposition, but lacked support from the coalition government. Nivcharot received support 
from both very quickly. 




Nivcharot. Ruth seems to make things happen by sheer force of will; she operates alone and 
doesn’t often make alliances. Nivcharot activists work with a certain level of savvy and are 
quite politic in their approach. Ultimately, I believe the rift between Ubizchutan and 
Nivcharot stems from deep philosophical differences in approach, which may or may not be 
augmented by certain personality clashes. While these philosophical differences are 
extremely fundamental, as I will discuss further, Ruth and Esti nonetheless agree on the 
major issues relating to the position of women in the Haredi world which need addressing. 
Both women are concerned about domestic violence within the Haredi community, as 
well as agunot [women who are being denied divorces by their husbands] and the dire 
economic status of single mothers. Both women discuss breast cancer awareness, and the 
general poor information available for women’s public health. They both also care about 
wage inequality, and how much less women are paid in teaching positions than men, within 
the Haredi world. In general, poverty is a significant issue when addressing the status of 
women in the Haredi world. And naturally, both Esti and Ruth care deeply about the 
representation of Haredi women in the Knesset. What both women disagree about is the 
approach that is necessary in achieving change in these areas. 
Esti and Nivcharot rely heavily on cooperation with partner organisations and leaders 
who offer financial and political support. Nivcharot’s leadership classes are partially funded 
by WIZO, the Women’s International Zionist Organization; Esti works with Chochmat 
Nashim, a women’s rights organisation in Beit Shemesh which is not specifically Haredi, but 
rather broadly religious; Nivcharot has also presented white papers to the United Nations as 
well as the Knesset; and they maintain a working relationship with Aliza Lavie, a National 
Religious woman who was an MK for Yesh Atid. Yesh Atid was a party which largely 
represented the interests of centrists in Israel, and the majority of Yesh Atid voters were 




Blue and White liberal centrist alliance; the current coalition government included members 
of the Blue and White. Aliza Lavie does not currently have a seat in the Knesset. Nivcharot 
are a Haredi organisation, but they do not bind themselves to the Haredi value system, and 
cooperate broadly with secular and nationalist groups and individuals. 
Ruth takes the opposite approach: she will not compromise Haredi values in order to 
achieve her goals. She says of Michal, 
‘Listen, I don’t feel that it’s the right way. I would never run with a non-religious party.’ 
She clarifies this a little, telling me that actually, she might run with a party that is not 
religious, but there are non-religious parties who also aren’t supporting the buses on shabbat. 
Ruth will not compromise her religious beliefs in order to win a place in the Knesset. 
Furthermore, she believes that her Haredi ethics and values should be applied to the whole 
country; they are an absolute, and absolutely correct, rather than a choice that she has taken 
on as part of her religious identity. 
‘It is one thing to run with a secular party,’ she says, ‘but it is another thing to join a party 
that does not [preserve the sabbath].’ 
In this way, despite her feminist ideology, Ruth maintains her undivided, intertwined 
religious-political identity. She is the Haredi ethical woman of the last sixty years within her 
own identity, rather than a New Haredim, though she is one of the New Haredi Middle Class 
by virtue of her law school education. Esti and Michal have separated their religious identity 
from their political ones. 
The difference in approaches between Ruth and Esti is reflective of broader changes 
within Haredi society. As Haredi society evolves and absorbs certain secular ideologies, the 
outlook of the community is gradually fragmenting. One of the significant divisions concerns 
the application of Haredi ethics and values to the greater nation as a whole. This is somewhat 




question of whether one recognises the separation of the secular government from the 
institution of religion. Esti’s approach separates the two; Ruth’s approach mandates religion 
as part of the state. Both of these approaches involve knitting together the secular and the 
religious; it is instead a difference in interpretation in, if the reader will allow, the types of 
stitches used—whether the yarn of Haredi ethics attains primacy in the pattern, or a balance 
is struck. 
‘Look,’ she says, ‘Israel is a Jewish State and a Democracy. In the world, you have lots of 
Democracies, but of the Jewish States? You have only one.’ 
This is particularly interesting in light of the time in which we were speaking; it was in 
February or March of 2019, just after Netanyahu had passed the Nation State Law 
(Hirschhorn 2018). Fundamentally, Ruth is also revealing that her political outlook bends 
right, with the Zionist parties, once she removes herself from the Haredi context. This is part 
of the greater process of pluralisation which is occurring in the Haredi political world 
presently, and which I will discuss further in Chapter Eight. 
Both Esti and Ruth adopt feminist ideology in negotiation with religious ethics, by 
applying an egalitarian ethos to matters of socioeconomics, public health, and the political 
system. They differ on understandings of the separation or unification of religion and the 
state. Ultimately, both approaches and contributions are meaningful in creating change, and 
the reverberations of the Haredi feminist movement are clearly felt even in the most stringent 
of Haredi establishments. 
The Haredi Feminist Movement is influenced by early secular thinkers like 
Wollstonecraft, in that it is constructed around beliefs of equal worth and therefore equal 
rights (Bryson 2003, 17), and it stems from a rejection of the social hierarchies which 
perpetuate poverty and inequality for both men and women (Ibid., 20), in this case the 




feminism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century suffragettes; but unlike Christabel 
Pankhurst (Ibid., 81-82) and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Ibid., 29-35), who grounded their 
efforts in the Christian moral imperative, the Haredi Feminists have liberated their feminism 
from religion. Perhaps in Michal’s case, in her belief in the mission and politics of the Labour 
Party, some of her feminism has taken on Marxist or socialist dimensions, but in terms of the 
articulation of goals by Ruth and Esti, the Haredi Feminist Movement is simply one for 
straightforward equal rights.  
Despite being organised in large part by non-Ashkenazi women, the Haredi Feminist 
Movement has avoided intersectionality, as discussed above. There is not yet room for a 
Sephardi Haredi Angela Davis within the struggles of the Haredi feminists (Davis 1981), nor 
is there a Judith Butler questioning the very assumption of sex and gender among Haredim 
(Butler 1999). The Haredi Feminists have, however, placed the issue of women and public 
health front and centre, which is an unusual tactic. Through health activism, for example 
through breast cancer awareness, the Haredi Feminists can legitimately begin to limit the 
infinite authority of Da’as Torah. The stringent modesty standards imposed by the rabbinic 
leadership are, in the example of breast cancer, as well as domestic violence, in conflict with 
the Jewish mandate of pikuach nefesh, saving a life. The investment in public health and 
secular equal rights begins to present a path forward in curtailing the power of the rabbis and 
the reach of Da’as Torah. 
In the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned Blu Greenberg and her predictions for the 
inevitability of feminism reaching the Jewish world. Since Greenberg, feminism has 
flourished in certain parts of the Modern Orthodox world, where women have formed 
minyanim, and several organisations have begun to grant smicha to women. Within Modern 
Orthodox Feminism, the focus has chiefly been religious change, as it has been without 




Judaism. This is because these movements have maintained the Western Liberal ideology 
around secular-religious distinctions, as established in Chapter Two. In Modern Orthodoxy, 
there has always been a certain amount of acceptance of secularisation and modernisation in 
parts of life considered outside the realm of religious authority. Therefore, Modern Orthodox 
women’s fights for equal pay have been a part of the greater world’s feminism and secular 
feminist movements. By definition, a Modern Orthodox Feminist Movement applies the 
theories of feminism to the tenets of Orthodox Judaism. Haredi women live in a completely 
different paradigm, in which there is almost no distinction between religious life and secular 
life; the everyday has been made religious through the most stringent interpretations of 
halacha and the power of Da’as Torah. Haredi women are not yet ready to explore ideas of 
women rabbis and being counted as part of a minyan; they must first fight the battles which 
their secular ancestors waged one or two centuries ago. In addition, they have a different 
understanding of their roles as Jewish women, and would find great fault with Plaskow’s 
statement that women have been excluded from the process of ‘naming and shaping the 
Jewish tradition’ (Plaskow 1990). Indeed, many Haredi women, like Miriam earlier in this 
chapter, find a certain type of empowerment in their femininity as it is dictated within 
Judaism (Kaufman 1991). To approach changing religion as part of the feminist agenda in the 
Haredi world will take some time yet, and a certain amount of natural evolution in the activist 
movement (Bryson 2003); at that point there may also be room for queer activism (Dave 
2012, Stackhouse 2005). It remains to be seen whether such changes will even be possible. 
Certainly at present, with very little exception,23 Haredi feminists are not interested in access 
 
23 Following my research, an article was published in Haaretz concerning a Belz woman who is promoting 
ideas around women and Torah learning (Littman 2019). Malki Rotner, the woman in question, is certainly 
unusual; she also benefits from an extremely high position in her community due to yichus, and this allows her 
far more freedom without repercussions. Perhaps she is the first of her kind, and more will follow. She is not 
seeking anything very radical as of yet; currently she simply wants women to have better quality learning. In 





to the beit midrash or the Torah scroll. They are more concerned with the practicalities of 




The Haredi Women’s Feminist Movement is an unsurprising result of the changes that 
have been taking place in the Haredi world in Israel. Like other aspects of Haredi life, the 
Feminist Movement represents a negotiation between the secular knowledge and values 
which Haredim are inevitably exposed to, the machinations of the state apparatus, and the 
religious values which are at core of Haredi ethics. The feminists knit in strands of feminist 
ideology as part of their work of negotiation of the secular and the religious, and more of 
these strands are finding purchase in the scarf of Haredi society. Acceptance of feminism is 
still low, but growing in the Haredi world. Haredi women maintain feminist values and 
accept religious patriarchy as not mutually exclusive, and negotiate these complexities with 
sensitivity. Feminists apply equal rights values to parts of Haredi life which lie outside of the 
clear realm of halacha, and in doing so, limit the authority of Da’as Torah within their lives. 
The Feminist Movement is split between those who work cooperatively with those outside of 
the Haredi world and accept liberal values of pluralism, and those who adhere strictly to 
Haredi-only partnerships. Ultimately, the Haredi Feminists share a similar type of feminism 
in terms of the practical application to issues of women’s health, economic parity, and safety. 
The Haredi Feminist Movement is significant in that activists are created as a result of 
intersectional identities, in which they experience discrimination based on their race, class, 
and gender, but the Movement avoids articulating intersectional goals. This is likely due to 
the danger of doing so, especially in light of the precariousness of the Feminist Movement in 




represents an adoption of secular values in the least dangerous manner, in order to ensure 
long-term survival of feminist ideology within a community that is extremely resistant. 
Though NGO-isation is strongly criticised within activist feminist scholarship, in the case of 
Haredi Feminists it may serve to be less of a hindrance. NGO-isation also transforms Haredi 
Feminists into agents of the state, insofar as the state seeks to break down religious ethics and 
transform Haredim into secularised citizens. Haredi Feminism is thus bounded by Haredi 
women’s status as members of a religious minority. Haredi women negotiate the secular 
values of feminism with their religious ethics; the community responds in kind with some 
resistance towards these secular ideas, but creeping acceptance. Ultimately, the Haredi 




Chapter Seven: Political and 
Religious Identity 
This chapter argues that people in the Haredi world are currently separating their Haredi 
religious identity from their political identity, and there are emerging a range of Haredi 
political identities. Picking apart the entwinement of the political and the religious is not 
transforming people into something other than Haredi; rather, these processes are producing 
new types of Haredim of a plurality of types. The processes under which these 
fragmentations are taking place are all essentially the same. This represents the culmination 
of nearly a century of negotiations between religious values and ethics with the secularising 
agenda of the state of Israel. The picking apart and knitting together of the other processes 
discussed in this thesis has contributed directly to this process. In terms of the (now possibly 
over-extended) knitting metaphor, these processes look like an unravelling of the part of the 
scarf where the political and the religious have been completely entwined, and reknitting the 
block of religious identity separate to a section of the scarf that is political identity. The 
political identity section of the scarf will include new yarns from secular skeins; these will be 
different for different people. In the scarf of Haredi society, each of these new parts of 
individual scarves may blend into the complexity of the rest of the scarf, or some may poke 
out as bobbles or tassels. These new political identities do not diminish people’s Haredi-ness; 
rather, the negotiations explored in this chapter represent the range of ways in which people 
shape similar religious ethics into different political meanings. 




including the leadership of Trump in America, and the (first) 2019 Israeli General Election. 
Within these contexts, women articulated political identities which broke away from the 
centrist stance of the Haredi parties, and aligned with both the Left and the Right Wings of 
the Israeli political spectrum. Michal Tchernovitsky details her gradual process of realisation 
that she harboured socialist beliefs, and her commitment to the Israeli Left and Avodah, the 
Labour Party. She believes her religious ethics are supremely compatible with socialist 
values; others tell me of their left-wing sympathies and shock at the acceptance of Trump in 
the Haredi world. From Michal’s Leftist Awakening, I move on to ethnography conducted 
with women who embrace the Far Right, including groups considered Jewish terrorists by the 
Israeli government. These women remain Haredi; they do not espouse a type of Jewish ethic 
that is Chardali, though their beliefs align politically with some Chardalim. They have been 
radicalised through their displacement from traditional Haredi neighbourhoods to specific 
settlements in the West Bank. Other Haredim have moved politically to the Right, though in a 
less extreme way, through their move to Haredi-only settlements. In this way, their 
negotiation of their identities with the machinations of the state apparatus have ultimately 
been to the benefit of the state’s agenda in expansion and occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories. Though those going Left and those going Right are the result of similar processes 
of negotiation with the secular, the results of the choice of the Left or the Right have vastly 
different implications for the future of the state of Israel. 
 
The Haredim and Israeli Politics 
 
The final three months of my fieldwork were during the lead-up to what would become 
the first Israeli General Election of 2019, though at the time everyone, including myself, 




elections in most cities, including Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh. Everyone was abuzz with 
political talk. In general, my interlocutors were more preoccupied with the local municipal 
elections than the national ones, though this was not universally true. Perhaps, for a 
community whose identity centres on distance from the secular, governmental state, the 
municipal elections felt more relevant to the Haredi community. 
One day at the dance school, in the adult classes during the day, in the middle of stretches 
and warm-ups, Rachel said, ‘What is next week Monday, ladies? That’s right! Election day! 
And we know who we are voting for, and who we’re not voting for, right?’ 
She laughed a little bit, and followed it up with the comment, ‘Of course, I’m not telling 
you who to vote for, you should vote how you want.’ 
I am not convinced that the follow-up comment was not for my benefit, and I do not 
know if it would have been said if I had not been dancing that day. It may have been said no 
matter who was in the room, but I have no way of making that judgement. 
The reality is that since the beginning of the state of Israel, the Haredi community has 
tended to vote as a bloc, and follow the advice of rabbanim about which candidate is best for 
the community interests. The three Haredi parties, Agudat Yisrael, Shas, and Degel haTorah, 
may run individual candidates against each other in municipal elections in heavily Haredi 
areas; in the national elections, Agudat Yisrael and Degel haTorah ally to form United Torah 
Judaism, which ultimately is a very centrist party, as is Shas.24 The far right is dominated by 
the Yamina, the union of Right Wing Parties, which include groups like the Jewish Defense 
League, Tkuma [meaning revival, resistance, or resilience], and HaBayit haYehudi [the 
Jewish Home party]. More centrist right-wing parties include those like Likud, Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s party, and the New Right party, of which Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked are 
 
24 It is worth noting, as mentioned in Chapter Two, that non-Ashkenazi voters in Israel are considered to be 
prevalently Right Wing (Lavie 2018, Shohat 2017), and often vote as a bloc for Likud, Netanyahu’s party (Lavie 




a part. Simply by virtue of being not Zionist,25 the Haredi parties are not really considered to 
be Right Wing within Israel. 
‘Shas and [United Torah Judaism] … they are centre,’ Michal tells me, as she draws 
diagrams of the political spectrum, and the multitude of political parties in Israel. ‘Because 
they will go… with whoever offers the best deal for the Haredim.’ 
Bina’s interpretation of the stance of Haredi parties is similar to Michal’s, though she 
suggests that several other parties are left wing which Michal describes as centre-right, such 
as Likud. ‘Haredi institutions are so desperate for funding that votes can be bought,’ Bina 
tells me. ‘The Haredi parties aren’t ever going get a majority, not in my lifetime at least. So 
instead, there is like this desperation mentality. How do we fund our schools? Have you seen 
most of our schools? They are in such a terrible state. But if the Haredi parties are willing to 
make an alliance with someone, that means they’ve made some sort of deal. So when the 
rabbis tell us to vote for someone, we do it, because it’s the only way to improve the 
community.’ 
Ultimately, community behaviour around voting is dictated by the historically 
enmeshment of the religious and the political that became integral to Haredi identity. 
However, this entwinement is slowly getting picked apart by the various changes that have 
occurred in the last decade. The rapid changes of the previous chapters are forcing 
negotiations of identity, and this is leading to hybridisations (Lefkowitz 2006, 263); these 
hybrid identities sometimes seem almost antithetical to the established Haredi ethical person, 
but are nonetheless Haredi.  
In Dalsheim’s 2019 work Israel Has a Jewish Problem, she suggests that Haredi society 
will be completely transformed within the next generation (Dalsheim 2019, 96). She suggests 
 
25 Lavie suggests that in order to be Right Wing in Israel, it is necessary to be Zionist, an assessment with 
which my ethnography aligns. However, she also suggests that Meretz and Avodah are neo-conservative parties 
(2018, 9-11, 68) and suggests that there are no truly left-wing parties in Israel (Ibid., 62-70), which leads me to 




this will eliminate traditional, religious Judaism as it has existed for the last several centuries. 
Indeed, Haredi society is changing, but as we have found out in previous chapters, this is not 
a new development and indeed is part of the negotiations which all identities undergo. 
Furthermore, I truly believe that there will endure a core at the centre of the Haredi 
establishment which will cling to traditionalism and conservatism, be slow to change, and 
maintain the unification of the political and the religious in their identity and outlook. They 
will resist all forms of secularisation as fiercely as they ever had. This is especially true of 
certain Hasidic communities. Furthermore, the anti-Zionist extremist fringe will also continue 
to resist and react to the Zionist state, and the influences of this will continue to affect the 
Haredi world. The changes which I will be discussing are occurring in many quarters of the 
Haredi world, but they are not universally applicable; nor are they necessarily un-Haredi. 
On the surface, this could be understood to be a chapter on the secularisation of the 
Haredi women who appear in the ethnographic accounts. To separate one’s political identity 
from the religious would be, in the context of pre-War European foundations of Haredi 
identity, to secularise. The entwinement at that point in time was a necessary component of 
resisting the secular. But today, unpicking the political ideology of one’s identity from the 
religious adherence to Haredi ethics is not necessarily so clearly an act of secularisation. 
These women are not agents of secularisation in their community; Michal is still Haredi, and 
Shaindel and Grune have not become Dati Leumi. As the previous chapters have displayed, 
secular knowledge and ideology is constantly absorbed and reproduced within the Haredi 
world, and done so in combination with Haredi values and ethics. This is the next logical step 
in that process; but it is not, as Asad mentions, people being ‘pushed, seduced, coerced, or 
persuaded’ into secularism (2003, 154); it is the negotiation of the secular with the religious. 
As Mahmood tells us, ‘modern secularism has transformed religious identity’ (2016, 2), but 




one (Asad 2003, 25). 
There can be ‘multiple, independent (possibly mutually exclusive) reasons for subscribing 
to a secular ethic’ (Ibid., 6). As part of the transformation of the religious identity under the 
modern secular state (Mahmood 2016, 2), we must seek to understand the complex forces at 
play in these shifts and negotiations; negotiations can be part of powerful resistances 
(Lefkowitz 2006, 265), and emotion is often central to moral and ethical formation (Asad 
2003, 90). Below, we can see how the secular political has increasingly penetrated the 
personal (Ibid., 186), but we must remember that political consciousness and critical 
interpretations are inextricably linked (Rinaldo 2014, 83). In the chapter that follows, we can 
see how the state plays a role in ‘transforming preexisting religious differences, producing 
new forms of communal polarization, and making religion more rather than less salient’ 
(Mahmood 2016, 2) in Israel today.  
There is an assumption that secularism is inextricably linked to liberalism; that the Left is 
naturally secular, but the Right is somehow less secular (Asad 2018, 19). However, 
‘liberalism’ and the many forms which the Right takes (Authoritarianism, Fascism, Alt-
Right, etc) are governed by the same liberal values and secular ideologies (Mahmood 2016, 
5; Asad 2018, 19). Thus, the two extremes explored below are both part of the same process 
in the secular modern state. It does, however, matter that they result in very different outlooks 
and ideologies. While ‘going Left’ and ‘going Right’ are results of the same process, the 
ultimate implications are markedly different for the Left and the Right, and these implications 
have real-world, life or death results which matter to the future state of Israel, the future of 
the Palestinian people, and the future of global conflicts. 
 
 Trump the Messiah? 
 




fieldwork trips to Israel coincided with the date chosen by United States President Donald 
Trump as the opening of the new American Embassy in Jerusalem, part of his controversial 
decision to officially recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The date of the event was 
announced last minute, less than a day before he planned on flying to the country; had I 
known that my arrival would coincide with his, I would have changed my plans in order to 
avoid such a chaotic time to arrive at Ben Gurion Airport and travel to my accommodation in 
Jerusalem. As it was, despite my accommodation being fairly close to the site of the new 
embassy, the streets of Jerusalem were quieter than I expected when I arrived just two hours 
after Trump’s departure. The neighbourhood in which I was staying, Katamonim, is 
populated mainly by National Religious people, and so I was not surprised to see remnants of 
the festival atmosphere that had prevailed during Trump’s visit, with Israeli flags hanging out 
of windows and signs on the lamp posts reading, ‘Trump Make Israel Great Again.’ 
What I found somewhat more surprising was the sign that was hanging on Strauss Street, 
across from Bikur Cholim Hospital, a main thoroughfare near the Mea Shearim 
neighbourhood in Jerusalem. A large poster hung on a fence, also reading ‘Trump Make 
Israel Great Again,’ but instead of the blue and white theme seen throughout the rest of 
Jerusalem, this poster had a golden background with typically Hasidic crown iconography, 
such as the crown insignia seen on many strict Kosher mehadrin seals [indicating a very strict 
level of rabbinic kosher supervision]. It was hanging on a fence at the rear of the Russian 
Compound, a police centre, which suggests it may have been hung by the police, who are not 
likely to be Haredi, but the imagery would argue more strongly for its origins in the Haredi 
community. This street acts as a gateway to the Haredi neighbourhoods of north Jerusalem, 
and are close to the heavily self-policed streets of the most stringent communities in Mea 
Shearim. Frequently, I read anti-Zionist graffiti and broadsides in HaShabbat Square, just a 




so aligned with those of the Nationalists as this Trump sign suggested. 
Throughout much of the Haredi world in Israel (and elsewhere), there is much love for 
Trump. Most of the women with whom I conducted research spoke of him with admiration 
and hope, and he was broadly considered to be the best American President for the Jewish 
people in many years. While the Haredi parties may not be considered Right Wing in the 
Israeli context, especially given the complicated relationship with Zionism, the Haredi 
community is nonetheless attracted to conservatism. Whether or not Trump is truly 
conservative is not relevant to this particular discussion; what matters is that he is perceived 
to be a sort of saviour for conservatives, and the Haredim in Israel have embraced his role as 
such. Michal suggests that certain parts of the religious ethic correspond well with 
conservative political thinking. 
‘Here it [conservatism] connects well with being religious,’ Michal says. We were deep 
in a discussion of the mentalities of the Left and the Right in Israel, and the ways in which 
Haredi values align with various perspectives. ‘I as a person believe in redemption. Religious 
people believe in redemption. But again: are we sitting and waiting for Moshiach [Messiah], 
or we have to bring, like, the moshiach, you know – we have to bring it. So, I think that we 
have to be both. But again, you can sit and wait for Moshiach or you can go and do 
something. Maybe we should be like Moshiach and bring him. So, I think that we should be 
both. I think that it is our responsibility to redeem the world, but we still need a moshiach to 
bring it to a conclusion. I think these things complement each other. Because if you don't 
believe in the possibility of redemption at all… You have to believe in the possibility of 
redemption in order to say: So, let's do it. I often feel that right-wing attitudes say: There will 
never be peace and we will always hate each other. Humanity is very crooked and bad. Also, 
economically, what can we do? There will always be rich and poor. It’s fate. There will 




Michal is talking about the two mindsets that she believes exist in the Haredi world, in 
terms of the Jewish duty toward tikkun olam which brings the messiah. She is suggesting that 
one theological interpretation takes a passive approach, a mentality of continuous waiting, 
because only the coming of the messiah will redeem the world. She suggests this creates a 
mentality that minimises the importance of suffering and injustice in the world, because the 
only one who can mend the world is the messiah. This mindset shifts agency and 
responsibility away from human beings and onto the divine. 
But Michal’s ‘moshiach’ for the Left and the Right touches on something significant to 
the secular political state, as well. Though both the Left and the Right are products of this 
secular modernity, Wendy Brown suggests that the polarisation which is increasingly present 
in our political life are a function of ‘Western political theory’s own impoverished 
understanding of religion and religious need’ (Brown 2010, 86). Brown writes of the Left’s 
redemptive myth within the Obama campaign’s Yes We Can slogan (Ibid., 85), and the 
problem of ‘our hopes versus their hopes, our Messiah versus theirs’ (Ibid., 86). Michal 
understands the polarisation of modern politics in the secular state, how it serves the state, 
and the ways in which Trump and Obama become figureheads for different types of secular 
morals and ethics. 
I mentioned that some of the Hasidic women I know believe in the imminence of the 
messiah, and believe that he may arrive any day, perhaps even tomorrow. 
‘That's the problem,’ Michal exclaims. ‘What if he doesn't come? That's just what I was 
talking about. It’s like, you believe, but you wait for him to come and until then… so it gives 
you patience. Now everything is terrible, but tomorrow he will come. About the issue of 
moshiach I could speak forever.’ 
But, she suggests, the other approach is to take action to make the world ready for the 




She says she believes in both, meaning that she believes redemption will only be complete 
with the arrival of the messiah, but in order to reach redemption, in order for the messiah to 
arrive, humans must do what they can to improve the world. Michal believes that religious 
people who wait for the messiah are more sympathetic to conservative politics, whereas 
religious people who believe that human actions will bring messiah are already used to 
thinking like political progressives. Deep theological differences translate into a deep 
political divide . 
‘It’s like saying Barak Obama— No, no, that's just it!’ Michal says as I laugh at the idea 
of Obama as the Progressive Messiah. She continues, ‘I really felt it, the difference between 
Barak Obama's first elections and the second. In the first elections it was like people voted for 
him because they felt Moshiach had come. Really, it was voting for Moshiach. And then they 
were very disappointed because, oh, he's not Moshiach. He's not like we thought, he wasn't 
capable, he also failed in most of the things he tried to do. And then they elected him again, 
so that was the more meaningful election as I see it. Because the second time meant 
understanding that it is not him alone, it’s all of us. And it’s okay, we're all human. And no 
one is Moshiach. Stop waiting for Moshiach, he won't come. That's just the point. And still 
voting. I think that's the difference. But it repeats itself in the world constantly. You expect, 
wait for Moshiach. And then - Trump is the moshiach for other people. He is their moshiach. 
And they too will be disappointed in the end.’ 
Indeed, the signs on the streets of Jerusalem, and the way in which many people spoke of 
Trump throughout my field research, he was like a messiah to many. Like many of the 
National Religious, my Haredi interlocutors believed that American recognition of Jerusalem 
as the capital of Israel was the first step toward redemption. My shock upon seeing the signs 
in Mea Shearim was due to my historical understanding of Haredi identity, and the separation 




the level of change that has occurred, and the complexification of the Haredi religious and 
political perspective. I was not, however, alone in my surprise toward the Haredi love of 
Trump. Tovah tells me, 
‘I was shocked about Trump in the frum world. Since when did becoming frum mean I 
had to become a Republican?’ 
Here we see the ba’alei teshuvah choice for what it is: becoming frum is a religious 
choice, not a political one; being Haredi, then, is a religious identity, not a political one. 
While some ba’alei teshuvah are, of course, adherent to the Haredi communal behaviour 
surrounding politics, it is still under the understanding of two separate parts of their identity, 
the religious and the political. 
‘When I was in the States, sure, I would have voted for Hilary,’ Sitta tells me. ‘But now, 
I’m in Jerusalem, I’m Haredi, and, well,’ she shrugs, ‘I don’t really vote anymore.’ 
Sitta, unable to reconcile her former political identity with her new religious identity, 
instead chooses to remove herself from participation in politics entirely. 
‘Not all politics need to be dictated by Torah,’ Tovah tells me. ‘There’s the practical, and 
then there’s the ideological. Personally, in politics, often my concerns about the security of 
the country matter more than any other concerns.’ 
Sarah, too, treats security concerns as primary. When discussing Ruth Colian’s party, 
Sarah tells me that while she is intrigued by the idea, she is concerned that someone like Ruth 
would have no idea how to handle the country’s security. This subjugation of feminist 
concerns in favour of national security is not an obstacle only for Haredi feminists: Lavie’s 
Mizrahi feminists of the 2003 Single Mothers’ March also ultimately capitulated in the face 
of national security concerns as well (Lavie 2018). It’s important to note that Sarah is 
Ashkenazi frum from birth, as were her parents before her; yet she does not view her voting 




or other changes, Sarah is representative of the new type of Haredim, who vote based on their 
own opinions. She is not part of the New Middle Class— no one in her family has a 
university degree, she works at a low-paying desk job in a community office, and the family 
lives in Arzei Habira while her husband attends kollel. She is a perfect example of 
mainstream, establishment Litvish Haredi womanhood, yet she has a completely separate 
political identity from her religious one. Ultimately, for whatever reason, the once unified 
religious-political Haredi identity is fragmenting and breaking apart. She, too, is picking apart 
and re-knitting. 
‘Ultimately, I vote for the person who I want to,’ Tovah concludes. ‘In the end, Hashem 
is still in charge.’ 
 
Michal’s Leftist Awakening 
 
For some, picking apart the political and the religious in their identity has led them to lean 
Left politically, and embrace liberal values and politics. Asad tells us that early Liberalism 
was ‘engaged in challenging hegemonic power…. Now… it is the ally of global power’ 
(Asad 2013, 19). It recognises the individuality of each human voter as equal (Ibid., 18), and 
assumes a modality of neutrality toward difference which (should) foster pluralism (Ibid., 
20). Marxism, socialism, and labour movements are of course also part of the greater secular 
Left, though Lavie suggests that Avodah, the Israeli Labour party which will become relevant 
below, has long ago left such socialist tendencies behind in favour of neoliberalism (Lavie 
2018). Either way, the Left within Israel today is very distinctly focussed on the above 
mentioned secular ideals of equality and pluralism in the modern state. Michal Tchernovitsky 
is very conscious of the process which she underwent in unpicking her political identity from 




she kept secret from her family for the majority of that time.  
It began in early November 1995. Michal took to the streets of Tel Aviv with her school 
friends to protest the Oslo Accords. It was something that she remembers feeling not at all 
strongly about, it was simply what everyone else was doing in her class at school. She says 
that maybe one of her friends had encouraged the rest, a certain friend who came from a 
household which was perhaps more Chardal than Haredi. Michal attended the march, but for 
her, it was less about the Oslo Accords and rather an opportunity for a nice day out with 
friends. A few days later, her parents were listening to the news on the radio, and she heard 
that Yitzhak Rabin had been assassinated. 
‘It made me start to think,’ Michal said. ‘Who was this man? What did he stand for? 
What did he believe? What do I believe? And I realised that what he stood for was really 
good, and so I had to think about what I stood for.’ 
Her transformation was a slow process. Michal describes slowly realising that she felt her 
‘Torah values’, her Haredi ethics, aligned well with the values of the Left. The more she 
began to think about her priorities, and her beliefs, her morals and her ethics, the more she 
realised that she cared about civil rights and human rights. She began volunteering with Bat 
Melech [literally ‘daughters of the king’], an organisation that supports abused religious 
women, both Haredi and others. 
 In 2008 to 2009, Michal decided to take a Social Democracy course run by the Kinesset, 
and she told me that she was the first religious, not to mention Haredi, woman to have ever 
enrolled in such a course. During the course, she met Amir Peretz, who was a prominent 
member of Avodah [the Israeli Labour Party] at the time, in a one-to-one meeting and she 
was very impressed with him. 





This was a turning point for Michal. Until this moment, she had been having a crisis of 
faith, unsure of how to rationalise her internal process of increasingly independent thinking 
and her development of a political consciousness independent of her religious identity. She 
had joined Bat Melech because of this, hoping that she could find a way to live an ethically 
Haredi life while also making the world a better place in the ways that she felt were 
important. Once she acknowledged that she was, in fact, ideologically a socialist, she joined 
Avodah, though it would be a few more years before she would become active in the party. 
After becoming a Labour party member, Michal no longer questioned her religious Haredi 
identity, and is clearly comfortable with and proud of her membership in her religious 
community. 
To understand how unlikely it is for Haredim to associate with the Left Wing parties in 
Israel, it is important to realise that, before meeting Michal, everyone else I met suggested 
that she was running for office with Avodah simply because they were the only party that 
would allow her to join. People found it impossible to believe that Michal was actually 
politically Left in her beliefs. 
‘What you have to understand,’ Bina told me, ‘is that Haredi women who want to run for 
office will be forced to go with whatever party that takes them. Maybe they had someone fall 
off their list; maybe they just think for whatever reason it’s worth taking you on. But it’s not 
because these Haredi women are, like, agreeing with these parties.’ 
Shortly after I completed my fieldwork, I gave a presentation on the New Haredi 
Feminists at a conference of Israeli Studies. Even outside of the community, outside of Israel, 
in a room full of academics, both Israeli and European, everyone in who attended my 
presentation had assumed that Michal was running on the 2019 Avodah ticket because they 
were the only party that would accept her onto their list. After the presentation, some scholars 




Haredim are not necessarily ‘Right’ within Israel, as discussed above, their aversion to the 
secular has created a deep impression on the psyche of those both within and without the 
community, and it is impossible for many people to imagine the possibility of a Left Wing 
Haredi person. 
‘Michal, she is a very honest person,’ Esti Shushan told me, when I asked her about 
Michal and Avodah. I had not yet met Michal, and so I did not yet know about her process of 
awakening her political consciousness. ‘That’s her unique personality. And I think when she 
became a feminist and she tried to demand equality for women, I think she realised that she 
cannot ignore the suffering of other people. I’m trying to understand her perception. So from 
her perspective, when we occupied another people, we took from them their rights. It’s not 
only the Palestinian issue, it’s also the refugees, all the objectives of Labour, and the left side 
of Israel, she really believes it. If she were really political, she would have joined a different 
party. But she’s very honest, that’s what I’m trying to tell you. She always says, “I don’t like 
to hide any more. I don’t want to hide my opinions, it was enough for me [before]. And I 
want to say what I’m thinking, and what I want to promote, and this is my agenda.”’ 
 Michal is truly Left Wing politically, and Haredi religiously. In order to reach the point 
where both identities could co-exist within her person, Michal had to undergo the difficult 
process of picking apart the religious and political parts of her identity; separating them from 
their enmeshment and allowing each to exist independent of each other. Until she reached the 
point where she could look in the mirror and say, ‘Michal, you’re Left Wing,’ she was facing 
a major crisis of faith, because her religious identity and her political identity were one and 
the same. However, that moment, almost fifteen years after the event that sparked the 
process, when she clarified her political identity, she was suddenly able hold both identities 
as separate and yet equally true within herself. She became Left Wing politically, and 




Furthermore, she has come to create a new type of ethical religious personhood which is 
not counter to progressive political philosophy. As she discussed in the previous section, she 
relates the progressive philosophy to the religious belief in proactivity in order to bring the 
messiah; whereas ‘sitting and waiting’ for the messiah is the conservative mindset, in which 
nothing will change. She accuses conservative religious types of absolving themselves of 
responsibility for anything unjust within the world on the basis of their belief in the 
imminence of the messiah. Yet she suggests that the values of Haredi life are more aligned 
with the objectives of the Israeli Left Wing parties and the philosophy of the political 
progressive.  
 
 Leadership and Community Work: Changing the Political Consciousness 
 
Michal’s transformation, on its own, would be meaningless, an anomaly. Rather, she is 
simply one example of broad, systemic change that is occurring. Michal is herself very much 
a motivator for this change; her choice to become a leader was precipitated by her 
participation in Lo Nivcharot, Lo Bocharot, and she has become a leader in multiple ways, 
but she also recognises the other women who are working for change, as well. Indeed, 
without encountering other women who were having similar struggles as her, Michal may 
have never taken her first step into political life. 
‘So we sat in this circle, about twenty or thirty women, I don't know,’ Michal tells me, 
remembering the circle organised by Esti Shushan which she joined. ‘And then it went— you 
know when they say, “Ok, each person should say a few words about herself, how many kids 
she has, what animal she would like to be—” so. It wasn't like that. Beginning with the first, 
each of the participants began to tell her entire life story. Ok, so not two hours, but each 




was completely about the question of where she is as a Haredi woman, how it clashes with 
her wishes, with her career, with her faith— I don't know. And there were stories, each with 
her own life story, for the good and for the bad. Both amazing stories and— and it took three 
hours. Then they reached me, and at the time I was deliberating whether to run in the 
municipal elections in El’ad.’ 
This was a few years after Michal’s realisation of her socialist beliefs. She had joined 
Avodah, but had not yet become politically active in the party. 
‘And then they reached me and I was the last in the circle,’ Michal continued. ‘So I said a 
few words, and then I said, “Ok, I've decided to run.” It was at that moment that I decided. 
Because I suddenly felt that I was not alone. Because that was the issue. And then I said, 
“Wow, what I am seeing here— I'm not the only one who thinks like this!” And I remember 
that the strongest thing I received from that circle was that suddenly I understood. Earlier I 
spoke about the weird, about not wanting to be the weird one. Suddenly you understand that 
everyone thinks like me. So it wasn't everyone, but there was a whole circle of women and it 
was like – everybody is having the same thoughts. It wasn't that their political views were 
like mine but that they were talking about it at all. It’s not only politics, it’s like— and I think 
that this experience was shared by everyone. Of women who previously had not spoken to 
anyone. And then we had lots of sessions like that. It was like a support group. And it doesn't 
matter what happened with it afterwards. It dissolved, it came together again. Lots of things. 
But it was— that group was very significant.’ 
Michal had been so afraid to act on her new ideals for so long; this was nearly twenty 
years after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, which had begun it all for her. The simple act 
of joining this circle, hearing others confess critiques of Haredi society and being open about 
their struggles, Michal knew that she was not alone in her internal conflict. She saw other 




from the Haredi unified identity of politics and religion. This gave her the strength to decide 
to take the risk to run for office within her community. 
‘And then when I ran in El’ad,’ Michal continues, ‘afterwards it was a type of coming 
out. I am a Haredi woman and I'm involved in politics. It was for the local council. It was the 
first time that a Haredi woman had run, really the first time. …In El’ad it was an independent 
list.’ 
Though she had joined Avodah by this time, and was becoming more active in leadership 
there, the Labour Party had no presence in the all-Haredi city of El’ad. Michal ran as an 
independent, not associated with any party; she did not win. She says she never intended to. 
‘Because that was my intention to begin with,’ she says, to my question about her lack of 
success. ‘Even when I ran in El’ad I said, let's make a stop on the way.’ 
Michal knew she would not be able to win; she ran for municipal council simply because 
she wanted to break the barrier, and create a precedent. Someone had to be the first Haredi 
woman to run for municipal council, and Michal decided she would take on that role. 
Winning did not matter; running was an end in itself. This outlook is similar to Esti’s position 
in the previous chapter that a women’s movement, like Nivcharot, must come before a 
woman’s party, like Ubizchutan. Like Esti, Michal has a conception of the long-term project 
of change. 
‘Even today there are no female Haredi council members anywhere,’ she explains. ‘There 
were none and there are none. Nothing. Ruth Colian wanted to run but didn't in the end. 
Racheli Ifenboim wanted to run and didn't in the end. … This time there was Pnina Pfeuffer 
in Jerusalem. Who didn't run in the end. There were several Haredi women but none got in. 
Unbelievable.’ 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ruth wanted to run for municipal council in Petach 




who ran for municipal council in Jerusalem, but ultimately withdrew before the election due 
to community pressure. Pnina Pfeuffer is another Haredi woman who is a member of Avodah, 
and she was also pressured not to run in Jerusalem. 
‘Through the Haredi parties it is impossible,’ Michal continues, ‘and don't think it’s that 
easy even through the non-Haredi parties. I had a friend in Kfar Yona [a mixed city of both 
religious and secular Jews] who wanted to run for the local elections in Kfar Yona and she 
nearly got into one of the non-religious lists, but they simply didn't want her there. In the 
party, some of the non-religious members said: We don't want you on the list. Like, you have 
several representatives, there are several Shas representatives… we don't care about your 
problems, we won't put another Haredi woman in the council and then you'll vote with the 
Haredim. Like, tomorrow we'll want to open a Reform synagogue – how will you vote? And 
then they sort of said: the issue of not having Haredi women on the list. Why should I be the 
one to replace you? Not everyone says it but there everyone said it.’ 
In Kfar Yona, Michal’s friend was unable to run with the non-religious party ultimately 
because they did not believe she would honour the party’s values over her own religious 
ethics. The non-religious party did not want to disrupt the balance of power on the city 
council between the secular and the religious by including a Haredi woman on their list. This 
serves to upset the representation offered by Bina previously, that Haredi women can simply 
run with Left Wing parties. Rather, there is great distrust within the Left of anyone religious, 
and this is something which Michal and others have had to overcome. 
‘And with Pnina Pfeuffer in Jerusalem it was the same story,’ Michal adds. ‘Because 
when they united – her party dissolved and then they put her in another party. And they did 
not assign her a realistic place on purpose because they didn't want any trouble with the 
Haredi parties. What do you think? It’s the same story now with Omer Yankelevich. They 




even when she does speak she says, “No, I won't speak about Haredi issues.” In the few 
sentences she did say, she didn't even say the word Haredim. She said, in the clip where she 
was given two sentences, “I represent Israel's social periphery.” Because she didn't want any 
trouble with the Haredi parties. Simply unbelievable.’ 
Like Pnina and Racheli, Omer has also been pressured politically. She was formerly a 
member of Tkuma, and was then a member of the Blue and White, but in both situations the 
party of which she has been a member has felt it more urgent to preserve the relationship with 
the Haredi parties, with whom they often form a coalition. Omer and Pnina, beyond feeling 
pressure individually from the Haredi parties, have also seen the parties of which they are 
members succumb to pressure from the Haredi parties. Yet Michal recognises the leadership 
and roles of these women, and the steps they have made in opening politics to Haredi women. 
‘And from then on I really think about saying, speak out,’ Michal says. ‘Like, speak out 
and you will discover that your neighbour shares your thoughts. But it’s the hardest thing. 
Even today it’s hardest to talk to your neighbour. Harder than speaking in the newspaper. 
Like, I can't explain it. For me, not for everyone. For me personally. It’s always the hardest. 
It’s the hardest with the family… Because with them you don't want to develop a 
confrontation. But funnily enough, if you speak out, then – it’s not that you will agree about 
everything, but suddenly you understand that on many issues you think the same.’ 
Michal understands both the power of leadership, and the pressure of the community. She 
did not speak honestly about her political beliefs for decades within her family, for fear of 
creating conflict. She knows others feel the same and fear they are alone. The women’s circle 
run by Esti Shushan helped Michal to see that she was not the only person who questioned 
the community structure and the expectations of the religious identity which is also a political 
identity, and this gave her the confidence to run for office. By running for office and taking 




critiques to see that they are not alone. Her newfound confidence in her political identity, 
which she can hold within her and still maintain a religiously Haredi identity, creates a new 
example of Haredi personhood for others. 
‘And then all of this, it was also an opportunity to get to know the entire sphere of Haredi 
social activists,’ Michal says, ‘both men and women, who are introducing lots of changes 
within Haredi society. And it sort of pulled me back home…. It like really took me back, like 
a little, into struggles within Haredi society. And I think that today I am sort of one foot there 
and one here. And I think that my contribution to this entire story of the Haredi activists … 
may really be first of all talking about the political aspects. Because most people occupy 
themselves with the civil areas – education …, employment, sexual abuse, etc. So the 
discourse focuses a great deal on civil society, and making the political connection is 
something that— today it’s done more often. But I made that connection from the beginning. 
And also the issues of – you know, when talking about solutions – to bring the social-
democrat solutions, that's very significant. 
‘Oh no, before that also – do you remember the social-democrat course [at the Knesset]? 
So we held it for Haredim. We have already had four mixed groups of both male and female 
Haredim. …We have more than one hundred graduates.’ 
Michal now runs classes designed specifically for Haredim to become educated about 
social democracy within Israel. These classes are non-partisan classes run by the Knesset to 
promote understanding of the government and help Haredi people begin to understand how to 
form their own perspectives on politics and political participation.  
‘Something else about the New Haredim [the New Middle Class] is that they say, “Okay, 
I'm no longer in the Haredi parties,”’ Michal explains. ‘So suddenly you start thinking about 
other things. “So, wait a minute, am I Left or Right?” I sort of think that I gave them that 




minute, am I Left Wing?” It’s sort of saying, you can be both religious and Left. It’s like 
giving an option, that's the most important.’ 
Michal knows that her leadership allows the possibility of imagining oneself as both 
Haredi and Left Wing. She recognises that young people, and even adults, will see her 
leadership and realise that it is ok to feel politically progressive, Left Wing, or Socialist. 
‘Then we founded the Haredi group in Avodah,’ Michal concludes. ‘That's something, 
too. That's what I was saying about options.’ 
This group includes Michal and Pnina, among others, including Haredi men. There are 
left-wing Haredi leaders emerging. These people are not, however, completely ostracised, 
and the broader mission of developing a political consciousness is not an anathema to the 
Haredi mainstream institutions. 
‘These days I sit on panels,’ Michal tells me. She is part of a group of religious women 
politicians, from all political perspectives, who are invited to speak at seminaries and 
women’s academic programs. The mission of the group is simply to develop independent 
thought around political issues. The group speaks at Haredi institutions, but also at Chardal 
and Dati Leumi institutions. Within these religious Zionist institutions, it is sometimes even 
more difficult to imagine being Left Wing. 
‘I’m constantly being sent… to all the West Bank settlements,’ Michal says with 
amusement. ‘It seems that no one wants to go. Last week I was in Ariel, Kfar Edumim, and 
Ma’ale Edumim. Teens, that's the hardest. High school students. For them everything is black 
or white. It’s crazy. And really like, in Ma’ale Edumim, every time I came: booing. You start. 
Yelling in the audience. The principal was shocked. At one stage the principal took the 
microphone and said, “Please respect everyone here. They came to speak to us and you will 
respect them.” And then when he finished I took the microphone and said, “Yell, yell, it’s 




Ariel, first I was at the Efrata college. Do you know about the Efrata college? All the [all-
female] students have these tall kerchiefs. Very West Bank. All settlers. I don't know. It’s like 
very Chardali. So I'm sitting there. It was also the people who were sitting in the panel. To 
my left was Orit Strook [Tkuma and Bayit haYehudi], to my right Shuli Mualem [Bayit 
haYehudi and HaYemin HaChedash, the New Right], and then a few more Right Wing 
[types]. All religious, all women, and all Right Wing, and me – Avodah. So I started by 
saying to them, “Girls, I having nothing to say to you, I don't want to convince you, nothing. 
I just want to say that it’s possible, you can be both religious and Left Wing.” And it was a 
crazy panel, really far out. But I think that is what it means. It’s giving the option. Not only 
for religious people. In certain places in the periphery, not everywhere, I mean, calling 
someone left-wing is a curse.” 
Michal knows her leadership, and the leadership of others like her, will break down the 
entanglement of religious and political identities which has grown so complex in the religious 
world, and not only in the Haredi sector. Michal understands that leadership is about 
examples, and that by seeing examples, she is allowing change to happen, though it may be 
invisible and likely will not have an impact for many years. She is helping others to pick 
apart their political identities from their religious identities. By offering an alternative and 
allowing the world to see the possibility of a Haredi woman who is also politically 
independent, she is imagining a new future for the Haredi world, for the greater religious 
world, and therefore for Israel. 
 
Going Far Right 
 
Not everyone who undergoes this process of picking apart their identities resolves into a 




include, after all, skeins of Fascism as much as they do the Left Wing values discussed 
above. The resurgence of the Right, in Israel as elsewhere, has arisen from a confoundment 
of nationalism and the state (Asad 2003, 177). When one must be nationalistic in order to 
ethically and morally participate in the polity, the Right flourishes. Dalsheim (2019), Lavie 
(2018), and Shohat (2017) all suggest that Zionism is fundamental to participation and 
inclusion in the state of Israel. This is complicated by the conundrum of secularism: the 
secular project seeks to both value the individual (and individual ‘rights’ therein), and it 
seeks to be collectivist in its morals, ethics, and values (Asad 2003, 178). Thus, secular 
democracies struggle to escape a majority, which the state has perpetuated and perpetuates 
the state, and which dominates all other minorities. In the current state of Israel, Dati Leumi, 
Religious Zionism, has become the dominant majority, and Haredim remain a minority 
(Dalsheim 2019, 190). The Dati Leumi are probably most aptly compared to the Islamist 
movements which parallel these changes in Muslim post-colonial countries (Asad 2003, 195-
200), in that extreme nationalism is combined with religion to generate new types of religious 
personhood. 
Though Dati Leumi identity is fundamentally opposite to formations of Haredi identity 
more than a century ago, it is nonetheless a close relative to the Haredim, as it still includes 
fairly strict religious observance (which naturally varies across the population). Due to the 
changes discussed extensively in Chapter Four, the National Religious community has 
become less of a pariah within certain parts of the Haredi world, especially the New Haredi 
Middle Class. Furthermore, ba’alei teshuvah are part of this shift in acceptance of certain 
aspects of National Religious life; for as they introduce this idea of a religious identity which 
is separate from the political, they also introduce ideologies in which they wish religion to be 
more a part of the Jewish state (Dalsheim 2019, 131-135). Ruth Colian’s support of the 




uncompromising Haredi values to the administration of the nation. Indeed, secular parents in 
Israel today are sometimes more concerned about their child becoming religious for the 
political implications, than for the religious aspects— though generally they are more open to 
see their children become Dati than to become Haredi (Ibid., 69). Today, the expected way to 
be a member of the Israel polity is to be Jewish, Zionist, and religious (Ibid.). This 
necessarily makes one a member of the political Right (Asad 2003, 177). 
The re-integration of religion into national identity in Israel is attractive to Haredim, 
because it seems to be a triumph of religion (Dalsheim 2019, 196). Ultimately, though, this is 
actually a triumph of the state projects, and nationalist ideologies (Ibid.). Remember, as 
Shohat (2017) and Lavie (2018) have argued, to be Israeli is to be not Arab. Thus, the ‘moral 
panic’ of Trump and the Muslim ban become attractive to building a Zionist identity (Asad 
2018, 142-143), and the liberal value of equality is transformed into the neoliberal idea of the 
‘right to compete on equal terms’ (Ibid., 26-27). Certain authoritarian outlooks are justified 
through liberal values, and the Right becomes a product of secular liberalism. 
One of the most significant state projects of the neoliberal Right in Israel (Dalsheim 
2019) is the proliferation of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories of the West 
Bank. Haredim started moving to settlements in the West Bank in the 1990s. The Haredi 
community was in desperate need of affordable housing, and the state offered them new cities 
in four different settlements: Beitar Illit, Modi’in Illit, Tel Zion, and Emanuel (Cahaner 2017, 
112-113). The state offer was initially viewed with ambivalence, as living over the Green 
Line suggested a problem for Haredi opposition to political Zionism (Ibid., 114-115). 
However, most Haredi leaders ultimately embraced the option, not least because it was the 
first time that the state had recognised Haredi self-segregation as legitimate (Ibid., 115). 
However, this was a single instance in which the interests of the religious minority 




Haredim into a tool for the state’s neoliberal expansionist project (Ibid.). Rather than the 
Haredi high fertility being a burden on the state, the state could transform this fertility for its 
own interests. 
Despite the fact that the majority of Haredi people who move to the settlements imbue 
their choice with no political significance, the move to the settlements is accredited with 
shifting Haredi politics to the Right (Cahaner 2017, Dalsheim 2019). Essentially, the move to 
the settlements is seen as a process to ‘radicalise’ the Haredi populace (Cahaner 2017, 119). 
Dalsheim notes that in her recent research in Jerusalem, Haredi individuals were now heavily 
involved in the Temple Institute, and extreme Right Religious Zionist organisation 
(associated with the Chardal not the Dati Leumi) which seeks to regain the Temple Mount 
area for Jewish use (Dalsheim 2019, 73).  
I would suggest, however, that there are more complex reasons at play both for the 
choices Haredi people make to move to the settlements, and the reasons for their sympathies 
with Right Wing political movements. Just as the choice to wear the veil and make obvious 
one’s religious identity is a form of resistance to secularism by provoking secular anxieties 
(Nilüfer 2010, 257-258), so are certain choices on the fringes of Haredi life a form of 
resistance. The non-Haredi settlements are known for their openness and acceptance to Jews 
who otherwise have trouble integrating into Jewish religious communities (Egorova 2015, 
499). While this serves the Zionist ideal of The Ingathering (Shohat 2017), it nonetheless 
offers real alternatives to certain people who struggle in Haredi communal living. In addition, 
many Mizrahim were forced into moving to the settlements for the cheap housing, like the 
Haredim (and indeed there may well be overlap between the two), and because the Right 
made this possible, they now feel a certain loyalty to the politics of the parties who made it 
possible for them to have a higher quality of life (Lavie 2018, 66-68). These complexities 




women who lived in Haredi-only settlements like Beitar and Tel Zion, the women featured 
below all lived in non-Haredi-specific settlements. They also exhibited ethics and values that 
were Haredi, but political identities which were Right, sometimes perhaps Far Right. 
‘I was so proud,’ Shaindel offered, out of the blue, as we were sitting outside a building 
where a rehearsal was about to begin. ‘Last night there was a problem at the edge of [the 
settlement in the West Bank where she lives], and my oldest son, he’s eighteen now, going to 
kollel after Simchas Torah, he didn’t hesitate: he grabbed the rifle to join his father and the 
other men. He and his friends have new ideas that they’re trying to make happen where we 
live.’ 
This was the first time I encountered a Haredi woman talking about actively participating 
in violence, specifically violence against Palestinians, in the context of the settler movement. 
Once I had a chance to process what Shaindel was telling me, I started to be concerned. Was 
Shaindel not Haredi? Maybe she identified as Chardal? I needed to understand better what 
was going on in Shaindel’s family, and with her identity. I asked her why they moved to the 
settlement. 
‘We wanted that freedom,’ she explains, ‘but it was the best decision we ever made as a 
family. We love our community and our neighbours, and my husband loves davening by their 
shul on shabbos. But we sent them [the children] to school in Jerusalem. My husband still 
learns by his rav in the yeshiva here [in Jerusalem]. We wanted them at a hashkafically 
Haredi school. We are Haredi, but we love where we live.’ 
Shaindel’s choice to refer to the synagogue in the settlement as ‘their’ shul, rather than 
‘our’ shul, serves to underscore her sense of Haredi identity as separate from the identity of 
her neighbours, who are majority Chardali. She is conscious of her choice and purposefully 
pursues maintaining the Litvish Haredi religious identity of her family and her children 




to explore other aspects of her identity based on where she lives. I asked about the pride she 
feels for her sons, and the ‘new ideas’ that her oldest son is espousing. It seems he is 
particularly enamoured of a particular young rabbi in the settlement who preaches the 
expansion of Jewish settlements into the area ‘from the Jordan River to the Euphrates.’ This 
is a biblically rationalised extreme version of Zionism which is espoused only by Far Right 
groups like the Jewish Defense League. Shaindel, so purposefully committed to a religious 
identity established by hashkafically Haredi institutions, is proud of her son who is at the 
very least sympathetic with political groups classified by Israel as terrorist organisations, if 
not actually one himself. Shaindel, like Michal, has disentangled her political identity from 
her religious identity, though unlike Michal, she has politically found sympathy with the Far 
Right, rather than the Left Wing socialists. 
Shaindel was not the only person I encountered who had gravitated to the right politically. 
Grune is a Breslever Hasidic woman, and an aguna, a woman who is waiting for her husband 
to grant her a Jewish divorce, a gett. Grune grew up within the very devout Hasidic 
community of Breslev in Mea Shearim. She is the fourth of nine children, all daughters, and 
she met her husband once before marrying him when she was eighteen. He learns in the 
Breslev yeshiva in Mea Shearim. The Breslev are an unusual Hasidic sect, and they are often 
ostracised by the rest of the Hasidic groups, because they currently lack a rebbe. Many 
Breslev are ‘messianic’ Breslevers, who believe that their deceased rebbe is the messiah. 
Some Breslev are Chardali, rather than Haredi. The community in Mea Shearim, however, is 
the most pure type of Breslev, strictly adhering to only the traditional chassidus, and they 
firmly resist Zionism. Grune was raised within this purist Breslev community, and her 
husband with whom she made a shidduch was equally as parochial a Breslever. 
‘He was very shtark,’ she tells me, using the Yiddish word for extreme religious 




Whereas in most Hasidic households, women manage the finances, and have some 
independence when running their own households, Grune said her husband became very 
controlling after marriage, asking her how she spent every shekel. ‘We weren’t rich, but I 
wasn’t spending stupidly,’ she tells me. ‘And it only got worse after my first son was born.’ 
Grune said that her husband’s intensity and strictness translated into severe and 
unrealistic expectations for her sons’ achievements in school. She tells me that it was most 
difficult for her oldest son; while the others felt the pressure, all of her husband’s focus fell 
on the oldest boy. 
‘No matter what he did, it wasn’t enough,’ Grune says. ‘And so he didn’t have the power 
in himself to do well. No belief in himself. And he became a more and more difficult 
student.’ 
When her oldest son was sixteen, he dropped out of yeshiva. Grune’s husband kicked him 
out of the house. 
‘I knew then, it was my choice to make, my children or my husband,’ Grune says. ‘But I 
had eleven children by then, and the youngest was only six months old. It wasn’t easy to just 
leave him.’ 
Grune made a plan on her own, without the help of any of the community organisations 
that exist to assist women in abusive marriages. She is a musician, and I met her through 
other musicians; she knew some women who were Chardali Breslevers and musicians, living 
with their family in a settlement.26 For six months, she saved shekels by buying a cheaper 
chicken for shabbos without her husband knowing; she gave half of what she saved to her 
son, who was still living on the street. At the end of six months, she took eight of her ten 
children onto a bus one evening while her husband was studying at the yeshiva, and she went 
 
26 Breslev have many splinter groups. Some Breslever groups are more Chardal, rather than Haredi 
(Cahaner 2017, 113), and some participate in aggressive expansionist settler movements, as will be discussed. 
The Breslev group in Mea Sharim, in which Grune was raised, is very Haredi and will have nothing to do with 




to the settlement, and her friends’ house. She stayed with her friends for a week, and then the 
settlement leaders found a way to move her and her children into a trailer on the settlement. 
‘And then my son came home,’ she tells me with tears in her eyes. 
The two children whom she left at home were her next oldest boys. She wanted them to 
continue their yeshiva studies, which they would not be able to do in the settlement. Her 
second oldest, a girl, helped her coordinate the move to the settlement; she has recently 
married a young Chardali Breslever in the settlement community. Her statement that her 
oldest son came home is a mild exaggeration; he now lives rough on hilltops in the West 
Bank. 
‘I am very, very proud of him,’ she tells me. ‘He has fire back in him now.’ 
Her son has, essentially, become one of the so-called Hilltop Youth. These are 
disorganised bands of teenagers, often yeshiva and high school drop-outs. They, and others 
like them, participate in so-called ‘Price Tag Attacks’ in which they vandalise Palestinian 
property and sometimes attack people bodily (Dalsheim 2019, 69). They are radicalised; 
Dalsheim suggests that they participate in a form of ‘anti-Zionism’ which suggests that the 
state doesn’t always have the best interests of the Jewish people at heart (Ibid., xiv). Tzfadia 
offers a gentler interpretation, suggesting that they adhere to a very radicalised version of 
their parents’ National Religious ideology (Tzfadia 2017, 102). I believe the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle of these two interpretations: they are radicalised, anti-state terrorists 
who adhere to an extreme interpretation of Zionism. They perpetrate violence against both 
Palestinians and the IDF, who are often called upon to force them to abandon these make-
shift forts which they create. Grune’s son was nineteen at the time of our conversations, but 
she would prefer he continue his activities within these extreme groups, rather than serving in 
the IDF. 




police are looking for him,’ Grune says. They may be looking for him on criminal charges 
associated with his Hilltop activities, as well as his draft dodging, though she does not admit 
this. 
Grune is proud of her son, and happy to live in a Chardali, somewhat aggressively violent 
settlement, while maintaining her Haredi identity. She still speaks Yiddish at home, though 
she has improved her Modern Hebrew skills over the years she has lived in the West Bank. 
She wants her sons to learn in the yeshiva of the Breslevers in Mea Shearim; though she 
worries about her next two older sons, especially given the pressure they feel from their 
father, she tells me that she is happy that they are doing what they should be doing as Hasidic 
men. She is unsure of how her two youngest sons will be educated, though she would prefer 
they attend Haredi institutions. They are currently aged ten and four, and attend the local 
branch of Talmud Torah, which is hashkafically National Religious. 
I ask her about her daughters’ education and shidduchim. 
Grune laughs. ‘For girls it makes no difference,’ she tells me. ‘Who cares about their 
school? First you are maidele [little girl] and then you are veib [wife].’ 
Grune suggests that the differences between streams of Orthodox Judaism only matter for 
men, who must learn; for women, there is no difference because all Jewish women are wives 
and mothers first. Yet, her insistence on maintaining Yiddish in the home, and indeed the 
Yiddish she uses to converse with me, suggests that she maintains a Haredi identity for 
herself, while living in a Chardali settlement. 
Grune represents the bottom fringe of Haredi society, which Michal described in her 
description of the class breakdown of Haredim. Her son is a drop-out and she is an aguna, 
two markers of exclusion from the Haredi mainstream. Her identity is also fragmenting, but 
this is a result of social exclusion, deprivation, and trauma; in order to find a way to be proud 




disadvantage within the Haredi shidduch system, and so she is happy to see them make 
matches within the Chardali community, because at least they will then have the chance to 
fulfil their roles as women by becoming wives and mothers. Shaindel, in contrast, has been 
more purposeful in her choices and her maintenance of her Haredi identity, while embracing 
the ideology of her chosen community. Both represent ways in which the Haredi world is 
fragmenting into the Far Right; these choices also need to be considered when imagining the 
future of the Haredi world in Israel. 
Clearly, Grune and Shaindel are extreme examples in their Far Right beliefs. They have 
both unravelled their religious identities from their political identities, like Michal. Though 
Grune was somewhat forced into this situation, she uses what agency she does possess to 
maintain the threads of her Haredi identity, through using Yiddish in the home, and 
prioritising her sons’ yeshiva study. Shaindel’s unravelling and re-knitting was done more 
purposefully, and is bound up with her critique of the suffocating nature of Haredi 
community living. She has adopted extreme Right yarns into her political identity block in 
her scarf, which is perhaps what makes her an exceptional example. There is, however, a 
gradual tendency towards the Right and Zionist ideology in the mainstream of the Haredi 
world, and the process is no different, if less extreme. This is a significant result of the move 
of the Haredim to West Bank settlements; when the Haredim became a tool of the 
expansionist project, they also became open to the influences of the conflict which they had 
thus far avoided (Dalsheim 2019). When questions about state security became relevant to 
the safety of Haredim, then it became almost necessary to invest in certain Right Wing 
ideologies; and if given a choice between a Zionist and an anti-Zionist, the mainstream 






Political and Social Futures: Diverse Haredi Politics 
 
In this chapter, we have examined Michal’s and Shaindel’s processes of picking apart 
their enmeshed Haredi political and religious identities, creating new types of Haredi ethical 
personhood in which Haredi religious values can coexist alongside a spectrum of political 
beliefs and identities. Michal has suggested that the progressive and conservative political 
philosophical spectrum is rooted in deep theological differences; those who invest in human 
agency in order to achieve redemption engage in progressive philosophical processes, while 
those who remove their own agency based on a belief in preordination are more suited to 
conservative political thinking.  
This reflects the deep philosophical differences discussed in the previous chapter between 
Esti and Ruth. Ruth invests in the purity of Haredi values, refusing to work with non-Haredi 
groups in order to, as she puts it, secure the trust of the Haredi women she hopes to serve. 
This viewpoint extends to her overall political perspective, in which she applies Haredi 
values to the nation as a whole, and how she believes a ‘Jewish’ state should govern its 
people. Ruth has, essentially, maintained the unity of her political and religious identity; she 
is philosophically liberal only in the limited ways in which her feminist ideology is not in 
conflict with her traditional Haredi ethical personhood. 
Esti is more willing to cooperate with other groups, and work outside the Haredi value 
structure in order to achieve her feminist goals. She and Michal also share a similar outlook 
about recognising the difference between religion and the state, and separating their Haredi 
identity and values from how the country should be governed. This suggests that the liberal 
ideology of  ‘substitutability’ has entered into the value system of Michal and Esti: 
substitutability is the belief that each voter has equal rights to their beliefs in a democratic 
system (Asad 2013, 18). Michal believes, for instance, that there should be public 




fact, Michal suggests that there should be mandatory civil marriage available to all people 
within Israel, and that each couple can then pursue a religious marriage according to their 
beliefs as they see fit. 
In order to be comfortable with this, it is necessary to have done the work which Michal 
has, of picking apart one’s political beliefs from one’s religious identity. However, this 
picking apart does not necessarily lead one to progressive political attitudes, as Shaindel’s 
situation has illustrated. Shaindel has picked apart her religious identity from her political 
attitudes in order to embrace Far Right Zionist politics and practices, while maintaining 
Haredi religious values and ethics. Shaindel also believes in the imminence of the messiah, 
and so Michal’s suggestion that the conservative outlook aligns with this type of messianic 
thinking perhaps holds, though Shaindel also embraces a certain amount of human agency in 
her understanding of bringing redemption; she, however, sees the agency of Jews living in 
the areas of Judea and Samaria as one of the components which bring redemption. In this 
agency, too, we see that Zionist messianism is not necessarily the ‘sit-and-wait’ ideology of 
the conservatives of the Haredi world. This is her Zionist political viewpoint; it is 
fundamentally Right Wing, but it is not necessarily conservative. It is liberal in its source and 
values, and Right in its orientation. Shaindel, like Ruth, would encourage more religious 
values be included in the administration of the nation state, because Jewish religious ethics 
are necessarily entwined with her nationalism. 
Ultimately, these differences will all become part of the spectrum of approaches within 
the Haredi community; Haredi will have many strands, rather than the stringently driven 
unity under which the Haredi world was formed in the twentieth century. There will be 
Haredi ethics which will permeate each of these strands, but there will be increasingly diverse 
approaches to Haredi identity politically and socially. A mainstream Haredi establishment 




nonetheless be changed by the world around it.  
‘But that's how I raise my children,’ Michal says. ‘I know that today they still accept it 
[the Haredi mainstream] but as they grow it becomes a struggle between what they learn at 
school and what I teach them…. Like, I always tell them— even small things, like that there 
are secular religious people. What do I mean by secular religious? Like the traditional and all 
that, that there are all kinds of ways of being religious and that a woman can wear pants but 
be religious. And also about, let's say, non-Jews and Jews. I also talk to them about Muslims, 
I explain to them. I mean – I don't explain the entire theology but I do explain that there are 
other religions and all that. But it’s bad religious education. I mean, in religious education 
you're supposed to raise your children to think that this is the truth and everything else is shit. 
I'll tell you why. Because if you start debating what is the truth then maybe you will end up 
like me and then they'll turn out non-religious.’ 
Michal grins. 
Esti, however, has seen her daughter rebel against her feminist ideals. ‘Still my daughter 
is taught [in the Chardal school] that the significant destiny of your life is to be a mother, I 
heard this. And I am afraid that my daughter will buy into this ideology. And she is now 
about nineteen, and she is trying to find what she is going to study, now that she has done her 
National Service. Next year she’s going to find a course to study in the university and she has 
all the opportunities open, not like me, I had nothing! But she’s very confused. She told me 
something that hurt me a little bit. She told me, “Why do you try to fulfil your dreams 
through me? Like, you had your dreams, and you cannot fulfil them, and you are looking at 
me and wanting me to fulfil them.” I told her, “You don’t have to fulfil any dream of mine, I 
just want you to do your best because I know your skills, I know what you can do.” But it’s 
something that I’m thinking about. It’s always that the next generation has to rebel against 




have children, but maybe they didn’t appreciate it. … If it was just her, she would prefer to 
get married now, and to become a mother. But I told her, “You cannot get married now. You 
have to learn something, just to start, to see the world.”’ 
Esti’s daughter wants a traditional life for herself, but even with her rebellion, she has 
participated in National Service, something not many Haredi women do. Esti’s oldest son 
was serving in the army at the time of research, and she said he has always wanted to do so. 
Of course these choices are influenced by the schools which Esti’s children attended; they 
were excluded from Haredi schools because of her activism. However, Bina suggests that 
Haredi service in the Army is not such an unbelievable concept.  
‘Look, when they instituted the Haredi draft, they made a big mistake,’ she tells me, 
reflecting on the upheaval in 2017 surrounding the Knesset attempts to end army exemptions 
for the Haredi world. ‘If they had come to the rabbis first, they would have found out how 
easy it could have been to work something out. It’s not that far off, Haredim in the army! 
Many of us are not necessarily that against it. Look, we chose to move to this country. We 
could have stayed in New York, we were fine there, we weren’t unhappy. So it’s not like we 
don’t get that at some point we may have to do our part. But the people in the Knesset who 
wanted this to happen didn’t even approach us. They didn’t come to Shas, or the aguda 
[Agudas Yisrael], or any of the great rabbanim— it just shows why they did it. They didn’t 
do it because they really wanted the Haredim in the army, they did it to turn the Haredim into 
another scapegoat again.’ 
Bina suggests that the institution of the Haredi draft was a political move rather than an 
action on the plan to integrate Haredim into Israeli society. Ultimately, it created the Haredim 
as an enemy, an ‘other’, in the eyes of the secular and National Religious communities in 
Israel, and did not serve to significantly increase Haredi enlistment. Bina would say that it 




the key to Haredi integration into mainstream Israeli society. Michal disagrees, as discussed 
in Chapter Four. 
‘It’s necessary to understand that the true correction needs to be made in the educational 
system,’ Michal declares. ‘That's something that we encouraged in our campaign. I mean I 
really think that the solution—. First of all I have to say, I think that it’s not fair, the current 
situation is not fair. It makes no sense that some people have to enlist and others don't. Let's 
put that on the table – it’s not just and not fair any way you look at it. But there's a matter that 
if you ask me, like the story with education that we haven't talked about. The Haredi 
educational system too is outside the Israeli educational system. It’s like, if you want to bring 
us into Israeli society start with the educational system. Until the educational system becomes 
part of the government system….’ 
She doesn’t finish her thought, and moves on to the next idea. 
Reform of the Haredi educational system has already begun; as discussed in Chapter 
Four, there are new schools which combine better secular studies and bagrut preparation with 
hashkafically Haredi religious studies, and these schools are becoming more and more 
acceptable to Haredi parents. While the reforms of the type which Michal would choose may 
still be somewhat far off, the pluralisation and fragmentation of the Haredi world that is 
currently happening will allow more opportunities for these changes to occur in the future. As 
these strands of the Haredi world become more diverse and wide-ranging, this will also only 
serve to increase the mixing of Haredim with other streams of religious Jews.  
‘So in the past, indeed…,’ Michal says thoughtfully. ‘You know, Rabbi Kook [a 
Religious Zionist leader] was just like the Rabbi of Gur. He was very frum. There was a time 
when indeed – the Religious Zionists were more "light", Modern Orthodox. The Haredim are 
ultra-orthodox. But today it’s not true because today – you have within Religious Zionism 




and very light. So the difference is in the attitude to the State. And now that, too, is no longer 
true, because that, too, has been breached. Because there are Religious Zionists who no 
longer believe in all the business of the sacred state, and there are Haredim who are becoming 
more Zionist. So everything has become… it’s getting mixed up. It’s very very complex.’ 
In many ways, the Haredi world is changing to be more reflective of the type of religious 
life that existed before the Second World War. Michal is correct: the Religious Zionist 
movement and the creation of the Haredi identity throughout the nineteenth century were 
never very far distant; often, within a single family one brother became a Zionist leader and 
one brother became an aguda rabbi, as discussed in Chapter Two. Today, the Religious 
Zionist world is facing similar types of increasing stringencies involving the erasure of 
women, and increasing emphasis on modest dress. Meanwhile, the Haredi world has become 
less clearly resistant to the State and Zionism. Furthermore, there is a possibility now for 
adoption of left-wing, socialist, and progressive ideologies while maintaining religious 
ethical personhood. The distinctions and categories of the past are gradually being rendered 
more and more irrelevant and obsolete as people embrace complexities in their own 
identities, in their lives, and in their communities. 
Though both the Right and the Left are products of the liberal secular democratic state, 
the two choices have very different implications. Michal’s Leftism believes in pluralism; 
though we have yet to envision how true pluralism may be achieved (Mahmood 2016), her 
pursuit of this ideal results in conversations between those with disparate minority agendas, 
and political action against violence and war. Shaindel, Grune, and their sons’ Far Right 
choices result in deaths of Palestinians. Even those who are less extreme still participate in 
Right Wing politics which seek to displace non-Jewish people within the boundaries of the 
Israeli nation-state. This fundamental, practical difference must matter in considering the 




2013, about 15% of Haredim in Israel live in the Occupied Territories, and about 30% of the 
settlers living in the West Bank were Haredi (Cahaner 2017, 113). Today, that number is 
much, much higher. Furthermore, Haredi decisions about the Left and the Right contribute to 
the future role of religion in the state of Israel. Will the Haredim who lean Right, and who 
wish to apply religious values to the nation, become a more significant voting force? Those 
who think like Michal are in the minority presently. Those who are more like Ruth and 
Shaindel are the natural political allies of the National Religious, and together they form a 
formidable force in determining the future role of religion and the state. As the Haredim 
approach 16% of the Israeli population by 2030 (‘Statistical Report’ 2018, 4-5), these are not 




This chapter has concerned the process of picking apart the religious and political aspects 
of identity which is happening for so many in the Haredi world. It is the result of negotiation 
of state pressures and secular exposures; there are multiple reasons for which people choose 
to subscribe to certain secular ethics, and the ethnography explored herein illustrates why the 
secular and the religious are not mutually exclusive. Women are at the centre of these 
negotiations, as the mediators of the secular and the religious. Their acts of knitting in secular 
strands in the scarf of Haredi society can be considered a liberalising process. These 
liberalising processes do not necessarily produce ‘Liberal’ Haredim; rather, the same liberal 
secular processes lead some Haredim to align themselves with either the Left or the Right. In 
picking apart their politics from their Haredi identities, some Haredim choose to view their 
religious identity on parity with other forms of identity, and do not feel that their religious 
ethics should be applied universally to the state. They invest in the secular concept of religion 




further enmesh the religious in the national, and wish the state to function in alignment with 
religious ethics. This chapter shows how the constant negotiation of religious ethics with the 
state and the secular has produced new types of Haredi political identities which pose 




Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have argued that the Haredi identity formed as one in which the political 
was entwined with the religious in order to resist secularism, but that through decades of 
negotiation with the state, the political is being separated from the religious and there are 
emerging a range of Haredi political identities. At the centre of these processes of negotiation 
are Haredi women; their roles as protectors of the faith and mediators with the outside world 
give them agency to direct this negotiation. I imagine this negotiation as a form of knitting, in 
which strands of secular yarn are slipped into the Haredi scarf; sometimes, this allows women 
to unravel and re-knit whole sections of the scarf. I began my exploration of Haredi identity 
in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, and ended my discussion in the Occupied 
Territories of the West Bank today. Between these two places and times, I have covered a 
wide range of territory, literally and figuratively. 
I have argued that the roots of Haredi identity came from the organisation of the religious 
world against the Haskallah and the Zionist movements. In order to protect religious 
tradition, leaders had to participate in the political system, and thus formed Agudat Yisrael, 
an organisation that was both political party and religious institution. At the same time, the 
concept of Da’as Torah became a way of extending rabbinical authority over all aspects of 
life; thus, rabbis could become political leaders because Torah wisdom provided wisdom in 
all things. When religious leaders became political, then religious identity became political. 
This was exacerbated after the formation of the state of Israel. Haredim operated as a 
minority in defence of their own interests, and there occurred a gradual increase in stringency 
of interpretation of Jewish laws and traditions. The Haredim needed to distinguish themselves 




religious interpretation from Zionist influences. The Haredim are not anti-Zionist, but they 
are not Zionist. They do not include participation in the Israeli state-making project in their 
observance of Judaism; they do not say Hallel on Independence Day. But only the fringe 
extremists are anti-Zionist. Generally, Haredim are non-Zionist. This negotiation in 
protection of religious ethics from Zionist incursion led to an emphasis on yeshiva study for 
men, both because of the losses of the Holocaust, but also because yeshiva study meant not 
serving in the army. For women, the increase in stringency has meant stricter modesty 
standards; in fact, Haredi piety is constructed around modest docile bodies which are shaped 
into religiously ethical interiors. This emphasis on modesty has specific implications for 
Haredi women who are not Ashkenazi; ethnically different modes of dress and comportment 
became grounds for prejudice and discrimination. Women also must be wives and mothers 
who support their husbands in yeshiva study, which meant more secular education and jobs in 
the secular world. Thus Haredi life continued until around the end of the first decade of this 
century. 
In the new millennium, certain changes began to have significant influence on Haredi life. 
Women’s secular education had improved, but men’s secular education has weakened, and 
this created a gender crisis in the home. Furthermore, men were in a crisis of masculinity 
(Stadler 2009). The rabbis therefore have begun to encourage more secular education for 
men, including a range of options for Haredi boys in hashkafically Haredi schools with more 
secular studies, and by working to open the Haredi campuses of major universities. This 
move represented a negotiation with secular knowledge, to allow more into the community in 
order to maintain religious society. It also represented a negotiation with the state, which 
seeks to transform Haredi men into productive, working citizens (Dalsheim 2019). Another 
change that created more opportunity for Haredim to negotiate with secular values was the 




communities are generally poor, and housing stock in the areas around Jerusalem and Bnei 
Brak are in high demand. Haredim were given the option to move to Haredi-only settlements 
in the West Bank; this represented a negotiation between the values of the religious 
community and the goals of the state. Haredim sacrificed some of their resistance to Zionism 
for affordable housing, and in turn the state recognised their right to self-segregate. The 
Haredim, and their high fertility rates, in turn became a tool for the state expansionist project. 
Because of the housing crunch, Haredim also moved out of Haredi-only neighbourhoods and 
into neighbourhoods with Jews who were religious but not Haredi. This allowed Haredim to 
begin to negotiate new ways of holding religious ethics with secular values and knowledge. 
The influence of ba’alei teshuvah has often been underestimated, but it is significant as well. 
They view their choice as a purely religious one rather than a political one, and bring with 
their entrance into the community a wide range of secular middle class values which the 
Haredi community largely accepts and integrates into religious life for the benefit of the 
community. These changes have led to the creation of the New Haredi Middle Class, in 
which families have one or both parents working in white collar jobs outside the home, 
having earned higher degrees, and therefore bringing home more money. The New Middle 
Class is accepted, and indeed welcomed, by the mainstream establishment, who rely on them 
economically to ensure the Haredi community’s economic future. Thus, the New Middle 
Class represents a form of Haredi identity which is a negotiation of both the secular and the 
religious, and acceptable within Haredi religious ethics. 
Haredi women are some of the most prominent agents of change, not least because they 
are the mediators of secular knowledge for the religious world (Fader 2009). They invest in 
pious forms of agency, including embodying modesty, and prayer. Yet they use agency to 
achieve goals of negotiating certain secular values with religious ethics, in order not to 




includes the adoption of psychology and therapeutics. They critique their society, their 
community leaders, and the stringencies of current practice; yet they do not seek to throw off 
the yolks of patriarchy or the limitations of modesty, and they see certain limits as liberating 
in religiously ethical ways. Haredi agency works to critique certain aspects of society in order 
to produce new forms of Haredi identity which represent negotiations of secular and religious 
values towards a religiously ethical future. 
Unsurprisingly, a feminist movement has emerged as a result of improved women’s 
education in the face of increasingly stringent modesty standards. The activists are 
disproportionately Sephardi and Mizrahi, and they cite the racist discrimination which they 
encountered in the Haredi world as motivation for their feminist activism. The Haredi 
Feminist Movement represents a form of feminism in which religious women apply equal-
rights feminist values to non-religious aspects of life and society, but do not motivate for 
feminist change in any religious roles. This differentiates them from other Jewish feminists. 
They likely benefit from legitimacy and government support in ways which other activist 
movements have been harmed by the same processes. At the same time, this legitimacy 
transforms them into a tool of the state’s secularising project. The Haredi Feminist 
Movement is a study in the negotiation of Haredi ethics, state pressure, and secular values. 
While feminism is by no means accepted in the mainstream parts of the Haredi community, 
there is nonetheless a shift towards less ambivalence, and the ethnography shows that perhaps 
more women harbour secret feminism than did almost a decade ago. Thus, the activists are 
creating change throughout the community, and the community is negotiating with secular 
feminist values. 
In the final chapter, I explored how Haredi people have started to unpick their political 
identities from the religious ethics of being Haredi. This is happening because of the 




Jewish, are exposed to more secular knowledge and values, and have inevitably become tools 
of the state-making project. They begin to view their non-Zionism and religious ethics as part 
of the greater discourse of the Left; or alternatively they begin to integrate Zionist ideology 
into their religious ethics, joining the Religious Zionists of the Right. A certain proportion are 
also influenced by anti-state religious Zionist ideology of the Far Right. These Haredim 
nevertheless maintain their Haredi-ness; they are hashkafically Haredi, not Chardal or Dati 
Leumi. These political splinterings are fundamentally important to the future of the state of 
Israel.  
 
Paths of Inquiry 
 
This thesis has argued that the Haredi community is splitting into strands; becoming 
many different political types within the same religious approach. It is undeniably exciting to 
me to think that this could offer another decade of meaningful research. Whether that will fall 
to me or others remains to be seen. Nonetheless, certain avenues for exploration have been 
posed by this thesis which I have not been able to adequately pursue, either because of time 
or scope or funding. 
First of all, I have always thought that the advent of Hasidism should be explored from 
the perspective of its context in Europe during the Age of Enlightenment. It is fundamentally 
a democratising movement in Judaism, with the Besht’s dictates that all (male) Jews should 
have access to Jewish texts and learning. As I have just argued, religious Jews have always 
been in contact with the outside world, the non-Jew, the non-religious-Jew, and the 
philosophies and trends of thought of their day. To what extent should the Hasidic movement 
be investigated as the first vestige of reform and secular liberal philosophy? In light of that, 




influence study of the Haskallah and the alliance of Hasidim and misnagdim? I fear these 
questions will have to be left to an historian. 
I also neglected to conduct research with men who are activists or artists. I was limited by 
my own gender and the modesty standards of the community. There are considerable male 
activist movements; Michal sometimes cooperates with them in her social democracy work. 
An ethnography of men’s activism in the Haredi world in Israel is sorely needed, especially 
at this moment in time. 
Furthermore, I have neglected visual arts in favour of performing arts. That was, to be 
blunt, a choice I made in order to maintain the feasibility of this project as a one-woman 
study. There is a wealth of visual art emerging from the Haredi world, by both women and 
men— and unlike the performing arts, visual art by different genders can be displayed 
together in the same gallery. In Jerusalem, there is a Haredi art gallery called Shelter Gallery, 
which is open by appointment. A Hasidic art gallery, Shtetl Gallery, has just opened in 
Williamsburg, NY, and has regular hours. The paintings and sculptures of women and men 
are displayed side by side. There are likely many ethnographic avenues to pursue in Haredi 
visual arts. 
I also long for an ethnography of Sephardi and Mizrahi Haredi men. So much of my 
research with non-Ashkenazi women uncovered racism which as equally rooted in misogyny; 
what forms do prejudice against non-Ashkenazi men take? How do men resist? Where does 
their agency lie? Indeed, what forms do Haredi male agency take? So much of men’s life is 
proscribed for them in the Haredi world; men, too, must engage in agency, critique, and 
resistance. 
Finally, I believe that my thesis leaves us crying out for an ethnography of the Far Right 
in Israel. The Hilltop Youth and Pricetaggers, the Kahanists of the Jewish Defense League, 




up against the edges of these movements, but it is rare for any of us to go there and do 
ethnography directly. Scholars can barely even agree whether or not they are extremely 
Zionist or anti-Zionist. And yet these groups are having more and more of an impact on Israel 
and Israeli politics. The Jewish Defense League has recently been re-admitted to the Knesset. 
If this work has shown nothing else, it has shown that the fringe does eventually influence the 
centre. We must do more research at the fringe in order to understand the currents of change 




The future political choices of the Haredim are central to the question of the future of 
Israel. Haredim are not an insignificant minority anymore; they maintain the highest birth 
rate of any sector of Israeli society, and they will number two million by the end of 2033 
(‘Statistical Report’ 2018, 6). As the last four elections of 2019-2020 have illustrated, the 
ability to form a government or a coalition can be shifted by a few thousand votes. In the 
past, Haredim have always voted en bloc for United Torah Judaism or Shas; this is clearly 
changing as multiple political identities become acceptable in the spectrum of the Haredi 
world. The Haredim are in a delicate balance at this moment, between staying centrist, or 
tipping over to the Right, or possibly the Far Right.  
This has implications as well for the role of religion in the state and the identity of Israel 
as Jewish, or pluralistic. Many Haredim who are leaning Right wish to see Haredi religious 
ethics incorporated into governance of the country, while simultaneously maintaining a 
secular discourse of ‘democracy’ and other liberal values. As Asad warns (2018), 
secularising influences can contribute to fascism as much as they lead to progressive states. 




for an even more aggressive approach in the occupation of and expansion in areas left to 
Palestine in the Oslo Accords and other peace-building brokerages. With Haredim moving 
Right, the future of Israeli civil society, and the hope for peace in the Holy Land are both 
thrown into doubt. 
There is hope, however, that the choices of some Haredim will drift in the opposite 
direction. Michal Tchernovitsky is not alone or an anomaly; as my ethnography shows, many 
harbour sympathies for the Left Wing. Pnina Pfeuffer is also in Avodah. As Michal works 
with the social democracy projects, others hear that it is possible to be religious and Left 
Wing. Michal, Pnina, and others appear in the media and others see that it is possible. But 
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